Fear in Its Place – Comprehensive Study Notes

Introduction and purpose

Opening observation: "Americans do not know fear" contrasts with many Americans’ lived experiences of fear, as illustrated by Judy in Scottsdale, AZ. Judy carries a concealed weapon in a city noted for high affluence and low crime, yet permitting is widespread among affluent, white, suburban residents.
Judy’s case (magazine-like example) shows fear as a public phenomenon that crosses class and neighborhood lines, with high permit rates in upscale areas like Sun City West, north Phoenix, Scottsdale, Ahwatukee, and Mesa, despite lower crime in those neighborhoods. After the concealed-weapons law took effect in July 1994, over 35{,}000 Arizonans obtained permits (per a computer analysis).
Purpose: The book investigates fear and its role in contemporary society, focusing on how mass media and popular culture shape social expectations and everyday life. It argues that media formats promote entertainment and fear, shifting public discourse and daily routines.
Core thesis: The mass media and popular culture contribute to changing social expectations by channeling attention toward entertainment-tinged fear; public perceptions often fear the "+wrong things"" (crime, child abductions, aircraft crashes, school violence, etc.). The author seeks to explain how fear becomes a pervasive public discourse and a lens for interpreting social life.

What follows frames the discourse of fear, its sources, and its social consequences.

The discourse of fear: definition and scope

The author defines the discourse of fear as pervasive communication, symbolic awareness, and expectations that danger and risk are central in how people experience their environment (physical and symbolic) in daily life. This serves to link media reports and popular culture to audience perceptions (Pfuhl and Henry 1993).
Related scholarly observations include: fears around crime and drugs (Ferraro 1995; Warr 1990) and the role of the news media in shaping perceptions.
Barry Glassner (1999) The Culture of Fear chronicles Americans’ perceptions of risks (crime, child abductions, plane crashes, school violence, …). The work echoes older findings (Cantril, et al. 1940) that fears reflect broad anxieties about one’s environment in a given historical moment, with media sometimes offering perspective on exaggerated risks.
Frank Furedi (1997) argues that perceived lack of control over daily life drives safety/fear preoccupations; notes a tension between reducing uncertainty and infantilizing or overprotecting children via fear.
Furedi also critiques the idea that media alone creates risk perceptions; rather, media amplify or attenuate pre-existing dispositions toward risk. The media’s preoccupation with risk is a symptom, not a sole cause, of public fear.
The author argues for a view that fear is constructed through public discourse and cultural symbols, not simply a direct response to objective danger. The discourse of fear is shaped over time and helps create shared understandings that guide everyday life.

Building a framework for fear analysis

Fear as public discourse expands beyond specific referents to become a general orientation toward life (Ericson, Baranek, and Chan 1989; van Dijk 1988).
Entertainment formats contribute to a shift from mere recognition of danger to a more pervasive fear orientation, especially when fear is associated with children and schools.
The author situates fear within a broader process of media influence on identity and social life, arguing that fear is a dominant public perspective that helps define who we are and how we act.
The fear market has spawned a cottage industry of “victims” and a range of experts who market their agendas through self-help books, courses, research funding, and expertise (Best 1999, 2001). The expansion of mass media outlets (cable, Internet, niche newspapers) facilitates this social problem agenda.
In short, fear has become a pervasive framework for interpreting everyday life and for constructing social identities and social problems.

Personal narrative and the author’s working premise

The author recounts personal experiences with fear, starting with the fear of the devil in a fundamentalist upbringing, including vivid memories of looking for “flames” when passing taverns and theaters.
A turning point includes encounters with authority figures who personified fear in the form of religious figures and law enforcement (e.g., a sheriff who publicly degraded inmates in tents in extreme heat). These experiences illustrate how fear is propagated via authority figures and mass media, and how it can become both persuasive and politically influential.
The author links personal fear to broader social fear by asking what fear is, how it’s developed, and why fear is so widely shared. He cites Margolis (1996) on the phenomenon of “what everyone knows” and how reference groups shape what people believe—even when those beliefs may be wrong.
The central question becomes: How do mass media and popular culture shape fear, identities, and public discourse? The aim is to understand how fear becomes a framework for social life, not merely a response to crime.

