SOC 1100 CH.7

Introduction

Every day, we’re bombarded with news stories from multiple sources. Although reporters don’t often use the term, it’s pretty easy to find discussions about social stratification—persistent patterns of social inequality—in the headlines: “Child poverty up in Canada since 1989” (Alini, 2017); “Maps show homeless camps sprawled across city of Edmonton” (Parsons, 2018); “BC’s working poor: Meet the people whose jobs don’t pay the bills (Culbert and Sherlock, 2018); “Many University of Saskatchewan students experience food insecurity (MacVicar, 2018); “Almost a third of Canadians ‘very stressed about money’” (Maher, 2018). Among these, a CBC story stands out. It reports that 46 percent of Canadians are $200 or less away from financial insolvency (Canadian Press, 2019). How can so many people in a country as rich as Canada be so close to bankruptcy? Is there a connection between their circumstances and headlines like “World’s richest 26 billionaires own as much money as 3.8 billion poorest people” (Holland, 2019) and “Canada’s richest families own as much wealth as three provinces combined” (Alini, 2018)?

The headlines draw our attention to both extremes of the income and wealth distribution. However, it is also important to consider how the situation differs for various groups of Canadians. Although Canadians across the county experience poverty, the situation is worse for many groups, particularly for Indigenous people living on reserves and in Northern Canada (Savage, 2018). A large number of people living in Nunavut experience food insecurity and a high rate of infant mortality (De Meulemeester, 2018; Fenn, 2018). In 2019, housing conditions were so bad in the Cat Lake First Nation just north of Thunder Bay that a state of emergency had to be declared (Prokopchuk, 2019). Such living conditions are not just the result of isolation (Hutchins, 2018). Stratification research shows that racism and discrimination, rooted in Canada’s colonialist history, profoundly affect the lives of Indigenous people on and off reserves.

Visible minority Canadians also experience employment and housing discrimination. One CBC story notes that 16 percent of New Brunswick adults reported instances of racial discrimination (MacKinnon, 2018). An article in the Toronto Star highlights results from a study showing that racialized workers in Ontario face a higher rate of unemployment than do white workers, and racialized workers who find employment are disproportionately concentrated in low-wage jobs (Mojtehedzadeh, 2018). Another CBC story notes how police-reported hate crimes reached an all-time high in 2017 with increasing numbers of Jewish, black, and Muslim victims (Rieti, 2018). We have to ask why so much racial and ethnic antipathy exists in a country with a large immigrant population, a country that supposedly champions multiculturalism.

Racialized groups are not the only minority groups that appear in the news. As a contributor to The Globe and Mail notes, “When it comes to health care, transphobia persists” (Benaway, 2018). When seeking help at an emergency room, the contributor reports being misgendered and treated with distain by medical professionals. The contributor’s experience is corroborated by survey research indicating that 52 percent of trans people treated in Ontario in emergency rooms in 2010 experienced discrimination. The Canadian social stratification story is dire, and “intersectionality,” that is, being a member of multiple disadvantaged groups (e.g., black and trans), complicates and often worsens the story.

Although marginalized groups, the unemployed, and the very poor catch our attention, so do the very rich. In 2017, the 100 most highly paid chief executive officers (CEOs) of companies operating in Canada earned an average of $10 million dollars, nearly 200 times more than the $50 759 average earnings of all Canadian workers (MacDonald, 2019a).It’s shocking to realize that by 11:33 am on January 2, Canada’s top CEOs had already earned more than the average Canadian worker will earn all year! But inequality exists even among CEOs. Women, who comprised only 4 percent of CEOs and 10 percent of top executives in 2017, made 68 cents for every dollar earned by their male colleagues (MacDonald, 2019b).

Some stories discuss ways to deal with stratification, taking different perspectives on what should be done. Take, for instance, attempts to limit panhandling or solicitation. The Safe Streets Act, passed in Ontario in 1999 and in British Columbia in 2004, prohibits “aggressive soliciting” in public places and vehicles (Safe Streets Act, Ontario, 1999; Safe Streets Act, British Columbia, 2004). Although the goal of this legislation was to decrease instances of solicitation and push panhandlers into other types of work, it has led to increased fines for homeless people and various legal challenges. Fines can pile up for panhandlers who have few in any income options. One 59-year-old man in Hamilton owed over $20 000 after accumulating more than 250 tickets (Bennett, 2017). It seems reasonable to ask whether such laws are really the best way to help homeless people.

Other cities and businesses take a different approach. For instance, a downtown Edmonton cafe chose to give customers the option of adding a small donation to their bills to provide a free coffee or pastry for a vulnerable person who otherwise might resort to panhandling (McMillan, 2018). Is this a better way of dealing with panhandling? Should we be focusing on charity? Or can something more be done? It’s always hard to tell which policy approach will be successful, but research in social stratification can give us a good idea of what might work, along with why certain approaches tend to receive more support than others.

Other cities and businesses take a different approach. For instance, a downtown Edmonton cafe chose to give customers the option of adding a small donation to their bills to provide a free coffee or pastry for a vulnerable person who otherwise might resort to panhandling (McMillan, 2018). Is this a better way of dealing with panhandling? Should we be focusing on charity? Or can something more be done? It’s always hard to tell which policy approach will be successful, but research in social stratification can give us a good idea of what might work, along with why certain approaches tend to receive more support than others.

The common theme in these different news stories is the existence of groups—the unemployed and low-income workers, Indigenous people, women, and immigrants, for example—that rank lower than others in the social stratification system. A low position in this ranking typically means having little wealth, power (the ability to impose one’s will on others), and prestige (or esteem). A higher position generally implies the opposite. In this chapter, we begin by discussing how sociologists study social stratification. We then examine theories of social stratification that attempt to explain its origins and impact. The next section focuses on occupational and class structures and material inequality in Canada, and asks whether social inequality has been increasing. The chapter ends with a discussion of some of the consequences of social inequality and what might be done about it.

Stratification: A Cornerstone of Sociology

Sociologists have four basic areas of inquiry. We study social structure, or the way in which society is organized, both formally and informally. We ask questions about social order. What is it that holds together a society comprising individuals with different interests, and when and why does social order break down? Inquiries about social change form a third key area in the discipline. How and why do societies, the institutions and power structures within them, and the values and beliefs held by individual members, change? Finally, sociologists spend a lot of time studying social stratification, the manner in which valued resources— that is, wealth, power, and prestige—are distributed, and the way in which advantages are passed from generation to generation.

Arguably, the study of social stratification is the cornerstone of sociology. Descriptions of social structure that ignore the stratification system are clearly inadequate. Imagine describing Canadian society to someone from another country without referring to some features of stratification. Would the listener really understand our society if she or he did not know that most large corporations are run by men, that the working poor continue to struggle to make ends meet even though the majority of employed Canadians earn a decent living, that First Nations are much more likely than most others to be living in poverty, and that immigrants are doing less well today than they were several decades ago, even though they are better educated?

