Chapter 3 Quiz notes
Chapter 3 Quiz notes
statutory interpretation—the process through which judges give meaning to statutes when they are applied to individual disputes.
statutory interpretation
The process through which a judge gives meaning to an ambiguous term contained in a legal document, like a statute or a contract.
canons of construction
The rules of interpretation developed by the common law that help guide judges through the task of statutory interpretation.
common law
The body of law that is developed when judges apply statutes to individual cases and explain their reasons in written decisions.
judgment
The written reasons provided by a judge to explain their decision at the end of a trial.
case law
Judicially constructed law—that is, law that is established by decisions in specific court cases, with the decisions of the Supreme Court established as final case law. Also called judgments, judicial decisions, and precedent.
precedent
“A judgment or decision of a court of law cited as an authority for deciding a similar set of facts; a case [that] serves as an authority for the legal principle embodied in its decision.”*
persuasive
The term used to describe when legal authority from another jurisdiction may be informative to a judge from another jurisdiction, but that judge is not bound to follow.
binding
The term used to describe legal authority that must be followed by a judge in a lower court.
Every exercise of statutory interpretation begins with an ambiguous term
Plain meaning rule (also known as literal meaning rule)
-The meaning to be attributed to a statute is the one that comes to mind immediately for the average reader of the statute.
Golden rule
-When a literal reading of a statute would lead to an interpretation of a term that would not reasonably have been intended by Parliament, a judge will interpret the term in accordance with the general context of the statute.
2. Golden Rule
Judges start with the literal meaning, but if that leads to something absurd, unfair, or contradictory, they can change the meaning slightly to make sense.
It’s like a “safety valve” for the literal rule.
Example:
Law says “A man cannot marry his wife’s daughter.”
Literally, this would stop a man from marrying his stepdaughter and from marrying his wife’s daughter (which is actually his own daughter).
The Golden Rule would adjust it to mean only stepdaughters → avoiding an absurd result.
Mischief rule
- A statute will be interpreted in light of the legal wrong (“mischief”) that it sought to remedy.
The Mischief Rule
It is one of the main rules of statutory interpretation (how judges figure out what a law means).
The judge looks at:
What the law was like before the new law was made.
What problem or “mischief” the old law failed to deal with.
What Parliament wanted to fix by creating the new law.
Then, the judge interprets the new law in a way that stops the mischief and makes the law effective.
Why it’s used
Sometimes the literal wording of a law is unclear or too narrow.
The Mischief Rule lets judges focus on the intention of Parliament (what lawmakers wanted) instead of only the exact words.
It ensures the law actually works in practice to fix the issue.
Expression of one is the exclusion of the other rule
When one thing or class of things is expressly mentioned in a statute, it will be understood that things or classes of things not mentioned are considered to be excluded.
Limited class rule
- Where a general term follows a list of specific words or phrases, the general term shall be interpreted to include only words or phrases similar in nature to those listed before it.
limited class rule (also called ejusdem generis) in super simple terms:
When a law lists specific things, followed by a general word, the general word is only about things in the same category as the specific ones.
Example
If a law bans:
“dogs, cats, rabbits, and other animals” →
“other animals” doesn’t mean any animal (like a lion). It’s limited to the same kind of animals as dogs, cats, and rabbits (domestic pets).
✅ Key points for tests:
Limited class rule = general words take their meaning from the specific words before them.
Prevents laws from being applied too widely.
Latin name: ejusdem generis = “of the same kind.”
“To be known by its associates” rule
-Where a general term precedes a list of specific words or phrases, the general term shall be interpreted to include only words or phrases similar in nature to those to those that follow it.
Rule in penal statutes
- In cases involving a penalty, where the other rules of interpretation fail to resolve an ambiguity in a statute, the ambiguity will be resolved in the manner that is most favourable to the party facing the penalty.
The rule of statutory interpretation
that dictates that an ambiguous section of a statute is to be read according to the popular understanding of that term by the ordinary reader of a statute.
literal meaning rule
The rule of statutory interpretation that refers to dictionaries or other definitions provided for an ambiguous term to assist with its interpretation.
1. Literal Rule
Judges take the plain, ordinary meaning of the words in the law.
They don’t guess what Parliament meant — just what the words literally say.
Even if the outcome seems unfair, the court sticks to the wording.
Example:
Law says “No vehicles in the park.”
A motorbike is clearly a vehicle → banned.
A scooter isn’t written in the law → not banned, even if it causes problems.
✅ Quick summary for studying:
Literal Rule = exact words only.
Golden Rule = exact words, unless it causes nonsense → then fix it.
Mischief Rule = focus on Parliament’s goal/problem and stop it.
