CSP (Conflict Studies & Peace-building)

PREPARATION LECTURE 1: chapter 1 & 4 of Ramsbotham

CHAPTER 1

Conflict resolution as a defined specialist field has come of age in the post-cold war era.

At the height of the cold war (1950/1960), the development of nuclear weapons and the conflict between the superpowers seemed to threaten human survival.

By the 1980s, conflict resolution ideas were increasingly making a difference in real conflicts.

By the closing years of the Cold War, relations between the superpowers were improving, the ideological and military competition that had fuelled many regional conflicts were fading away.

Dissolution of the Soviet Union brought to a close the long period in which a single international conflict dominated the international system. Instead, internal conflicts, ethnic conflicts, conflicts over secession, power struggles within countries, became the norm.

→ Not so much struggle between competing powers, but the fragmentation and breakdowns of state structures, economies and whole societies.

Views on conflict resolution

1. Realists → see it as soft-headed and unrealistic (say that international politics is a struggle between antagonistic and irreconcilable groups, in which power and coercion was the only ultimate currency)
2. Neo-Marxist →saw the whole conflict resolution enterprise as misconceived, since it attempted to reconcile interest that should not be reconciled, failed to take sides in inequal and unjust struggles, and lacked an analysis within a properly global perspective of the forces of exploitation and oppression.
3. Others → less prepared to reject conflict resolution outright, but were sceptical (western tools also useful elsewhere? Developed during the Cold War, also relevant afterwards?)

The article argues that conflict resolution is an integral part of work for development, social injustice and social transformation, which aims to tackle the problems of which mercenaries and child soldiers are symptoms. They also argue for a broad understanding of conflict resolution, to include not only mediation between the parties but efforts to address the wider context in which international actors, domestic constituencies and intra-party relationships sustain violent conflicts.

Finally, it is argued that although the theories and practices of conflict resolution we deal with spring from Western roots, every culture and society has its own version of what is, after all, a general social and political need.

Symmetric conflicts = conflicts between relatively similar parties.

Asymmetric conflicts = conflicts between dissimilar parties (Majority vs. Minority / Employer vs. Employees)

Classical conflict resolution, in some views, applies only to symmetric conflicts.

In asymmetric conflicts, the top-dog always wins (and therefore, the top-dog does not want to change this structure)

Prisoner’s Dilemma = the tendency for contending strategies to end up in lose-lose situations (especially self-interested parties, since with full trust and cooperation, more could be achieved).

Classical Conflict Resolution = mainly concerned with entry to the conflict itself and enabling the relevant parties to solve the conflict in a non-violent way.

Contemporary approach to conflict resolution = to take a wider view of the timing of intervention. It suggests that resolving conflict should begin, before an armed conflict has broken out (more related to prevention). Even in the post-settlement phase, peace-building must be addressed.

Singer’s conflict typologies: he created five based on the political status of conflict parties.

1. Interstate wars:
2. Extra-systemic (mainly colonial) war:
3. Civil conflicts:
   • Revolution-ideology conflict = changing the nature of government in a state (capitalist to socialist, dictatorship to democracy, etc.)
   • Identity-secession conflict = involves the relative status of communities in relation to the state
   • Factional conflict = merely a struggle to control the state, or a part of the state.

Intra-state wars in former colonies:

The conflict triangle (GALTUNG

• Contradiction: the underlying conflict (incompatibility of goals)
• Attitude: parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other and themselves
• Behaviour: gestures signifying conciliation or hostility (cooperation or coercion)

In a full conflict, all three have to be present.

A conflict without conflictual attitudes or behaviour is called a ‘latent conflict’ or ‘structural conflict’

Three types of violence (GALTUNG)

1. Direct violence (children are murdered)
2. Structural violence (children die through poverty)
3. Cultural violence (whatever blinds us to this or seeks to justify it)

Peace keeping = refers to the interposition of international armed forces to separate the armed forces, often associated with tasks such as monitoring, policing, supporting humanitarian intervention

• Lowers the level of destructive behaviour

Peace enforcement = imposition of a settlement by a powerful third party

Peacebuilding = peace making and peace keeping by addressing the structural issues and the long-term relationships

Tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict

Peacemaking aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists

CHAPTER THREE:

Edward Azar and Protracted Social Conflict (PSC)

The term Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) emphasised that the sources of such conflicts lay predominantly within, rather than between states.

Azar identified deprivation of human needs as the underlying source of PSC. Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict.

Unlike interests, needs are non-negotiable.

NOTES LECTURE 1

Learning goals:

1. The student can explain contemporary challenges of civil war and conflict studies.
2. The student can analyze the main concepts, theories, approaches and instruments relating to the study of civil war, armed conflict and conflict trends.
3. The student can analyze concrete conflict contexts by applying concepts and theories
4. studied in the course.
5. The student can assess the enabling and obstructing factors in conflict mediation,
6. negotiation, and conflict resolution of civil wars.
7. The student can explain key concepts of conflict management and peacebuilding,
8. such as mediation, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security
9. sector reform (SSR), state-building, law and human rights.
   10. The student can analyze the role of local and international institutions and players in
   11. the field of conflict management and peacebuilding.
   12. The student can demonstrate the effectiveness and limitations of tools, strategies, and instruments.

Causes of conflict

→ are also referred to as:

• Background causes
• Root causes
• Underlying causes
• ‘Structural’ causes

General explanations often based on statistical generalisations (like poverty, undemocratic countries)

Conflicts are complex and often have multiple causes: greed or grievance? Or both?

An issue can be the cause of civil war on one country, but the same issue may not lead to war in another country. How can we explain this?

Timeline of international conflict phases

1. First phase: Focus on conflict in the context BEFORE WWII and WWI (classical war studies/Clausewitz)

2. Second phase: characterized by Cold War Conflicts

   1. Bipolar power base on nuclear deterrence
   2. Proxy wars (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc.)
   3. Politically and ideologically driven
   4. Fewer interstate wars after the end of WWII

3. Third phase: at the end of the Cold War when it became more evident…

   1. New wars/wars of the third kind/Hybrid wars
   2. These are about statehood, governance, and the role and status and communities within states
   3. Even fewer interstate wars
   4. From PSC to TNC models

Understanding contemporary conflict

• No possibility to generalize conflict explanations by any of the models or theories elaborated as far
• However, these models and theories can be identified as:
  • Internal → ethological, anthropological approaches
  • Relational → behavioural sociology and psychology
  • Contextual → looks mainly outside/Marxist theories etc.
• European theorist of early modernity
  • Machiavelli: self-preservation/power
  • Hobbes: competition for gain/fear/insecurity
  • Hume: scarcity

Conflict and war as…

• The failure of politics (politics should be able to keep the peace)

Conflict escalation and de-escalation model, the hourglass model

Galtung’s models of conflict, violence, and peace

• Why look at causes?
  • To prevent or deal with conflict, we need to understand what conflict is about
  • After a peace negotiation has been signed, underlying causes of conflict can remain
  • Latent Conflict

Protracted social conflicts (PSC)

• Causes of conflict in Azar’s view
  • Due to “the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation”
• The role of the state… “was to satisfy or frustrate basic communal needs, thus preventing or promoting conflict”
• Where to look to understand conflict from a PSC perspective
  • Communal content/identify a group (religion, ethnic, racial, cultural)
  • Identified deprivations of human needs as underlying source of PSC
  • Governance and the role of the state in frustrating the satisfaction of needs
  • International linkages (economic/military dependencies and clientage)

PSC dynamics

• Azar’s determinants to activate conflict
  • Communal actions and strategies (group formation, organization, and mobilization, etc.)
  • State actions and strategies (coercive repression or instrumental co-option, etc.)
  • Build-in mechanism of conflict (perception, experiences, fear, etc.)
• For PSC theorist like Azar, the causes of social conflict are about needs and the failure of states to satisfy them.
• The final stage of conflict resolution theories moves away from PSC to analyse conflicts between 1990-onwards under a different scope… so called TNC

Transnational conflict (TNC) framework

• Conflict are not about unsatisfied needs (like in PSC) but about opportunistic rebellions (a more Hobbesian explanation of conflict)
• Many levels of analysis (see table 4.2 p.123)
  • Global
  • Regional
  • State (Social/Political/Geographical)
  • Identity group
  • Elite/individual
• The Arab Revolution: a case study

PREPARATION LECTURE 2: Article (the Guardian) ‘The demise of the Nation-State’

The demise of the nation-state by Rana Dasgupta

In today's world, national politics are marked by instability and unpredictability, with examples such as changing regulations in the US, Brexit in the UK, and elections in France. Common themes include exhaustion, hopelessness, and a perception of diminishing effectiveness of traditional approaches, which has led to the rise of authoritarian "solutions" such as distraction through war (e.g. Russia, Turkey), ethno-religious purification (e.g. India, Hungary, Myanmar), and concentration of presidential powers at the expense of civil rights and the rule of law (e.g. China, Rwanda, Venezuela, Thailand, the Philippines, and others). When we talk about "politics", we usually refer to activities within sovereign states, while everything else is considered "foreign affairs" or "international relations," despite the increasing global integration in finance and technology.

