The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism

The Problem of Evil and Atheism

Introduction

• This paper addresses three main questions:

  • Can the existence of evil rationally justify atheism?

  • How can theists defend their position against the argument from evil?

  • What stance should informed atheists adopt regarding the rationality of theistic belief?

Defining Theism, Atheism, and Agnosticism

• Narrow Sense:

  • Theist: Believes in an omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, supremely good creator.

  • Atheist: Denies the existence of a divine being with the above attributes.

  • Agnostic: Claims that the existence of such a being is unknown or unknowable.

• Broad Sense:

  • Theist: Believes in some sort of divine being or reality (e.g., Paul Tillich).

  • Atheist: Denies the existence of any sort of divine being or reality.

• This paper uses the narrow sense of these terms.

The Argument for Atheism Based on Evil

• The argument centers on the existence of intense suffering (human and animal) as a clear instance of evil.

• Even if suffering leads to a greater good, it remains an evil in itself.

• Evil as a means can be morally justified if it leads to something good in itself.

Formal Statement of the Argument

1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without losing some greater good or permitting some equally bad or worse evil.

2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without losing some greater good or permitting some equally bad or worse evil.

3. Therefore, there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.

• The argument is valid; accepting its premises provides rational grounds for accepting atheism.

Analysis of Premise 2

• Let s_1 be an instance of intense suffering an omniscient, wholly good (OG) being could prevent.

• Necessary condition for OG failing to prevent s_1:

  • Either (i) there is some greater good, G, obtainable by OG only if OG permits s_1,

  • or (ii) there is some greater good, G, obtainable by OG only if OG permits either s_1 or some evil equally bad or worse,

  • or (iii) s_1 is preventable by OG only if OG permits some evil equally bad or worse.

• (iii) is distinct from (i) because losing a good is not the same as permitting an evil.

• Condition (ii) accounts for cases where preventing s_1 would lead to the loss of G unless OG permits some equal or worse evil.

• Premise (2) aligns with basic moral principles shared by theists and nontheists.

Analysis of Premise 1 and the Case of the Fawn

• Consider a fawn trapped in a forest fire, suffering intensely before dying.

• This suffering appears pointless, lacking connection to a greater good or prevention of a worse evil.

• An omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented the suffering.

• This case suggests premise (1) is true, but does not prove it.

• It's possible the suffering is connected to some unknown greater good or prevention of a worse evil.

• Knowing this with certainty would require something akin to omniscience.

Rational Grounds for Believing Premise 1

• We cannot know premise (1) is true with certainty, but can have rational grounds for believing it.

• Analogy: It's reasonable to believe certain political candidates won't be elected, even without certainty.

• Is it reasonable to believe the fawn's suffering is necessary for a greater good that even an omnipotent being couldn't achieve otherwise?

• It seems unreasonable.

• Extending this to all instances of seemingly pointless suffering makes it even more unlikely.

Conclusion on the Argument from Evil

• Premise (2) expresses a widely held moral belief.

• Experience and knowledge of suffering provide rational support for premise (1).

• Therefore, we have rational support for atheism: it is reasonable to believe the theistic God does not exist.

Defending Theism Against the Argument from Evil

• Theists must reject premise (1) to counter the atheistic argument.

• Three possible responses:

  • Argue the reasoning supporting (1) is defective, without claiming (1) is false.

  • Attempt to show it is reasonable to believe (1) is false (direct attack).

  • Attempt to show it is reasonable to believe (1) is false (indirect attack).

The Direct Attack

• Point out goods connected to suffering that an omnipotent, omniscient being couldn't achieve without permitting suffering.

• Examples: moral and spiritual development, free choices.

• Problems:

  • Suffering often exceeds what's needed for character development.

  • Much suffering doesn't result from free choices.

  • Theist doesn't know what goods are served by each instance of suffering.

  • Conflicts with theistic belief that God's purpose in allowing suffering is unknowable.

• The direct attack is unlikely to succeed.

The Indirect Attack: The G. E. Moore Shift

• Named after G. E. Moore, who used it against skepticism.

• Moore countered arguments that we can't know of material objects' existence.

• Instead of attacking the skeptic's premises directly, Moore argued:

  • I know this pencil exists.

  • If the skeptic's principles are correct, I cannot know of the existence of this pencil.

  • Therefore, the skeptic's principles (at least one) must be incorrect.

• The choice between arguments rests on which premise is more rational to believe.

Applying the G. E. Moore Shift to the Problem of Evil

• Given an argument: p, q, therefore, r.

• Construct a counter-argument: not-r, q, therefore, not-p.

• Basic Argument for Atheism:

  1. p. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without losing some greater good or permitting some equally bad or worse evil.

  2. q. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

  3. r. Therefore, There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.

• Theist's Response (G.E. Moore Shift):

  1. not-r. There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.

  2. q. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

  3. not-p. Therefore, it is not the case that there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

• Theist has rational grounds for believing in God, accepts (2), and sees that (not-1) follows.

• Therefore, theist has rational grounds for rejecting (1) and the atheistic argument. Note that the choice rests on if we have more belief in (1), or (not-r).