Furthermore, inequalities in wealth can threaten social stability (the poor resenting the wealthy, for example, and demanding more equality), and inequalities in power can be used to maintain social order. For example, powerful corporations might lobby provincial or territorial governments for changes in the labour laws that would make it more difficult for unions to organize employees. In less democratic countries, high levels of inequality and direct control of the police and military by a powerful political minority can lead to the quick and violent suppression of mass unrest (Ortiz, 2007).

An understanding of social stratification is also essential for studying social change since frequently it is the stratification system that is undergoing change. For example, changing gender roles and the slow movement of women into positions of power and authority in North America in the past few decades are really features of a changing stratification system. The massive social, economic, and political changes that began in the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and in China a decade earlier are, among other things, changes in stratification systems, as the main sources of power came to include both the political system and the emerging capitalist economy.

Social Hierarchies in Stratified Societies

Imagine a society in which stratification did not exist, in which all things of value were distributed equally. Even if you picture a very small group, perhaps a preindustrial society with only a few hundred members, living on some isolated island where the necessities of life are easily obtained, it is still difficult to imagine a nonstratified society. A social hierarchy might emerge as a result of skill differences in fishing, in nursing the ill back to health, or in communicating with the spirits, for example. Inequalities in wealth might develop simply because some families were fortunate enough to have a larger number of children, providing more of the labour needed to accumulate valued possessions. Once accumulated wealth began to be passed from generation to generation, a structured and relatively permanent pattern of inequality would emerge.

Perhaps you imagined some contemporary society comprising adults who, believing strongly in equality, decide to live and work together in some kind of urban or rural commune, sharing all their possessions. Again, it is easy to imagine how a social hierarchy could emerge, as those with more useful skills find themselves playing a more central role in this small-scale society. No doubt, when important decisions need to be made, these individuals will be more likely to influence the outcome.

We do not need to repeat this mental exercise too many times before we see that social stratification in one form or another exists in all societies. However, our hypothetical examples are far from typical. In most societies, stratification is pronounced, and basic skills are seldom the foundation of social hierarchies. Nevertheless, cross-cultural variation exists in the criteria by which individuals and groups are ranked, the degree to which they can move from one position to another within the hierarchy, and the extent of inequality in wealth and power that exists within the hierarchy.

Ascribed and Achieved Status

Let’s begin by defining the rank or position that a person has within a social hierarchy as that person’s status. We can further distinguish between an ascribed status and an achieved status. The former is assigned to individuals, typically at birth. An ascribed status can be a function of race, gender, age, and other factors that are not chosen or earned and that cannot be changed (a few people do choose their gender status, but they are exceptions). In contrast, an achieved status is precisely that—a position in a hierarchy that has been achieved by virtue of how well someone performs a role. The most obvious example is that of occupational status— for instance, individuals who have performed well in law school are entitled to become lawyers, and high performance athletes may strive to achieve the status of professional athlete. By the same logic, someone could achieve the status of homeless person by performing poorly in educational, employment, family, and other social roles.

Although we may accept that a completely nonstratified society is impossible, most of us would probably agree that a stratification system in which higher positions are achieved, not ascribed, is preferable. In a meritocracy, everyone would have an equal chance to compete for higher status positions and, presumably, those most capable would be awarded the highest rank. Such a society would exhibit a considerable degree of social mobility, as those who are more qualified move up the social hierarchy to replace those who are less competent and are consequently compelled to move down.

Open and Closed Stratification Systems

When we compare Canada with other societies, or look back at our history, we find that this country has what appears to be a relatively open stratification system in which merit, rather than inheritance or ascribed characteristics, determines social rank and in which social change is therefore possible. For example, dramatic changes in the status of various groups have occurred in this country over time. Although slavery was not nearly as widespread in Canada as in the United States, slaves (most of them black and from Africa but also some First Nations) were bought and sold in Canada from the 1630s to the 1830s (Milan and Tran, 2004). Chinese labourers, brought into the country to help build the railways, were kept out of most “white” jobs by law until well into the twentieth century (Li, 1982). Similarly, it was not until the 1960s that black Canadians were allowed to compete for much more than the lowest level positions in the Canadian railway industry (Calliste, 1987). However, by the 1830s, slavery had disappeared in Canada, and we now have laws prohibiting racial discrimination.

Comparing ourselves to other contemporary societies, we note that Canada does not have an aristocracy, such as the one that exists in Britain, where children of wealthy and powerful families of long standing inherit positions and titles. The degree to which Canadians compete for higher status occupations (in the education system and, later, in the workplace) stands in clear contrast to the situation in India, for example, where the caste into which an individual is born largely determines the type of work that he or she will be allowed to do. Although discrimination on the basis of caste membership has been illegal in India for many decades, the caste system continues to underpin a relatively closed stratification system. Compared with India, Canada offers many more chances for upward social mobility, an indication of a more open stratification system.

It is all too easy, however, to overlook the extent to which ascribed statuses continue to limit opportunities for many Canadians as well. Discrimination against Indigenous people and visible minority groups continues. So, too, does discrimination against members of the gay community, seniors, people with disabilities, and women. These people are in lower status positions not because they competed poorly for some higher ranking in the social hierarchy, but because they are gay, are elderly, have disabilities, or are female.

These are fairly obvious examples of the ways in which ascribed statuses continue to play a prominent role in Canada’s social stratification system. But what about the child from a wealthy family who graduates from an excellent high school in a wealthy neighbourhood, completes a degree or two in a prestigious and costly university, and then begins a career in a high-status, well-paying profession? Is this simply an example of someone achieving a deserved high-status position, or did the advantages of birth (an ascribed status) play some part in this success story? Similarly, when we hear of large companies laying off hundreds of workers, does the workers’ sudden downward mobility reflect their failure to compete in an open, merit-based stratification system, or were they simply unfortunate enough to be employed in a corporation that was being downsized?

As these examples illustrate, the social stratification system consists of numerous hierarchies, some based on ascribed characteristics, others on achievement. Elsewhere in this book, you will read chapters devoted to various dimensions of stratification, such as gender, race, and ethnicity, and their “intersectionality,” or how they sometimes overlap. Other chapters address activities and institutions in which stratification processes are extremely important, and still others focus on inequalities among countries. Once you have read all these chapters, you will, we expect, be convinced of the central importance of social stratification in the discipline of sociology.

Social Class

You will also notice that, even though studies of gender, race, and ethnicity take you in quite different directions, all frequently share an emphasis on inequalities in income, wealth, or property, and on resulting inequalities in power. On average, for the past two decades, women have been earning less than 75 percent of what men earn (Krahn, Hughes, and Lowe, 2020: Ch. 6). Older women are much more likely than are older men to be living in poverty. Immigrants and, particularly, Indigenous people are more likely to be unemployed or, if they are employed, to be in low-paying jobs. Owners of large workplaces are wealthier than are most other members of society, and employees in professional and managerial occupations typically earn much more than lower-level employees do. Recognizing, then, the extent to which such material inequality (that is, differences in income and wealth or property) parallels and overlaps with other social hierarchies, the rest of this chapter will focus primarily on material inequality or, after we define the terms, on social class and class structure.

