Libertarianism

Feelings of Freedom vs. the Determinist “Illusion”

• First‐person phenomenology
  • We experience decision making as an active, effortful process originating “inside” ourselves.
  • Introspective test: “Wait and see what I decide.” • The very act of waiting is already a decision, so the test collapses.
• Determinist reply
  • This vivid experience is labelled the illusion of free will.
  • Key point: A feeling is not an argument; feeling free ≠ being free.

Determinism, Indeterminism & the Switch to “Mechanism”

• Classical Determinism: Every detail of an effect is fully explained by prior causes.
• Empirical counter-example: Quantum physics shows indeterminacy— e.g. a particle may go left or right with no prior cause.
• Philosophical move: Rename the target mechanism rather than determinism.
  • Mechanism ≈ “Everything proceeds via blind, law-governed forces,” whether strictly deterministic or probabilistic.
• Why quantum randomness doesn’t rescue autonomy
  • If choices become random events, we still lack control.
  • Freedom we seek = self-authored, reason-guided action, not coin-flips at the sub-atomic level.

Libertarianism: Agent Causation Outside the Normal Chain

• Core claim: Human (or rational) agents can initiate causal chains ex nihilo (“agent causation”).
  • We cause effects in the ordinary world, but we ourselves are not caused in the ordinary way.
• Religious version
  • A deity created us with this special power of free will.
  • Philosophical objections:
  • Non-explanatory: Merely states a fact; supplies no mechanism compatible with science.
  • Problem of evil: An omniscient/omnipotent creator who foreknows every free act still bears responsibility for resulting evils.

Secular Libertarian Attempts & the Metaphysical Cost

• Conflict with naturalism
  • If we are natural beings, why would our decisions escape natural causation?
  • If we do escape, are we then supernatural? — a problematic dualism.
• Kant’s two-worlds model
  • Phenomenal self: Embodied, law-governed, part of causal network.
  • Noumenal self: Rational will, standing “outside” causation; source of moral autonomy.
  • Ambitious metaphysics—requires a split ontology (physical vs. non-physical).

Acting for Reasons: The Luck vs. Cause Dilemma

• Ordinary agency: We explain actions by citing reasons; reasons function as causes.
• Libertarian tension
  • Remove causal determination → action risks becoming random.
  • Re-introduce reasons → causal story returns, undermining “uncaused choice.”
• Robert Kane’s “Self-Forming Actions (SFAs)”
  • Occur in situations of maximal conflict where reasons are evenly balanced.
  • Decision is supposedly undetermined, thus free.
  • Critique: Without causal sway of reasons, outcome appears to be luck; autonomy not secured.

Summary: Problems Facing Libertarian Free Will

• Being outside the causal chain threatens naturalistic credibility.
• Without causal reasons, choices look random; with reasons, determinism creeps back in.
• Religious grounding adds the problem of evil and lacks explanatory detail.
• Quantum or probabilistic gaps provide indeterminacy, not autonomy—leaving the original quest for self-governance unresolved.