Reid J. (orally):
Summary
Justice Reid explains that when interpreting statutes that apply broadly to the public, the words should be understood in their ordinary, everyday meaning rather than in a narrow legal or technical sense. To decide whether mushrooms count as “vegetables” under the statute, the court considered the common understanding of the term. Testimony from people with experience in farming and agriculture supported that mushrooms are generally seen as vegetables, and no evidence contradicted this. Dictionaries also supported a broad definition of “vegetable.” Therefore, the statute should be read according to this plain and common-sense meaning.
Key Points for a Test
Principle of Interpretation:
General statutes meant for the public are presumed to use words in their popular/common sense.
Latin maxim: loquitur ut vulgus (“speaks in the language of the common people”).
Application to Case:
The statute in question covered many occupations (e.g., farm work, sales, camps).
Words should be clear and understandable to ordinary people affected by the law.
Evidence Considered:
Testimony from agricultural experts and those familiar with mushrooms = mushrooms are considered vegetables.
Canadian Horticultural Council supported this understanding.
No opposing evidence was presented.
Use of Dictionaries:
Dictionaries were used as another source of “common meaning.”
Webster’s defined “vegetable” broadly as “any plant,” which includes mushrooms.
Conclusion:
Courts prefer to rely on the plain, ordinary meaning of words.
In this case, mushrooms were interpreted as vegetables under the statute.
👉 For an exam, you’d want to remember:
General rule: statutes → ordinary meaning.
Why? To ensure laws are understandable to the public they govern.
Evidence: expert testimony + dictionaries can establish “common meaning.”
Case takeaway: Mushroom = vegetable under common understanding.
Summary
The judge argues that when interpreting statutes, common understanding of words should take priority over dictionary definitions. Dictionaries can be misleading or incomplete, so they should not be used to contradict ordinary usage when reliable evidence of that usage exists. Examples show that dictionary definitions don’t always reflect local/common meanings (e.g., “fall” = autumn, “bonnet” = car hood, “boot” = car trunk). Since the common understanding of “vegetable” includes mushrooms, and testimony supported this, it would be wrong to reject that meaning based only on alternative dictionary entries.
Key Points for a Test
Role of Dictionaries:
Dictionaries can support evidence but should not override common/public understanding.
Judge reluctant to rely solely on dictionaries to contradict common sense.
Judicial Notice vs. Evidence:
Judges may be aware of common usage (e.g., “fall” = autumn in Ontario).
But they must still be cautious not to rely entirely on personal experience.
Examples of Dictionary Limitations:
Fall: Oxford Dictionary calls it only a U.S. usage → contradicts Ontario’s everyday meaning.
Bonnet: Dictionary = car hood, but not commonly used in Ontario.
Boot: Dictionary = luggage area/coach trunk, but in Ontario not commonly used in that sense.
Statutory Interpretation Principle:
Where legislation addresses ordinary people, meanings should follow common understanding of the group the statute applies to.
Do not adopt obscure dictionary meanings that depart from ordinary local use.
Application to Mushroom Case:
Common/public understanding (and testimony) says mushroom = vegetable.
Even if a dictionary suggests otherwise, the plain, ordinary, popular meaning prevails.
👉 For an exam, the main takeaway:
Ordinary/common meaning > dictionary definitions when interpreting statutes.
Dictionaries can back up evidence, but courts should avoid relying on them to overturn widely accepted everyday meanings.
Examples of “fall,” “bonnet,” and “boot” show how dictionary definitions can mislead if taken out of social or regional context.
Mushroom = vegetable because that is the ordinary understanding among the people affected.
Professor Florestal writes:
Attempting to discern the “ordinary meaning” of a word is a process fraught with potential landmines of exploding possibilities. The meaning of words cannot be separated from the society in which those words were created; thus a word’s meaning often embodies many of the beliefs, perceptions, and biases of that society.12
golden rule
The rule of statutory interpretation that the ordinary sense of words is to be adhered to, but where such an interpretation would lead to an absurdity or incongruity, that ordinary sense may be modified to avoid the absurdity or incongruity.
rule in Heydon’s case
The rule that states that the intention of a statute is to be derived from an understanding of the “mischief” that the law aims to correct—the “defect” in the common law that existed prior to the implementation of the statute. This rule is often referred to as the “mischief rule.”
Braidwood J.A.:
Summary
Justice Braidwood explains the background of Criminal Code s. 85(2), which deals with mandatory sentencing for using firearms in crimes. The provision originated in 1977 and required courts to impose an additional one-year consecutive sentence if a firearm was used in committing an indictable offence. Its purpose, as noted in earlier cases like R. v. Langevin, was to deter the use of firearms by treating it as a separate offence and ensuring extra punishment. Parliament’s intent was to protect the public from the danger and fear caused by gun use during crimes.
Key Points for a Test
Legislative History:
Section 85 introduced in 1977.