Definitions of the concept of social class vary considerably, as we will see in the next section, which outlines different theories of social stratification. We prefer to use the term in a general sense to indicate the position of an individual or a family within an economic hierarchy, along with others who have roughly the same amount of control over or access to economic or material resources. For example, an individual can be said to be a member of a class of large landowners, a class of wage-labourers and salaried workers (that is, the “working class”), or a “professional/managerial class.” It is their similar economic situation and opportunities, a result of their shared position within a society’s system of economic production, that makes these individuals members of the same class. In turn, we can use the term class structure to refer to the overall economic hierarchy comprising all such classes, choosing the word structure deliberately to indicate the relative stability of this social ranking.

Do you think of yourself as a member of a specific social class? Probably not. Like most North Americans, you probably have a reasonably good idea of how well off you are compared with others in your community. You probably have some sense of where your education, occupation, and income (or your parents’ education, occupation, and income) fit in some general hierarchy of socioeconomic status. “Class,” however, is unlikely to be part of your everyday vocabulary. Nor is it typically part of the media’s vocabulary. The news stories we discussed earlier, for example, identified a number of different dimensions of stratification, but social class was not among them.

This situation does not make class a useless concept. As already suggested, pronounced patterns of material inequality exist in our society and overlap with most other dimensions of social stratification. The economic hierarchy is obviously not completely closed, but it is relatively stable, and it comprises fairly distinct categories of individuals with similar amounts of control over material resources. Hence, it is useful to try to identify the classes that make up the stratification system (or class structure), to seek to understand their origin, and to examine the effects of membership in them on individuals and families. Rather than discarding the concept of class because few people think in these terms, we should perhaps ask why few people think about social classes despite their prominence. This is one of the topics discussed in the next section.

Explanations of Social Stratification

Now that you have considered some examples of social stratification and learned some new concepts, it is time to examine theories (or explanations) of social stratification. As you will see, it is important to consider the time and place in which a social theory was developed, since theorists construct their social explanations on the basis of what they see around them and expect to see in the future.

Karl Marx: Capitalism, Exploitation, and Class Conflict

Karl Marx had an immense impact on how we think about social stratification (Marx, 1904 [1859]; Marx and Engels, 1972 [1848]). He was born in Germany in 1818 but lived in England from 1849 until he died in 1883. His writings about the social and economic forces that brought about economic change look back over history but focus particularly on the rapidly changing European world that he observed during his lifetime. This was a time when industrial capitalism was transforming the economy and society. Large, mechanized, factory-based systems of production were emerging; cities were growing rapidly as peasants were being forced off the land and attracted to the city by jobs in factories; and material inequality was extreme, as factory owners and merchants made huge profits while labourers lived in poverty. Trade unions and labour laws that protected workers did not yet exist. For these reasons, as Marx observed, the Industrial Revolution was a time when both the level of economic production and the degree of inequality in society increased tremendously.

Modes of Production and Social Classes

Marx called the system of economic activity in a society its mode of production. Its major components were the means of production (technology, capital investments, and raw materials) and the social relations of production (the relationships between the main classes involved in production). Slavery was the primary mode of production in some societies in ancient times, and feudalism, an economic system in which peasants worked for landowners, not for a wage but for some share of the produce, was the mode of production that gave way to industrial capitalism in Europe.

Within industrial capitalism, Marx identified two major classes: the capitalist class, or bourgeoisie, which owned the means of production; and the proletariat, or working class, which exchanged its labour for wages. He also described a middle class— the petite bourgeoisie—comprising independent owners/producers (farmers, for example) and small business owners. Marx expected this middle class largely to disappear as capitalism matured and drew some of its members up into the bourgeoisie but pushed most down into the proletariat. Of much greater importance in his theory of class inequality and social change was the relationship between workers and owners.

Marx reasoned that the value of a sold product was directly proportional to the average amount of labour needed to produce it. So, for example, an elegant piece of furniture was more valuable than its component pieces mainly because of the labour invested in it by the worker(s) who built it. Marx argued that the value of goods produced by wage labourers far exceeded the amount needed to pay their wages and the cost of raw materials, technology, and other factors of production. Marx referred to this excess as surplus value. According to Marx, when commodities were sold, their surplus value was turned into profits for the owner.

Marx viewed this as an exploitive relationship but one that differed from the exploitive relationships that characterized slavery or feudalism. After all, factory workers were paid a wage for their labour and were not legally forced to stay with the job. However, because most workers had few other options for making a living, and because owners controlled all aspects of work, the legal freedom of wage-labourers to change jobs was, in practical terms, an illusion.

Class Conflict and Class Consciousness

According to Marx, class conflict among major classes is the driving force behind social change.He argued that previous modes of production had collapsed and been replaced because of class conflict. Feudalism in Europe had given way to capitalism as a result of the growing power of the merchant class relative to the traditional alliance of landowners and the aristocracy, and the deteriorating relationship between landowners and peasants.Furthermore, Marx argued, capitalism would eventually be replaced by a socialist mode of production, in which private ownership of property would disappear, along with the exploitation and inequality it produced. The impetus for this massive change would again be widespread class conflict, this time between wage labourers and the owners of the means of production, as inequality between these two classes became more pronounced.

Marx stated that this revolution would take place only when members of the working class recognized that they were exploited. Marx did not take it for granted that members of a class would see that their interests were similar. Whereas capitalists might be conscious of their class interests, wage-labourers needed to become personally aware of their common enemy. They needed to be transformed from a “class in itself” to a “class for itself.” Class consciousness was therefore an important social-psychological component of Marx’s theory of social inequality and social change. His vision of the future was that of a revolutionary upheaval in which the oppressed working class would recognize its enemy, destroy the institutions of capitalism, and replace them with a classless society based on collective ownership of the means of production.

Max WeMax Weber: Class and Other Dimensions of Inequality

Weber was born in Germany half a century after Marx, in 1864. Like Marx, he built his analysis of social stratification on a careful reading of history and a thorough analysis of the economic and political events of his day. But because he was only beginning his university studies about the time Marx died, Weber had the advantage of seeing the direction in which a more mature industrial capitalism was taking European society. He continued to write about many aspects of social stratification and social change until his death in 1920.

Class, Status, and Party

Weber shared with Marx the belief that economic inequalities were central to the social stratification system and that ownership of property was a primary determinant of power, or the ability to get others to do what you want them to do. However, he argued that power could lie in controlling resources other than property (Weber, 1948 [1922]). Specifically, he proposed that structures of social stratification could be better understood by looking at economic inequalities, hierarchies of prestige (or social honour), and political inequalities (control of power blocs, such as political parties and other organizations)—in his words, at “class, status, and party.” Although these different hierarchies often overlap, they need not. For example, suddenly wealthy individuals might not enjoy the prestige they desire, being rejected in “high society” by those with “old money.” Similarly, a politician might have considerable power through control of government resources, but might not be very wealthy or, for that matter, enjoy much prestige.

