Postrevolutionary Mexican Politics, 1940–1968: PAGE-BY-PAGE NOTES

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Overview of postrevolutionary Mexico (1940s–1960s) and the paradox it posed: on paper elections and participation existed, peaceful transfers happened, and the PRI dominated, yet observers did not view Mexico as a full democracy for much of the period.
The PRI employed classic machine-style politics: genuine base support from clientelistic beneficiaries, combined with exclusion, fraud, and coercion to restrict competition.
The chapter’s aim: explain institutions and practices that held the PRI system together for over six decades and how they eventually undermined legitimacy and paved the way for democratization in the late 20th century.
Core concepts introduced:
- Postrevolutionary politics blend of authoritarian traits (coercion, control) and democratic trappings (participation, representation).
- The regime was often described as semiauthoritarian, restricted democracy, or an electoral autocracy/democradura depending on the lens.
- The PRI’s evolution: from PNR (National Revolutionary Party) to PRM (Party of the Mexican Revolution) and finally PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) under Manuel Ávila Camacho’s era.
- The regime relied on co-optation and a robust political machine more than overt coercion alone.
Historical backdrop: a period during which other Latin American countries fell to military dictatorships, yet Mexico remained comparatively stable, enjoying broad popular support and notable economic and redistributive achievements.
Key takeaway: “living museum” of institutionalized one-party rule that persisted despite evident undemocratic practices, until deeper democratization processes began later in the century.

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The PRI’s consolidation and the broader puzzle of Mexican democracy: while elections were not free and fair, the regime managed to accumulate legitimacy through performance, nationalist rhetoric, and broad-based inclusion.
The regime’s image as stable and democratic was aided by the absence of a strong military role in politics, unlike many neighboring Latin American regimes.
However, electoral competition was severely restricted, and there were episodes of repression.
Terminology and examples:
- Electoral monopolies and manipulation included media alignment, state resources, and discriminatory practices.
- The PRI’s control over the state’s political machinery produced widespread corruption and selective repression.
Notable cultural/propaganda note: a satirical film about Mexican politics, Herod’s Law, was censored in 1999 but later released amid civil society pressure (Box Textbox 3.1).
The regime’s reliance on an extended period of economic growth contributed to its legitimacy and support base, even as nondemocratic practices persisted.

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Core features of the PRI’s hegemonic system during 1940–1968: single-party dominance, fusion of party and state, centralized power, restricted opposition, and periodic repression.
Despite its autocratic features, the PRI’s system appeared stable and often democratic in practice due to popular support and policy achievements.
The narrative emphasizes the importance of understanding how the postrevolutionary state reconstructed the state and embedded policy with the party to secure political control.
Historical arc: by 2000 the system that emerged from the Revolution had transitioned to a more democratic, though less predictable, regime.
The chapter stresses the challenge of consolidating power after a violent upheaval and the necessity of building durable institutions to manage diverse revolutionary groups.
Road to consolidation involved creating a single, institutionalized party (the PRI) with national, state, and local organizational structures and a centralized executive.

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The path to PRI dominance was twofold in 1946: (1) the creation of the Federal Electoral Law and (2) a reorganization that transformed the ruling party into the PRI.
The 1946 Federal Electoral Law centralized electoral regulation under the Interior Ministry (Secretaría de Gobernación). This shift placed registration of parties, campaign oversight, and reporting results under a key presidential cabinet body.
Consequences of centralization:
- The president gained the leverage to modify electoral rules, prohibit or register parties, and influence outcomes.
- The PRI effectively operated as a national political machine due to centralized control over elections.
Electoral fraud and manipulation were common pre-1946 and continued afterward, including tactics like multiple voting at polling places (carousel), stuffed ballots (tacos de votos), adding fictitious names to rolls (Cantinflas, Mickey Mouse), pregnant urns (urnas embarazadas), and manipulating official results.
The 1946 reform thus institutionalized the ruling party’s monopoly on power and tied electoral outcomes to the president’s office.