The mass media and identity

Fear as a perspective is expanding in social life and public discourse, influencing language and social identity.
Three broad dynamics shape the mass-mediated identity landscape:
- Widespread audience involvement with media and popular culture (TV, film, music, brands).
- Pop culture offers many styles, personas, and potential role models; audiences are participants.
- The environment reflects media culture (theme parks, malls, media-infused spaces), with new standards for authenticity, credibility, and acceptability that are shared and taken for granted.
- Fear is embedded in these processes and helps define how people see themselves and their world.
The mass media contribute to defining situations and informing the generalized other (a concept from symbolic interactionism) as well as other social “others” through curated representations.
The identity process is reflexive: audiences experience products as identity signals (e.g., Nike, Guess), turning consumer labels into memberships and social identities; individuals buy to participate in a shared cultural identity.
Popular culture life involves five key features: (1) heavy audience involvement, (2) abundance of styles and personas, (3) audiences as participants, (4) environment reflecting media culture, and (5) shared criteria for authenticity and acceptability; fear is embedded in these features.
The authors argue that fear contributes to market-driven identity construction: products are marketed as identity-building tools, and people are encouraged to enact identities through consumption (cell phones for safety, alarms like The Club, etc.). Fear thus fuels a cycle of consumerism and identity production.
Narratives and identity are shaped via media communities that emerge as part of speech communities; these communities define appropriate identities, roles, language, and styles for their members (Scott 1968; Lyman and Scott’s idea of speech communities).
Identity, then, is not just a self-concept but an outcome of interaction with others and with media-propagated symbols; the generalized other is complemented by mass-mediated “others” and the broader market context.
The entertainment format of news and popular culture emphasizes absence of the ordinary, openness to adventure beyond routine, and suspension of disbelief; this format yields a familiar but heightened tempo that audiences come to accept as normal communication.
Fear becomes part of the meaning landscape: evocative communication (rather than referential) dominates, shaping how audiences interpret events and how they present themselves in social life.
The mass media convert identity into both a product and a signal; advertising appeals to shared identity signals and the desire to belong, which further reinforces consumer-based identities and fear-based motivations for consumption.

Narratives of identity and crisis

Narratives are not neutral; they reflect social order and communication processes. Historically, narratives mirrored the experiences of talk across communities; with mass media, narratives increasingly originate from mass media sources (e.g., 60 Minutes, Oprah, Jerry Springer).
Cerulo (1998) shows that the organization of a news narrative (the sequence of actions, whose perspective is emphasized, and whether a story centers on the victim, the perpetrator, or the context) affects public judgments of violence and crime. The sequencing of violent accounts can shape social opinion, highlighting media responsibility in shaping perceptions.
News and popular culture are intertwined with entertainment values; evocative formats dominate, and referential (factual) forms are increasingly secondary. The public’s sense of danger is shaped by entertainment formats and the media’s definition of “what is happening.”
The generalized other remains central, but the media supply many other publics and identities; audiences are guided by a broader circulation of media-coded identities rather than only by direct face-to-face interactions.
The rise of media culture leads to a cycle in which entertainment formats package fear and present social settings as dramatic adventures, thereby shaping ordinary life through a constant sense of risk.
The entertainment-news nexus reinforces the belief that fear is a normal condition of social life; it contributes to a pervasive sense of danger and to a social order that uses fear to justify social control measures and policy actions.
The concept of a fear-themed public sphere generates political and social consequences, including incentives for policy proposals and enforcement actions that rely on fear as a social regulator.
Cerulo’s work emphasizes the importance of how violence is framed and sequenced in news and entertainment; early frames (victim-focused or officer-focused) influence whether a violent act is seen as deviant or normal.

