Forensic psychology

Chapter 1

What’s Wrong with Mr. Big? False Confessions

The Case of Nelson Hart

On 4 August 2002, Nelson Hart and his wife, Jennifer, were preparing to celebrate "Gander Day" with their three-year-old twin daughters- Krista and Karen. While waiting for Jennifer to get ready, Nelson drove the twins to a secluded beach just west of Gander, NL. Typically, Hart avoided being alone with the twins due to his risk for severe epileptic seizures. Indeed, after removing the girls from the car, Hart suffered a massive seizure and, when he came to, saw Krista "into the water" (R. v. Hart, 2014). Confused and unable to swim, Hart drove to get his wife, dropped her at the beach, and went to call authorities Although paramedics were able to retrieve both twins from the water, Karen was deceased, and Krista died the following day. Hart suffered a second seizure in the police car while being taken for questioning. The RCMP launched a criminal investigation and, although Hart was an early suspect, it would be three years before he was arrested and charged with two counts of first-degree murder. What happened in those intervening three years would change Canadian law. In many ways, Nelson Hart was a logical suspect in the death of his daughters. At 33 years of age, Nelson Lloyd Hart was a man with a troubled past (e.g., rumoured mental health problems; poor work record) and had some additional current challenges (e.g. gambling problem). The eldest of three sons, he had suffered from epilepsy since nine months of age, apparently a patrilineal inheritance. It seems his seizures repelled his schoolmates and "prevented him from being normal (K6hler, 2013). After repeating Grade 5 three times, Hart left school at age 12. While he managed to obtain a driver's licence, he lost it several times due to his epilepsy. In his 20s, his seizures worsened under the stress of trying to live on his own following an altercation with his mother's new partner. In a 2006 interview with Maclean's magazine, his mother claimed: "He was sort of a

/

child in a man's

body" (Köhler, 2013). In 1997, Hart was approved to receive live-in care, which is how he met his wife, Jennifer Hicks - the live-in care nurse hired to help with Hart's needs. Before long, the two became a couple and, in 1999, the twins were born. Hart was frightened by the prospect of having children and struggled under the responsibility. He was chronically poor. A $25,000 settlement for a neck injury sustained in a 1998 car accident vanished quickly and, by August 2002, he was a slave to gambling machines. The situation was so dire that Social Ser- vices had threatened to take the twins into care. According to Jennifer, she had to choose between Nelson and the girls (see Köhler, 2013). It seems Nelson Hart was not entirely honest with police about what happened that day at the beach. He did not tell them that he had suffered a massive seizure until a week after the drownings. More- over, he told a somewhat different story of how events unfolded to his new friend, Steph Sauve. Sauve's arrival into Nelson Hart's life in the winter of 2005 was serendipitous and quite auspicious. After the drownings, Nelson and Jennifer had separated for a while but now were back together and living in poverty (no bed, no food) in Grand Falls, NL, about an hour east of Gander. One day, Sauve stopped to ask directions from Hart, explaining that he was looking for his sis- ter, a drug addict and gambler, because their mother was dying in Montreal. Sauve offered Hart $50 to help him locate his sister. When Hart's efforts to find the woman in Grand Falls failed, Sauve gave him another $50 and a carton of cigarettes to search a nearby town Hart never did find the woman but the dole-outs of money continued When Sauve offered him money to collect and deliver a package, Hart grew suspicious - thinking it might be drugs. He consulted with his mother, and they called the local RCMP. Apparently, the RCMP's re- sponse was "If he's foolish enough to pay you, then let him" (Köhler, 2013). Before long Sauve Was paying Hart to do a range of odd jobs, such as transporting vehicles around the province and running er- rands to the mainland. Jennifer often accompanied Nelson, and the two enjoyed free dinners and hotel rooms. With his earnings, Hart bought a $4,000 headstone for Krista and Karen.