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The second major development in 1946 was the reorganization of the ruling party into the PRI, symbolizing a “champion of the revolution” and the paradoxical consolidation of a permanent revolution.
PRI organizational structure on paper: national, state, and local committees; formally elected leaders; democratic procedures for candidates and platforms.
In practice, the PRI functioned as a highly centralized, autocratic machine that depended on government resources and a symbiotic relationship with the state.
A significant reform after Ávila Camacho’s leadership was demilitarization of the ruling party, paving the way for civilian leadership and reducing the military’s political influence.
Context: Ávila Camacho faced a contested 1940 election against conservative General Juan Andreu Almazán and, despite fraud indicators, emerged victor. His post-election strategy sought to diminish military influence and foster civilian political leadership, differentiating Mexico from other Latin American regimes that entrenched military power.
The military would remain relevant but was repositioned as a subordinated force within civilian-led governance.
By the mid-20th century, the party’s internal structure and civilianizing reforms helped stabilize the regime and reduce direct military intervention in governance.

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The PRI’s power base continued to rely on three formally recognized sectors: labor (CTM), agrarian (CNC), and popular (CNOP).
The CNOP (Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares) was formally incorporated in 1943, and by 1946 it joined the formal corporatist system alongside CTM and CNC.
The CNOP emerged as a crucial source of leadership and mobilization for the PRI, especially within the popular sector, which came to play a major role in party organization and political socialization.
Corporatism (Box 3.2) is defined as formal incorporation of key interest groups into government decision-making, often by the state shaping which groups have seats at the table. It contrasts with pluralism, where autonomous interest groups compete more independently for influence.
The PRI’s corporatist arrangement integrated labor, agrarian, and popular sectors into the party’s decision-making processes, stabilizing broader support but also constraining opposition.
The chapter notes the shift from labor (CTM) to the popular CNOP as the brains of party organization, with the agrarian sector (CNC) retaining a large share of legislative seats into the 1960s.

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Clientelism defined: a system where powerful patrons exchange material benefits or services for political allegiance and support from clients. This mechanism operated across federal, state, and local levels within the PRI’s networks.
The patron–client network extended through the political hierarchy, with loyalties built on personal connections and long-term exchanges of favors.
Examples of benefits include jobs, goods, services, permits, and social demonstrations of support; correspondingly, voters receive tangible rewards like food, basic services, or help with administrative matters.
The term is often used with negative connotations due to preferential resource distribution and potential exclusion of non-supporters.
The chapter highlights that the PRI’s clientelistic system connected ordinary citizens (even poor urban/rural voters) to the party’s networks, strengthening loyalty and participation.
The Godfather analogy is used to illustrate patron–client relationships and the quid pro quo nature of political support.
The text notes that clientelism can be seen as facilitating inclusion in some contexts (e.g., granting access to government jobs for marginalized groups), but modern democracies strive to provide public goods more equitably rather than privileging one group over another.

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Political exchange within the PRI produced a hierarchical lattice of influence, with camarillas (cliques or factions) forming around influential leaders.
As politicians rose, their networks expanded into a labyrinth of power, enabling loyalty and mutual reinforcement across levels.
At the bottom, ordinary voters benefited from occasional tangible rewards (e.g., a sandwich or a T-shirt for showing up to vote) but remained highly dependent on patronage and continued support.
The system required loyalty to the party over individual merit, with personal ties often determining political advancement more than formal credentials.
The text notes the presence of prolific intraparty competition, factionalism, and a broad spectrum of ideological currents within the PRI.

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Party discipline and power sharing were core to the PRI’s durability.
The no reelection rule (no immediate reelection) created a turnover in public administration and made career mobility depend on the incumbent president and party leadership.
Dedazo (the president’s act of handpicking a successor) was the central mechanism by which the sitting president ensured party loyalty and influence over the next six years (the sexenio).
Destape (unveiling of the president’s preferred candidate) further solidified loyalty as supporters aligned behind the designated successor.
The president’s control extended through administrative controls and fiscal resources, shaping subnational appointments and policy outcomes.
The interior secretary (Secretario de Gobernación) functioned as enforcer and a likely future president, given the history of interior secretaries becoming presidents.
The centralization of the executive weakened the legislature and judiciary, which were often rubber stamps for executive agenda and constitutional amendments.
The text notes the constitution was amended more than 400 times between 1917 and 2000, signaling a procedural dynamic that accommodated elite power rather than checks and balances.
The judiciary was underfunded and aligned with PRI interests, providing limited capacity for judicial review beyond amparo (constitutional injunctions).

