Category 2

The International Space Station retires soon. NASA won't run its future replacement.

Since its first modules launched at the end of 1998, the International Space Station has been orbiting 250 miles above Earth. But at the end of 2030, NASA plans to crash the ISS into the ocean after it is replaced with a new space station, a reminder that nothing within Earth's orbit can stay in space forever.

NASA is collaborating on developing a space station owned, built, and operated by a private company — either Axiom Space, Voyager Space, or Blue Origin. NASA is giving each company hundreds of millions of dollars in funding and sharing their expertise with them.

Eventually, they will select one company to officially partner with and have them replace the ISS. NASA says this will help them focus on deep space exploration, which they consider a much more difficult task.

But any company that is able to develop their own space station, get approval from the federal government and launch it into space will be able to pursue their own deep space missions – even without the approval of NASA.

Phil McCalister, director of the Commercial Space Division of NASA, told NPR's Morning Edition that NASA does not want to own in perpetuity everything in low-Earth orbit – which is up to 1,200 miles above Earth's surface.

"We want to turn those things over to other organizations that could potentially do it more cost-effectively, and then focus our research and activities on deep space exploration," said McCalister.

McCalister says the ISS could stay in space longer, but it's much more cost-effective for NASA to acquire a brand new station with new technology. NASA would then transition to purchasing services from commercial entities as opposed to the government building a next-generation commercial space station.

How space stations of the past inform the future

The ISS was designed in the 80s, so the technology when it was first built was very different from what is available today.

"I kind of see this as like an automobile. When we bought that automobile in 1999, it was state of the art. And it has been great. And it serves us well and continues to be safe. But it's getting older. It's getting harder to find spare parts. The maintenance for that is becoming a larger issue," McCalister said.

A new, private space station will have a lot of similarities and some differences from the current ISS.

Robyn Gatens, director of the International Space Station, says that despite it aging, not all the technology on the ISS is out of date.

"We've been evolving the technology on the International Space Station since it was first built. So some of these technologies will carry over to these private space stations," said Gatens. "We've upgraded the batteries, we've upgraded and added solar arrays that roll out and are flexible, we've been upgrading our life support systems."

Paulo Lozano is the director of the Space Propulsion Laboratory at MIT and an aerospace engineer. He said, "NASA has already changed the solar panels at least once and switched them from these very large arrays that produce relatively little power, to these smaller arrays that produce much more power. All the computer power at the beginning is nothing compared to what can be done today."

Gatens says the structure of the space station – which is the size of a football field – is what can't be upgraded and replaced. And something of that size is costly for NASA to maintain.

"The big structure, even though it's doing very well, has a finite lifetime. It won't last forever. It is affected by the environment that it's in. And every time we dock a vehicle and undock a vehicle, the thermal environment puts stresses and loads on that primary structure that will eventually make it wear out," said Gatens.

Gatens says we can expect a new space station to be designed a little more efficiently and right sized for the amount of research that NASA and its partners are going to want to do in low-Earth orbit.

What astronauts want in new stations

The structure of the ship is also extremely important to the people who work there.

The ISS carries scientists who perform research that can only be done in the weak gravity of space, like medical research. In space, cells age more quickly and conditions progress more rapidly, helping researchers understand the progression of things like heart disease or cancer more quickly.

Researchers on the ISS also work to understand what happens to the human body when it's exposed to microgravity. This research is aimed at helping develop ways to counteract the negative effects of being in space and let astronauts stay there longer – something essential to getting a human on Mars.

Gatens says a new space station will have updated research facilities.

"I'm looking forward to seeing very modern laboratory equipment on these space stations. We say the International Space Station has a lot of capability, but it's more like a test kitchen. I'm looking forward to seeing the future commercial space stations take these laboratory capabilities and really develop them into state-of-the-art space laboratories," said Gatens.

On top of having modern research facilities, new space stations will likely be designed to provide a cleaner environment for researchers.

"If you see pictures of the station, you'll think 'how can they work there?' It looks cluttered, it looks messy," Astronaut Peggy Whitson told NPR. She's spent more time in space than any other woman and is the first woman to command the ISS. Whitson is now Director of Human Spaceflight and an astronaut at Axiom Space, one of the companies funded by NASA to develop a space station.

Whitson said the reason there are cables all over the place is because the structure of the station wasn't designed for some of the systems it has now. She thinks having a method for making a station even more adaptable to new technology will be important in terms of user experience.

Whitson doesn't know what technology will be available five years from now. But she said Axiom Space will want to take advantage of whatever they can get their hands on, ideally without wires everywhere.

"I would like all that cabling and networking to be behind the panels so that it's easier for folks to move around in space," Whitson said. "Having and building in that adaptability is one of the most critical parts, I think, of building a station for low-Earth orbit."

Paulo Lozano says many of the electronic components on the ISS are bulky. But now that electronics are smaller, she expects the interior of future stations might be a bit different.

At the current ISS, there is one small inflatable module. That structure flies up, collapsed, and then expands as it gets filled with air once it's attached to the primary structure of the station — with it literally blowing up kind of like a balloon. Gatens says they are looking at multiple elements of a new space station being inflatable.

Whitson told NPR that on the space station Axiom Space is developing, they will have windows in the crew quarters and a huge cupola, what she describes as an astronaut's window to the world. On the ISS, they have a cupola you can pop your head and shoulders into and see 360-degree views of space and look down at the Earth.

On the proposed Axiom space station, Whitson said the cupola is so large that astronauts will be able to float their whole body in there and have it be an experience of basically almost flying in space.

Why commercialize low-Earth orbit?

NASA hopes that by handing responsibility of an ISS replacement over to private companies, it will allow the agency to develop technology more quickly and focus on their next goal of putting a station beyond low-Earth orbit for the first time. Current proposed low-Earth orbit stations include the Lunar Gateway, which is NASA's planned space station on the moon.

"What the space stations of today are doing is just paving the way for humans to actually explore deeper into space, which is going to be a significantly harder challenge to accomplish. The space stations of today are essential stepping stones towards that goal," said Lozano.

Gatens says one piece of technology that is being developed at Blue Origin is a big rotating space station that, when finished, would have artificial gravity.

For long trips in space, the lack of gravity is a main issue for the human body, causing bone-loss and other health issues. "If you could recreate that in space, that will be very beneficial," Gatens said.

Lozano says that a space station beyond low-Earth orbit would need new technology that is radically different from what's been used in the ISS. And both NASA and Lozano don't think it is possible to venture deeper into space, and eventually get a human on Mars, with U.S. government funding alone.

"I don't think we're very far away in terms of technology development. I think we're a little bit far away in terms of investment, because space technology is quite expensive and sometimes a single nation cannot really make it work by itself. So you need international cooperation." Lozano said.

NASA Selects International Space Station US Deorbit Vehicle

NASA is fostering continued scientific, educational, and technological developments in low Earth orbit to benefit humanity, while also supporting deep space exploration at the Moon and Mars. As the agency transitions to commercially owned space destinations closer to home, it is crucial to prepare for the safe and responsible deorbit of the International Space Station in a controlled manner after the end of its operational life in 2030.