In addition, there is a growing awareness of the similarities in style and substance among populist leaders in various countries, such as Trump, Putin, Modi, Orbán, and Erdoğan. This is a result of a common system that subjects all countries to similar pressures. The most significant development is the decline of the nation state, as it struggles to withstand 21st-century forces and loses influence over global affairs. This decline has led to the rise of apocalyptic nationalism, manifested in machismo, wall-building, xenophobia, mythology, and race theory. These are not solutions, but symptoms of the decay of nation states, which are unable to extricate themselves individually from their political and moral challenges.

Reasons for this are:

• Deregulated finance
• Autonomous technology
• Religious militancy
• Great power rivalry while the consequences of a previously colonised world is suppressed.

Increasingly, people are losing faith in their nations and the system they are a part of, as national political authority has failed due to loss of control over money flows. Money is being transferred out of national spaces into offshore zones, undermining national communities and contributing to moral decay. Many countries are experiencing national breakdowns, leading to conflicts and wars, with most war deaths occurring due to internal strife rather than foreign invasion. This has resulted in a significant refugee crisis, with 65 million refugees worldwide, surpassing the numbers seen in the aftermath of World War II. The unwillingness to acknowledge and address this crisis is evident in the contempt for refugees that is widespread in rich countries' politics.

The crisis we face in the world political system today was not inevitable. Since 1945, the original vision of a global political systems does not adequately address human security and dignity issues as intended. The nation state was able to deliver achievements in the past because there was a "fit" between politics, economy, and information at a national scale. However, globalization has changed that, and today, economics and information have grown beyond the authority of national governments, leading to an uncontested distribution of wealth and resources at a global level.

As a solution the political purpose needs to be refocused on imagining political forms capable of operating on that same scale.

A potential solution to address the challenges posed by global finance, big data, mass migration, and ecological upheaval is the development of new political forms capable of operating at a global scale. This may involve the establishment of global financial regulations and transnational political mechanisms. It is important to acknowledge that throughout history, there have been moments of political expansion to previously inconceivable scales, such as the creation of the nation-state itself. It is time to consider alternatives to the current nation-state system and be open to political innovation to address the current crisis.

Imperial countries

The invention of the nation-state in Europe through the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 led to the establishment of powerful states with strong bureaucracies and democratic systems. These states made promises to their citizens for their spiritual and material development through state-run projects in education, healthcare, welfare, and culture. This promise became a foundational secular faith, replacing God with the state as the source of power, development, liberation, and redemption. During the post-World War II period, the European nation-state model was exported globally, but it was built on unique conditions that cannot be replicated. The postwar states had significant control over the domestic economy, allowing for high taxation rates and national development. However, over the past four decades, this moral promise has been withdrawn, leading to a search for new beliefs in the Western psyche and nostalgia for the golden age of the nation state.

After World War II, the European nation-state structure was exported worldwide during the period of decolonization. Western countries felt a moral promise in this structure, especially after the creation of the welfare state and postwar economic growth. However, nostalgia for the golden age of the nation-state is misplaced, as it was built on unique historical conditions that are unlikely to recur. During that time, governments had significant control over the domestic economy, with limited capital flow across borders and low foreign currency speculation. This allowed governments to impose high taxation rates and channel resources into national development, creating secure and relatively equal capitalist societies.

However, the financial revolution of recent decades has aimed to dismantle state authority over capital and transform governments into custodians of the market. This has diminished national political authority and led to rising inequality and austerity measures that undermine the social-democratic welfare state. Western governments no longer possess the same level of control over national economic life, and their promises of fundamental change are often mere PR and wishful thinking

The next stage of the techno-financial revolution, driven by new technologies and big data companies like Google and Facebook, may further erode national political authority. These companies have assumed functions previously associated with the state, such as cartography and surveillance, and membership in their systems has become a new form of de-territorialized corporate citizenship, antagonistic to national identity. The growth of digital currencies also suggests that new technologies may replace other fundamental functions of the nation-state, making the libertarian dream of hi-tech corporate systems managing all aspects of life and resources more likely than a return to social democracy.

The assault on political authority is not merely an economic or technological event, but an epochal upheaval that leaves western populations feeling shattered and vulnerable. Outbreaks of irrational rage, such as anti-immigrant sentiment, arise as scapegoats for deeper forms of national contamination. The idea of the western nation as a universal home collapses, and transnational tribal identities, such as white supremacists and radical Islamists, emerge as refuge. Western governments are desperate to prove their control, but attempts to enhance executive authority or fake mastery through tactics like Twitter or blaming others for the state's impotence are unlikely to address the underlying predicament of political authority running on empty. Instead, leaders may resort to arousing and deploying powerful emotions like hatred and euphoria to maintain power, as seen in the strategies of leaders like Trump and Putin.

It is unlikely that these strategies will quickly break down, and moderation may not easily come back into fashion. As shown by Putin's Russia, authoritarianism and populism can thrive in a political landscape where national political authority is diminished, and the consequences could be dire for the future of western societies.

Postcolonial countries

Empires, despite being non-democratic, were historically more inclusive and stable compared to nation-states. In many postcolonial countries, nation-states were hastily formed during the process of decolonization, leading to internal conflicts, authoritarianism, ethnic cleansing, corruption, and ecological devastation. The author highlights the role of external powers during the Cold War in supporting dictators in postcolonial countries, which contributed to the containment of conflicts within those countries but led to the implosion of state authority after the breakup of the superpower system. This has resulted in the rise of "post-national" forces such as militant religious groups in Africa and the Middle East that reject the concept of nation-building and instead focus on creating transnational networks. The author suggests that the future sought by these groups is inspired by ancient empires rather than modern nation-states.

The nation-state system, which became dominant after World War I with the principle of national self-determination, was originally intended to create a global society of nations that would cooperate for peace and justice. However, during the Cold War, this vision was undermined as superpowers pursued lawless actions and disregarded international constraints. Today, many people in different parts of the world are disillusioned with this system and seek alternatives, either through seeking Western passports for constitutional protection or through armed resistance against the state system itself, as exemplified by groups like ISIS. Assertive regional powers are also challenging the nation-state system by infringing national borders. The decline of US power further adds to global insecurity and instability.

The global system is facing a crisis with three main elements that are worsening over time. First, there is an existential breakdown of rich countries as global forces assault national political power. Second, there is volatility in the poorest countries and regions as the departure of Cold War-era strongmen reveals their fragility. Third, there is the illegitimacy of the international order, which lacks a "society of nations" governed by the rule of law.

Rana Dasgupta suggests that these issues are rooted in transnational forces that cannot be effectively addressed by well-meaning political reforms within individual nations. Instead, she proposes three directions for re-examining the political foundations of the global system.

1. Flobal financial regulation.

   1. Offshore wealth creation undermines nation states by evading taxes
   2. Global financial regulation to track money flows, redistribute wealth, and strengthen national states.