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The centralized power structure meant decisions and policy implementation were concentrated at the national level, with Mexico City as the hub of political life and resource allocation.
The state’s centralized model contrasted with more distributed or federalist models; the PRI’s corporatist system built a network of power that spanned federal, state, and local levels, but always anchored in the presidency.
Box 3.4 (Centralization and Decentralization) clarifies the definitions:
- Centralized system: decision-making concentrated at high levels.
- Decentralized system: more authority delegated to lower levels or shared across branches.
The PRI’s system was highly centralized, with limited checks from the legislative or judicial branches, reinforcing the executive’s dominance.

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The combination of no reelection and the PRI’s hegemony concentrated power in the presidency rather than in individual leaders.
The dedazo mechanism ensured the next leader’s loyalty and shaped the political landscape for the next six years.
The presidency controlled the federal bureaucracy, the military, and intelligence services, which answered to the Interior Ministry.
A striking statistic: eight of the thirteen PRI presidents elected from 1928 to 2000 were former interior secretaries, illustrating the pattern of power being consolidated through this position.
The overall governance structure limited the separation of powers and reduced the viability of checks and balances across branches.
The text describes the presidency’s authority as “metaconstitutional” or “anticonstitutional” in practice, given the extraordinary powers that went beyond formal constitutional limits.

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Opposition, co-optation, and repression frameworks:
- The PRI’s dominance was supported by a mix of co-optation and coercion, balancing persuasive strategies with selective repression.
- Opposition sources included: (1) PAN (Partido Acción Nacional), founded in 1939 by conservatives and professionals seeking reform and anti-corruption governance; (2) minor parties (third parties) created to fractionate the opposition yet often allied with the PRI; (3) illegal or unrecognized groups such as the Communist Party (PCM) and various insurgent or social movements.
PAN: attracted educated professionals, Catholics concerned about anticlerical policies, and business interests opposed to expropriation and capital flight; it remained the strongest opposition but never challenged PRI dominance until late in the century.
Parastatal parties: PARM (Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution) existed as a semi-PRI ally, providing a controlled outlet for opposition while supporting PRI presidential candidacy and acting as a legislative ally.
Illegal opposition: PCM and other insurgent groups, including leftist movements and student or urban-based groups, emerged in the 1960s and beyond but posed limited threats to the PRI’s overall dominance.
The EZLN and related movements emerged later (1994 onward) but are referenced as part of a broader historical arc of insurgent activity against the state.

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Co-optation (co-optation as a key instrument of regime stability):
- The PRI used co-optation to prevent opposition from consolidating power outside the party by offering posts, subsidies, or favorable contracts in exchange for compliance or restraint.
- Concessions could be provided to outside critics (subsidies, contracts, revenue gains, or public works) to keep them within the system.
- Co-optation often blurred the line with coercion; when co-optation failed, the PRI could resort to coercion or force, though coercion was generally used as a last resort.
Coercive repression: when needed, the regime used police and military force to suppress labor movements, protest actions, or opposition groups (e.g., railway worker strikes in 1958–1959 leading to imprisonment of organizers Demetrio Vallejo and Valentín Campa).
The 1960s saw active repression of dissent, with notable incidents in León (1945), Mérida (1967), Tijuana (1959, 1968), and the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre (to be detailed later in the chapter).
Overall assessment: PRI relied on a balance of carrots and sticks; coercion was not the dominant tool but an emergency capability that, when used, damaged legitimacy.