NASA announced SpaceX has been selected to develop and deliver the U.S. Deorbit Vehicle that will provide the capability to deorbit the space station and ensure avoidance of risk to populated areas.

“Selecting a U.S. Deorbit Vehicle for the International Space Station will help NASA and its international partners ensure a safe and responsible transition in low Earth orbit at the end of station operations. This decision also supports NASA’s plans for future commercial destinations and allows for the continued use of space near Earth,” said Ken Bowersox, associate administrator for Space Operations Mission Directorate at NASA Headquarters in Washington. “The orbital laboratory remains a blueprint for science, exploration, and partnerships in space for the benefit of all.”

While the company will develop the deorbit spacecraft, NASA will take ownership after development and operate it throughout its mission. Along with the space station, it is expected to destructively breakup as part of the re-entry process.

Since 1998, five space agencies, CSA (Canadian Space Agency), ESA (European Space Agency), JAXA (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency), NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), and State Space Corporation Roscosmos, have operated the International Space Station with each agency responsible for managing and controlling the hardware it provides. The station was designed to be interdependent and relies on contributions from across the partnership to function. The United States, Japan, Canada, and the participating countries of ESA have committed to operating the station through 2030. Russia has committed to continued station operations through at least 2028. The safe deorbit of the International Space Station is the responsibility of all five space agencies.

The single-award contract has a total potential value of $843 million. The launch service for the U.S. Deorbit Vehicle will be a future procurement.

In its 24th year of continuously crewed operations, the space station is a unique scientific platform where crew members conduct experiments across multiple disciplines of research, including Earth and space science, biology, human physiology, physical sciences, and technology demonstrations not possible on Earth. Crews living aboard station are the hands of thousands of researchers on the ground having conducted more than 3,300 experiments in microgravity. Station is the cornerstone of space commerce, from commercial crew and cargo partnerships to commercial research and national lab research, and lessons learned aboard International Space Station are helping to pass the torch to future commercial stations.

Politicians must not ignore security threats in space

Increased military reliance on space brings new threats and challenges along with it, and Western policymakers need to urgently adapt.

News that the U.S. had intelligence regarding Russian attempts to deploy nuclear capabilities in space rocked Washington D.C. last month. And though leaders in Congress and President Joe Biden’s administration were quick to temper ensuing panic, making clear that there was no imminent danger to the U.S. or its allies, the disclosure itself highlights some important facts.

The military threat in space is real, and it is growing. Furthermore, as the conflict in Ukraine shows, modern warfare is almost entirely dependent on space-based capabilities, with forces on both sides relying on satellites for communications, situational awareness and targeting enemy positions.

But this increased military reliance on space brings new threats and challenges along with it.

It’s no secret that Russia and China are investing heavily in space-based capabilities. Both have carried out well publicized anti-satellite missile tests, and Russia is known to have ground-based laser weapons designed to blind satellite sensors. Moscow has even been explicit in stating that it sees Western commercial satellites as legitimate targets in any future conflict.

However, the development of nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapons in outer space would mark a significant escalation — and it would also be in direct violation of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which prohibits “any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” in orbit.

Moreover, as space becomes increasingly important to warfare, there is an added danger that countries lacking sophisticated space-based capabilities — such as Iran — could attempt to level the playing field in a future conflict by launching land-based missiles to hit targets in space. In such a case, satellites in the orbits closest to earth would be particularly vulnerable. And that’s not all.

A hostile actor may also attempt to destroy a handful of satellites in low-earth orbits to create a dangerous cloud of debris. Such a move would then knock out further satellites, damaging not only military capabilities but threatening all global services that rely on a satellite connection.

Western policymakers thus need to urgently adapt for these new threats.

First, we need to clearly signal the consequences of escalation in space to Russia. If we leave space as a gray zone, it will only encourage our adversaries to test us, risking miscalculation. NATO took an important step in this regard in 2021, when leaders agreed that the Article 5 collective defense clause could be invoked by “attacks to, from, or within space.”

The next step should now be to take defensive measures, as in other domains, signaling our resolve to maintain stability in space.

Second, space needs to be treated as critical infrastructure. Activities and capabilities in space are essential to our national security as well as our economies and day-to-day lives, which is why military strategists need to work more closely with regulators and space agencies. Space is a delicate ecosystem, and any military escalation would have severe consequences for all other activities that rely on satellite connections.

Finally, we need to understand that threats to human activity in space stem not only from malign states but any actions that unduly increase the risk of space debris. NASA recognizes this, listing orbital debris as the “number one threat to spacecraft, satellites, and astronauts.” And this danger was again highlighted last month, when a U.S. research satellite narrowly avoided a Russian Electronic and Signals Intelligence satellite in low-earth orbit.

In the coming years, as the number of objects we send into space increases at an exponential rate, the risk of such collisions is set to skyrocket. In 2018, there were around 2,000 active satellites in space. That number has more than tripled, and there could be 100,000 or more active satellites by the end of the decade. This growth is driven by the launch of mega-constellations of commercial satellites by companies like SpaceX or Amazon. And the rush to populate space with so many satellites in such a short period of time brings serious risks that have yet to be properly addressed.

To this day, we lack a clear understanding of how much is too much in space. When looking at an overall threat assessment, policymakers need to understand the consequences and management of what is being put into orbit — not just the potential threat of new anti-satellite weaponry. We shouldn’t assume that putting up more satellites necessarily makes a constellation more resilient to attacks. On the contrary, doing so may well make it more fragile, leaving it vulnerable to a series of cascading collisions that could be instigated by an attack.

Space is often said to be the next geopolitical frontier. However, the reality is that it’s already the key domain for strategic competition between countries. The immediate furor in Washington over potential new Russian capabilities may have passed, but the focus on threats in space should not.  

For too long, space has existed at the outer reaches of our political consciousness. And given the central role that activities in our orbits play for our economies, societies and security, this must change — urgently.  

Happy 4th Birthday to the U.S. Space Force!

The U.S. Space Force (USSF) turns four today. The youngest branch of the U.S. military was established on December 20, 2019, with the passage of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act. Here are a few things to know about the newest U.S. military service.

Space Force was created to address the growing importance of space to both national security and everyday life. Just as the U.S. Marine Corps is part of the Department of the Navy, Space Force is organized under the Department of the Air Force. Space Force’s ties to the air force are understandable. It was created by merging twenty-three different air force units, and Air Force General John W. “Jay” Raymond was named its first chief of space operations. Last year, another air force veteran, General B. Chance Saltzman, succeeded Raymond as chief of space operations. The air force’s influence over the USSF will likely continue for some time—it handles more than 75 percent of the space force’s logistics work.

Space Force’s mission is to organize, train, and prepare its service members “to conduct global space operations that enhance the way our joint and coalition forces fight, while also offering decision makers military options to achieve national objectives.” Its specific responsibilities include operating missile detection networks and the Geographic Positioning System (GPS) constellation—the set of satellites that your smartphone, among other applications, uses to pinpoint your location. The USSF also monitors both intentional and unintended threats (e.g., “space junk”) to the 6,718 satellites active in space—more than half of which U.S. owners operate. And it works to enhance U.S. space strategy and the international rules governing space.