Since Weber lived to see the emergence of white-collar workers, the growth of large private- and public-sector bureaucracies, and the growing power of trade unions, he was able to write about these alternative sources of power in a stratified capitalist society. He provided an insightful analysis of how power resided in the control of top positions in large bureaucratic organizations, even if the officeholder was not an owner of the organization. He recognized that well-educated wage-labourers might not be as powerless as were the factory workers of an earlier era. He also saw that a new class of middle-level, educated workers might not necessarily align themselves with blue-collar workers, and he was less inclined to conclude, as had Marx, that the middle class would disappear (Zeitlin with Brym, 1991: 118–19). In fact, he expected that the number of educated technical and professional workers in bureaucratic capitalist society would increase.

Compared to Marx, Weber saw considerably more complexity in the social stratification system because of the growing diversity of the occupational structure and of capitalist enterprises. And although Weber was sometimes pessimistic in his writings about the future of democracy in a bureaucratic capitalist society, he did not link inequality and class conflict to the ultimate demise of capitalism, as did Marx. Similarly, although Weber, like Marx, commented on how members of a class might or might not recognize their shared interests, he did not conclude that it was the inevitable destiny of the working class to become a “class for itself.”

Social Class and Life-Chances

Despite these divergences in their thinking, Weber, like Marx, placed primary emphasis on the economic underpinnings of social stratification. However, he defined class more broadly than Marx did. Rather than insisting that a limited number of class positions were based on an individual’s relationship to the means of production, Weber saw a larger variety of class positions based both on ownership of property and on other factors, such as occupation and education. Furthermore, he emphasized the life-chances that class positions offer, noting that a higher position in the economic hierarchy, however obtained, provides more power and allows an individual and his or her family to enjoy more of the good things in life.

So the general approach to studying stratification that we outlined earlier, one that recognizes the central importance of class while acknowledging that gender, race, and other possibly intersecting dimensions of social inequality can also be very important, is in the Weberian tradition. Similarly, our general definition of class as a relatively stable position within an economic hierarchy held by an individual or a family, along with others with roughly the same amount of control over or access to material resources, follows Weber’s use of the term.

Income Distribution

High-Paying and Low-Paying Occupations

Most people have no contact with the wealthiest families in Canada. We are much more aware of, or perhaps are even members of, a larger, not quite as wealthy but still affluent group of households containing one or more individuals in high-paying occupations. For example, according to 2016 census data, Canadian dentists earned a median income of $98 582 in 2015, while medical specialists earned considerably more ($122 002). Judges earned even more ($259 603), while lawyers had to be content with average yearly earnings of $97 589 (Statistics Canada, 2019d). In contrast, cashiers earned only a fraction of this ($10 054), as did taxi drivers ($13 432), hair stylists and barbers ($16 393), and home childcare providers ($12 688). The low incomes of these service-sector workers reflect, in part, the fact that many are employed part-time.

Using the term class in the Weberian sense, you could label individuals in well-paid managerial and professional occupations as members of an upper-middle class, given their high incomes and their access to and control of material resources through their employment positions. In contrast, retail workers and those employed in some service occupations (for example, food and beverage services, child-care and home-support services) work in the low-paying, insecure occupations that we might describe as the lower working class.

These occupational earning patterns hide large gender differences. Among people working full-time and full-year, women’s earnings were 80 percent of men’s earnings in 2015, a figure that has not changed significantly since 1995 (Krahn, Hughes, and Lowe, 2020: Ch. 6; Statistics Canada, 2019c). Female dentists’ median earnings were 87 percent of their male counterparts’ median earnings in 2015. Among senior managers in finance and communications, women earned 88 percent of what men earned. In the higher education sector, the female–male median earnings ratio was 92 percent. Among lower-paid occupations, female salesclerks earned only 71 percent of what male salesclerks earned, while female general farm workers earned 66 percent of their male counterparts’ earnings (Statistics Canada, 2019b). As these examples demonstrate, the female–male earnings ratio varies considerably by occupation, and tends to be lower in higher status and better paying occupations. However, women also tend to be underrepresented in higher status occupations, which contributes to the broader gender pay gap.

Income Inequality

The 2016 census data discussed above give some indication of the distribution in Canada of employment earnings, the largest component of total income, which also includes income from investments, government assistance, and all other sources. Studies of income tax data show that the level of total income inequality in Canada has increased dramatically over the past few decades.

In 1945, at the end of World War II, the most advantaged 10 percent of Canadians (the top decile) received 37 percent of all income (Yalnizyan, 2010). While this figure fluctuated over the next four decades, income inequality in Canada slowly declined. In 1985, the top decile received 35 percent of all income. However, the long-term trend then reversed, and income inequality increased steadily during the next two decades—in 2016, the top 10 percent received 38.5 percent of all income. In fact, by 2016, the top 1 percent of Canadian income earners were receiving 10.7 percent of all income, up from 7.6 percent 35 years earlier (see Figure 7.2). When income from privately owned corporations (frequently set up by high earners to reduce their taxes) is considered, income inequality is even higher (Wolfson, Veall, and Brooks, 2014).

The Poor

Defining and Measuring Poverty

Poverty can be defined in different ways. We could talk about absolute poverty, arguing that the poor are those who have barely enough to stay alive, like many of the inhabitants of poor countries. Or we could conclude, as most Canadians do, that relative poverty is really what matters. If your neighbours own their homes and one or more cars, eat in nice restaurants, put money into pension plans, and take foreign vacations, while you rent a small apartment, ride the bus, look forward to a meal at McDonald’s, have no savings, and watch travel shows on TV, you probably consider yourself poor. According to this definition, Canada has a considerable number of poor people.

Most discussions of poverty in Canada rely on the low-income cutoff (LICO), commonly, although unofficially, known as the “poverty line.” The average Canadian spends about 43 percent of after-tax income on the basic necessities (food, shelter, and clothing). To establish the LICO, Statistics Canada adds 20 percent to this figure (Statistics Canada, 2019e). Hence, anyone spending more than 63 percent of after-tax income on the basic necessities is considered a low-income earner. Obviously, some people budget better than others do, so these are average cost estimates. However, there is no denying that the cost of living is higher in larger urban centres and that it takes more money to feed and clothe additional people, so different LICOs are calculated for communities of various sizes and for families of various sizes within those communities (Statistics Canada, 2019e). For example, based on 2016 income data, Statistics Canada sets the after-tax LICO for a single person living in a city with more than half a million residents at $20 675, compared with $13 525 for a single person living in a rural area. The after-tax low-income line for a family of four in a large city was $39 092, substantially higher than that for a similar-sized family in a rural area ($25 571).

Who Are the Poor?

Rising unemployment causes the number and proportion of people living below the poverty line to increase. In 1980, for example, 11.6 percent of all Canadians were below the after-tax poverty line but, with the recession of the early 1980s, that figure climbed to 13.7 percent by 1984. As the economy recovered, the proportion of poor Canadians dropped again to 10.2 percent in 1989 but then rose steeply to 15.2 percent in 1996 following the recession in the early 1990s. Over the next decade, the proportion of poor Canadians rose and fell again. In 2015, the most recent year for which data are available, 9.2 percent of Canadians were living below the after-tax LICO (Statistics Canada, 2019f).

