India: 2025 Focus Country

As tensions rise in the Indo-Pacific between the United States and China, India’s ability to maintain its long-standing policy of “strategic autonomy” faces an increasing challenge. Recent developments, ranging from China’s joint military cooperation with Russia to its increased aggressiveness in the South China Sea, have made the prospect of a conflict in the Pacific ever more plausible. Historically, India has strategically balanced relations with global powers, but as the Indo-Pacific region inches toward potential conflict, India’s diplomatic role will become more crucial—and more difficult to navigate.

India has long maintained a delicate balancing act. During the Cold War, India was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, seeking to avoid entanglement in the ideological battles between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite its neutral stance, India’s diplomatic relations with Moscow remained close, with the Soviet Union being one of its closest partners. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent rise of a multipolar world presented India with opportunities to further diversify its international ties.

In the years following the Cold War, India managed to preserve this autonomy. However, since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the global landscape has shifted. Russia’s increasing isolation, especially from the West, has unexpectedly strengthened India’s position. As Russia becomes more reliant on India for trade and diplomatic support, India’s leverage on the global stage has grown. For example, Prime Minister Narendra Modi played a significant role in ensuring Russian nuclear restraint in 2022. This shift has placed India in a unique position to influence global dynamics, especially as tensions between the United States and China grow more unpredictable.

One of the most significant developments in recent years has been the increasing prominence of BRICS (whose membership has grown from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa to also include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates), the organization that some view as a potential alternative to the Group of Seven, commonly referred to as the G7. As a key member of BRICS, India plays a pivotal role in shaping its direction. The organization allows for better collaboration between emerging economies, and has been perceived as a counterbalance to the international order dominated for decades by the United States and its partners, though that order itself is staggering.  

India’s involvement in BRICS also creates an opportunity for collaboration with China, its primary geopolitical rival. While tensions between India and China remain high, especially over territorial disputes, BRICS provides India with an avenue to diplomatically engage with China. If India can successfully manage its relations with both China and the United States, it could become one of the few countries capable of maintaining strong ties with each major superpower. Furthermore, the Indo-Pacific has become the geoeconomic center of the world, and China’s prosperity is intrinsically linked to it. As a result, China has a vested interest in maintaining India’s non-alignment policy. This would give India an unprecedented ability to mediate in a future Pacific conflict, placing it in a strategically advantageous position.

In addition to its role in BRICS, India has become a key partner in the United States’ strategy to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) consists of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia. The first Trump administration revived it as part of its broader strategy to counter China’s assertiveness. The Biden administration has continued this policy, seeking to strengthen the Quad as a pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy.

However, India’s role in the Quad has been a subject of debate. While it has participated in joint military exercises and diplomatic initiatives, India remains reticent about fully committing to the Quad and is unwilling to frame the grouping as a counterweight to China. India’s reluctance to take a more confrontational stance with China reduces the Quad’s effectiveness. For the United States to rely on India as a strategic partner in the event of a Pacific conflict, the Quad would have to expand its agenda and foster stronger partnerships.

India’s strategic autonomy, which has long been a cornerstone of its foreign policy, faces increasing strain. Economically, China and the United States are India’s two largest trading partners, and both are vital to India’s growth. However, as these two superpowers continue to move further apart, India finds itself caught in the middle. On the security front, India’s national interests are now directly threatened by China’s assertiveness, particularly along their shared border. Its diplomatic ties with Russia further complicate the situation, as Moscow’s increasing isolation has created an even more polarized international environment.

Unlike during the Cold War when India was not a priority in U.S. grand strategy, the relationship is now considered the “most consequential relationship of the 21st century.” This makes it increasingly difficult for India to maintain its non-alignment policy as the risk of being dragged into a larger conflict grows. At the same time, while India remains an important player in both global economic and diplomatic affairs, it lacks the leverage to serve as an effective mediator between the United States and China.

For the United States, this presents both a challenge and an opportunity. Strengthening the U.S.-India relationship through economic and political cooperation would provide India with the support it needs to grow its diplomatic capital. Lastly, by bolstering India’s capabilities to mediate between China and leading democracies, the United States could more effectively manage conflicts in the Indo-Pacific through diplomatic, rather than militaristic, avenues.

However, with the collapse of the Soviet system in the early 1990s, India adopted a series of free-market reforms that fueled the growth of its middle class, and its highly educated and well-trained workforce made India one of the global centers of the high-technology boom that began in the late 20th century and produced significant annual growth rates

Numerous key universities, institutes of technology, and other specialized institutions of higher education are under union government control, while a much larger number of universities are controlled by the state governments. The government recognizes a number of “Institutes of National Importance” (INIs) across the country: Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs), National Institutes of Technology (NITs), All India Institutes of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), and National Institutes of Design (NID) are some key INIs. There are over 20 IITs and IIMs each, more than 30 NITs, and close to 20 AIIMs in the country, with many more under development. A disproportionate share of India’s total educational budget goes toward higher education. The number of universities and equivalent institutions increased more than sevenfold in the first four decades after independence, while the number of students enrolled increased more than 15 times during the same period. Each of those numbers has continued to grow dramatically since then. At the same time, funding for libraries, laboratories, and other facilities has been a constant and serious problem. Critics of the unabated growth of higher education have asserted that the quality of university education has steadily declined and have noted the increasingly large proportion of graduates who are unable to find employment, especially among those with liberal arts degrees. Among the established universities are three founded by the British in 1857, at Kolkata, Mumbai, and Chennai.