2. Global flexible democracy.

   1. Nation states' monopoly on political life challenged
   2. Author suggests nested democratic structures to prevent breakdown
   3. European Union (EU) cited as example, but with acknowledged failures
   4. Calls for establishment of truly democratic ethos

3. Rethinking conceptions of citizenship.

   1. Citizenship perpetuates extreme privilege/disadvantage based on birthplace
   2. Calls for deregulation of human movement in line with capital
   3. Suggests using technology to de-link citizenship from territory
   4. Distribute citizenship advantages more fairly
   5. Claim rights/opportunities associated with Western citizenship beyond Western territories
   6. Participate in political processes regardless of geographic location.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the author acknowledges that building the politics of our integrated world system will require political imagination and innovation. The proposed directions of global financial regulation, global flexible democracy, and rethinking conceptions of citizenship are presented as starting points for addressing the crisis facing the global system. The author acknowledges that this will be a challenging endeavor that may take the better part of this century, but emphasizes the need for radical novelty to address the worsening global crisis.

LECTURE TWO: guest lecture --> NO NOTES

PREPARATION LECTURE THREE: The Political Science of Syria's War

The conflict in Syria started as a peaceful civil uprising inspired by the successful Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings. However, it has now evolved into a complex case.Political science findings do not particularly apply to the unique case of Syria's combination of a coherent regime, external supporters, and diverse opposition factions. Comparisons to Afghanistan in the 1980s and the Congo in the 2000s offer bleak prospects for Syria's future. However, many features of Syria which seem unique really aren’t:

• The fragmentation and internal battles of the opposition are typical.
• The pernicious effects of uncoordinated external support to armed insurgency factions are as well

The targeting of civilians for tactical reasons and the politicization of humanitarian In Syria, the intensity of violence against civilians and displacement is typical of early stages of civil wars. The regime's brutality aims to not only defeat insurgents militarily, but also prevent them from building alternative governance structures. Rebel groups have incentives to provide services and stability, but intra-insurgency rivalries often result in infighting. The highly fragmented nature of the insurgency leads to shifting alliances and internal violence, as documented in cases from Afghanistan to Bosnia by MIT's Fotini Christia.

As the war in Syria continues, Stanford's James Fearon suggests that the toll on civilians may decline as the conflict settles into a more conventional war with defined front lines. The fragmentation and internal fighting among rebel factions could potentially decrease as their fortunes decline and they feel less safe from the regime, leading to an unwanted truce among rivals. Local power relations may also stabilize, as much of the violence in civil wars is driven by diverse local motivations, according to scholars like.

However, Syria's fragmented opposition, lack of centralized leadership, and external meddling have made diplomatic resolution, post-war stability, and rebel unification challenging, as argued by various scholars. External support for rebels often leads to dependence on foreign sponsors and further fragmentation, as different interests and agendas come into play. Syrians themselves have lamented that fragmentation in funding sources and distribution has caused disunity within the opposition, as found in research by Pearlman.

Foreign support for fragmented rebel groups in Syria, without addressing their weak organizational structures, is unlikely to trigger meaningful change and may result in internal battles over resources, according to Paul Staniland. This suggests that efforts to prioritize a viable political opposition in Syria, instead of solely providing material support, may have been more effective, but ultimately failed.

The foreign support for Syrian rebels, while sustaining their fight against the Assad regime, has also exacerbated internal infighting and the rise of extremist groups, resulting in a fragmented insurgency lacking the ability to defeat the regime decisively. This pattern of arming fragmented opposition has been observed in other cases as well, making the war longer, bloodier, and less likely to be resolved without direct military intervention from a dominant power, which is viewed as unlikely.

Syria's civil war is characterized by a highly fragmented opposition, numerous veto players and spoilers, and foreign intervention that is enough to sustain the conflict but not enough to decisively end it. The presence of "veto players" who can derail settlements, commitment problems in negotiated agreements, and the lack of trust between opposing sides make it difficult to envision a successful negotiated settlement in Syria without some form of international peacekeeping force. The overall prospect for ending the civil war in Syria is viewed as highly pessimistic by most contributors, with the likelihood of a successful negotiated settlement being close to zero, according to UCSD's Barbara Walter.

Future Prospect

Syria's civil war is likely to continue for a long time, there is a minority view that the war may end quickly and unexpectedly. Duke's Laia Balcells and Kalyvas argue that the war in Syria already resembles a conventional war more than an irregular one, with pitched battles, visible frontlines, and urban fighting. They suggest that Syria may have a good chance of ending quickly and in a regime defeat, similar to the case of Libya. Foreign support could play a crucial role in determining the outcome of the war, with a sudden shift in fortunes for either the Assad regime or the opposition if they lose key external sponsors.

The contributors believe that post-war recovery in Syria is unlikely due to factors such as death, displacement, economic challenges, and the presence of black markets and warlords. Violent insurgencies can create powerful emotions and seeking revenge may be expected from communities that have suffered greatly.

What Can Civil War Scholars Tell Us About the Syrian Conflict?

By Fotini Christia, Masssachusetts Institute of Technology

Introduction

This memo illustrates that the ongoing conflict in Syria is classified as a civil war due to the high number of estimated fatalities, and the power dynamic between a strong government and a weak opposition classifies it as an insurgency. The literature on civil wars, particularly on insurgency, has largely focused on the experiences of the United States in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, where the U.S. supported the government. However, in Syria, the U.S. has sided with the opposition despite concerns about affiliations with jihadi groups. The memo highlights the need to assess Assad's capacity as a counterinsurgent and its implications for the Syrian rebels and prospects for peace.

Conflict Dynamics

The conflict in Syria is complex and cannot be reduced to simplistic sectarian or ethnic divisions. There are multiple underlying factors at play, including ideological, ethnic, tribal, religious, and sectarian narratives. The violence has emerged along different cleavages, with various groups and interests involved. The Syrian government has used indiscriminate violence as a deliberate tactic, including aerial bombing, which has led to civilian displacement. Service provision and aid have been found to potentially reduce violence in some areas, but not in highly violent contexts. Communication technology, such as cell phones, has played a significant role in the conflict.

Duration and Prospects for Termination

The Syrian conflict is characterized by a high level of rebel group fragmentation, with estimates of up to 1,000 distinct groups, which makes reaching a negotiated settlement challenging. Jihadi groups aligned with al Qaeda, Free Syrian Army groups, and Kurds are among the warring actors with conflicting interests. Spoilers, who have no interest in ending the conflict, further complicate the peace process. Foreign assistance to both sides, including from regional and global powers, prolongs the conflict. Outright military victory is often the result when one side loses external support. U.N. peacekeeping operations can increase the duration of peace post-conflict but may not be viable in the context of Syria.

Technology of Rebellion in the Syrian Civil War

By Laia Balcells, Duke University and Stathis Kalyvas, Yale University

The argument presented is that the civil war in Syria resembles the war in Libya more than the conflict in Afghanistan. The intervention by NATO in Libya, following U.N. Resolution 1973, strengthened the rebels and weakened the forces of Muammar al-Qaddafi, resulting in a relatively quick victory for the rebels. The authors argue that the conflict in Syria is a conventional civil war rather than a guerrilla war or insurgency, as it involves pitched battles, artillery contests, and urban sieges across clearly defined frontlines, and is fought conventionally. They cite research that shows conventional civil wars are more intense, shorter in duration, and less likely to end in regime victories compared to irregular civil wars. Based on this analysis, the authors suggest that the Syrian civil war may turn out to be shorter than anticipated and result in the defeat of the regime.

It's important to note that the outcome of any conflict is highly uncertain and can be influenced by a multitude of factors. Civil wars are complex and multifaceted, involving political, social, economic, and military dynamics that can change over time. Predicting the outcome of a civil war is challenging and often subject to unforeseen developments. While the authors present an argument based on historical data and analysis, it's important to approach such predictions with caution and recognize the inherent uncertainties in predicting the outcome of complex conflicts like the one in Syria.