Members of space force are called “guardians.” (No, they do not take their name from Cleveland’s professional baseball team or Marvel’s band of galaxy saviors.) Space Force’s motto is Semper Supra, or “Always Above.” As Space Force hits its fourth birthday, it has 8,600 uniformed guardians. To put that number in perspective, the next smallest service, the coast guard, has nearly 43,000 active-duty service members. Space Force is expected to grow next year with a requested 2024 budget of $30 billion as individuals currently serving in the army, navy, air force, and marines transfer into the service. But Space Force was established with the expectation that it would remain a small (and relatively agile) organization. So don’t bank on it ever rivaling the size of the air force (329,000 active-duty personnel), let alone the army (482,000 active-duty personnel).

Although Space Force is the first independent service of its kind in U.S. history, it isn’t the U.S. military’s first space-centered program. Shortly after World War II ended, the Army Air Forces (the predecessor of the U.S. Air Force) turned its attention and funding to satellite and rocket technology. In 1985, the Defense Department organized U.S. Space Command, which was charged with planning military operations in the domain of space. In 2002, Space Command was absorbed into U.S. Strategic Command. It was reactivated as a distinct combatant command in 2019 and now works closely with Space Force. Meanwhile, U.S. military leaders and policymakers debated the need for an independent branch for space for years before President Donald Trump pushed for the USSF’s establishment.

Space Force stands separate from NASA, the United States’ civilian space agency, though the two are frequent collaborators. In April 2022, the two agreed to share information on near-earth objects to help inform efforts to eventually construct a planetary defense strategy against asteroids. USSF also cooperates with international partners, such as Japan and Norway.

I asked Col. Kristen D. Thompson, an air force officer spending a year as a visiting military fellow in CFR’s David Rockefeller Studies Program, to recommend readings for anyone looking to learn more about the space force. Here’s what she suggested:

Loren Grush, The Six: The Untold Story of America’s First Women Astronauts (2023). In this magnificent book, Grush chronicles the stories of six extraordinary women astronauts. Each woman made her indelible mark on the development of the U.S. space program. Along the way they inspired subsequent generations to dream about flying on the NASA Space Shuttle and orbiting in space. The rigorous training, media attention, self-sacrifice, and gender bias all played a role in each of the astronaut’s careers and remarkable journeys. It is worth the read to see how each conquered her fears and silenced her critics.

Robert Kurson, Rocket Men: The Daring Odyssey of Apollo 8 and the Astronauts Who Made Man’s First Journey to the Moon (2018), is a great add to one’s personal library. The danger, courage, audacity, and leadership needed by the crew of Apollo 8 to depart earth and head to the moon is riveting. The Apollo 8 mission also took place during the backdrop of an interesting and poignant year in the United States. Kurson extolls the bravery in undertaking this extraordinary mission while the nation dealt with Vietnam’s Tet Offensive, the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy, and the riots at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

Tim Marshall, The Future of Geography: How the Competition in Space Will Change Our World (2023). Marshall details the inevitable space race and ensuing power struggles among great power competitors–the United States, China, and Russia. The book also discusses the intense economic challenges surrounding the space race that will continue to transform geopolitics. Marshall offers valuable insight into how this will affect leaders, nations, and people throughout the world in the foreseeable future. It is a great read for anyone interested or invested in space technology to know what to expect in the future.

Rush Doshi, The Long Game (2021). Straight from the secretary of the air force’s reading list, Doshi’s masterful and comprehensive work details China’s ambition for domination on the global stage. Doshi argues that efforts to accommodate or change China are unlikely to succeed, so the most logical alternative strategy is that of competition. Guardians understand that the future is dependent upon their innovative ideas to preserve freedom of action in the ever-important space domain, especially in the great power competition with a near peer adversary.

StarTalk, from New York City’s Museum of Natural History and Hayden Planetarium. Dr. Neil deGrasse Tyson and his rotating hosts bridge science, pop culture, sports, comedy, and science through an interesting podcast. The hosts dive into the military’s newest service on the episode, “Space Force: A New Domain with Maj Gen DeAnna Burt, Charles Liu, and Moriba Jah.” In fifty-five minutes, you learn, laugh, think deep thoughts, and grow to not only love the hosts for their intelligent and thought-provoking questions but the guests with their fascinating answers as well. You can listen on YouTube or any of the popular podcast platforms.

To get a good feel for the comprehensive necessity for a United States Space Force, look no further than the U.S. Space Force website where you can watch the video short called, “Never a Day Without Space.” The video centers on the everyday importance of the constellation of Global Positioning System satellites (GPS). The U.S. Space Force operates the GPS which was conceived in the Pentagon in 1973 and has since grown to more than thirty satellites. These satellites are a resilient system designed to maintain the signals required for accurate positioning, navigation, and timing around the world. The video is just four minutes in length but packs a punch in understanding what life would be like if we lost control of the space domain.

The growing military and commercial role of space means that the importance of Space Force will only increase in the future. So Happy Birthday to the U.S. military’s youngest branch, and a tip of the cap to all new and incoming guardians of the space force for their service.

NATO’s overarching Space Policy

INTRODUCTION

1. Space is increasingly important for the Alliance’s and Allies’ security and prosperity.  Space brings benefits in multiple areas from weather monitoring, environment and agriculture, to transport, science, communications and banking.  The use of space has greatly enhanced Allies’ and NATO’s ability to anticipate threats and respond to crises with greater speed, effectiveness and precision. The evolution in the uses of space and rapid advances in space technology have created new opportunities, but also new risks, vulnerabilities, and potentially threats for the Alliance’s and Allies’ security and defence. Today, access to, and use of, space is no longer the prerogative of a few nations that are technically capable of launching and operating a spacecraft. Space technology and services have become more readily accessible, cheaper and more capable.  Most space capabilities are dual use, serving civilian/commercial as well as military purposes, often at the same time, further adding to the complexity of the space domain¹.  In security and defence terms, space is increasingly contested, congested and competitive and requires the Alliance to be able to operate in a disrupted, denied and degraded environment. Allies’ space capabilities could become a high priority target given the advantages that space systems provide in conflict and given Allies’ dependence on these systems to enable operations.   

SPACE-RELATED THREAT ENVIRONMENT

2. Space is a unique physical domain which is challenging Allies’ traditional perceptions of time, distance and geography. Potential adversaries are developing, testing and operationalising sophisticated counter-space technologies that could threaten Allies' access to, and freedom to operate in space. These technologies comprise a diverse range of counter-space capabilities to disrupt, degrade, deceive, deny, or destroy capabilities and services on which Allies – and the Alliance – might critically depend. Potential adversaries are increasing their own use of space, thereby extending their ability to project power over greater distances, with increased precision, speed and effectiveness. They are also using space capabilities to track NATO and Allies’ forces, exercises, and other activities. Satellite navigation and commercial services are also used for planning and targeting by potential adversaries, including by non-state actors. The capabilities being developed by potential adversaries could be used against the Alliance in order to, inter alia:

   1. Hold space assets at risk, thereby complicating NATO’s ability to take decisive action in a crisis or conflict;

   2. Deny or degrade Allies’ and NATO space-based capabilities critical to battlespace management and situational awareness and the ability to operate effectively in a crisis or conflict;

   3. Create impacts on Allies’ space systems that are damaging or disruptive to economic or public life and violate the principle of free use of space, yet fall below the thresholds of threat of force, use of force, armed attack or aggression.