Iconography of fear

The discussion introduces the iconography of fear as a historical study of how fear is depicted in symbols and icons across eras.
Judy’s gun in Scottsdale is used to illustrate how fear manifests as a cultural symbol (icon) that travels across media channels: newspapers, TV news, film, neighbors’ discussions, and political rhetoric.
Iconography evolves with political contexts and information technologies; social scientists are urged to study how information technologies and social relations shape fear symbols and their targets.
Icons are powerful because symbols can carry complex ideas, including fears, social roles, and moral judgments. The cross in Christianity is cited as an icon that can symbolize fear as well as salvation; in advertising, Coca‑Cola and Nike symbolize lifestyles and social identities beyond the product.
The same iconography applies to weapons and the law; Judy’s concealed weapon is an emblem of safety and empowerment in a context of perceived danger. It is a response to a perceived risk amplified by media depictions and political discourse.
The historical arc: fear has moved from religious to secular icons; the information age magnifies icons through visuals, branding, and mass communication.
Carl Couch (1995) argues that social scientists must examine the intertwining of social relationships and information technologies to understand how fear is produced and sustained in modern society.
The iconography of fear ties to the broader concept of risk; the notion of risk shifts from risk as a natural peril to risk as a social condition produced by relationships between people and their systems of belief, commerce, and governance (Ewald 1993).
Naphy and Roberts (1997) provide a historical heuristic for fear in early modern Europe, noting distinctions between fear and anxiety and the role of authorities in preventing panic; they argue fear can be managed to avoid panic, which is crucial for social stability.
The chapter compares sixteenth-century plague era fears (e.g., rats as fear symbols) to modern fears (crime, drugs, youth) to show continuity in how societies use symbols to manage risk and socialize behavior.
Public opinion data: despite significant health and life expectancy improvements, Americans report high fear of crime; in the mid-1990s, crime and related issues dominated public concerns, influencing political and social policies.
Poll data highlights include: public concerns about crime as a major problem (e.g., around 1995-1996 polls); high percentages of older adults reporting crime as a serious problem; changes in dress, travel, and social behavior due to fear; a sizable portion of households owning firearms (e.g., 1994 data show about 25 ext{%} of homes with handguns). The data illustrate how fear translates into everyday behavior.
The discussion emphasizes that fear is a social product, shaped by mass media and popular culture rather than simply a malfunction of individual psychology.

Fear and social control

Fear is a component of social control: it helps regulate behavior, aligning individuals with social expectations through anticipation of punishment or social sanction.
The relationship between fear and social control is mediated by storytelling (oral traditions) and, in modern society, by mass media and information technologies. The shift toward a risk society emphasizes policing, control, and prevention of risks (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Staples 1997).
When a population is labeled as a risk, everything within it tends to be redefined as risky, creating a politics of prevention (Ewald 1993).
The tension between traditional oral storytelling (parochial, sacred views of social order) and secular mass media (risk-focused, crime-centric fear) shapes how societies manage control and fear.
The iconography of fear, its targets, and its symbols are central to understanding how authorities promote fear to justify social control and governance actions.
The historical arc shows fear as a tool of governance, evolving with media technologies and political contexts, and often used to justify punitive or coercive measures in the name of safety.

Fear in the communication environment

The mass media operate within the broader communication environment, shaping public perceptions through mechanisms such as priming, agenda setting, and framing (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1991).
Priming: TV news shapes which national problems people consider important by providing accessible, pre-formed cues (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).
Framing: Episodic versus thematic framing affects whether viewers attribute responsibility to individuals or to societal conditions (Iyengar 1991).
The circularity problem highlighted by Gunter (1987): greater fear can lead people to stay indoors and watch more TV, which in turn reinforces fears—a feedback loop between fear and media consumption.
The mass media typically short-circuit events, treating new events as like prior ones; instant replay and scrolling narratives contribute to collective forgetting and rapid, endless succession of concerns (Massumi 1993).
News formats and entertainment values shape how audiences understand risk and crime; sensational, dramatic presentation tends to dominate, and social control agencies (police, courts) align their messaging with media logic.
Edelman’s crisis theory: crises are defined in ways that promote political action and serve the interests of leaders and other interest groups; fear is used to mobilize public support for decisive actions (Edelman 1971, 1985).
The media’s portrayal of crime during the 1980s–1990s helped justify expanded police powers and aggressive crime-control policies; media narratives can influence policy beyond objective crime trends (Massumi 1993).
Fear in mass media is a tool for mass political communication and social organization; fear narratives contribute to political legitimacy for strong-state responses.