Although poverty rates tend to follow unemployment rates, not all of Canada’s poor are unemployed or out of the labour force. In 2014, 746 000 Canadians were living in working poor households, where the main earner had been paid for at least 910 hours of work (Statistics Canada, 2016). These families were poor, not because no one in them was working for pay but because they earned so little. Overall, as part-time and temporary work have become more common in Canada, the working poor have come to make up a larger proportion of Canada’s poor (Krahn, Hughes and Lowe, 2020: Ch. 4).

Stemming from a long history of colonization, Indigenous people are among the poorest citizens of our country. In 2015, the unemployment rate among Indigenous Canadians (15.2 percent) was more than twice as high as among non-Indigenous people (7.7 percent) (Statistics Canada, 2019g). First Nations living on reserves have the highest unemployment rate (24.9 percent in 2015). The poverty rate (LICO) for First Nations living off-reserve in 2015 was 18.3 percent, compared with 9.2 percent for all Canadians (Statistics Canada, 2019h). The comparable rate for First Nations living on reserves, if available, would be much higher.

On average, recent immigrants are younger and more educated than are native-born Canadians (see Chapter 8, Race and Ethnic Relations). Even so, in 2015, 21 percent of immigrants who had arrived in Canada in the previous decade were living below the LICO, and this figure does not include non-permanent residents, who were more than twice as likely to live in poverty (Statistics Canada, 2019i). So, despite their relatively high level of education over the past several decades, recent immigrants have come to be significantly overrepresented among Canada’s working poor (Picot and Lu, 2017).

Several decades ago, senior citizens were more likely than younger Canadians were to be living below the poverty line. However, a higher proportion of recent cohorts of retirees have had employer provided pensions and personal retirement funds (Gougeon, 2009), and the federal government has maintained old-age pension levels. Consequently, in contrast to the working poor, among whom poverty rates have risen, the poverty rate for seniors has declined. In 2015, only 5.1 percent of seniors were living below the LICO, compared with 9.2 percent of the total Canadian population (Statistics Canada, 2019f). In contrast, 19.2 percent of Canadian single parents were living below the LICO in 2015. Eighty-five percent of these single parents were women. Many of these young women were completely dependent on social assistance, since it is almost impossible for a single young mother to look after children and hold down a job.

Social Assistance for the Poor

Many people believe that “welfare” (social assistance) and Employment Insurance are too easy to obtain and that the amount of money received is enough to discourage people from seeking work (Swanson, 2001). Is this true? Because welfare regulations vary across provinces and territories, we will examine data from Ontario, the largest province and among the provinces with the highest welfare incomes, for 1997, 2007, and 2017.

Figure 7.3 shows that, in 1997, a single, employable adult (an adult who did not have a disability, was not a senior, and was not considered unable to seek work because of family responsibilities) who was eligible for Ontario social assistance received 42 percent of the after-tax low-income cut-off (LICO). A decade later, in 2007, the same type of person received only 33 percent of LICO, but the rate later rebounded so that person received 45 percent of LICO in 2017. Single people with disabilities who are receiving welfare have generally been treated a bit more generously–in 1997, such an individual would have received total annual transfer payments that were 72 percent of the LICO. In 2017, the $14 682 that a person with a disability received from the provincial government was 70 percent of the LICO.

Single parents and couples with children, like adults with disabilities, have also been treated somewhat better by the welfare system, compared to single, employable adults, and for both groups we see in Figure 7.3 that their total annual welfare payments, as a percentage of the appropriate low-income line for their family type, increased over the past two decades. In fact, in 2017, a single parent with one child would have received $21 136, or 83 percent of the LICO. However, the $20 545 that a couple with two children would have received from welfare that year was only 77 percent of the LICO (Tweddle and Aldridge, 2018).

Summing up, in Ontario, and also across Canada, the amount of welfare assistance is low. Increases to welfare income for almost all types of recipients in recent years have helped to offset cuts made in the early-to-mid 2000s. However, welfare income does not bring recipients up to the poverty line. Consequently, it is difficult to accept the argument that overly generous welfare systems discourage people from looking for work. Many of those who receive assistance cannot work outside the home, and the money provided keeps the poor who receive it well below the poverty line.

Moving Into and Out of Poverty

Discussions of poverty can leave the impression that the poor and the nonpoor are separate groups and that there is little mobility from one status to the other. While the proportion of Canadians with low income, defined as income that is half the median income for a family the same size, has varied between 10 and 14 percent over the past several decades, between 2009 and 2016, 27 percent of all Canadians lived below the low-income threshold for at least one year (Statistics Canada, 2019j, 2019k).

Additional data reveal that, between 2015 and 2016, about 4 percent of all Canadians slid below the low-income threshold, while a similar proportion moved above it (Statistics Canada, 2019l). Obviously, poverty is not a static status. Individuals and families move into and out of poverty each year. Nevertheless, a sizable minority remain stuck in poverty year after year. Losing a job, having to take a lower-paying job, becoming a single parent, or being widowed can drastically increase the chance of falling into, and remaining stuck in, poverty. In addition, welfare regulations in many provinces “claw back” social assistance benefits as soon as welfare recipients start earning even a small income (Tweddle and Aldridge, 2018). This predicament creates a “welfare trap” that further increases the chance of poor Canadians, particularly single- parent families, remaining poor.

Material Inequality in Canada: Summing Up

Is Inequality Increasing in Canada?

Compared with some other countries, and compared with the situation in Canada a century ago, the level of inequality in this country today is relatively low. Even so, you have seen evidence of a great deal of inequality in wealth and income. Furthermore, indications are that, for several decades, the level of inequality has been slowly rising. Corporate concentration has been increasing as a small number of huge business enterprises, many of them family-owned or family-run, have gained control over a larger share of the assets of Canada’s biggest corporations. Wealth inequality in general appears to be increasing, income inequality has risen, and the number of working poor has increased.

Looking more closely at the labour market, we see that unemployment rates have been rising slowly but steadily for several decades.Although these rates have gone up and down a number of times, and are lower now than they were in the 1990s, the longterm trend since the mid-twentieth century has been upward. In 2018, the average annual unemployment rate was 5.8 percent, representing 1.76 million unemployed Canadians (Statistics Canada, 2019m), a number almost equal to the populations of Manitoba and Prince Edward Island combined. With increasing global financial and economic uncertainty, we can expect the national unemployment rate to stay at least at this level over the next several years. Comparisons across provinces in 2018 reveal the extent of regional inequality in Canada, with unemployment rates of 13.8 percent in Newfoundland and Labrador, 8.0 percent in New Brunswick, 5.6 percent in Ontario, and only 4.7 percent in British Columbia.