Veto Players and Civil War in Syria

By David E. Cunningham, University of Maryland

Introduction

• Civil wars historically end through military victory or negotiated settlement.
• Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in civil wars ending in negotiated settlement.
• Civil wars with more "veto players" - actors who can block settlement - tend to last longer and are less likely to end.
• International peacebuilding efforts are more successful in civil wars with fewer veto players.
• The conflict in Syria is resistant to resolution due to the presence of many internal and external veto players.
• International actors can promote resolution in multi-party civil wars under certain conditions.
• Implications for international conflict management efforts in Syria should be considered.

Veto Players and Civil War Bargaining

• Veto players are actors that can unilaterally block settlement of a civil war.
• Civil wars usually have at least two veto players - the government and one rebel group.
• Civil wars with more veto players are harder to resolve through negotiated settlement due to smaller set of preferred agreements, difficulties in assessing power balance, and incentives for individual actors to hold out.
• External states can also function as veto players in civil wars when they have their own agendas.
• The conflict in Syria has numerous rebel groups and is further complicated by difficulties in identifying veto players and strong international involvement.
• Determining veto players in Syria and reaching a negotiated settlement is challenging due to the presence of multiple rebel groups and external actors with independent preferences.

International Efforts to Resolve Multi-Party Civil Wars

• The Syrian civil war is unlikely to end soon due to the presence of multiple veto players, both internal and external.
• Barriers to a negotiated settlement in multiparty civil wars are extremely high, and international efforts to resolve them have been less successful compared to two-party - wars.
• Imposing an agreement upon unwilling combatants, as seen in the former Yugoslavia with the Dayton Accords, requires significant resources and long-term commitment of forces.
• Sequencing negotiations to address each dimension of the conflict, with the external dimension addressed first, can be a potential strategy to reach accord with internal parties, as seen in Angola in the 1980s.
• However, international actors often exacerbate barriers to settlement by excluding certain veto players from peace processes, as seen in Burundi and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
• Resolving the external dimension of the conflict may not necessarily lead to agreement among internal parties, and excluding veto players can further hinder settlement efforts.
• Several powerful rebel groups in Syria are Islamist in nature and likely to be veto players, and Iran's involvement in the conflict makes it a likely veto player as well.
• International actors have been hesitant to deal with these veto players, but they may need to be included in any political settlement for the war.

Overall, while there are potential strategies that international actors can use to build peace in multiparty civil wars, it may be challenging to apply them in Syria due to various factors, including the reluctance to deal with certain veto players and the complex nature of the conflict.

Conslusion

In civil wars, negotiated settlements require either unanimous agreement among all actors or imposition by international actors. In Syria, with multiple veto players and lack of international commitment, prospects for a negotiated settlement are low, and the war is likely to continue.

The Four things We Know About How Civil Wars End (And What this Tells Us About Syria)

By Barbara F. Walter, University of California, San Diego

The Obama administration favors a diplomatic solution to the civil war in Syria, as stated by President Obama in a U.N. speech. However, based on historical patterns of civil war resolution and the current situation in Syria, diplomacy is likely to fail despite its surface-level appeal.

Here are three things Obama should keep in mind as he considers the feasibility of pushing for a negotiated settlement in Syria, and one big conclusion:

1. Civil wars don't end quickly

   1. Historical data shows that civil wars typically last around 10 years on average. Given that Syria's civil war is still in its early stages, serious negotiations for resolution are unlikely at this point

2. The greater the number of factions, the longer a civil war tends to last

   1. Syria's civil war involves the government of President Bashar al-Assad and at least 13 rebel groups with shifting alliances, indicating that it may last longer than the average civil war.

3. Most civil wars end in decisive military victories not negotiated settlements

   1. Governments win about 40% of civil wars, rebels win about 30%, and the rest end in negotiated settlements. This implies that the civil war in Syria is unlikely to result in a negotiated settlement, but rather may be resolved on the battlefield

The civil wars that end in successful negotiated settlements. Therefore tend to have two things in common.

1. Division of political power among combatants based on their position on the battlefield.
2. Support from a third party to ensure the safety of combatants during the demobilization period.

The main obstacles to a successfully negotiated settlement in Syria are the division of political power among combatants, lack of incentive for both Assad and the opposition to negotiate, absence of third-party support for demobilization, and concerns about enforcing agreements. This makes the likelihood of a successful settlement close to zero, despite efforts by the Obama administration to convince otherwise.

Actor Fragmentation and Conflict Processes

By Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, University of Maryland

Introduction

Internal divisions within states and opposition movements affect negotiations during conflict. Divided non-state actors face credibility problems, and limited settlements are more likely. This impacts the outcomes of negotiations between states and fragmented oppositions.

Commitment problems and negotiated settlement

Fragmented oppositions in civil conflicts struggle to make credible commitments about behavior and intentions, as they lack a universally recognized leader and factions often act independently. This creates credibility concerns for states during negotiations, as it is unclear whether any specific faction can implement agreements. Competition, succession problems, and lack of internal continuity further complicate matters. As a result, negotiations with fragmented oppositions are less likely to fully resolve conflicts.

Incentives for partial/limited settlements

Fragmented opposition movements in civil conflicts pose challenges in making credible commitments and negotiations with states. Lack of unified leadership and internal divisions make it difficult for opposition factions to speak with authority or guarantee concessions. However, states can strategically use limited concessions to reveal information about the strength of different demands in the opposition and strengthen moderate factions. By negotiating with specific factions, states can gauge what minimum concessions would be acceptable and use them to influence intra-group competition. Strengthening moderates through concessions can reduce the challenge to the state, but may not satisfy all factions, leading to continued conflict.

Fragmentation and the Syberian opposition

The Syrian opposition is highly fragmented, and shows few signs that substantial progress toward cohesion is eminent. Moreover, the underlying sources of fragmentation are diverse meaning that it is unlikely that organizations will be able to overcome this fragmentation. There is clearly some recognition that there are costs to extreme fragmentation and the Syrian opposition, with international support, has tried to generate greater cohesion, and several umbrella organizations have emerged to coordinate the struggle. Yet, the opposition remains highly fragmented, both in terms of operations on the ground, and as a political actor more generally. As such, commitment problems are likely to plague any settlement attempts, and the Assad regime will face incentives to pursue only the most minimal settlement that is unlikely to end conflict.

Insurgent Organisation and Stage-Armed Group Relations

By Paul Staniland, University of Chicago

Introduction

This memo addresses two strands of my research. :

1. The first seeks to explain the cohesion and organizational structure of insurgent groups.
2. The second studies how governments deal with non-state armed groups.

Types of Insurgent Groups

Insurgent organizational structures can be categorized into four types: Integrated, Vanguard, Parochial, and Fragmented.

1. Integrated groups: These have a centralized command and control structure over local units, allowing for coordinated strategy and effective military operations. Examples include the Tamil Tigers, Afghan Taliban, and Hamas.
2. Vanguard groups: These have a strong central command but weak local control, with local units often defying or ignoring central leadership. They are susceptible to leadership decapitation or integration through local alliances. Examples include early Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Bolsheviks during the 1917 Revolution.
3. Parochial groups: These are composed of powerful local factions without a unified central command. Consistent strategy implementation is challenging, and they often operate as militarized coalitions. Examples include the Jaish al-Mahdi in Iraq and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
4. Fragmented groups: These lack central cohesion or local control and tend to be marginalized quickly. They are difficult to reform and often become irrelevant after the initial stages of war. An example is the Irish National Liberation Army in Northern Ireland.

Insurgent Origins and Change

1. The original structure of armed groups is determined by the structure of prewar political networks, such as political parties, religious associations, student networks, and tribal ties.

   1. Insurgents rely on the networks they have when going to war, and create new organizational structures by mobilizing these networks.
   2. Strong horizontal ties between leaders create robust central commands, while strong vertical links between leaders and local communities create reliable local control.
   3. Weak horizontal or vertical ties can result in divided central commands or difficulty in building local presence.

2. Different pathways of organizational change exist depending on the initial structure of the armed group.

   1. Integrated groups are the most resilient, but can be broken down by militarized state-building counterinsurgency or rapid, mismanaged expansion.
   2. Vanguard groups can decay into fragmented groups when leaders are decapitated or face revolts from disloyal local units, but can also create local alliances to bridge the gap between leaders and communities and become integrated groups.
   3. Parochial groups are hard to change, as embedded local units and factional structures create resistance to integration.

