Libertarianism

Feelings of Freedom vs. the Determinist “Illusion”

  • First‐person phenomenology
    • We experience decision making as an active, effortful process originating “inside” ourselves.
    • Introspective test: “Wait and see what I decide.” • The very act of waiting is already a decision, so the test collapses.
  • Determinist reply
    • This vivid experience is labelled the illusion of free will.
    • Key point: A feeling is not an argument; feeling free ≠ being free.

Determinism, Indeterminism & the Switch to “Mechanism”

  • Classical Determinism: Every detail of an effect is fully explained by prior causes.
  • Empirical counter-example: Quantum physics shows indeterminacy— e.g. a particle may go left or right with no prior cause.
  • Philosophical move: Rename the target mechanism rather than determinism.
    • Mechanism ≈ “Everything proceeds via blind, law-governed forces,” whether strictly deterministic or probabilistic.
  • Why quantum randomness doesn’t rescue autonomy
    • If choices become random events, we still lack control.
    • Freedom we seek = self-authored, reason-guided action, not coin-flips at the sub-atomic level.

Libertarianism: Agent Causation Outside the Normal Chain

  • Core claim: Human (or rational) agents can initiate causal chains ex nihilo (“agent causation”).
    • We cause effects in the ordinary world, but we ourselves are not caused in the ordinary way.
  • Religious version
    • A deity created us with this special power of free will.
    • Philosophical objections:
    • Non-explanatory: Merely states a fact; supplies no mechanism compatible with science.
    • Problem of evil: An omniscient/omnipotent creator who foreknows every free act still bears responsibility for resulting evils.

Secular Libertarian Attempts & the Metaphysical Cost

  • Conflict with naturalism
    • If we are natural beings, why would our decisions escape natural causation?
    • If we do escape, are we then supernatural? — a problematic dualism.
  • Kant’s two-worlds model
    • Phenomenal self: Embodied, law-governed, part of causal network.
    • Noumenal self: Rational will, standing “outside” causation; source of moral autonomy.
    • Ambitious metaphysics—requires a split ontology (physical vs. non-physical).

Acting for Reasons: The Luck vs. Cause Dilemma

  • Ordinary agency: We explain actions by citing reasons; reasons function as causes.
  • Libertarian tension
    • Remove causal determination → action risks becoming random.
    • Re-introduce reasons → causal story returns, undermining “uncaused choice.”
  • Robert Kane’s “Self-Forming Actions (SFAs)”
    • Occur in situations of maximal conflict where reasons are evenly balanced.
    • Decision is supposedly undetermined, thus free.
    • Critique: Without causal sway of reasons, outcome appears to be luck; autonomy not secured.

Summary: Problems Facing Libertarian Free Will

  • Being outside the causal chain threatens naturalistic credibility.
  • Without causal reasons, choices look random; with reasons, determinism creeps back in.
  • Religious grounding adds the problem of evil and lacks explanatory detail.
  • Quantum or probabilistic gaps provide indeterminacy, not autonomy—leaving the original quest for self-governance unresolved.