Eisenhower wanted to end the war in Korea, although Republican hardliners hoped that he would ârollbackâ communism in Korea and all over the world. Instead he settled for limiting the spread of communism, or âcontainmentâ which had been Trumanâs policy. Eisenhower made it Americaâs policy for the rest of the Cold War. But containing aggression with ground forces was costly in men and monetarily. Early on in his presidential term, Eisenhower spoke with eloquence of the cost of war, âevery gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense a bread from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are poor and cold and are not clothed. The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 citiesâ. He essentially sketched out the cost of the Arms Race to the American people. âthis is not a way of life at all. under the cloud of threatening war is it humanity hanging from a cross of ironâ. In 6 months, he ended the war in Korea and brought the troop shome. He had threatened the Chinese with the use of nuclear weapons, but the ordinary Americans didnât care, they were simply glad to have their family and friends back home safe. Eisenhower kept the defence budget down by relying on nuclear weapons as they were cheap. He would contain communist expansion by threatening âmassive nuclear retaliationâ.
Covert action was also cheap and it had already served him well fighting against Hitler, so he allowed the Cold War to essentially be fought by the CIA as a secret presidential army. To protect Iran and British oil from Soviet meddling, the CIA stirred up a riot to return the Shah to his thrown, not caring that a legitimate ruler was overthrown.
He avoided another war in Asia when he refused to send bombers or atomic bombs to help France fight the communist North Vietnamese. His commitment to a non-communist South Vietnam seemed harmless enough at the time (obviously wasnât so later).
Eisenhower wanted to avoid war, contain communism and protect the US economy. He worked by a style that his Vice President Richard Nixon called âdevious in the best sense of the wordâ.
In late 1954, Communist China began to shell two small islands, Quemoy and Matsu, held by the nationalist Chinese (Chiang Kai-Shek) on Formosa (Taiwan), which Eisenhower had pledged to defend. If he considered an attack on the islands to be an attack on Formosa, Eisenhower faced war with China. Eisenhower staged military maneuvers off the coast of China and he ordered testing of nuclear weapons in the Nevada desert. To send China a message, he made the tests public knowledge, and then threatened to use said nuclear weapons on China. âIn any combat, for these things can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason that you wouldnât use them exactly as you would a bullet or anythign elseâ. Eisenhower wished for the world to believe that the US could fight and survive a nuclear war. In private, he had no such hopes. In a Cabinet meeting, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers gave a briefing on what they would do in the event of a nuclear war to re-establish the dollar Eisenhower stopped the meeting and said âboys listen to me, if we have a nuclear exchange weâre not going to be talking about re-establishing th edollar, weâre going to be talking about grabbing for wormsâ. Eisenhower had committed the United States to a nuclear arsenal, one that he felt he could never use. But he had threatened China with it. If Chinaâs ally the Soviet Union got involved, there could be global nuclear war. Within weeks, China had stopped shelling the islands. Eisenhower had gone to the brink (hence why we call policies such as this âbrinkmanshipâ) and prevailed. But he knew that there had to be a better way than threatening nuclear war.
In Geneva 1955, Eisenhower prepared to dine with the Soviets, who led what the West called the âworld-wide communist conspiracyâ. He was the first American president to meet with other world leaders in peacetime to try to avoid war. âThe only way to save the world is through diplomacyâ, Eisenhower told the Kremlin leaders during the dinner. The Soviets seemed to agree. At the following meeting, he made a startling proposal. Each country would permit the other to take aerial photography of its military installations. This would lessen the fear of surprise attack, of a nuclear Pearl Harbour. Eisenhower proposal became known as âopen skiesâ. Afterwards, Khrushchev came walking up to Eisenhower and said âno, no, no, no, noâ and in Russian said âwe cannot agree, you are simply trying to look into our bedroomsâ. Stalin had died and Nikita Khrushchev had emerged as the new leader. The military secrets that he would not willingly reveal, Eisenhower then planned to steal. The next July, a spy plane, the U2, left West Germany to begin secret photography of the USSR. It flew high over Moscow as Nikita Khrushchev attended an Independence Day party at the American Embassy where he toasted Eisenhower and world peace. The aerial photographs showed loads to the US, especially regarding the day-to-day life of ordinary Soviet citizens, as they had been pictured going to the beach, in the streets, and driving on the roads. It was an extraordinary wealth of information. The CIA assured Eisenhower that if a plane were to be tracked by the Russians and thus hit, it would be destroyed and so would the pilot. There would be no evidence of espionage by the US. Yet Eisenhower worried that if Soviet planes made similar flights over the US he would consider it an act of war, so why wouldnât they do the same with him. Khrushchev, whoâs radar had tracked the U2, drew one conclusion, improve Soviet rockets and improve fighter planes. The CIA told Eisenhower that the Russians would by 1960. His brother Miltonâs predicted upheaval abroad came on the heels of Little Rock, Arkansas (link to Civil Rights topic) and cast a shadow over Eisenhowerâs presidency for the next 3 years.
The Soviet Union managed to launch the worldâs first satellite, which they called Sputnik. It was harmless, like a beeping basketball in space, but it dawned on the Americans that soon the Soviets would be able to launch a missile (as the technology required to launch a rocket and a missile is essentially the same thing). Eisenhower attempted to keep the country calm about it but had a really hard time doing so. Sputnik didnât surprise Eisenhower as the U2 had shown the launch site in preparation and would warn when missiles became operational. Itâs photographs had already discounted the notion that the USA lagged behind the Soviet Union in numbers of bombers. Eisenhower had forseen the dangers of the missile age and commissioned a high level secret report. The report warned that the US was facing the greatest danger in its history, but Eisenhower dismissed much of it as hysterical. âIt is my conviction, afforded by trusted scientific and military advisors, that although the Soviets are quite likely in some mental and special areas, and are obviously ahead of us in satellite development, as of today the overall military strength of the free world is distinctly greater than that of the communist countriesâ, Eisenhower said in an address to the nation. Senate Democracts saw Eisenhower as vulnerable and began hearings on what became known as a âmissile gapâ. The day that the hearings began, Eisenhower suffered a stroke. Speculation focused on whether Vice President Richard Nixon was ready to assume Eisenhowerâs duties. But Eisenhower would not be written off. There was an important NATO meeting in Paris on the implications of Sputnik. He notably stated a few days before he left âIâm going to do this goddamn job (even) if it kills me!â in a display of fortitude that amazed many of his close colleagues. In the countryâs dismay, the first attempt to launch a US satellite (the Vanguard TV-3) burned out, derided as a âflopnikâ and âstayputnikâ (as well as âoopsnikâ, âkaputnikâ and âdudnikâ). This further fueled Eisenhowerâs defence critics