3. Historical contingencies, such as prewar political networks and events, shape the capabilities and actions of armed groups.

   1. Prewar politics shape what new insurgents can do when wars come, influencing their organizational structure and strategies.
   2. Integrated groups can shift into a weaker structure through external pressures or mismanaged expansion.
   3. Vanguard groups can leverage local alliances to shift towards an integrated structure, but may also face challenges from revolts or lack of local presence.
   4. Parochial groups may resist integration due to factionalism and embedded local units.

Implications for Syria

1. Rapid organizational change is challenging: Once a parochial structure is established within an armed group, factional unification becomes difficult due to weak ties of trust and information between commanders.

   1. Vanguard groups, on the other hand, can embed themselves on the ground and become more resilient and harder to defeat over time.
   2. Foreign support for undisciplined groups may not lead to deep organizational change and may be more effective to sponsor sub-factions that are effective and integrated.

2. External sponsors struggle to control proxy groups: In various conflicts, external sponsors have found it difficult to fully control armed groups they support on the ground.

   1. Examples include the Indian government's conflict with their former ally, the LTTE, in Sri Lanka, and the challenges faced by Pakistan in controlling the Taliban in Afghanistan and managing local feuds in Kashmir.
   2. Local dynamics and feuds can impact the behavior and actions of proxy groups, making it challenging for external sponsors to exert full control.

3. Guns and money have differential impacts on armed groups: The effectiveness of resources such as guns and money depends on the organizational structure of armed groups.

   1. Groups with strong organizational structures can use resources effectively, while weakly organized groups may face internal battles over resources.
   2. Pumping resources into parochial groups may not trigger significant organizational change, and sponsoring effective and integrated sub-factions may be more effective.

4. Mass popular support and ideology do not always determine organizational outcomes: The presence of mass popular support or a specific ideology does not guarantee organizational success for armed groups.

   1. Some groups with Islamist, nationalist, or communist ideologies have successfully built integrated structures, while others have failed.
   2. Similarly, seemingly popular groups may face fragmentation, while less popular groups may become disciplined war machines.

Armed Groups and the State

1. States adopt different strategies towards non-state armed groups: States often adopt different strategies, including suppression, collusion, containment, and incorporation, towards non-state armed groups depending on their political goals and the dynamics of the conflict.

   1. These strategies may involve formal or tacit alliances with armed groups, blurring the lines between state and non-state power.
   2. Examples of these strategies can be seen in Syria, where collusion appears to be extensive in Kurdish areas and with Alawite militias, and where pragmatic accommodations may be made between current insurgents and the Assad regime.

2. Wartime political orders emerge: In conflicts with overlapping state and non-state power, various governance arrangements, referred to as "wartime political orders," can emerge.

   1. These orders may involve shared sovereignty, spheres of influence, and tacit coexistence, and can vary in different regions of the conflict zone.
   2. In Syria, for example, areas of overlapping state or non-state power may give rise to heterodox governance arrangements.

3. Future prospects of diverse political-military authority: In prolonged conflicts that result in a stalemate, large areas may lie between war and peace, and states may make hard choices about allocating their coercive capacity.

   1. This may involve abandoning irrelevant regions, subcontracting control to local armed allies through "indirect rule" situations, and containing threats in politically peripheral areas while focusing on suppression of major threats.
   2. The political orders that have emerged in Syria already bear resemblance to similar patterns observed in other conflict zones such as Burma, the Philippines, Iraq, and Pakistan, with an intricate mix of conflict and cooperation.

LECTURE THREE: Syria and Iran (an analysis of conflict theories)

QUESTION: What starts war? What are underlying causes?

ANSWER: Positions, interests, and needs.

Explanation of the triangle (as mentioned in the first lecture)

Behaviour (direct violence; soldiers, traditional warfare)

Attitude (cultural violence; subtle, very prevalent, zwarte piet, Hollywood productions and the portraying of enemies: Americans fighting Russians in the 80s movies)

Contradiction (structural violence; South Africa, apartheid, against minorities for example)

Negative peace → when you still have a lot of racism, classism, etc. but you did manage to stop the direct violence (you stop the behaviour, but not the attitudes and contradictions / you stopped the direct violence, but not the cultural- and structural violence)

Positive peace → if you REALLY solve the conflict by managing all three factors (behaviour, attitude, contradiction)

Syria (2011 – to present)

Iran (1979) (1980 – 1988)

What is ‘latent’ conflict?

Almost a synonym of negative peace. There are no killings, but the root causes of conflict are still there; exploitation, racism,

An example: Lebanon, Kosovo, Myanmar? (explain one of these in preparation for the exam)

PSC – needs + governance (failure)

Protracted Social Conflict

TNC - opportunistic rebellion (state fragility)

Trans-National Conflict

The start of conflict

• Triggers
  • Factors that affect the timing of the onset of armed conflict
  • Does not explain why a conflict started, but why it started then (so NOT the cause, but an event)
  • Example: murder of Franz Ferdinand
  • Example: Mohamed Bouazizi (the man who set himself on fire in front of the municipality in Tunisia à Revolt in Tunisia)
  • ‘The boy who started the war in Syria’:
• Catalysts
  • Factors that affect the intensity and duration of the conflict (internal & external)
  • Example: technology, fragmentations within a country, catastrophes like earthquakes or tsunamis

Types of Conflict

• Syria’s war?
• Iran 1979?
• Iran 1980-1988?
• Iran today?

Syria’s war characteristics (2013)

• Fatalities in its two and a half years of fighting, has long surpassed the 1000 battle death threshold that would qualify it as a civil war
• The general power dynamic, if a strong government facing a weak opposition, classifies the conflict as an insurgency
• Fragmented opposition
• Sunni vs. Alawite groups confrontation do not explain the conflict
• Secular vs. religious/jihadist cleavage, which overlaps partly but not fully with the ideological, Baathist versus non-Baathist cleavage.
• Not fully ethnic or religious conflict… then? PSC or TNC? Conventional or new war?

Civil war studies statements

• The greater the number of factions, the longer a civil war tends to last (takes longer to end it)
• Most civil wars end in decisive military victories, not negotiated settlements (Syria, push and pull)
• Role of “veto players” in Syria (external-internal) (the five are: England, China, France, Russia and the United States)
• The likelihood of a successful negotiated settlement in Syria is close to zero

On insurgencies typologies (1)

1. Integrated groups → have a well institutionalized central command and control over local units. These tend to be the most military effective groups, able to carefully coordinate strategy and keep fighting even in difficult situations.

   1. (LaFarge in Colombia?)

2. Vanguard groups → have a strong central command but weak local control. Local units defy or ignore the central leadership. They are the most likely to change, either by being wiped out through leadership decapitation or becoming integrated by building local alliances with local communities.

3. Parochial groups → are made up of powerful local factions that lack a powerful, unified central command. They resemble militarized coalitions, even if under a common organizational umbrella

4. Fragmented groups → lack central cohesion or local control and tend to be quickly marginalized.

What type of insurgency can be seen in Iran 1979 and Syria 2011?

In Azar’s view…

• Security needs
• Development needs
• Political assets needs
• Identity needs (cultural and religious expressions)

Out of the three basic rights- security/subsistence/freedom… Which one explains the conflict in Syria… and Iran better?

PREPARATION LECTURE FOUR: Ethically insoluble dilemmas in war (Schulzke, 2013)

Dilemma for soldiers: how to follow laws of war and rules of engagement while also protecting themselves and accomplishing their mission.

This article argues that some of the apparent ethical dilemmas are ethically insoluble dilemmas that cannot be solved using ethical reasoning processes (in the case where soldiers do not have sufficient knowledge of a situation or control over it to apply an ethical decision procedure)

Wars place people in terrible situations that are shaped by conditions beyond their control. In those situations, it is often asked of them to choose between two or more ethical imperatives, duties, or values that cannot all be satisfied.

The author argues that some of the apparent ethical dilemmas that soldiers encounter are impossible to resolve using moral or ethical decision procedures because the outcomes of these decisions is largely a matter of luck.

