Hard Determinism

Hard Determinism – The “Last” Category of Arguments

• Speaker introduces hard determinism as the final type of philosophical stance in the free-will debate.
• Hard determinists maintain two core theses:
– \text{Determinism is true.}
– Therefore, we do not possess metaphysical (ultimate, contra-causal) free will and we do not possess genuine moral responsibility.
• Contrast is set up with earlier views: libertarianism (not covered here) and compatibilism (covered previously).

Galen Strawson’s Specific Argument

• Galen Strawson (son of Peter F. Strawson) gives a concise hard-determinist argument:

1. We are only morally responsible for an act if we chose that act freely.

2. An act issues from one’s character.

3. Hence, to be responsible for an act, we must have freely chosen our own character.

4. Empirically, we do not freely choose our character:
   – Character is shaped by genes, early environment, social context, upbringing, etc.
   – These shaping factors are outside our control.

5. Therefore, we are not morally responsible.
   • Logical form is a regress/loop argument: any attempt to trace responsibility pushes the requirement of self-origination back further, and no endpoint satisfies the “chosen-by-self” criterion.

Relation to the Lecture’s Opening Claims

• Lecturer reminds us that, earlier, they already emphasized the causal sources of character (genes, environment).
• Galen’s argument dovetails with that empirical picture, reinforcing his conclusion that free will (in a robust metaphysical sense) is absent.

Compatibilism vs. Hard Determinism

• Compatibilism:
– Admits determinism but redefines “free will” so that ordinary decision-making counts.
– Claims that redefined free will is sufficient for praise, blame, and moral practices.
• Hard Determinism:
– Replies that compatibilism is merely “changing the subject.”
– What we want is real, metaphysical free will; anything else is a consolation prize.
• Key rhetorical move: hard determinist says “I was looking for metaphysical free will; compatibilist says ‘you can’t have that—take this lesser version.’ I refuse.”

Bedrock Disagreement: What Should We Even Ask For?

• The debate bottoms out in clashing intuitions/standards:
– Peter F. Strawson (the father): urges practical focus—look at how responsibility works institutionally and interpersonally.
– Galen Strawson (the son): insists we must stay with the metaphysically hard question.
• No straightforward argument edges out one side; it is a criterion clash.

Practical Aims & Their Ambiguity

• Lecturer notes: hard determinists rarely spell out practical recommendations.
• Questions raised:
– Should we abandon praise/blame?
– Stop holding each other accountable?
– Restructure interpersonal relationships?
• Observed reality: most hard determinists neither preach nor practice total abolition of moral practices.
– Suggests a possible disconnect: retaining everyday moral life while denying its ultimate grounding.

What Is the Point, Then?

• Hypothesis: hard determinists’ real point reduces to the claim that “metaphysical free will does not exist.”
• But that starting point was already supplied by the naturalistic worldview plus determinism.
• Therefore, hard determinism may not advance the debate; it merely re-asserts the deterministic picture.

Overall Take-Aways

• Hard determinism squarely rejects compatibilist redefinitions.
• Galen Strawson’s regress argument centers the role of unchosen character.
• Debate divides over whether we should care about metaphysical freedom or accept practical sufficiency.
• Practical implications remain unclear; most theorists continue everyday moral life, even while denying its metaphysical foundation.
• Thus, the discussion risks circularity: begin with determinism ⇒ conclude no free will ⇒ repeat.