Rats, guns, and historical context of fear

The chapter links historical fears (rats, plague, arson, witchcraft) with contemporary fears (crime, drugs, youth, terrorism) to illustrate the continuity of fear as a social mechanism.
The plague-era fear context shows how fear was tied to religious and political power; rat control and social policing served as symbolic acts of social order.
The discussion emphasizes that fear is not a universal pathology but a social product shaped by historical conditions, technology, and political economy.
The modern fear regime remains anchored in media and consumer culture; entertainment formats fuel fear narratives that justify surveillance, control, and market-based identities.

Public perception, trust, and fear of crime

Public fear of crime in the 1990s is well-documented: about 70 ext{+}% of older adults considered crime a serious problem; shifts in public behavior included clothing choices, travel, and social interactions due to fear.
Trust in government has declined over decades: General Social Survey shows trust in others dropped from around 46.3 ext{%} in 1972 to 34.4 ext{%} in 1994; TV news consumption correlates with lower trust in others.
Research on fear and mistrust emphasizes a link between fear of crime and mistrust of government, media sensationalism, and perception of public policy efficacy.
Warr (1992) notes that fear often centers on children (third-person and altruistic fear) and that parents’ concern for children shapes fear narratives around crime and drugs.
Public opinion polls in the mid-1990s show crime as a dominant concern; about 27 ext{%} of the public saw crime and drugs as the top problems; these perceptions are amplified by media emphasis on crime.
Ferraro (1995) proposes perceptual criminology: fear of crime can be decoupled from actual victimization and lead to avoidance and increased security costs; media effects on risk interpretation warrant further study.
Chiricos, Eschholz, and Gertz (1997); Chiricos, Padgett, and Gertz (2000) show that mass media, especially TV news, affect perceptions of crime; critical journalism on crime coverage argues that fearoften outpaces actual crime trends.
Westfeldt and Wicker (1998) criticize coverage patterns showing that even as crime rates fell in the 1990s, fear and crime-focused stories rose dramatically on network news; this supports claims about media influence on public fear.
A key takeaway: the relationship between media and fear is complex and possibly bidirectional; media may prime or frame fear, while public fear may drive media demand for crime coverage.

Preoccupation with fear

The secular nature of modern society shifts fear from religious salvation to threats in everyday life (crime, drugs, youth, terrorism).
Fear in popular culture is tied to entertainment and consumerism; fear narratives provide social palliatives—solutions often delivered through technology and consumer products.
The mass media promote identity as a product and as a personal resource; fear helps sell products and generate participation in consumer culture.
The entertainment logic is the dominant mode of experience across business, politics, marketing, and education; entertainment is the primary context in which people consume, learn, and engage with fear-based messages (Crichton’s interpretation of a media-entertainment era).
Crichton (1999) suggests that in late 20th-century life, entertainment dominates across sectors; people want to be amused and engaged, which helps explain fear’s prominence as a mechanism for social engagement and policy justification.
The author acknowledges complexity: people do seek safety and escape, but media-driven fear remains a compelling tool for shaping social order and public policy, often under the banner of security and risk management.
Fear is characterized as a social product rather than an individual deficiency; it is produced by a “mass-mediated symbol machine” that informs social action and policy, including social control tactics in education and policing.
The chapter concludes by noting the ongoing interplay among fear, identity, and social order, with fear embedded in media formats, political discourse, and consumer culture; fear remains a central organizing principle for public perception and social life.