3. Space-related threats and risks can vary in form and intensity, ranging from low-end, non-kinetic systems which create reversible effects (such as jamming of communications or GPS signals), to non-kinetic and high-end kinetic capabilities that produce irreversible effects and which may result in significant and adverse long-term impacts to the space environment. In particular, the latter can produce space debris, leading to reduced accessibility and usability of orbits and collateral damage.  It is worth noting that both space-based (satellites) and ground-based (ground stations and launchers) segments, as well as the links between them, can be the targets of such capabilities.  In addition to man-made risks, space systems are also vulnerable to natural hazards and accidents.
    

4. A number of nations are developing counter-space and anti-satellite systems². Potential adversaries in particular are pursuing the development of a wide range of capabilities from non-kinetic (such as dazzling, blinding and jamming of space assets) to kinetic destructive systems (such as direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, on orbit anti-satellite systems, and laser and electro-magnetic capabilities). Such space destruction, disruption, degradation and denial capabilities are further exacerbated by the susceptibility of space to hybrid approaches and the associated difficulty of attributing harmful effects to space systems.  Some threats, such as signal jamming and cyber-attacks, can potentially be caused also by non-state actors, including terrorist organisations. Many threats to Allies’ space systems originate in the cyber domain and are likely to increase. 

 PRINCIPLES AND TENETS

5. This overarching NATO space policy is based on a number of principles and tenets which are consistent with those of the Alliance’s overall posture:

   1. Space is essential to coherent Alliance deterrence and defence;

   2. Space is an inherently global environment and any conflict that extends into space has the potential to affect all users of space.  Even in cases where NATO is not involved in conflict, Allies’ space systems could be affected;

   3. The free access, exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes is in the common interest of all nations. NATO and Allies will continue to carry out all activities in outer space in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding³;

   4. Space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty⁴; 

   5. Allies will retain jurisdiction and control over their objects in space⁵ as well as full authority and sovereignty over their space capabilities and resources;

   6. Considering that the Alliance is not aiming to develop space capabilities of its own⁶, Allies will undertake to provide, on a voluntary basis and in accordance with national laws, regulations and policies, the space data, products, services or effects that could be required for the Alliance’s operations, missions, and other activities;

   7. NATO is not aiming to become an autonomous space actor. NATO will seek to complement and add value to the work of Allies and to engage with other relevant international organisations, as appropriate, avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort.

 NATO’S APPROACH TO SPACE

6. Key roles. Consistent with the principles outlined above, NATO’s overall approach to space will focus on the following key roles:

   1. Integrating space and space-related considerations into the delivery of NATO’s core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and, where appropriate, cooperative security; 

   2. Serving as a forum for political-military consultations and information sharing on relevant deterrence and defence-related space developments, with a view to informing the Alliance’s situational awareness, decision-making, readiness and posture management across the spectrum of conflict. Such consultations could cover threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and opportunities, and take into account the development of legal and behavioural norms in other fora;

   3. Ensuring effective provision of space support and effects to the Alliance’s operations, missions and other activities;  

   4. Facilitating the development of compatibility and interoperability between Allies’ space services, products and capabilities.

In support of these key roles, NATO will pursue a number of lines of effort, as outlined below.

7. Space support in operations, missions and other activities.  Continuous and secure access to space services, products and capabilities is essential for the credibility of the Alliance’s posture, management of that posture, and the conduct of the Alliance’s operations, missions and other activities.  NATO requires space systems in the following functional areas:

   1. Space situational awareness is required to understand the operational environment, which enhances the Alliance’s strategic anticipation and resilience.  It is a prerequisite to identify risks and threats in space, from space, and to space, and to propose mitigation measures;

   2. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance requires space capabilities for strategic, operational and tactical assessment, situational awareness and to support decision-making and planning;

   3. Space-based monitoring of the atmospheric, oceanic and space environments is important for planning and execution of NATO missions and operations;

   4. Satellite communications are essential in all NATO missions. NATO operations require the availability of satellite communications to efficiently and effectively support consultation, command and control;

   5. Positioning, navigation and timing is essential in all NATO missions. It enables precise positioning and allows for the synchronisation of effort across the full spectrum of military operations;

   6. Shared early warning is a capability that contributes to deterrence and defence by providing persistent monitoring and warning of missile events and other services.

8. NATO will identify and, if necessary, develop appropriate mechanisms, based on voluntary participation, to fulfil and sustain requirements for space support in NATO operations, missions and other activities in the above functional areas. Allies’ capabilities, and, if necessary, trusted commercial service providers should be leveraged to meet these requirements in the most secure, efficient, effective and transparent manner. 
    

9. In November 2019, NATO declared space as an operational domain, which will help to ensure a coherent approach to the integration of space into NATO’s overall deterrence and defence posture. In October 2020, NATO established a NATO Space Centre⁷ at Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany. A NATO Space Centre of Excellence is also being established in Toulouse, France. 
    

10. Space domain awareness. NATO is developing space domain awareness through a number of actions:

    1. Raising general political and military awareness across the Alliance about NATO’s reliance on space and the importance of the Alliance’s continuous and secure access to the space services, capabilities and effects it requires;

    2. Building a shared understanding of the evolving space-related threats and vulnerabilities, including through continued information and intelligence sharing among Allies, as well as fusion and assessment of this material at NATO level;  

    3. Continuing voluntary sharing of information and data on relevant national space activities.
        

11. Deterrence, defence and resilience. Space must be seen as an integral part of the Alliance’s broad approach to deterrence and defence, drawing upon all of the tools at NATO’s disposal, to provide the Alliance with a broad range of options to be able to respond to any threats from wherever they arise. To this end:

    1. Considering that Allies have recognised that space is essential to the Alliance’s deterrence and defence, and to a coherent Alliance posture, the Alliance will consider a range of potential options, for Council approval, across the conflict spectrum to deter and defend against threats to or attacks on Allies’ space systems, as appropriate and in line with the principles and tenets outlined in this policy;

    2. The Alliance should develop a common understanding of concepts such as the role of space in crisis or conflict;

    3. As part of the effort to increase the readiness and ability of the Alliance to operate decisively across all operational domains (land, maritime, air and cyber), due consideration will need to be given to the role of space as a key enabler for operational domains, as well as for NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence, and, for Allies concerned, nuclear deterrence;

    4. While resilience and survivability of Allies’ space systems is a national responsibility, NATO will consider ways to improve space resilience Alliance-wide, including through sharing of best practices, and by exploiting force-multiplying redundancies in space capabilities owned by Allies;

    5. Guidelines will need to be developed on how to secure and ensure NATO’s access to space data, products, services and capabilities.