Hart soon discovered that he had been recruited by an organized crime group, a group from which he felt helpless to escape. "When I got into it," says Hart, "I couldn't back out" (Köhler, 2013). While Hart enjoyed the money, he declined the offers of strippers, saying: "Im married, I love my wife, I thinks the world of her." Over the course of time, Hart was exposed to implicit and explicit acts of violence, and he felt increasingly vulnerable. When challenged by the "crime boss" to "[t]ell me how you done away with your daughters," Hart protested. "Never, sir, never, I never hurt my daughters,'" he said. "I'm epileptic sir." The boss was displeased. "Oh, no, no, no - don't go lying to the boss,"' he said. "Don't lie to the boss." Eventually, Hart relented and confessed that "I drowned my daughters, I pushed them over the wharf." He even reenacted the scene with Sauve at Little Harbour. On 13 June 2005, the RCMP arrested Hart at the airport in Gander As Hart hastened to call his friend Sauve, police told him: "No point in calling Steph. He's with us." Thus, Nelson Hart learned the truth that "his friend" Sauve and the many other characters he had met over the past six months, including the "crime boss,"' were not who they claimed to be. These people were not organized crime figures but undercover RCMP officers engaged in an elaborate ruse known as a "Mr. Big" operation.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE "MR. BIG" TECHNIQUE

"Mr. Big" is a covert investigative operation used by police to elicit confessions from suspects in cold cases or cases with little forensic evidence, especially murder. Typically, the operation includes a four- stage process: intelligence probe, introduction (i.e., "the bump"), relationship/credibility-building, and evidence-gathering (Keenan & Brockman, 2010; Lutes, 2020). The intelligence probe stage involves police officers gathering information about the target (e.g., their usual whereabouts, lifestyle, and typical associates). The introduction stage involves an undercover oficer "bumping" into the target, befriend- ing them in some way, and recruiting them for seemingly small tasks was done by Steph Sauve to Nelson Hart). The relationship/ (as credibility-building stage involves introducing/: recruiting the tar- powerful, fictitious criminal organization whose boss get into ("Mr. Big") can offer safety and protection if the target can prove a themselves and show their commitment to the organization; the price of admission, however, is that the boss requires all members of the organization to confess to all previous criminal activity as means to establish trust. The evidence-gathering stage is essentially getting the target to confess to the crime under investigation by police (see Luther & Snook, 2016, for a summary of all stages and an in-depth explana- tion of how various social influence factors challenge the admissibility of Mr. Big confessions in cout). The RCMP (2015) refer to the Mr. Big operation as a "major crime homicide technique"; sometimes, it is called the "Canadian technique," having originated and been popularized in Canada (Moore et al., 2009). While legal in Australia and New Zealand (where it is called the "Crime Scenario Undercover Technique"; see East, 2017), Mr. Big is banned in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany because of its po- tential to violate people's rights (see Smith et al., 2009, 2010). In Canada, it has drawn criticism for preying on suspects' vulnerabilities and elic- iting false (coerced) confessions (to be discussed later). The first recorded use of a Mr. Big-like operation was in Manitoba in the U. Todd (1901) case. Todd was suspected of the murder of a Mr. Gordon. The chief of police recruited two men, neither of whom was a peace officer, to act as detectives in procuring evidence against Todd. The two "detectives' approached Todd pretending to be mem- bers of an organized crime gang with the promise of large profits to be ofan made if he joined. Of course, to join, Todd would have to affirm that he had committed some serious crime. In this way, Todd was induced to confess to the murder of Gordon. Although the trial judge deemed the evidence-gathering operation to be "vile,"' "base,' and "contempt- ible," he concluded that "it does not seem to be a sufficient ground for excluding the evidence" (R. 7. Todd, 1901; see Coughlan, 2015) Concerns about the manner by which Todd's confession was elicited presaged the controversy that would revolve around such operations for the next 100+ years The first real Mr. Big operation may have been the R. v. Beaulac (1999) case (see Keenan & Brockman, 2010). Here, an undercover officer posed as a gangster and got Beaulac to confess to the brutal murder of a young woman in 1981. At trial, Beaulac claimed that his confession was false and that he had been merely boasting in order to be accepted into the "gang." Most credit two RCMP detectives from British Columbia - Al Haslett and Peter Marsh - as being the archi- tects of Mr. Big. Haslett is portrayed in two episodes (S1E01, $2E06) of The Detectives (Duszara et al., 2018). In a CBC The Fifth Estate inter- view in 2015, Haslett (now retired) defended Mr. Big: "[We] seek the truth. We don't go there, we don't wake up in the morning and say 'we're going to get confessions.' This is not a bunch of cowboy cops going out and doing this. This is planned, the scenarios are planned, thought out, and we go to seek the truth" (Bridges & Dinh, 2019).