The part-time employment rate has also been rising over the past few decades. Back in 1953, fewer than 4 percent of employed Canadians worked part- time. In 2018, 18.7 percent had a part-time job. Employers do not have to pay pension and other benefits to parttime employees, so they have been hiring more part-time employees since the 1980s, thus cutting costs. By 2018, 13.3 percent of working Canadians had a job with a specific end date (Statistics Canada, 2019n). Real wages are increasing slowly, and inequality in earnings has been rising as a result of part-time and temporary employment trends, as well as declines in employment in traditionally higher paying industries and occupations (see Critical Sociology: How Precarious Work Contributes to Economic Insecurity in Canada).

A More Polarized Society?

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in Canada, the gap between the advantaged (those with full-time, permanent jobs) and the disadvantaged (those with part-time, temporary, or no jobs) is slowly increasing (Heisz, 2016). A similar pattern has been observed in the United Kingdom and the United States (Alvaredo et al., 2018). In fact, as French economist Thomas Piketty (2014) has argued, under capitalism, growing inequality is inevitable, even with a growing economy.

This is not to suggest that a new era of massive inequality is dawning. However, the evidence is clear that inequality is increasing, and that society is becoming more polarized in terms of access to and control over economic resources (Fortin et al., 2012; Foster and Wolfson, 2010). Using Weber’s definition of class, we can conclude that class differences in Canada and many other countries are becoming more pronounced.

Obviously, many interrelated factors have contributed to the growth in inequality. In North America, layoffs and downsizing have been a frequent response to economic downturns. So has the replacement of full-time permanent jobs with part-time and temporary positions. Globalization has led to a more competitive, cost-cutting economic environment. Business enterprises have responded by shifting many of their activities to countries in which lower wages and less rigorous environmental and labour laws allow them to earn higher profits.

Critical Sociology: How Precarious Work Contributes to Economic Insecurity in Canada

Uber, Lyft, AirBnB, SkiptheDishes, TaskRabbit—these are the companies that come to mind when we talk about “the gig economy,” “the new economy,” or “precarious work.” however, these terms refer to something much broader than a few well-known companies (Katz and Krueger, 2018).

Precarious work, or “employment that is uncertain, unpredictable, and risky from the point of view of the worker” (Kalleberg, 2009: 2), is characteristic of the new economy dominated by service-sector jobs. It includes temporary employment, such as seasonal labour, term or contract jobs, and casual work. Such jobs accounted for 13.3 percent of total employment in Canada in 2018 (Statistics Canada, 2019n). According to a 2018 study by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 22 percent of professionals were in precarious jobs, many of whom reported fluctuating incomes and unpredictable schedules (Hennessy and Tranjan, 2018). There’s a good chance that the person teaching your sociology class is an adjunct professor or sessional instructor who is paid per course, earns only a fraction of what a full-time professor earns for teaching, and receives few employment benefits (Pasma and Shaker, 2018). Although contract academic staff have been part of universities since their inception, these positions have been growing relative to the number of tenure-track positions as more universities come to rely on temporary staff to deal with budget cuts (Ehrenberg, 2012; Field et al., 2014; Thedwall, 2008).

Precarious employment has numerous negative consequences (Anani, 2018; Standing, 2016). Temporary jobs can act as stepping stones to permanent employment. however, that is not always the case (Fuller, 2011). More often, temporary workers move into unemployment or another temporary position after their temporary job ends. And a history of temporary employment can lead to lower earnings for many years to come, even among workers who find full-time employment (Fuller and Stecy-Hildebrandt, 2014).

Nor does precarious employment affect all workers equally. Women account for a larger proportion of precarious professionals than do men, and they are more likely to have temporary jobs (Fuller, 2011; Hennessy and Tranjan, 2018). Overall, the rise in precarious work has contributed to growing economic insecurity among workers and families, as a job no longer guarantees consistent income or a pension for most workers (hacker, 2006; Vosko, 2006).

Four main drivers explain the rise of precarious labour—de-unionization, financialization, globalization, and the digital revolution (Kalleberg and Vallas, 2017). First, the waning power of unions means that workers enjoy less protection in the labour market. For example, the proportion of workers with company pensions is low and falling. Financialization refers to shareholders’ intensifying desire to see share prices increase. One way to achieve that outcome is for companies to hire fewer people with stable, full-time jobs and more people with precarious jobs.

At the same time, globalization makes it easier for companies to locate factories and offices in places where wages and salaries are low. In high-wage regions, the wage bill must fall to stem the outflow of investment and therefore jobs. Again, precarious employment helps in this regard. Finally, the digital revolution decreases the need for human labour. Together, these forces have resulted in risk being shifted toward workers as jobs become more precarious.

Labour unions, which traditionally have resisted attempts to cut wages and jobs, have lost some of their power. At the political level, an ideology emphasizing that “the market knows best,” and that people need less rather than more government intervention in the economy and the labour market, has led to fewer government efforts to reduce inequality and reduced transfer payments to the poor (Fortin et al., 2012). Tax cuts for the highest income groups have exacerbated patterns of income and wealth inequality (Myles and Banting, 2013).

Consequences of Material Inequality

Other chapters in this textbook will go into more detail about the many consequences of inequality for individuals and families. You will see that position in the class structure affects behaviour, and that the poor, the middle classes, and the very wealthy frequently hold different opinions on various subjects, may vote differently, and certainly enjoy different lifestyles. In short, people in different positions in society’s economic hierarchy experience different life-chances, to use Weber’s term.

Consequences for Individuals and Families

Children from poorer families typically do not do as well in school as children from more affluent families do (Davies and Guppy, 2006). They are more likely to drop out before completing high school and to be enrolled in non-university academic streams if they stay in school (Tanner, Krahn, and Hartnagel, 1995; Taylor and Krahn, 2009). They are also much less likely to go to university and to experience more difficulties if they do go (Lehmann, 2012). As noted earlier in the discussion of occupational mobility, such effects of poverty are largely responsible for the perpetuation of class inequalities from one generation to the next.

For a variety of reasons, including better nutrition, access to better health care, and less hazardous working conditions, those who are situated higher in the economic hierarchy are typically healthier than are poor people (Raphael, 2011). Consequently, on average, the poor do not live as long as those who are better off (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). Similarly, when dealing with the criminal justice system, those with greater access to and control over economic resources tend to fare better (King and Winterdyk, 2010). As a result, the poor are overrepresented in jails. Indigenous and visible minority Canadians with low incomes are particularly disadvantaged when dealing with the criminal justice system (Fitzgerald and Carrington, 2008). These examples show that life-chances are a function of position in the class structure and that those higher up in the economic hierarchy enjoy a better quality of life and, often, a longer life.

Consequences for Society

In addition to these substantial consequences for individuals and families, can material inequality have other broader social outcomes? Specifically, given the relatively high and increasing level of inequality in Canada, can we expect more social unrest? Will conflict between the “haves” and the “have-nots” increase? Those committed to a classical Marxist theory of social change might welcome such conflict; for them, it would indicate that capitalism was finally beginning to give way to a socialist society. Others might view such conflict negatively. Whatever the response to such a possibility, it is clear that values and beliefs directly influence the way people respond to evidence of inequality and its consequences.