12. At the 2021 Brussels Summit, Allies agreed that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, the impact of which could threaten national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability, and could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. Such attacks could lead to the invocation of Article 5. A decision as to when such attacks would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.⁸

13. Capability development and interoperability.  NATO will pursue a number of work strands related to capability development and interoperability, pertaining to space:

    1. Allies have previously agreed on the need to be cognisant of the enabling role of space capabilities and the growing importance of space for NATO operations, missions and other activities, while at the same time recognising that Allies retain full authority and sovereignty over their space capabilities and resources;

    2. NATO will encourage cooperation between Allies to enhance the compatibility and interoperability of their space capabilities, including through information sharing (e.g. Space Situational Awareness) and coordination, joint development and production, standardization and related doctrinal, legal and procedural work;

    3. The space domain should be appropriately reflected in the context of the relevant NATO capability development programmes.

14. Training and exercises. NATO also has an important role to play in the area of Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation with a view to advancing Alliance-wide understanding of the space domain, taking into account the extensive network of NATO’s educational and training facilities, multinational education and training institutions, entities and programmes.  Space should continue to feature more consistently and prominently in NATO exercises, to include partial or complete loss of access to space services provided by Allies’ capabilities. NATO forces should be prepared to operate when space support in operations is degraded, denied or disrupted.
     

15. Strategic Communications and responsible space behaviours. NATO will continue to communicate on NATO’s approach to space based on concrete decisions and developments. NATO and Allies support international efforts to develop norms, rules and principles of responsible space behaviours.
     

16. Science, technology and innovation. NATO will consider ways to better exploit scientific, research and technological capacity that exists across the Alliance (e.g. the NATO Communication and Information Agency, the Science and Technology Organisation, relevant NATO educational and training facilities and NATO-accredited Centres of Excellence), as well as the work in innovation and experimentation which is being led by Allied Command Transformation, with a view to contributing to space awareness and effective application of space capabilities and services to meet the Alliance’s political and military objectives. 
     

17. Industry.  Allies should also explore opportunities to foster cooperation with space-related industry and the commercial sector through readily available frameworks (e.g. the NATO Industrial Advisory Group and the NATO-Industry Forum).
     

18. Partnerships. NATO will engage with selected partners and relevant international organisations, such as the UN and the EU, on space and space-related aspects, as appropriate, and where it adds value to NATO’s core tasks.

NATO SPACE TERMINOLOGY

In the context of NATO’s overarching space policy, the following terminology is used:

Space. Space is the ‘volume’ beyond the upper limits of airspace⁹.

Space system. A space system can include: (1) the space segment (all elements in orbit); 2) the ground segment (ground station and command and control centre); 3) the data links (uplink, downlink and cross-link); and 4) the user segment (decision-makers and deployed forces).

Space capability. The capability using space systems, which supports, among others, military commanders, staffs and forces in all operational domains.

Space services. The services provided by space systems to users in order to enable them to conduct operations (e.g. SATCOM and PNT).

Space data.  The information acquired, produced and provided by space systems or relayed to or through space systems necessary for the provision of space-based products and services.

Space products. Space products are synthesised and processed data used for operations (e.g., satellite images, weather forecasts and satellite reconnaissance advanced notice).

Space support. Space support is the ability to support operations through the provision of data, products and services, provided or procured by space-capable nations, governmental and commercial organisations.

Space domain awareness. Shared understanding of the operational space-related environment, threats and vulnerabilities that encompasses the functional areas: Space Situational Awareness (SSA), Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT), Satellite Communications (SATCOM), Meteorological Services (METOC), Shared Early Warning (SEW), with regard to the implications for NATO’s ability to conduct operations, missions and activities in other domains. 

NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY

During the past 50 years, U.S. leadership in space activities has benefited the global economy, enhanced our national security, strengthened international relationships, advanced scientific discovery, and improved our way of life. Space capabilities provide the United States and our allies unprecedented advantages in national decision-making, military operations, and homeland security. Space systems provide national security decision-makers with unfettered global access and create a decision advantage by enabling a rapid and tailored response to global challenges. Moreover, space systems are vital to monitoring strategic and military developments as well as supporting treaty monitoring and arms control verification. Space systems are also critical in our ability to respond to natural and man-made disasters and monitor longterm environmental trends. Space systems allow people and governments around the world to see with clarity, communicate with certainty, navigate with accuracy, and operate with assurance. Maintaining the benefits afforded to the United States by space is central to our national security, but an evolving strategic environment increasingly challenges U.S. space advantages. Space, a domain that no nation owns but on which all rely, is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. These challenges, however, also present the United States with opportunities for leadership and partnership. Just as the United States helped promote space security in the 20th century, we will build on this foundation to embrace the opportunities and address the challenges of this century. The National Security Space Strategy charts a path for the next decade to respond to the current and projected space strategic environment. Leveraging emerging opportunities will strengthen the U.S. national security space posture while maintaining and enhancing the advantages the United States gains from space. Our strategy requires active U.S. leadership enabled by an approach that updates, balances, and integrates all of the tools of U.S. power. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Intelligence Community (IC), in coordination with other departments and agencies, will implement this strategy by using it to inform planning, programming, acquisition, operations, and analysis.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

“The now-ubiquitous and interconnected nature of space capabilities and the world’s growing dependence on them mean that irresponsible acts in space can have damaging consequences for all of us.” - 2010 National Space Policy Space is vital to U.S. national security and our ability to understand emerging threats, project power globally, conduct operations, support diplomatic efforts, and enable global economic viability. As more nations and non-state actors recognize these benefits and seek their own space or counterspace capabilities, we are faced with new opportunities and new challenges in the space domain. The current and future strategic environment is driven by three trends – space is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. Space is increasingly congested. Growing global space activity and testing of China’s destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) system have increased congestion in important areas in space. DoD tracks approximately 22,000 man-made objects in orbit, of which 1,100 are active satellites (see Figure 1). There may be as many as hundreds of thousands of additional pieces of debris that are too small to track with current sensors. Yet these smaller pieces of debris can damage satellites in orbit

Today’s space environment contrasts with earlier days of the space age in which only a handful of nations needed to be concerned with congestion. Now there are approximately 60 nations and government consortia that own and operate satellites, in addition to numerous commercial and academic satellite operators (see Figure 2). This congestion – along with the effects of operational use, structural failures, accidents involving space systems, and irresponsible testing or employment of debris-producing destructive ASATs – is complicating space operations for all those that seek to benefit from space. Increased congestion was highlighted by the 2009 collision between a Russian government Cosmos satellite and a U.S. commercial Iridium satellite. The collision created approximately 1,500 new pieces of trackable space debris, adding to the more than 3,000 pieces of debris created by the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. These two events greatly increased the cataloged population of orbital debris. Another area of increasing congestion is the radiofrequency spectrum. Demand for radiofrequency spectrum to support worldwide satellite services is expected to grow commensurate with the rapid expansion of satellite services and applications. As many as 9,000 satellite communications transponders are expected to be in orbit by 2015. As the demand for bandwidth increases and more transponders are placed in service, the greater the probability of radiofrequency interference and the strain on international processes to minimize that interference.