PREVALENCE OF "MR. BIG" AND CHALLENGES AGAINST ITS USE IN CASE LAw

According to self-reported RCMP statistics in 2008, Mr. Big operations had been used in over 350 cases across Canada (Dawson, 2011). Re- portedly, the operation was successful in clearing or charging the per- son of interest in 75 per cent of cases; the other 25 per cent remained unresolved and/or required further investigation. Of cases referred for prosecution, an estimated 95 per cent resulted in a conviction (see Bridges & Dinh, 2019). An academic study has found an 88 per cent conviction rate with 81 Mr. Big confessions (e.g., Keenan & Brock- man, 2010) and another found a 91.5 per cent conviction rate with 153 Mr. Big confessions (e.g., Puddister & Riddell, 2012; see Lutes. 2020; Sukkau & Brockman, 2015). While police champion this record of success, especially given the alternative of not pursuing suspects others (e.g. lawyers, legal scholars, and psychologists) consider the risks associated with Mr. Big to be too many and too consequential These risks include tunnel vision (i,e., police becoming too fixated or one suspect; FPT Heads of Prosecution Committee, 2018), "the Luci- fer effect" (e.g., inducing an innocent suspect to commit crimes; see Zimbardo, 2007), elicitation of false confessions (Smith et al., 2010),. and influencing jurors' moral prejudice (Connors et al., 2019). These staggering statistics and their implications for wrongful convictions have been the impetus for limits being imposed on Mr. Big. These lim- its have evolved over a number of cases: R. v. Rose (1983), United States v, Burns (2001), R. v, Hart (2002), and R. v. Mack (2014). The latter two, in particular, have been instrumental in the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) tightening the reins on the Mr. Big operation

The R. v. Hart (2002) case represented the first time that the SCC ruled on the general admissibility of Mr. Big confessions. The court cited three main concerns: (a) reliability of a confession elicited by threats and inducements, (b) potential for prejudice against the ac- cused for their willingness to participate in crimes they believed to be real, and (c) "risk that the police will resort to unacceptable tactics in their pursuit of a confession" (Lutes, 2020, p. 222). Prior to the Hart case, police had fewer restrictions on how they investigated a suspect (outside of custody). Undercover confessions took place in something of a "legal vacuum," where an individual's right to remain silent (Ca- nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [CCRF], Section 7, 1982) and the voluntary confession rule did not apply (see Lutes, 2020). Since the 2002 Hart case, Mr. Big confessions are considered pre- sumptively inadmissible and subject to voir dire ("see say"). A voir dire is a trial within a trial where the admissibility of evidence is assessed A two-prong test is applied to determine the reliability of the confes- sion. First, the Crown needs to demonstrate that the probative value (i.e., evidence that tends to prove) of the Mr. Big evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect (i.e., evidence that may unfairly bias, such as bad character evidence and moral prejudice). For example, Hart's actions (i.e., delivering stolen goods for a crime organization) could be seen to reflect poorly on his character and thereby be prejudicial. In reality, of course, what he was delivering was not contraband so, at worst, he was guilty of attempting to commit the offence (see Coughlan, 2015). Second, the accused needs to demonstrate that police miscon- duct (e.g., use of coercion to elicit a confession) resulted in an abuse of process. Protections against abuse of process are included in com- mon law and Section 7 of the CCRF. These protections are intended "to guard against state conduct that society finds unacceptable and which threatens the integrity of the justice system' (Government of Canada, 2019). While there is no precise formula for determining if a particular Mr. Big operation was abusive, it is imperative that police not "overcome the will"' (R. v, Hart, 2014) of the accused and coerce a confession. Unacceptable police tactics include actual or threatened physical violence against the accused; providing coercive induce- ments; or preying on an accused's vulnerabilities such as mental health problems, addictions, or youthfulness (R. v. Hart, 2014).