But returning to the question, can we expect an increase in social unrest and conflict as a result of higher levels of inequality? During the early 1980s, the solidarity movement in British Columbia brought together members of trade unions, social-welfare organizations, and various community-based groups in opposition to the Social Credit government’s cutbacks in government programs and attempts to change labour legislation. Bryan Palmer (1986) described the protests and rallies that took place as evidence of growing class conflict. However, these events were exceptional. More often, the poor and the near-poor put up with their less advantaged position because they have few of the resources (for example, money, education, organizations) that make it possible to fight for social change (Brym, 1979). In fact, in the past decade, we have seen more opposition from a better-organized middle class in response to government cutbacks in health and education funding, and in support for seniors, than from the poor in response to welfare cutbacks. And we have witnessed intensified negative stereotyping of the poor and those on welfare, a process that Jean Swanson (2001) calls “poor- bashing.”

Several years ago, however, we saw the emergence of a remarkable new social movement, Occupy Wall Street, that brought together a wide range of individuals and groups, including middle-class, university-educated social activists and the homeless, all concerned about the growing level of social inequality in North America. The movement attracted a great deal of public attention, but after some time died down as other social, political, and environmental issues took centre stage. It remains to be seen whether this movement will have an impact on patterns of social inequality in Canada and elsewhere.

It is unlikely that growing social inequality and fewer opportunities for upward mobility will translate into widespread social unrest in Canada. However, at least one study shows that some workers are digging in for long struggles against the threat of job cuts (Brym, Birdsell Bauer, and McIvor, 2013). Moreover, it remains possible that coalitions of concerned citizens will have an impact on the long- term trend toward growing inequality and declining opportunities. For example, despite the declining strength of unions in North America, we are beginning to see some responses to social inequality from the “social unionism” movement (Camfield, 2011; Krahn, Hughes, and Lowe, 2020: Ch. 11). Rather than focusing only on the needs of their members, some activist unions have begun making alliances with community groups and social justice organizations to implement social reforms in the broader community.

Responding to Inequality

Some people believe that more equal distribution of society’s resources would be preferable to the current level of inequality. They believe that existing differences in life-chances are unjust and look for ways in which social institutions, laws, and tax systems might be changed to reduce material inequality. Others, equally offended by inequality and its consequences, reject this reformist approach in favour of a more radical position, advocating the replacement of capitalist society by some kind of socialist or social-democratic alternative.

Still others respond to evidence of extensive inequality with little ambition to change it, believing, simply, that this is “the way things are.” Although perhaps bothered by its consequences, members of this group might still conclude that the existing level of inequality is inevitable and that well-intentioned efforts to reduce it will, in the long run, have little effect. They might even conclude that inequality is functional, as Davis and Moore (1945) argued 70 years ago, and that efforts to reduce it will be counterproductive. In short, reactions to inequality, and recommendations about what, if anything, should be done about it, reflect personal values and political orientations.

Assuming that a lower level of inequality is a goal worth striving for, it is clear that the government has a role to play in trying to reach that goal. The Canadian state has a significant impact on the distribution of wealth and income through tax systems that redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor (Fortin et al., 2012); through minimum-wage and other types of legislation; and through transfer payments, such as pensions for seniors and those with disabilities, social assistance for low-income individuals and families, and Employment Insurance. Even so, compared with some other industrialized countries, Canada spends considerably less on attempts to reduce poverty and inequality. Analysts estimate that nearly two-thirds of the increase in after-tax inequality that has occurred in Canada since 1981 would be eliminated if our tax and redistribution system was like that of Western European countries (Sharpe and Capeluck, 2012: 22).

However, Canada’s welfare policies appear to be based on the belief that a relatively unregulated labour market will produce wealth and jobs that should, in time, trickle down to the poor (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Unfortunately, as our review of labour market trends indicates, there is little evidence that the free market has performed successfully in this regard. Instead, unemployment rates have risen, precarious employment has become more common, and social inequality has increased.

Furthermore, during the past several decades, the political mood has changed, and concerns about reducing government deficits, streamlining government, and making Canada more competitive in the global marketplace appear to have been influencing government policy more than concerns about reducing inequality. In fact, some deficit-reducing initiatives (for example, reductions in social-assistance payments) have led to increases in inequality, as have tax reform initiatives that have favoured the rich.

But twenty-first-century government policies do not necessarily require this tradeoff. For example, government- funded job-creation strategies may continue to be useful in the future, as they were during the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–09. Revised tax policies that would raise corporate income taxes, increase the marginal tax rate for Canada’s highest paid citizens, and eliminate some of the tax write-offs enjoyed by the upper and middle classes could also be useful. Support for affordable housing would also go a long way toward helping families build wealth (see Critical Sociology: Housing, Homelessness, and Canada’s Commitment to Social Housing).

A large part of the problem lies, of course, in the fact that any serious effort to redistribute wealth and income from the well-off to the poor would probably be opposed by the former. If we really want to do something about material inequality in Canada and globally, if we want a different kind of society and a different kind of world, many of us—including the authors—have to be willing to accept less so that others can have more.

Critical Sociology: Housing, Homelessness, and Canada’s Commitment to Social Housing

In 2017, as part of the National housing Strategy, the federal government committed $40 billion to social housing infrastructure to ensure access to adequate, affordable, and stable housing (Government of Canada, 2017). This action came after many years of what some refer to as a crisis of affordability in housing in Canada, evidenced by rising home prices, a lack of affordable housing, and an increasing rate of homelessness.

In 2016, almost one-quarter of Canadian households had monthly shelter costs of 30 percent or more of average monthly household income (the accepted definition of unaffordable housing) (Statistics Canada, 2017). Thirteen percent of households were in dwellings considered “unsuitable, inadequate or unaffordable” and unable to afford better alternatives (Statistics Canada, 2019o). In 2014, about 235 000 Canadians experienced homelessness. That is, they lived without shelter, in emergency shelters, or in provisional accommodations at some point in that year (Gaetz et al., 2016). In the same year, 8 percent of Canadians over the age of 14 reported that, at some point in their lives, they had to “temporarily live with family, friends, [or] in their car . . . because they had nowhere else to live” (Rodrigue, 2016).

Although the National housing Strategy marked a departure after years of limited funding for housing, Canada has been committed to social housing (that is, subsidized, public, non-profit, and co-op housing for low- and moderate-income households) since the 1940s. After a modest start through the early post- war period, social housing entered its heyday in the 1960s and early 1970s. This period marked a rapid expansion of social housing, propelled by a federal agenda of welfare state expansion, increased urban growth, and surging industrialization (Suttor, 2016).

In the mid-1970s, social policy began focusing less on large government programs and more on non-profit involvement with an emphasis on mixed income housing. The federal government essentially stopped building social housing developments and relied on non-profit organizations to fill the gaps by integrating low-income housing into larger developments. This emphasis continued through the 1980s as the federal government slowly decreased its role in providing social housing, shifting the responsibility to the provinces. Some federal grants for housing reappeared in the early 2000s, but little public housing has been built in Canada since the 1990s.