Space is increasingly contested in all orbits. Today space systems and their supporting infrastructure face a range of man-made threats that may deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt, or destroy assets. Potential adversaries are seeking to exploit perceived space vulnerabilities. As more nations and non-state actors develop counterspace capabilities over the next decade, threats to U.S. space systems and challenges to the stability and security of the space environment will increase. Irresponsible acts against space systems could have implications beyond the space domain, disrupting worldwide services upon which the civil and commerical sectors depend. Space is increasingly competitive. Although the United States still maintains an overall edge in space capabilities, the U.S. competitive advantage has decreased as market-entry barriers have lowered (see Figure 3). The U.S. technological lead is eroding in several areas as expertise among other nations increases. International advances in space technology and the associated increase in foreign availability of components have put increased importance on the U.S. export control review process to ensure the competitiveness of the U.S. space industrial base while also addressing national security needs. U.S. suppliers, especially those in the second and third tiers, are at risk due to inconsistent acquisition and production rates, long development cycles, consolidation of suppliers under first-tier prime contractors, and a more competitive foreign market. A decrease in specialized suppliers further challenges U.S. abilities to maintain assured access to critical technologies, avoid critical dependencies, inspire innovation, and maintain leadership advantages. All of these issues are compounded by challenges in recruiting, developing, and retaining a technical workforce. Figure 3. Source: Satellite Industry Association. $8.3 $10.6 $12.4 $10.4 $11.5 $9.5 $11.0 $9.8 $10.2 $7.8 $12.0 $11.6 $10.5 $13.5 $4.9 $6.9 $7.9 $6.6 $6.0 $3.8 $4.4 $4.6 $3.9 $3.2 $5.0 $4.8 $3.1 $7.7 59% 65% 64% 63% 52% 40% 47% 38% 41% 42% 41% 30% 57% 0% 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 $0 $2 $4 $6 $8 10 12 14 16 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Notes: Revenue figures are in-year estimates, not adjusted for inflation over time. Satellite Manufacturing revenues are recorded in the year the satellite is delivered/launched, not when contract is awarded or interim payments are transacted. World revenue includes U.S. revenue. World Revenue U.S. Revenue (in Billions of U.S. Dollars) U.S. Share of World Revenues U.S. versus World Satellite Manufacturing Revenues, 1996-2009 In executing the National Space Policy, our National Security Space Strategy seeks to maintain and enhance the national security benefits we derive from our activities and capabilities in space while addressing and shaping the strategic environment and strengthening the foundations of our enterprise. The U.S. defense and intelligence communities will continue to rely on space systems for military operations, intelligence collection, and related activities; access to these capabilities must be assured. We must address the growing challenges of the congested, contested, and competitive space environment while continuing our leadership in the space domain. Our strategy is derived from the principles and goals found in the National Space Policy and builds on the strategic approach laid out in the National Security Strategy. Specifically, our national security space objectives are to: • Strengthen safety, stability, and security in space; • Maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by space; and • Energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security. We seek a safe space environment in which all can operate with minimal risk of accidents, breakups, and purposeful interference. We seek a stable space environment in which nations exercise shared responsibility to act as stewards of the space domain and follow norms of behavior. We seek a secure space environment in which responsible nations have access to space and the benefits of space operations without need to exercise their inherent right of self-defense. We seek to ensure national security access to space and use of space capabilities in peace, crisis, or conflict. We seek to meet the needs of national leaders and intelligence and military personnel, irrespective of degradation of the space environment or attacks on specific systems or satellites. Enhancing these benefits requires improving the foundational activities of our national security space enterprise – including our systems, our acquisition processes, our industrial base, our technology innovation, and our space professionals. A resilient, flexible, and healthy space industrial base must underpin all of our space activities. We seek to foster a space industrial base comprised of skilled professionals who deliver those innovative technologies and systems that enable our competitive advantage. Our space system developers, operators, and analysts must deliver, field, and sustain national security space capabilities for the 21st century. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES “To promote security and stability in space, we will pursue activities consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deepen cooperation with allies and friends, and work with all nations toward the responsible and peaceful use of space.” - 2010 National Security Strategy The National Security Space Strategy draws upon all elements of national power and requires active U.S. leadership in space. The United States will pursue a set of interrelated strategic approaches to meet our national security space objectives: • Promote responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space; • Provide improved U.S. space capabilities; • Partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms; • Prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security; and • Prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment. Promoting Responsible, Peaceful, and Safe Use of Space “All nations have the right to use and explore space, but with this right also comes responsibility. The United States, therefore, calls on all nations to work together to adopt approaches for responsible activity in space to preserve this right for the benefit of future generations.” - 2010 National Space Policy As directed in the National Space Policy, the United States will promote the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space as the foundational step to addressing the congested and contested space domain and enabling other aspects of our approach. We will encourage allies, partners, and others to do the same. As more nations, international organizations, and commercial firms field or aspire to field space capabilities, it is increasingly important that they act responsibly, peacefully, and safely in space. At the same time, they must be reassured of U.S. intentions to act likewise. We will encourage responsible behavior in space and lead by the power of our example. Moreover, U.S. diplomatic engagements will enhance our ability to cooperate with our allies and partners and seek common ground among all space-faring nations. The United States will support development of data standards, best practices, transparency and confidence-building measures, and norms of behavior for responsible space operations. We will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if STRATEGIC APPROACHES they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies. We believe setting pragmatic guidelines for safe activity in space can help avoid collisions and other debris-producing events, reduce radiofrequency interference, and promote security and stability in the space domain – all of which are in the interests of all nations. Shared awareness of spaceflight activity must improve in order to foster global spaceflight safety and help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. The United States is the leader in space situational awareness (SSA) and can use its knowledge to foster cooperative SSA relationships, support safe space operations, and protect U.S. and allied space capabilities and operations. DoD will continue to improve the quantity and quality of the SSA information it obtains and expand provision of safety of flight services to U.S. Government agencies, other nations, and commercial firms. DoD will encourage other space operators to share their spaceflight safety data. DoD, in coordination with other government agencies, will seek to establish agreements with other nations and commercial firms to maintain and improve space object databases, pursue common international data standards and data integrity measures, and provide services and disseminate orbital tracking information, including predictions of space object conjunction, to enhance spaceflight safety for all parties. Providing Improved U.S. Space Capabilities “Being able to deliver capability cost-effectively when it is needed improves mission effectiveness, provides leadership with flexibility in making investments, and precludes gaps in necessary capabilities.” - 2009 National Intelligence Strategy U.S. space capabilities will continue to be fundamental for national security. DoD and the IC will identify, improve, and prioritize investments in those capabilities that garner the greatest advantages. We will develop, acquire, field, operate, and sustain space capabilities to deliver timely and accurate space services to a variety of customers, from soldiers to national decision-makers. We will enhance interoperability and compatibility of existing national security systems, across operational domains and mission areas, to maximize efficiency of our national security architecture; we will ensure these characteristics are built into future systems. We will ensure that data collection and products are released at the lowest possible classification to maximize their usefulness to the user community. Ensuring U.S. capabilities are developed and fielded in a timely, reliable, and responsive manner is critical for national decision-makers to act on time-sensitive and accurate information, for military forces to plan and execute effective operations, and for the IC to enable all of the above with timely indications and warning. Improving our