In the past, virtually all higher instruction was in English, but, as new universities and their thousands of affiliated colleges have spread out to smaller cities and towns, state languages increasingly have been used, notwithstanding the paucity of textbooks in such languages. Reserved quotas in universities and lower admission standards for members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes—whose prior education often has been less than adequate—have put additional stress on the system. The fact that India’s best students often take their higher degrees abroad, many never to return, further exacerbates the problem of quality. Nevertheless, elite institutions continue to exist, and, in absolute terms, the output of well-educated individuals is substantial.

The history of sports in India dates to thousands of years ago, and numerous games, including chess, wrestling, and archery, are thought to have originated there. Contemporary Indian sport is a diverse mix, with traditional games, such as kabaddi and kho-kho, and those introduced by the British, especially cricket, football (soccer), and field hockey, enjoying great popularity.

Radio broadcasting began privately in 1927 but became a monopoly of the colonial government in 1930. In 1936 it was given its current name, All India Radio, and since 1957 it also has been known as Akashvani. The union government provides radio service throughout the country via hundreds of transmitters. Television was introduced experimentally by Akashvani in 1959, and regular broadcasting commenced in 1965. In 1976 it was made a separate service under the name Doordarshan, later changed to Doordarshan India (“Television India”). Television and educational programming are transmitted via the Indian National Satellite (INSAT) system. The country’s first Hindi-language cable channel, Zee TV, was established in 1992, and this was followed by other cable and satellite services.Radio broadcasting began privately in 1927 but became a monopoly of the colonial government in 1930. In 1936 it was given its current name, All India Radio, and since 1957 it also has been known as Akashvani. The union government provides radio service throughout the country via hundreds of transmitters. Television was introduced experimentally by Akashvani in 1959, and regular broadcasting commenced in 1965. In 1976 it was made a separate service under the name Doordarshan, later changed to Doordarshan India (“Television India”). Television and educational programming are transmitted via the Indian National Satellite (INSAT) system. The country’s first Hindi-language cable channel, Zee TV, was established in 1992, and this was followed by other cable and satellite services.

Despite having a woman in the presidency, a largely symbolic office, India’s women have not prospered under Modi. Women only comprise 14.7 percent of the legislature, and a promised reserved quota of 30 percent in the lower house will not materialize until a long-delayed census is conducted, possibly in 2028 or 2029. Gender inequality is deeply entrenched in economic, cultural, and legal forms, and attempts to advance women’s rights in India have sometimes backfired, according to research by political scientist Rachel Brulé. Reserved quotas have enabled women to press for inheritance and property rights in some cases, but in others created a backlash and an upsurge in female infanticide. That practice has led to an enduring imbalance in women as 48.4 percent of the population. According to social scientist Anoop Sadanandan, the preference for sons is especially pronounced in India’s Hindu states, and overall women there receive less education and are poorer and unhealthier. 

Despite making support for democracy a part of its foreign policy, the United States has not made supporting democracy in India a priority. The United States, eager to court India as part of its strategy to contain China’s global muscle-flexing, issued tepid lamentations about Modi’s visit and continued embrace of Putin. The White House also welcomed Modi on a state visit last year and will continue to prioritize India’s role in the Indo-Pacific over any serious pressure to restore its democracy. That is a mistake: a democratic India makes for a stronger ally with an enduring base of support at home. 

The countries that comprise BRICS—which stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and now five new members—are an informal grouping of emerging economies hoping to increase their sway in the global order. Established in 2009, BRICS was founded on the premise that international institutions were overly dominated by Western powers and had ceased to serve developing countries. The bloc has sought to coordinate its members’ economic and diplomatic policies, found new financial institutions, and reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar.

The coalition is not a formal organization, but rather a loose bloc of non-Western economies that coordinate economic and diplomatic efforts around a shared goal. BRICS countries seek to build an alternative to what they see as the dominance of the Western viewpoint in major multilateral groupings, such as the World Bank, the Group of Seven (G7), and the UN Security Council.

The group’s 2024 expansion comes with a range of geopolitical implications. It represents growing economic and demographic heft: the ten BRICS countries now comprise more than a quarter of the global economy and almost half of the world’s population. The group is poised to exert influence over the wars in the Gaza Strip and Ukraine, the shape of the global economic system, the competition between China and the West, and efforts to transition to clean energy.

Growing membership also brings new challenges, however, including increasing pushback from Western counties and divisions within the bloc. Experts say that how BRICS members navigate those tensions will determine whether the group can become a more unified voice on the global stage.

The term was originally coined by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill in a 2001 research paper in which he argued that the growth of what was then the “BRIC” countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) was poised to challenge the dominant G7 wealthy economies.

According to experts, in addition to those challenges implementing their economic vision, the BRICS countries also face increasing internal tensions and rivalry among members. China and India have seen tensions rise over their decades-old border dispute as well as their growing competition for economic and geopolitical leadership of the Global South. The group has already had problems in making decisions; at a foreign ministers’ meeting in New York in September, leaders sought to propose a model for streamlining new additions to the UN Security Council, but the group could not muster an agreement. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also deepened fissures.

The push to grow membership is another fault line in the bloc. China and Russia have favored expansion, while Brazil and India were more hesitant, concerned it would dilute their own influence. India’s growing rivalry with China further fueled the desire not to prop up China’s power with a larger group in Beijing’s orbit.

Western countries have largely downplayed the group’s growth. White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that Washington doesn’t see BRICS as a geopolitical rival, while Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has largely dismissed efforts to move away from the dollar. Similarly, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has downplayed growing ties between BRICS members. Other political analyses claim the BRICS countries’ ambitions are exaggerated, and its members’ domestic headwinds are troubling enough to hamper any real threat to Western economic health.

Indian chess star Gukesh Dommaraju returned to a hero’s welcome in his home city on Monday after becoming the youngest world champion aged only 18.Gukesh surpassed a record held by Russia’s Garry Kasparov, who won the title at age 22, after Ding, 32, faltered at the final hurdle of his title defence.