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Political repression and the limits of PRI coercion:
- The regime’s coercive actions were relatively infrequent but significant when used.
- Repression included threats, surveillance (wiretaps), infiltration of social movements, and constraints on civil liberties.
Notable labor repression: the oil and railroad sectors saw periodic crackdowns on labor mobilization; the 1958–1959 railway workers’ dispute is cited as a brutal episode that decapitated segments of the labor movement.
Other forms of control: surveillance and suppression of dissent through monitoring and intimidation, alongside co-optation strategies to incorporate opponents into the party.
1968 is identified as a turning point: although repression was not new, the 1968 student movement exposed the limits of piecemeal co-optation and foreshadowed the regime’s vulnerability to organized, broad-based opposition.
Box 3.3 (Clientelism) and 3.2 (Corporatism) are referenced as the framework through which the PRI mobilized, controlled, and rewarded loyalty.

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The 1968 mass protests and the Tlatelolco massacre are presented as the most significant instance of PRI repression in the classic period.
Context for 1968:
- Global wave of student activism and leftist movements in the late 1960s influenced Mexican campuses in a context of economic growth and political stability.
- The PRI sought to project a positive image during the Tokyo Olympic Games, investing heavily in preparations and presenting itself as a modern, developed regime.
Tlatelolco events (October 2, 1968) featured a large demonstration that was met with a massive deployment of troops and police, including plainclothes units (the Olympia Battalion).
The government claimed a low death toll (~25), but independent and international sources argued the toll was much higher, with many protesters missing or killed and not accounted for.
The massacre is widely viewed as ordered at the highest levels, with blame placed on President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz and Interior Secretary Luis Echeverría Álvarez, though exact orders remain debated.
The aftermath: the incident undermined PRI legitimacy, spurred new generations of opposition, and contributed to later crackdowns and reforms in the 1970s and beyond.

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The 1968 student movement timeline and organization:
- Students organized across IPN and UNAM campuses, employing decentralized leadership and rotating cells to resist co-optation and repression.
- The National Strike Council (comprising 250 representatives from over 100 schools) and a network of brigades allowed for autonomous operation and resilience against targeting leaders.
- A key escalation occurred when the military entered UNAM in September 1968, demonstrating the regime’s willingness to use direct force against perceived dissent.
The Olympic Games provided a backdrop of national prestige; the regime faced a choice between repression and accommodation in response to student activism.
The regime’s response escalated with mass police and military actions, aiming to restore order at the cost of civil liberties and legitimacy.

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The escalation on October 2, 1968, in Plaza de las Tres Culturas (Tlatelolco Plaza):
- A march of around 6,000 protesters was surrounded by 10,000 soldiers with machine guns and bayonets.
- The security force used helicopters and armored vehicles; plainclothes units appeared with distinctive white gloves.
- The crowd was fired upon; many were beaten, arrested, or disappeared; journalists and civilians suffered.
- The government claimed the protesters fired first, but independent accounts dispute this.
Aftermath and accountability:
- The massacre is widely recognized as a state crime, though accountability has been slow, with investigations and judgments occurring only decades later.
- The Diaz Ordaz administration faced strong criticism; interior secretary Luis Echeverría Álvarez faced particular responsibility for planning and ordering the acts, though attribution remains contested.
- The post-event period included official denials, media suppression, and a strategic emphasis on the Olympic Games to project a positive image internationally.

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The long-term impact of Tlatelolco on PRI legitimacy:
- The massacre damaged the regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of many Mexicans and generated a new generation of opposition activists.
- It contributed to increased repression in the 1970s as the government sought to bolster support and suppress dissent, often with limited success.
- Civil society groups and new democratic institutions later pressed for investigations and accountability, signaling the erosion of the PRI’s monopoly on political life.
The Olympic Games and subsequent historiography:
- In the immediate aftermath, the regime prioritized international optics over domestic accountability, redistributing attention away from the violence.
- The broader historical record views Tlatelolco as a watershed moment in which the PRI’s coercive capacity revealed its limits and foreshadowed broader democratization movements.