After so many years of retrenchment, the National housing Strategy represents a shift in the federal government’s support for social housing, taking a more active role with the goal of reducing homelessness and increasing affordability through the creation of new housing units and provision of financial support. Importantly, the National housing Strategy also focuses on improving housing conditions for vulnerable populations that include survivors of family violence, northern and remote residents, new immigrants, the elderly, and people with disabilities.

Summary

1. What is social stratification?
Social stratification refers to persistent patterns of social inequality. Some social hierarchies are based on ascribed statuses, such as gender, race, and age, which are typically assigned to an individual at birth. Other social hierarchies are based on achieved status, which indicates how well an individual has performed in some role.

2. What are the main sociological theories that explain social stratification?
In his class-based theory of social stratification, Karl Marx emphasized the exploitation of the working class by the owners of the means of production and the potential for class conflict to generate social change. Max Weber also emphasized the power that resides in ownership of property but argued that hierarchies of prestige and political power are influential as well.

3. Do any sociological theories argue that social stratification is useful?
The functional theory of social stratification suggests that inequality is both inevitable and necessary insofar as it ensures that the most qualified individuals are selected to fill the most important and rewarding roles. This theory downplays power differences and conflict between social classes.

4. How do sociological theorists account for how society and the economy have changed over the past century?
Erik Olin Wright developed a class-based theory of stratification that adapts many of Marx’s ideas to today’s circumstances. Frank Parkin’s approach follows in the footsteps of Weber by focusing on how some social groups exclude others from power. Pierre Bourdieu’s explanation of how social inequality is reproduced across generations emphasized different forms of capital: economic, social, cultural, and symbolic.

5. What can we learn about Canada’s social stratification system by examining relevant data?
While studies of occupational mobility show that Canada is a relatively open society, strong evidence exists that class-based advantages are often passed from one generation to the next. Ownership of wealth and property in Canada remains highly concentrated, and income inequality is also relatively high. The poor and others near the bottom of the social hierarchies enjoy fewer life-chances than do the well-off. Because of their limited access to social and material resources, the poor have seldom become an active force for social change.

6. Is social inequality decreasing, staying the same, or increasing?
Some theories of social stratification developed in the middle of the twentieth century suggested that inequality was declining as the North American economy expanded. However, the period of rapid economic growth that characterized the middle decades of that century appears to have ended. As unemployment rates have risen, as part-time and temporary jobs become more common, and as governments cut back on social-assistance programs while reducing taxes for the wealthy, evidence accumulates that material inequality is slowly increasing in Canada and also in other Western industrialized countries.

Glossary

Absolute poverty is the state of existence of those who have so little income that they can barely stay alive.

Achieved status is a changeable status that is acquired on the basis of how well an individual performs a particular role.

Ascribed status is a status such as age, gender, or race that is assigned to an individual, typically at birth.

The bourgeoisie, according to Marx, is one of the two main classes in the capitalist mode of production. It comprises the owners of the means of production.

A caste system is a closed stratification system, like India’s,with strict rules regarding the type of work that members of different castes (the strata of Indian society into which people are born) can do.

Circulatory mobility is the occupational mobility that occurs in a society when better-qualified individuals move upward to replace those who are less qualified and who must consequently move downward.

Class conflict, according to Marx, is conflict between major classes in a mode of production. According to Marx, it eventually leads to the emergence of a new mode of production.

Class consciousness, according to Marx, is the recognition by members of a class of their shared interests in opposing members of another class.

Class structure is the relatively stable economic hierarchy comprising different social classes.

In a closed stratification system, little or no social mobility occurs because most or all statuses are ascribed.

Contradictory class locations, according to Erik Olin Wright, are the locations within a class structure populated by occupational groupings with divided loyalties (for example, managers who supervise others yet report to owners).

Cultural capital refers to the knowledge and skill required to navigate the social world of the more advantaged people in society.

Economic capital consists of money, property, and other material assets. It is the core form of capital in contemporary society.

Exclusion, according to Frank Parkin, is the organized effort by privileged, powerful groups to maintain their advantaged position.

Habitus, according to Pierre Bourdieu, describes people’s sense of how to cope or compete and succeed in a particular field of power.

Intergenerational occupational mobility refers to an individual’s occupational mobility, either upward or downward, in relation to her or his parents’ occupational status.

Intragenerational occupational mobility refers to an individual’s occupational mobility, either upward or downward, within his or her own lifetime.

Life-chances, according to Weber, are the opportunities (or lack thereof) for a higher standard of living and a better quality of life that are available to members of a given class.

The low-income cutoff (LICO), known unofficially as the “poverty line,” is an estimate of the income level below which a person or family might be considered to be living in relative poverty. It is defined by Statistics Canada as the level of income at which more than 63 percent of income is spent on basic necessities.

The means of production, according to Marx, constitute one of the main components of a mode of production, consisting of the technology, capital investments, and raw materials used in production.

A meritocracy is a society in which most or all statuses are achieved on the basis of merit (how well a person performs in a given role).

The mode of production, according to Marx, is the system of economic activity in a society, comprising the means of production and the social relations of production (the class system).

In an open stratification system, merit, rather than inheritance (or ascribed characteristics), determines social rank.

The petite bourgeoisie, according to Marx, is a secondary class within the capitalist mode of production, including independent owners/producers (for example, farmers) and small-business owners.

Power is the ability to impose one’s will on others.

The proletariat, according to Marx, is one of the two main classes in a capitalist mode of production, comprising workers who exchange their labour for a wage.

Relative poverty is a state of existence in which individuals have significantly less income than most others have in their society, causing their lifestyle to be more restricted and their life-chances to be substantially curtailed.

Social capital, according to Pierre Bourdieu, is composed of relationships with other individuals and groups that can help someone get ahead in life.

Social class is a position in an economic hierarchy occupied by individuals or families with similar access to, or control over, material resources.

Social closure, according to Max Weber and Frank Parkin, refers to the methods used by relatively powerful groups to maintain their unequal access to status and resources, and to exclude others from such access.

Social mobility is the process whereby individuals, families, or other groups move up or down a status hierarchy.

Social relations of production, according to Marx, are one of the main components of a given mode of production—specifically, the relationships between the main classes involved in production.

Social stratification refers to persistent patterns of social inequality perpetuated by the way wealth, power, and prestige are distributed and passed from one generation to the next.

Status is a culturally and socially defined position that a person occupies.

Structural mobility refers to the occupational mobility in a society resulting from changes in the occupational structure (for example, the upward mobility of many individuals resulting from the creation of more middle- and upper-level jobs).

Surplus value, according to Marx, is the value of goods in excess of the cost of production, which takes the form of profit when the product is sold.

Symbolic capital, including honours and prizes, involves social recognition of advantaged people.

Usurpation, according to Frank Parkin, is the effort of excluded groups within a stratification system to gain advantages and power at the expense of more powerful groups.