Added a mandatory one-year consecutive sentence for use of a firearm in committing an indictable offence.
Parliament’s Intention:
To repress firearm use in the commission of crimes.
Treat firearm use as a separate offence, not just an aggravating factor.
Purpose of the Provision:
Public protection: firearms are dangerous and alarming when used in crime.
Sentencing tool to deter criminals from using guns.
Case Reference:
R. v. Langevin (1979, Ont. C.A.).
Martin J.A. emphasized that Parliament wanted firearm use punished independently, with at least one year added to the base sentence.
👉 Takeaway for exam:
Section 85 shows how Parliament uses mandatory minimums to deter dangerous conduct.
Its history and interpretation show legislative intent → protect the public, discourage guns in crimes.
Important precedent: R. v. Langevin confirmed this purpose.
Summary
Section 85(2) was added to the Criminal Code in the mid-1990s to address problems that arose after earlier cases limited “firearm” under s. 85(1) to real, barrelled weapons capable of causing serious harm (R. v. Covin). This created difficulties for prosecutions when guns weren’t recovered or when criminals used replicas, toy guns, or air guns.
The legislative intent of s. 85(2) was therefore to prohibit the use of any object that appears to be a gun during a crime, recognizing that victims experience the same fear and trauma whether the weapon is real or fake. Courts have since interpreted “imitation firearm” broadly — sometimes beyond its plain meaning — to fulfill Parliament’s purpose of closing evidentiary gaps and preventing alarm caused by gun-like objects.
Key Points for a Test
Background Problems (Pre-1990s):
Covin (1983): SCC ruled “firearm” = only real barrelled objects capable of serious harm.
Victims still terrified by fake/replica guns, but no s. 85(1) charges possible.
Prosecution difficulties if gun wasn’t recovered or fired.
Legislative Response:
DOJ 1994 report showed growing use of replicas and air guns.
Only ~20% of Montreal hold-ups used real guns; majority used fakes.
Parliament amended s. 85 in 1995 Firearms Act → created prohibition on using an “imitation firearm.”
Definition of “imitation firearm” came into force in 1998.
Purpose of s. 85(2):
To prevent alarm and trauma from gun-like objects.
To complement s. 85(1) (real guns) by covering cases where:
a fake/replica was used, or
a real gun was used but not recovered (so Crown can’t prove it was capable of firing).
Judicial Interpretation:
Plain meaning of “imitation firearm” would be “looks like a gun, but isn’t.”
Courts extended meaning to also include real guns that aren’t recovered → ensures prosecutions aren’t blocked.
Principle from Driedger on Statutory Interpretation: sometimes courts must adopt an “unordinary meaning” to achieve harmony with legislative purpose.
Case Examples:
McBride (1998): lighter shaped like a gun counted as an imitation firearm.
Current case (Scott robbery): since gun wasn’t recovered, interpreting “imitation firearm” narrowly would defeat Parliament’s purpose.
Exam Takeaway
s. 85(1) = real firearms (must be capable of serious harm).
s. 85(2) = imitation firearms (covers fakes + unrecovered real guns).
Parliament’s intent: protect victims from fear/trauma and close evidentiary loopholes.
Courts may depart from plain dictionary meaning of “imitation” to fulfill legislative purpose.
The limited class rule says that where a general word or phrase follows a list of specific terms, the general word will be interpreted to include only items of a similar nature to the terms specified.
“to be known by its associates” states that a general word followed by specific words will be defined by the context of those specific words. Thus, to be known by its associates is essentially the mirror image of the limited class rule.
applies only where there is some kind of penalty involved in a statute, so it is referred to as the rule for “penal” statutes.
then the interpretation that is the most favourable to the person facing the penalty is the one that ought to be adopted.
Summary
Chief Justice Lamer upholds the constitutionality of mandatory life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 25 years for first-degree murder. He reasons that this punishment is not “cruel and unusual” under s. 12 of the Charter because first-degree murder is the most serious offence, involving the highest level of moral blameworthiness (intentional killing with foresight of death). The 25-year parole ineligibility reflects society’s condemnation and is neither excessive nor contrary to decency. Parliament has discretion to set penalties for serious crimes, and courts should only intervene if the punishment is clearly excessive. Moreover, mechanisms like the royal prerogative of mercy and limited parole provisions show sensitivity to individual circumstances.
Key Points for a Test
Offence at Issue:
First-degree murder = most serious crime, highest moral blameworthiness.
Requires subjective foresight of death.
Punishment:
Mandatory life sentence with 25 years before parole eligibility.
Seen as severe but deserved.
Parliament’s Role:
Broad discretion to define crimes and set punishments.
Courts only strike down sentences if they clearly “outrage standards of decency.”
Charter s. 12 (Cruel and Unusual Punishment):
Standard: punishment must be so excessive as to outrage society’s standards of decency.