acquisition processes, energizing the U.S. space industrial base, enhancing technological innovation, and deliberately developing space professionals are critical enablers to maintaining U.S. space leadership. In cooperation with our industrial base partners, DoD and the IC will revalidate current measures and implement new measures, where practicable, to stabilize program acquisition more effectively and improve our space acquisition processes. We will reduce programmatic risk through improved management of requirements. We will use proven best practices of systems engineering, mission assurance, contracting, technology maturation, cost estimating, and financial management to improve system acquisition, reduce the risk of mission failure, and increase successful launch and operation of our space systems. Mission permitting, we will synchronize the planning, programming, and execution of major acquisition programs with other DoD and IC processes to improve efficiencies and overall performance of our acquisition system and industrial base. DoD and the IC will evaluate the requirements and analysis of alternatives processes to ensure a range of affordable solutions is considered and to identify requirements for possible adjustment. The requirements process must produce combinations of material and non-material solutions. Realistic cost and schedule estimates must inform the President’s annual budget request. Human resources processes must provide the right personnel for successful execution. We seek to foster a U.S. space industrial base that is robust, competitive, flexible, healthy, and delivers reliable space capabilities on time and on budget. DoD and the IC, in concert with the civil space sector, will better manage investments across portfolios to ensure the industrial base can sustain those critical technologies and skills that produce the systems we require. Additionally, we will continue to explore a mix of capabilities with shorter development cycles to minimize delays, cut cost growth, and enable more rapid technology maturation, innovation, and exploitation. A key aspect of energizing the U.S. space industrial base is to reform U.S. export controls to address technology security and global competitiveness. Export controls have a farreaching impact on national security interests, as they help deter illicit efforts by others to obtain and use the materials, technology, and know-how that are vital to our national security. Export controls, however, can also affect the health and welfare of the industrial base, in particular second-tier and third-tier suppliers. Reforming export controls will facilitate U.S. firms’ ability to compete to become providers-of-choice in the international marketplace for capabilities that are, or will soon become, widely available globally, while strengthening our ability to protect the most significant U.S. technology advantages. In particular, as new opportunities arise for international collaboration, a revised export control system will better enable the domestic firms competing for these contracts. Revised export control policies will address U.S. firms’ ability to export space-related items generally available in the global marketplace, consistent with U.S. policy and international commitments. We will continue to pursue, adapt, and evolve the unique technologies, innovative exploitation techniques, and diverse applications that give the United States its strategic advantage in space. The United States seeks to maintain and enhance access to those global and domestic technologies needed for national security space systems. We will do so by expanding technology partnerships with the academic community, industry, U.S. and partner governments, mission customers, and other centers of technical excellence and innovation, consistent with U.S. policy, technology transfer objectives, and international commitments. To advance the science and technology that enables U.S. space capabilities, we will continue to assess global technology trends to find emerging technologies and potential breakthroughs. We will explore new applications of current technologies and the development of unique, innovative technologies and capabilities. We will improve the transition of scientific research and technology development to the operational user and into major system acquisition. To the extent practicable, we will also facilitate the incorporation of these capabilities and technologies into appropriate domestic space programs. People are our greatest asset. To support the range of national security space activities, we will develop current and future national security space professionals – our “space cadre” – who can acquire capabilities, operate systems, analyze information, and succeed in a congested, contested, and competitive environment. We will build a more diverse and balanced workforce among military, civilian, and contractor components. These professionals must be educated, experienced, and trained in the best practices of their field – whether it is planning, programming, acquisition, manufacturing, operations, or analysis. We will continue to encourage students at all levels to pursue technical coursework as a foundation for space-related career fields. Working with other departments and agencies, we will synchronize our science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education initiatives with sound education investments to ensure an ample supply of space professionals with appropriate skills and capabilities. We will encourage our space professionals to participate in STEM outreach and mentoring programs. We will continue to develop structured personnel development programs to expand, track, and sustain our space expertise, employing focused education and training as well as purposeful utilization of our people to offer a broad range of experiential opportunities. We will further professional development by growing, rewarding, and retaining scientific and technical expertise and professional leadership. We will support an entrepreneurial ethos by encouraging initiative, innovation, collaboration, resourcefulness, and resilience. As national security space priorities shift, we will continue to educate and train the workforce to align with new priorities. Partnering with Responsible Nations, International Organizations, and Commercial Firms “[E]xplore opportunities to leverage growing international and commercial expertise to enhance U.S. capabilities and reduce the vulnerability of space systems and their supporting ground infrastructure.” - 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review The evolving strategic environment allows for additional opportunities to partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms. DoD and the IC will continue to partner with others to augment the U.S. national security space posture across many mission areas. This includes looking for opportunities to leverage or work in conjunction with partnerships pursued by U.S. Government civil space agencies. By sharing or exchanging capabilities, data, services, personnel, operations, and technology, we can ensure access to information and services from a more diverse set of systems – an advantage in a contested space environment. We will promote appropriate cost-sharing and risk-sharing partnerships to develop and share capabilities. Decisions on partnering will be consistent with U.S. policy and international commitments and consider cost, protection of sources and methods, and effects on the U.S. industrial base. Partnering with other nations also is essential to ensuring global access to the radiofrequency spectrum and related orbital assignments and promoting the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of outer space. Nations gain international acceptance of their use of the radiofrequency spectrum and satellite orbits through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Registering satellite networks with the ITU can help prevent and, if necessary, address radiofrequency interference. The United States will lead in building coalitions of like-minded space-faring nations and, where appropriate, work with international institutions to do so. With our allies, we will explore the development of combined space doctrine with principles, goals, and objectives that, in particular, endorse and enable the collaborative sharing of space capabilities in crisis and conflict. We will seek to expand mutually beneficial agreements with key partners to utilize existing and planned capabilities that can augment U.S. national security space capabilities. We will pursue increased interoperability, compatibility, and integration of partner nations into appropriate DoD and IC networks to support information sharing and collective endeavors, taking affordability and mutual benefit into account. At the same time, U.S. military and intelligence personnel will ensure the appropriate review and release of classified information to enhance partner access to space information. We will actively promote the sale of U.S.