They are insoluble in the sense that it is unreasonable to expect a person to judge these problems effectively and to make sound decision given the circumstances in which these decisions must be made.

Military ethics and war are usually analysed from the perspective of one of the three dominant traditions in western moral philosophy:

1. Aristotelian virtue ethics: Aristotle says that an action can only be judged in moral terms when it is not compelled, or performed under, constraint.
2. Kant’s deontological moral theory: Kant argues that the moral quality of an action depends on the actor’s will + actions cannot be considered good or bad because of their consequences, but only to the extent that they were motivated by the actor’s good will, as opposed to self-interested motives.
3. Utilitarianism:

These theories are united however in presupposing that agents have adequate information about their circumstances and control over their actions.

The same is true for the ethical reasoning procedures taught to soldiers, such as the US army’s four step ethical reasoning process.

Agents who face ethically insoluble dilemmas lack the crucial information that they need to understand the situation and to evaluate different courses of action.

This article emphasizes that preventing insoluble dilemmas is better than trying to solve them.

Control in decision-making

Some say war is amoral and that applying moral language to wars overlooks this basic fact.

Autonomy is an essential element in moral decision-making by the dominant traditions in wester moral philosophy.

Autonomous actions → those that are freely performed by an agent and that reflect that person’s will.

Bentham about ‘autonomy’: an instrumental good that allows one to pursue and happiness.

Mill about ‘autonomy’: argues that it is an essential element of happiness.

They agree in characterizing it as a necessary condition for making moral choices.

Williams and Nagel famously challenge the standard view of control with the concept of moral luck.

Williams discusses moral luck with reference to the problem of retrospective justification. (Was it the right decision? If he lives and prospers, then yes, but you only know afterwards)

William critiques utilitarian and Kantian moral philosophies, which he thinks are incapable of dealing with the non-rational forces that affect moral judgement.

Nagel undertakes a more exhaustive description of moral luck and its various manifestations. He distinguishes four types of luck:

• Constitutive luck: who a person is or what character a person has (person may act on abilities and attitudes that have been learned but are beyond that person’s control to alter) à the kind of luck described by luck egalitarians like Rawls
• Causal luck: refers to the extent to which a person’s actions are predetermined by antecedent causes (raises questions about free will and determinism à can someone really be held accountable if it is all pre-determined?)
• Circumstantial luck: the luck that governs the kind of challenges a person faces. (A nazi sympathizer during WWII would have much different circumstantial luck depending on whether that person lived in Germany or Argentina. The German would be more blameworthy and more likely to engage in immoral actions than the latter because of their different circumstances.
• Resultant luck: has to do with the unforeseeable consequences that an action may have. (A drunk driver who swerves onto a sidewalk. The driver may be guilty of negligence if no pedestrian is there, but manslaughter if he kills someone). The consequences are the same but the conditions for the driver, the same. It is beyond the driver’s control.

The effects of friction

The problems of chance and uncertainty are often described in terms of Clausewitz’s concept of friction, especially the type of friction called ‘fog’ → these help to understand the external constraints on moral decision-making.

Friction & fog are general problems that not only impede all military operations, but that are general conditions that affect any group interactions and especially problematic during wartime (since mistakes are of high costs)

Friction = the tendency for disruptions to occur, even when there are no serious mistakes or miscalculations (natural byproduct of high-risk environment)

It arises from all the events that are outside personal control (enemy’s decisions, weather) and influences the context in which soldiers make ethical decisions. It may cause ethical dilemmas to occur, impede soldiers’ ability to resolve them, and increase the costs of misjudgements.

Fog is a component of friction, but it is often described as a distinct problem. Fog is uncertainty, an absence of information.

The concepts of friction and fog are akin to the circumstantial and resultant forms of moral luck, in that these refer to how a person’s actions are affected by conditions outside a person’s control. In also sparks discussion about whether decision-making is possible when friction and fog deprive actors of the level of control that is needed.

Genuine and Insoluble Ethical Dilemmas

Ethical dilemma = a situation in which an actor must choose between two or more obligations that cannot all be satisfied (contradictory demands).

Sartre’s story about the student (do I join the army to avenge my brother, or do I stay with my mom?) is a perfect example of an ethical dilemma.

People confronted with these dilemmas can make independent decisions based on relevant information.

Ethical dilemmas are insoluble when the influence of moral luck (factors outside the actor’s control) are so strong that individuals cannot apply ethical reasoning.

The reality of ethical dilemmas is contested by moral philosophers:

• Kantian & Utilitarian reasoning: there are no real ethnical dilemmas since philosophies provide ways of ranking demands (so you never have to choose, there is always one which precedes)
  • Utilitarianism also demands that:
  • The person has relevant information…
  • And knows the potential consequences of different courses of action (therefore, it demands a high level of situational awareness since you must be able to judge what might come next)
• Deontological moral theories: also make strong assumptions about agents’ levels of knowledge and control
• Kant: act on good will à you don’t need to have knowledge of potential consequences however, you do need some basic information about the situation.

The fundamental problem introduced by the concept of moral luck and by the concepts of friction and fog is that faulty or incomplete information limits a person’s control.

One type of ethical dilemma: determining whether to use force when non-combatant bystanders may become collateral damage à outweighing their own self-interest against the principle of non-combatant immunity.

Ethical insoluble dilemmas are so deeply affected by circumstantial and resultant luck that they are unresolvable using moral reasoning or military decision procedures.

The only way to overcome insoluble dilemmas is to minimize soldiers’ exposure to them (prevention).

Ethically insoluble dilemmas seem to be especially common in counter-insurgency operations.

NOTES LECTURE FOUR: Dilemmas of civil war

Dilemma is…

• A situation in which a difficult choice must be made between two or more alternatives, especially ones that are equally undesirable
• A dilemma is a tough choice. When you’re in a difficult situation and each option looks equally bad, you’re in a dilemma. Dilemma is from a Greek for “double proposition”. It was originally a technical term of logic, but we use it now for any time you have a problem with no satisfactory solution.

Morality = system of beliefs

Ethics is not what you think, but what you do.

Introduction

• One of the consistent facts of wars is that they place people in terrible, often life-threatening situations that are shaped in conditions beyond their control. These situations can force people to make difficult choices between undesirable alternatives (dilemmas)
• I will argue that some of the apparent ethical dilemmas that soldiers encounter are impossible to resolve using moral or ethical decision procedures because the outcome of these decisions is largely a matter of luck.

How to resolve ethical dilemmas

• Three dominant traditions in western moral philosophy:
  • Aristotelian virtue ethics à actions performed without constrains > autonomy (in order to make rational decisions, you must have a certain autonomy)
  • Kant’s deontological moral theory à actions-follow duty/rules vs. consequences (you should not lie, you shall not kill)
  • Utilitarianism à the consequences of an actions is the standard of right or wrong (you must do whatever it takes)
• However, these theories are united in presupposing that agents (in this case soldiers) have adequate information about their circumstances and control over their actions.

EXAM QUESTION: why do you need to have rational, ethical decisions?

ANSWER: enough adequate information and being in control over your own actions

Parts of the text

1. The first section of this essay will argue that moral theories are usually based on the assumption that individuals can be in control of their actions.
2. The second (exam question!) section will discuss Clausewitz’s concepts of friction and fog, which refer to the chance events and uncertainty that affect the way in which wars are fought.
3. The third section will discuss the differences between genuine ethical dilemmas, which allow agents to make choices using ethical deliberation, and ethically insoluble dilemmas, in which agents lack the power to make decisions based on any ethical basis because of constraints imposed by moral luck or friction.
4. The fourth and fifth sections will provide examples.

EXAM QUESTION: What makes an ethical dilemma into an unsolvable ethical dilemma?

ANSWER: A lack of information and not in control about the actions.

Control in moral decision-making

The brutality and confusion of war has led some to claim that wars are amoral and that applying moral language to wars overlooks this basic fact

Soldier’s decisions can be evaluated in moral terms

Prior to reflection it is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors beyond their control.