In this case, 25 years before parole does not meet that threshold.
Mitigating Mechanisms:
Royal prerogative of mercy.
Escorted absences for humanitarian/rehabilitative purposes.
Early parole provisions.
These show Parliament’s sensitivity to individual circumstances.
Case References:
R. v. Smith (1987): reaffirmed courts defer to Parliament unless punishment is grossly disproportionate.
R. v. Guiller (1985): quoted to emphasize judicial restraint in reviewing Parliament’s sentencing choices.
Exam Takeaway
Mandatory 25-year parole ineligibility for first-degree murder is not cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12.
Courts defer to Parliament’s sentencing policy, interfering only in clear cases of excess.
Safeguards (mercy, parole options) mitigate potential harshness.
R. v. Luxton confirms certainty and severity in punishment for the gravest crimes is constitutionally valid.
Lamer C.J.
Summary
The Supreme Court in R. v. Lloyd struck down a mandatory minimum one-year sentence for possession of Schedule I drugs (for trafficking) with a prior drug conviction. While trafficking in drugs like heroin, cocaine, or meth is serious, the problem is that the law was written too broadly. The mandatory minimum “casts its net” over a wide range of conduct, from professional drug dealers to addicts sharing small amounts. Because the punishment applies regardless of circumstances (e.g., type of drug, quantity, reason for sharing, or the seriousness of the prior conviction), it risks capturing less blameworthy conduct. Under s. 12 of the Charter (cruel and unusual punishment), a sentence is unconstitutional if it is “grossly disproportionate,” meaning so excessive it outrages standards of decency. Since the one-year minimum could be grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable cases (not necessarily for Mr. Lloyd himself), the law was struck down.
Key Points for Test
Test for Cruel and Unusual (s. 12):
A sentence must be “grossly disproportionate” (not just excessive).
Standard: abhorrent, intolerable, outrageous to societal standards of decency.
Cited cases: Smith (1987), Miller (1977), Morrisey (2000), Ferguson (2008).
Reasonably Foreseeable Applications:
Even if sentence isn’t cruel for the individual, it may be unconstitutional if it would be grossly disproportionate for others in reasonably foreseeable scenarios.
Lloyd challenged the law on this basis.
Why the One-Year Minimum Was Struck Down:
Overbreadth of application (“casts its net too wide”):
Applies to any amount of Schedule I drug (tiny or large).
Broad definition of “traffic” includes sharing, giving, delivering, not just selling for profit.
Prior conviction could be for any drug offence within 10 years, even a trivial one (e.g., small amount of marijuana).
Seriousness of Trafficking:
Court recognized Schedule I drugs (heroin, meth, cocaine) are dangerous and harmful.
Serious dealers deserve heavy sentences.
But addicts or minor offenders should not be punished the same.
Charter Implication:
Mandatory minimum struck down as unconstitutional under s. 12.
Illustrates the Court’s concern with laws that don’t distinguish between high and low blameworthiness.
Exam Takeaway
R. v. Lloyd (2016): Mandatory minimums must be carefully tailored.
A one-year minimum for trafficking Schedule I drugs is unconstitutional because it could apply to minor, non-serious offenders.
Reinforces that gross disproportionality is the threshold for finding cruel and unusual punishment.
Precedent meanings:
Here’s precedent explained simply:
In law, a precedent is when a past court decision is used as a guide for future cases.
It’s part of the system called stare decisis (Latin for “let the decision stand”).
This means that once a higher court (like the Supreme Court) makes a ruling, lower courts must follow it in similar cases.
Example
If a court decides that texting while driving = dangerous driving, then future cases about texting and driving will likely use that same ruling as a precedent.
✅ Key points for tests:
Precedent = earlier legal decision that guides later ones.
Ensures consistency and fairness in the law.
Binding precedent = must be followed (from higher courts).
Persuasive precedent = can influence but not required (from lower courts or other countries).
a binding precedent is a past decision that lower courts have no choice but to follow when deciding similar cases.
Example
The Supreme Court of Canada says: “Texting while driving counts as dangerous driving.”
Every lower court in Canada is bound by that decision → they must apply it in future texting-and-driving cases.
Canons of construction are basically guidelines or rules judges use to interpret laws when the wording is unclear. They help courts figure out what Parliament (or the legislature) actually meant.
Persuasive (opposite of binding)
A persuasive precedent is a past decision that a judge can choose to follow, but doesn’t have to.
It has influence but no legal force.
Rule in Heydon’s Case (1584)
The court said that when judges interpret a law, they should look at four things:
What was the law before?
What problem (“mischief”) was the old law not fixing?
What solution did Parliament create in the new law?
What was the reason for that solution?
Then the judge should interpret the law in a way that fixes the mischief and carries out Parliament’s intention.