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Conclusion of the chapter’s narrative:
- For much of the twentieth century, Mexico was described as a democracy with adjectives—either limited/restricted democracy or an authoritarian regime with democratic trappings.
- The PRI’s governance combined stability, economic growth, and broad social incorporation with repression and manipulation of elections.
- The regime’s legitimacy rested on revolutionary legitimacy, inclusion of diverse societal groups through corporatism and clientelism, and the ability to secure basic economic and social gains.
- By 1968 the PRI’s capacity to co-opt without excessive coercion began to falter; the combination of coercive displays and elite fractures foreshadowed the gradual erosion of single-party dominance and a transition toward a more open political system in the following decades.
Discussion questions (as a guide for student reflection):
1) How did the PRI’s internal organization facilitate its rise to and consolidation of power after the revolution?
2) Why was the opposition unable to garner significant support and effectively challenge the PRI at the ballot box until the late twentieth century?
3) In what ways are corporatism and clientelism different from one another? What role did each play in the era of PRI hegemony?
4) Many political scientists argue that the use of repression is a sign of a state’s or government’s weakness. Do you agree? If so, why and in what ways was the PRI regime weak in 1968?
5) Despite the government’s attempts to quash information about the 1968 massacre at Tlatelolco, it became a watershed moment in Mexican history. What was the lasting impact of this event?

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Resources for further study (listed for readers):
- Gladys McCormick, The Logic of Compromise in Mexico: How the Countryside was Key to the Emergence of Authoritarianism (2016).
- Jorge Castañeda, Perpetuating Power: How Mexican Presidents Were Chosen (2000).
- Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico (2006).
- Jaime M. Pensado, Rebel Mexico: Student Unrest and Authoritarian Political Culture During the Long Sixties (2013).
- Elena Poniatowska, Massacre in Mexico (1991).
Feature films/TV to contextualize the era:
- Herod’s Law / La ley de Herodes (1999)
- Los olvidados (The Young and the Damned) (1950)
- Rojo Amanecer (Red Dawn) (1989/1990)
- Un extraño enemigo (An Unknown Enemy) (2018)
- Roma (2018)
Internet resources for supplementary material.
Discussion prompts and study guidance to connect theoretical frameworks (corporatism vs. pluralism; clientelism; political machines) to the historical record of Mexico’s PRI era.

Key Concepts and Definitions (Glance)

PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party, the ruling party that dominated Mexican politics from the 1920s through 2000 and beyond in various forms.
PNR/PRM/PRI: Evolution of the ruling party’s name reflecting shifts in ideology and structure.
Dedazo: President’s act of handpicking his successor to ensure party loyalty and control over the electoral outcome in the next six years (sexenio).
Destape: The unveiling of the president’s preferred candidate for the next leadership cycle.
Federal Electoral Law (1946): Centralized regulation of presidential and federal elections under the Interior Ministry, strengthening the presidency’s power and the PRI’s electoral machine.
Corporatism: Formal integration of key societal groups (labor CTM, agrarian CNC, popular CNOP) into the political decision-making process.
Clientelism: Personal patron–client networks distributing material or symbolic benefits in exchange for political support.
Camarillas: Personal factions within the PRI that competed for influence but also sustained loyalty across the party via patronage.
Amparo: Constitutional injunctions used to shield individuals from government actions.
Centralization: Concentration of authority in the presidency and national-level institutions, reducing checks and balances.
Tlatelolco massacre (1968): The violent suppression of student protests in Mexico City, widely viewed as a state crime and a turning point in Mexican political development.

Connections to Foundational Principles

The PRI’s model combined nationalist legitimating myths with a modern bureaucratic machinery, illustrating how revolutionary legitimacy can be sustained through institutional design even when democratic norms are eroded.
The transition from a centralized, machine-driven regime to a more pluralist and democratic system highlights tensions between stability and political liberalization in post-revolutionary states.
The 1968 events demonstrate how state violence can undermine regime legitimacy and catalyze elite and mass movements toward democratization.

Practical and Ethical Implications

Ethically, the PRI’s blend of co-optation and coercion raises questions about the legitimacy of governance when public consent is manufactured through material incentives and suppression of dissent.
Practically, the centralized electoral mechanism and “machine” politics illustrate how institutional reforms (like centralized electoral supervision) can entrench one-party dominance.
The case shows the long-term consequences of political repression for legitimacy and the stability of a regime, including the potential for violent episodes to accelerate transitions to more competitive politics.