Key takeaways and concepts to remember

Discourse of fear: fear is a pervasive, symbolic framework shaping how people perceive risk and act in daily life; not just a response to crime but a social semiotics phenomenon.
Fear thematic: fear as a recurrent theme across narratives that organizes public discourse and everyday life; fear becomes a lens rather than a discrete concern.
Mass media and identity: media culture shapes social identities, norms, and expectations; fear frames how identities are formed and presented; consumers adopt identities via brands and media representations.
Narrative sequencing and responsibility: how stories are told (victim vs actor vs context) influences public opinion; media’s structure matters as much as content.
Iconography of fear: symbols (icons) evolve with technology and politics; Judy’s gun is an example of fear-objects that symbolize safety and empowerment within a fear-lueled social frame.
Risk and social control: fear and risk concepts have historically moved from natural dangers to social constructs that guide policy and policing; risk becomes a target for prevention and control.
Priming, framing, and agenda-setting: media shapes what people think about (priming), how they interpret issues (framing), and which issues are salient (agenda-setting).
Circularity in media fear: fear can increase media exposure, which in turn reinforces fear—a feedback loop in the public sphere.
Data and critique: polls and studies show fear of crime is widespread and influenced by media; debates exist about whether media causes fear or merely reflects pre-existing anxieties.
Ethical and practical implications: the rise of fear as a social product has implications for civil liberties, criminal justice policies, and the formation of social identities in consumer-era societies.

Important references and ideas to follow up on

Pfuhl and Henry (1993): definition of discourses of fear.
Barry Glassner (1999): The Culture of Fear.
Cantril, et al. (1940): classic study on fear and public perception.
Frank Furedi (1997): discussion of risk, fear, and lack of control.
Best (1995, 1999, 2001): commercialization and fragmentation of social problems in media.
Ericson and colleagues (1987, 1989, 1991, 1995): media framing of risk and social problems.
Iyengar and Kinder (1987); Iyengar (1991): priming and framing in television news.
Massumi (1993): fear as background radiation; entertainment as a mode of experience.
Cerulo (1998): sequencing in news narratives and its impact on public perception.
Edelman (1971, 1985): crises defined for political purposes.
Naphy and Roberts (1997): fear, anxiety, and the role of authorities in historical contexts.
Crichton (1999): entertainment as a dominant mode of experience across sectors.

Key numerical and statistical references (highlights for quick review)

Concealed-weapons permits in Arizona: after July 1994, more than 35{,}000 permits issued.
Poll and public opinion data cited include: a substantial share of the public sees crime as a problem (e.g., around 27{,}0{,}0{,}0 in some polls), fear statistics about talking to strangers (≈40 ext{%}), handgun ownership in homes (≈18 ext{%} in 1991 and 25 ext{%} in 1994).
Life expectancy comparisons: fourteenth to twentieth centuries, with modern life expectancy around 75-80 years in many places (Japan close to 80).
Crime fear and media coverage data: during the mid-1990s, crime stories in network news rose markedly while murder rates fell (Center for Media and Public Affairs cited; example figures include a ~600 ext{%} rise in murder stories while actual murders declined).
Trust data: General Social Survey numbers show trust in others declining from 46.3 ext{%} (1972) to 34.4 ext{%} (1994).

Connections to broader themes for exam preparation

How fear functions as a social emotion and a political tool in democracies.
The relationship between media industries, consumer culture, and social control.
The interplay between narrative structure, audience reception, and public policy.
Historical shifts in iconography and risk perception from medieval to contemporary times.
Methodological concerns in media studies: priming, framing, agenda setting, and the sequencing of narratives.
Ethical implications of fear-based discourses in journalism and political communication.

Study prompts

Explain how Judy’s concealed weapon case illustrates the central thesis of the discourse of fear in contemporary society.
Compare and contrast the notions of fear as a personal emotion vs fear as a social product. Which is more persuasive in explaining public policy changes?
Describe Cerulo’s findings on narrative sequencing and its impact on public opinion about crime.
Discuss how mass media contribute to identity formation through the concept of “identities-for-products” and the role of consumer brands in signaling social belonging.
Outline the evolution of fear iconography from historical to modern times, including the shift from religious to secular symbols and the role of information technology in that shift.

End of notes