Autonomy is considered an essential element in moral decision-making by the dominant traditions in western moral philosophy.

Control in moral decision-making

In most armies, the force of orders can even be suspended to permit soldiers to make autonomous moral judgements and to ensure that the limits on soldiers’ autonomy do not force them to engage in atrocities.

Williams and Nagel famously challenge the standard view of control with the concept of moral luck.

They distinguish four types of luck:

• Constitutive luck
• Causal luck
• Circumstantial luck (Nazis in Germany or Argentina)
• Resultant luck (drunk driver)

The most important types of luck for analysing the types of ethical dilemmas discussed in this essay are circumstantial and resultant luck.

Williams and Nagel make an important contribution to moral philosophy by showing the extent to which moral judgements are influenced by factors that are beyond a person’s control.

The effects of friction

In military thinking, the problems of chance and uncertainty are often described in terms of Clausewitz’s concept of friction, especially of the type of friction called fog.

• Friction arises from all the events that are outside personal control, including the enemy’s unexpected decision, the weather, weapons malfunctions, unreliable subordinates, or anything else that might be considered a matter of luck.
• Friction influences the context in which soldiers make ethical decisions. It may cause ethical dilemmas to occur, impede soldiers’ ability to resolve them, and increase the costs of misjudgement.
• “Friction is the umbrella” → (look for explanation in the text)

The concept of friction and fog are akin to the circumstantial and resultant forms of moral luck, in that these refer to how a person’s actions are affected by conditions outside a person’s control.

The concepts of moral luck and friction can help to draw the distinction between genuine ethical dilemmas and ethically insoluble dilemmas.

Propaganda makes fog (in the case of Ukraine vs. Russia for example)

Genuine and insoluble ethical dilemmas

• A person’s control can be reduced or even eliminated because of incomplete or faulty information. This is the fundamental problem introduced by the concept of moral luck and by the concepts of friction and fog.
• Ethical dilemmas are insoluble when the influence of moral luck, in the sense of factors outside the actor’s control, is so strong that individuals cannot apply ethical reasoning to make a choice.
• They must choose blindly and leave the outcomes to resultant luck.
• Ethically insoluble dilemmas may not qualify as ethical dilemmas.

POSSIBLE EXAM QUESTION: what is the relation between fog, friction, and insoluble dilemmas?

ANSWER:

Rethinking military ethics

• Ethically insoluble dilemmas can only be overcome by attempting to minimize soldiers; exposure to them.
  • Efforts should be made to prevent ethically insoluble dilemmas from occurring but preventing them is a task that must fall to military and political leadership who are in much stronger position to control when these situations arise.
  • Military and political leadership waging counter-insurgency wars have a strong interest in preventing ethically insoluble dilemmas… incidents of soldiers killing non-combatants may decrease domestic and international support for the war and strain relations with the local populations.

Conclusion

• However, as this essay has argued, more training cannot eliminate dilemmas that are ethically insoluble.
• When soldiers lack a critical level of knowledge and control when facing an ethical dilemma, then the dilemma cannot be solved using ethical decision procedures. Ethical reasoning may be applied to these dilemmas, but they cannot provide an answer. Ethically insoluble dilemmas force soldiers to guess at the right course of action, leaving the outcome to luck.
• However, just as militaries make plans that account for and attempt to minimize these forces, they should also seek to limit the occurrence of ethically insoluble dilemmas by planning for them and adapting their strategies and tactics accordingly.

PREPARATION LECTURE FIVE: “The limits of peace in Latin America” by Kurtenbach

Latin America governments frequently emphasise the democratic and peaceful order in the region. These claims are based on:

1. The region has experienced processes of democratisation since the early 1980s (except for Cuba)
2. A series of long-lasting civil wars have ended with negotiated settlements and without a relapse into war (since the 1990s)

A successful example of the liberal peacebuilding model? No, because it is still the most violent region in the world.

This article argues that:

• Democratisation and peacebuilding focussed rather on formal changes than on dealing with the structural problems…
• Which produced different manifestations of violence

The paradox of peace in Latin America

• 33 governments of the Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC) declared Latin America a ‘zone of peace’
  • Termination of civil wars in Central America and Peru
  • Peace accord between Colombian government and the region’s oldest guerrilla group: FARC-EP

However:

• The region shows low level of interstate war, but militarised interstate disputes are common
• 26 of the 54 countries classified as ‘dangerous places’ by SIPRI are in Latin America and the Caribbean (due to the thigh number of violent deaths)

21st century: three forms of violence have so far been dominant in Latin America:

1. Upsurge of violence mostly classified as ‘criminal’ (dominates the public discourse)
2. Repressive state policies and the militarisation of public security have emerged countries with and without a prior history of civil war (mostly neglected or justified)
3. Latin America has stood out as a region with high levels of selective political violence against human right defenders, representatives of social movement and independent journalists, among others.

Contradiction on democracy: Latin America shaped the debate of the third wave of democratisation.

• In 2001, the OAS adopted the American Democracy Charter (oblige to respect democracy and human rights)
• This article argues that the minimalist concepts of peace and democracy in Latin America are caused by and contribute to the neglect of the structural drivers of violence and authoritarianism à Framing the present as peaceful & democratic, allows states to criminalise actors advocating fundamental change.
• Therefore, all social orders need to develop formal and informal institutions to control and limit violence.

The possibilities for the prevention and containment of violence vary according to the context and may include the rule of law, control, or repression.

The process of democratization SHOULD mean that the rule of law and its application to all actors become more important → reforms such as creation of an independent judiciary or democratically accountable police force

Within Latin America however, reforms of the institutions crucial for democratic violence control have been limited, and mostly path dependent → security policies have been repressive, undermining civil and political rights and thus democratisation.

The links between peacebuilding and democratisation

Theoretically, democracy can be seen as a method of civil and constructive conflict transformation + consolidated democracies do not go to war with each other and are able to prevent and control violence inside their borders by democratic means.

Democracies: the state is responsible for controlling violence through institutions such as:

• The military (external security)
• The police (public security)
• Judicial system (for sanctioning of the illegal use of violence)

→ Historically, the process of state formation decreased war and armed conflict.

Main focus of the international peacebuilding = liberal paradigm

The main elements of liberal peace are:

• Negotiated forms of war termination
• Post-war democratisation
• State-building

The critique of the liberal peacebuilding strategy has focused on the (im)possibility of reproducing this model in non-Western historical and cultural context and under the current globalised conditions.

Ongoing debates have introduced new perspectives on peacebuilding dynamics:

1. Peace means many different things to many different people
2. Peacebuilding is a complex process and external interventions might be part of the problem, rather than part of the solution
3. There is no ‘one size fits all’ strategy and the outcome of peacebuilding is shaped by the interaction between local conditions and global contexts as well as the agency of a variety of actors

Therefore, it might be advantageous to analyse peacebuilding and its outcomes along a spectrum:

• It does not predict a specific outcome. The spectrum is a useful tool for comparative assessment and the explanation of variations in outcomes
• The idea of a spectrum broadens our concept of peace, beyond the absence of war (adheres to Galtung’s ‘negative peace’ concept)
• The idea of a spectrum acknowledges the fact that a clear-cut distinction between ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ or ‘war’ and ‘peace’ is often not possible.
• The spectrum enables us to assess the dynamics and the direction of peacebuilding processes over time and beyond transitions from war and armed conflict.

Why is Latin America interesting?

→ Almost all countries are rated as democratic (free and fair elections, have a cheques and balances and ‘guarantee’ civil and political rights) and perceived as a rather successful region. However, there is evidence across the region of a mix of liberal, hybrid and illiberal policies to control violence.