-developed capabilities to partner nations and the integration of those capabilities into existing U.S. architectures and networks. Posturing our domestic industry to develop these systems will also enable the competitiveness of the U.S. industrial base. We will explore sharing space-derived information as “global utilities” with partnered nations. As we do today with the positioning, navigation, and timing services of the Global Positioning System, we will provide services derived from selected space systems and enhance those services through partnerships. We will continue to share SSA information to promote responsible and safe space operations. We will also pursue enhanced sharing of other space services such as missile warning and maritime domain awareness. We may seek to establish a collaborative missile warning network to detect attacks against our interests and those of our allies and partners. Strategic partnerships with commercial firms will continue to enable access to a more diverse, robust, and distributed set of space systems and provide easily releasable data. Strategic partnerships with commercial firms will be pursued in areas that both stabilize costs and improve the resilience of space architectures upon which we rely. Innovative approaches will be explored for their utility in meeting government performance requirements in a cost-effective and timely manner. We will rely on proven commercial capabilities to the maximum extent practicable, and we will modify commercial capabilities to meet government requirements when doing so is more cost-effective and timely for the government. We will develop space systems only when there is no suitable, cost-effective commercial alternative or when national security needs dictate. Preventing and Deterring Aggression against Space Infrastructure that Supports U.S. National Security “U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend against, and defeat aggression by potentially hostile nation-states. This capability is fundamental to the nation’s ability to protect its interests and to provide security in key regions.” - 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Given the degree to which the United States relies on space systems and supporting infrastructure for national security, we must use a multilayered approach to prevent and deter aggression. We seek to enhance our national capability to dissuade and deter the development, testing, and employment of counterspace systems and prevent and deter aggression against space systems and supporting infrastructure that support U.S. national security. Many elements of this strategy contribute to this approach. We will: support diplomatic efforts to promote norms of responsible behavior in space; pursue international partnerships that encourge potential adversary restraint; improve our ability to attribute attacks; strengthen the resilience of our architectures to deny the benefits of an attack; and retain the right to respond, should deterrence fail. DoD and the IC will support the diplomatic and public diplomacy efforts of the Department of State to promote the responsible use of space and discourage activities that threaten the safety, stability, and security of the space domain. We will also work with the Department of State and other appropriate U.S. Government agencies to strengthen alliances with other space-faring nations and pursue partnerships with commercial firms and international organizations. We will improve our intelligence posture – predictive awareness, characterization, warning, and attribution – to better monitor and attribute activities in the space domain. Thus, SSA and foundational intelligence will continue to be top priorities, as they underpin our ability to maintain awareness of natural disturbances and the capabilities, activities, and intentions of others. We will also enable and develop intelligence professionals who can provide greater scope, depth, and quality of intelligence collection and analysis. We will seek to deny adversaries meaningful benefits of attack by improving costeffective protection and strengthening the resilience of our architectures. Partnerships with other nations, commercial firms, and international organizations, as well as alternative U.S. Government approaches such as cross-domain solutions, hosted payloads, responsive options, and other innovative solutions, can deliver capability, should our space systems be attacked. This also will enable our ability to operate in a degraded space environment. Finally, the United States will retain the right and capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail. We will use force in a manner that is consistent with longstanding principles of international law, treaties to which the United States is a party, and the inherent right of self defense. Preparing to Defeat Attacks and Operate in a Degraded Environment “Increase assurance and resilience of mission-essential functions enabled by commercial, civil, scientific, and national security spacecraft and supporting infrastructure against disruption, degradation, and destruction, whether from environmental, mechanical, electronic, or hostile causes.” - 2010 National Space Policy We believe it is in the interests of all space-faring nations to avoid hostilities in space. In spite of this, some actors may still believe counterspace actions could provide military advantage. Our military and intelligence capabilities must be prepared to “fight through” a degraded environment and defeat attacks targeted at our space systems and supporting infrastructure. We must deny and defeat an adversary’s ability to achieve its objectives. As we invest in next generation space capabilities and fill gaps in current capabilities, we will include resilience as a key criterion in evaluating alternative architectures. Resilience can be achieved in a variety of ways, to include cost-effective space system protection, cross-domain solutions, hosting payloads on a mix of platforms in various orbits, drawing on distributed international and commercial partner capabilities, and developing and maturing responsive space capabilities. We will develop the most feasible, mission-effective, and fiscally sound mix of these alternatives. To make the most effective use of space protection resources, we will identify and prioritize protection for vital space missions supporting national security requirements. We will implement cost-effective protection commensurate with threat, system use, and impact of loss – applied to each segment of our space systems and supporting infrastructure. To enhance resilience, we will continue to develop mission-effective alternatives, including land, sea, air, space, and cyber-based alternatives for critical capabilities currently delivered primarily through space-based platforms. In addition, we will seek to establish relationships and agreements whereby we can access partner capabilities if U.S. systems are degraded or unavailable. We will be prepared to use these capabilities to ensure the timely continuity of services in a degraded space environment. Preparing for attacks must extend to the people and processes relying on space information, operating our space systems, and analyzing space-derived information. We will improve the ability of U.S. military and intelligence agencies to operate in a denied or degraded space environment through focused education, training, and exercises and through new doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Consistent with the guidance provided by the President in the National Space Policy, DoD and the IC will implement the National Security Space Strategy by using it to inform future planning, programming, acquisition, operations, and analysis guidance. DoD and the IC will work with other U.S. Government agencies and departments, as well as foreign governments and commercial partners, to update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of U.S. power. We will evolve policies, strategies, and doctrine pertaining to national security space. Implementation plans will be developed based on feasibility and affordability assessments and cost, benefit, and risk analyses. Further, the impact of plans on manning, operations, and programs will be understood prior to implementation. As stated in the National Security Strategy, our ability to achieve long-term goals for space depends upon our fiscal responsibility and making tough choices, such as between capability and survivability. IMPLEMENTATION “Our national security strategy is, therefore, focused on renewing American leadership so that we can more effectively advance our interests in the 21st century. We will do so by building on the sources of our strength at home, while shaping an international order that can meet the challenges of our time.” - 2010 National Security Strategy The United States will retain leadership in space by strengthening our posture at home and collaborating with others worldwide. Just as U.S. national security is built upon maintaining strategic advantages, it is also increasingly predicated on active U.S. leadership of alliance and coalition efforts in peacetime, crisis, and conflict. Active U.S. leadership in space requires a whole-of-government approach that integrates all elements of national power, from technological prowess and industrial capacity to alliance building and diplomatic engagement. Leadership cannot be predicated on declaratory policy alone. It must build upon a willingness to maintain strategic advantages while working with the international community to develop collective norms, share information, and collaborate on capabilities. U.S. leadership in space can help the United States and our partners address the challenges posed by a space domain that is increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. Our strategy seeks to address this new environment through its set of interrelated approaches: • We seek to address congestion by establishing norms, enhancing space situational awareness, and fostering greater transparency and information sharing. Our words and deeds should reassure our allies and the world at large of our intent to act peacefully and responsibly in space and encourage others to do the same. • We seek to address the contested environment with a multilayered deterrence approach. We will support establishing international norms and transparency and confidence-building measures in space, primarily to promote spaceflight safety but also to dissuade and impose international costs on aggressive behavior. We will improve and protect vital U.S. space capabilities while using interoperability, compatibility, and integration to create coalitions and alliances of responsible space-faring nations. We will improve our capability to attribute attacks and seek to deny meaningful operational benefits from such attacks. We will retain the right and capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail. • We seek to address competition by enhancing our own capabilities, improving our acquisition processes, fostering a healthy U.S. industrial base, and strengthening collaboration and cooperation. CONCLUSION – A NEW TYPE OF LEADERSHIP Our objectives are to improve safety, stability, and security in space; to maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by space; and to energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security. Achieving these objectives will mean not only that our military and intelligence communities can continue to use space for national security purposes, but that a community of nations is working toward creating a sustainable and peaceful space environment to benefit the world for years to come.