Identity Politics: Democratic Institutions in Ethnically Divided States - Study Notes
Identity Politics and Democratic Institutions in Ethnically Divided States
Overview
Title: Identity Politics: Democratic Institutions in Ethnically Divided States
Authors: Benjamin Reilly
Source: World Politics Review
Date: October 8, 2013
Document Type: Article
Key Subject Terms: Democracy, Communalism, Political doctrines, Ethnocentrism
Geographic Terms: Indonesia
Abstract: The article examines methods for establishing democratic institutions in ethnically diverse nations, focusing on consociationalism, communalism, and centripetalism. It posits that centripetalism effectively promotes interethnic cooperation, particularly in Indonesia. The discussion includes the significance of electoral systems in fragmented societies and the impact of political engineering on democracy.
Institutional Design for Democratic Governance
Explosion of Creative Institutional Design
The past decade has witnessed significant innovation in institutional design within new democracies.
Notable regions include Indonesia and Iraq, where policymakers and scholars have pursued "political engineering" to mitigate ethnic conflict and foster stable democracies.
Approaches to Political Engineering
Consociationalism
Defined as a model relying on elite cooperation among leaders of different communities (similar to Switzerland).
Key elements include:
Grand coalition cabinets
Proportional representation elections
Minority veto powers
Communal autonomy
Consociational systems may lead to extreme communalism, structured around explicit ethnic representation (e.g., Lebanon).
Centripetalism
Advocates for strategies that promote electoral competition centered around moderate elements rather than extremes.
Encourages aggregation and interethnic politics.
Institutions can alter political outcomes (citing Donald Horowitz's assertion about rules restructuring systems).
Contrasts with the reliance on consociational and communal approaches, which may lead to weak multiethnic states.
The effectiveness of centripetalism is supported by the experiences in Indonesia.
Importance of Electoral Systems
Electoral systems significantly shape candidates' behavioral incentives.
Example: Minimum support thresholds across regions can counteract narrow parochialism (observed in Indonesia and Nigeria).
Preferential voting systems allow politicians to seek votes from rival ethnic groups.
Multiethnic requirements in political parties exemplified in:
Singapore - heterogeneous candidate lists
Indonesia - cross-regional political organization requirements.
Electoral Requirements and Cross-Regional Politics
Distribution Requirements: Encourages cross-regional voter support to ensure elections do not solely reflect regional preferences.
Examples:
Nigeria requires presidential candidates to receive a majority and at least one-third of the votes in two-thirds of states.
Kenya mandates a plurality of the overall vote and at least one-quarter of valid votes in five of eight provinces.
Indonesia requires over 50% of national votes and at least 20% in half of provinces to prevent runoffs.
These mechanisms are designed to ensure broad-based support rather than regional isolation, fostering national cohesion across diverse populations.
Complex Electoral Schemes and Their Implications
Various complex models for cross-voting:
Rhodesian Model (1961): Permitted cross-voting among racial groups.
Aborted Ugandan Proposal: Candidates elected in multiple districts to combine votes.
Fiji (1970-1987): Voters required to cast multiple votes for different ethnic representatives.
Lebanon's 'Confessional' System: Includes:
Predetermined communal representation within parliament.
Allocation of key executive roles by sectarian identity.
Ethnic identities entrenched, resulting in limited political flexibility.
International Influence on Democratic Processes
Role of International Actors in Elections: U.N.-administered elections often follow consociational models rather than centripetal models.
Major post-conflict polls have typically utilized proportional representation systems, with both benefits and drawbacks:
Encourages minority representation but can lead to ineffective governance.
Case Study: Iraq's 2005 Elections:
Originally proposed a provincial-based system but reverted to nationwide PR due to administrative necessities.
Resulted in fragmented legislatures and persistent ethnic polarization in politics.
Conclusion
Constructing representative institutions in post-conflict environments presents significant challenges.
Historical approaches to governance illustrate difficulties in balancing inclusivity with effective governance.
Growing reliance on ethnocratic solutions may be detrimental to democratic consolidation.
The success of centripetalism as demonstrated in Indonesia suggests a potential pathway for fostering cooperation across diverse societies.
Political engineering is essential; however, awareness of historical context and adaptive strategies are vital for future efforts.