Varieties of peacebuilding in Latin America

• Liberal peacebuilding approaches emphasize the importance of competitive elections to increase political participation. In addition, the rule of law and accountability for all actors should contribute to liberal peace. Also, they there should at least be the intention to work towards the reduction of inequalities. (Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica)
• Authoritarian conflict management is not just based on the absence of these ‘liberal’ conditions or the dominance of ‘illib
• eral’ elements but also relies on a set of specific control strategies including state propaganda, control of information, controlling space (military) and the hierarchical distributions of economic resources for specific constituents. (Nicaragua)

Most peaceful and democratic countries: Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica (no path dependency here, they developed since their dictatorships)

Hybrid is most related to the most violent societies: Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador

At the crossroads between peacebuilding and democratisation, there are two commonalities across the Latin Americas:

1. Negotiated transitions (out of war & authoritarianism à new, democratic future)
2. Neoliberal development model (this model dominated the transition to democracy)

Both developments affected peacebuilding:

• Inequality is a major driver of violence and crime
• Elite pacts supported impunity and contributed to the militarisation of public security (these were not only used to fight crime, but also social protests) à violence on the part of state security produces cycles of violence and repression that ultimately undermine democratisation.

Seen from a government perspective, hijacking the discourse of peace and democracy serves a double purpose:

1. Helps criminalise social and political opponents (and their actions) who are not limited to formal institutions such as elections or who contest the social status quo.
2. The discourses are an instrument to keep external intervention regarding democracy and peacebuilding to a minimum.

Latin American contributions to the global debate

Latin American experiences show how specific peacebuilding approaches are not only shaped by local contexts but also by the patterns of macro-regional development and path dependence regarding institutional change.

Two arguments can be made:

• Neither democratisation nor the termination of the civil wars has changed the deeply ingrained social inequality in many parts of the region.
• State repression, selective political violence and corruption have allowed traditional elites to maintain and reproduce their unequal economic and status quo despite democratisation. (‘Violent democracies’ / ‘criminal governance’ / perverse state formation’)

LECTURE FIVE: the limits of peace in Latin America

No relation between democratic governments and peace (for Latin America at least)

Costa Rica & Nicaragua are relatively safe and peaceful

Honduras is now the most dangerous country within Latin America

Galtung’s models of conflict, violence, and peace

• Why look at causes?
  • To prevent or deal with conflict, we need to understand what conflict is about.
  • After a peace negotiation has been signed, underlying causes of conflict can remain
  • Latent conflict
  • PSC and/or TNC (exam!)
  • The question of the fragility of the State…

Latin America:

Authoritarian regimes

Inequality

PNC: three underlying causes…

Position

Interest

Needs

TNC: characterized by…

Opportunistic rebellion

Cracks in a fragile state à paramilitary forces

OAS vs. CELAC

Organization of American States (OAS)

1949: anti-communist statement (Truman)

2017: ‘The Nations of the Americas have overcome their civil wars and bloody conflicts which unfortunately characterized the region for many wars’

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)

2014: … focusing on interstate relations, declared the region a ‘zone of peace’ in 2014

Characteristics of violence

Few interstate wars but quite some intrastate conflicts

Types of violence:

Criminal

Organized crime: profit, needs parts of the government to co-operate with them, hierarchical structure

Non-organized crime:

Repressive state policies and the militarization of public security

Selective political violence against human rights defenders, representatives of social movement and independent journalists, among others

A debate

Democratization and peacebuilding

3 phases (in the West)

War termination

Post war democratization

State building (or liberal peace)

What are the potential problems in Latin America while adopting this model?

What is Operation Condor? (LOOK THIS UP)

PREPARATION LECTURE SIX: ‘Containing and Ending Civil Wars’ (Ramsbotham)

NOG DOEN

LECTURE SIX:

UN Peacekeeping

When prevention of violent conflict has failed… then

We can think on the deployment of peacekeeping (three points)

To contain violence and prevent further escalation to war

To limit the intensity, geographical spread, and duration of war

Consolidate a ceasefire and create space for reconstruction

Peacekeeping as a conflict resolution mechanism

First generation, peacekeeping missions (1956 Suez Crises – UNEF I – Consent, impartiality, and non-use of force as ‘the holy trinity’ (POSSIBLE EXAM QUESTION)

Second generation, peacekeeping missions (1990s after the end of the Cold War – Rwanda and ex-Yugoslavia

Third generation… peacekeeping operations (9/11 2001, New Wars)

Are these modes of peacekeeping successful? à No, not that much.

The new model of peacekeeping argues for a Cosmopolitan model

As the best combination of military capability, political legitimacy, conflict resolution capacity and inclusive cosmopolitan cultural values

What is the cosmopolitan model? (POSSIBLE EXAM QUESTION)

Combination of the two mentioned above (which are? READ THE TEXT)

UN Peacekeeping, third generation

New types of conflict and/or new wars (warlords and militias- terrorism and attacks on civilians) obliged changes in peacekeeping

What Nordstrom called ‘cultures of violence’

New peacekeeping operations abandoned the UNEF I principles in front of these challenges

No consensus centred, deterrence power, ‘willing and capable’ and UN authorized, or UN managed

It is not exclusively the UN that can set peace missions and operations, it expanded in figures such as the EU, AU, NATO

Despite the increased number of peacekeeping interventions since 1956 in 2014 UN peacekeeping operations budget was less than half on 1 per cent of world military expenditures

The third-generation peacekeeping and human security

The impossible combination: greater military robustness with genuinely cosmopolitan international norms

Key danger is that those with military capacity (NATO, i.e.) will take control over interventions outside the ambit of UN. This will lead to a loss of international legitimacy.

A move from collective security to human security.

Human security means: physical safety, economic and social well-being, dignity and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms

Peacekeeping: the current debate (POSSIBLE EXAM QUESTION)

Four approaches:

Neo-Realist à refuses “peace language” not gear towards peace operations but stabilization forces

Pluralist à traditional peacekeeping, peacekeeping should be left to the UN

Solidarist à in line with peacekeeping operations

Cosmopolitan à peacekeeping operations but… with UN forces will train and serve entirely as UN forces, not as national troops

A critic and/or assessment of these approaches …

Conclusions:

Despite some spectacular failures UN peacekeeping efforts are worth continuation

UN peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution born in the same decade sharing central aims:

Not to defeat national enemies

Support peace processes

Protect civilians

Fulfil legitimate international mandates

The main aim of conflict resolution is to transform violent conflict into non-violent forms of political and other kind of change

Final conclusion: above all…

Peace operations must genuinely serve the interests of those in whose name the intervention is carried out, not the interests of the interveners.

RECAP SESSION:

Direct Violence example = a civil war, central America

Structural violence = Hutus and Tutsis, apartheid, institutionalised racism, oppression

Cultural Violence = Zwarte Piet,

Search examples for both, which you can explain so you can use them during the exam.

A lot of similarities between structural- and cultural violence, but structural violence tends to be more institutionalized.

Negative peace

Positive peace

Underlying causes of conflict: Protracted social conflict (Azar)

Positions:

Interest:

Needs: In Syria, it was the need of democratization, freedom of speech

Galto, Azar (important authors)

If the government cannot satisfy the three mentioned above, there will be conflict.

TNC = TransNational Conflict

Difference between TNC and Protracted Social Conflict?

TNC is based on opportunistic rebellion (weak governance)

Example of a trigger = does not explain the conflict, but does spark the conflict

Catalyst = make the conflict worse or better

You must be able to explain these, using examples.

Make a list of human needs: (guest lecture)

Security

Income

An insurgency =

Types of insurgencies (four): EXAM QUESTION

Integrated

Vanguard

Fragmented à Why are these hard to work with? Takes way longer, too many interest groups, very hard to negotiate, internal struggles,

Fog and Friction (Clausewitz)

Main critique:

Because of fog and friction, it is sometimes impossible to make good decisions. The best way to work with this, is preventing coming into such situations. Training does not get rid of this problem.

In order to ethically make decisions, you need to have enough information, and a certain degree of autonomy.

The difference between insoluble dilemmas and …

Cases from Latin America

Main things of the text:

What happens in ’49?

What is the OHS? Decision on the American states?

What is the recipe for peace, according to peace studies?

Ceasefire

Negotiations

Reconciliation process

According to the text:

Democracy à

Liberal peacebuilding à markets, freedom in a democratic setting

However, this is the recipe for peace in the Western world after the Second World War. But when putting it elsewhere in the world, it won’t work as effectively. For example: in Latin America.