FALSE CONFESSIONS

Confessions are powerful indicators of guilt and can be perceived as the most damning form of evidence against an accused person by both professional (police, judge) and lay people (jury) in the justice system (see Henkel et al., 2008). Indeed, some scholars have suggested that if a confession is admitted as evidence into a trial, undergoing the remaining proceedings is a moot point (McCormick, 1972). Saul Kassin (1997) proffered that "in criminal law, confession evidence is a prosecutor's most potent weapon' (p. 221). Confessions derive their probative force from the fact that they are against the accused's self-interest and legal protections. These legal rights and protections, at least in Canada, are afforded to Canadians through the CCRF under Sections (7) Life, liberty, and security of person; (8) Security against unreasonable search or seizure; (9) Not being arbitrarily detained or imprisoned; (10) Being informed of reasons for arrest or detention, access to counsel, validity of detention determined via labeus corpus ("have the body"); (11) Being informed of proceedings in criminal and penal matters (e.g., informed of offence, tried within reasonable time); (12) Not being subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or punish- ment; (13) Self-incrimination; and (14) Assistance of an interpreter. A trilogy of SCC cases outline the legal protections available to suspects when subjected to a police interrogation. These cases include R. v, Oickle (voluntariness of a confession), R. v. Singh (right to silence and against self-incrimination), and R. v. Sinclair (right to counsel; see Dufraimont, 2011).

Given these many legal protections, it is difficult to understand why someone would falsely confess to C crime, especially murder. While French philosopher Albert Camus maintained that "a guilty conscience needs to confess,"' research related to confessions shows that many people falsely confess and they do so whether they have a guilty conscience or not. Considered as the foundational taxon- omy of false confessions, Kassin and Wrightsman (1985) proposed three different types: Voluntary, Coerced-Internalized, and Coerced- Compliant. Voluntary false confessions may arise out of a person's need for notoriety, difficulty distinguishing fact from fantasy, desire for pun- ishment to assuage a sense of guilt, or to protect someone else. For ex- ample, in 1932, almost 200 people falsely confessed to the kidnapping and murder of Charles Lindbergh's baby (see Kassin & Gudjonsson 2005). Coerced-internalized false confessions may arise from evocative interrogation techniques with highly suggestible and/or vulnerable individuals (e.g., those with mental health problems, addictions, or brain dysfunction). One of the most sensational examples of coerced- internalized false confessions is the case of Paul Ingram, who falsely con- fessed to sexually assaulting his two daughters and spent 20 years in prison before being released (see Kassin, 2007). Coerced-compliant false confessions, which include many police-induced confessions, follow from coercive interrogation tactics that can entice a suspect to confess S0 as to escape further interrogation, gain a promised benefit, or avoid a threatened punishment. The Central Park Jogger case (discussed below) is an example of youth detainees falling victim to coercive in- terrogation tactics by police and confessing to a crime that none of them committed (see Kassin, 2002).

Kassin and Wrightsman's (1985) original taxonomy of false con- fessions, however, has not been without criticism. Others have since proposed some extended and refined versions of the false confession classification system (e.g. Davison & Forshaw, 1993; Gudjonsson, 1992, 2003; Kassin, 1997; Leo & Ofshe, 1997; McCann, 1998; Ofshe & Leo, 1997; see Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). For instance, McCann (1998) proposed adding a fourth category of false confessions: coerced-reactive false confessions, As defined by McCann (1998), coerced-reactive false confessions occur "when an individual (who may Or may not be a criminal suspect) confesses in order to avoid or escape some coercive action that arises out of a relationship with one or more individuals other than police" (p. 449). An example is a vic- tim of domestic violence claiming responsibility for a crime that was committed by their abuser in order to escape the abusive relation- ship, thus avoiding future victimization (see McCann, 1998, but cf. Kassin, 1998). Another Criticism of the original taxonomy model has been re- lated to the terminology used to describe the confession typologies (e.g., "coerced" vs. "persuaded" vs. "pressured"; see Davison & Forshaw, 1993; Gudjonsson, 2003; Leo & Ofshe, 1997; Ofshe & Leo, 1997). For example, Leo and Ofshe (1997) and Ofshe and Leo (1997) offered a similar but extended version of Kassin and Wrightman's (1985) false confessions model that proposed five levels: voluntary, coerced-compliant, stress-compliant, noncoerced persuaded, and coerced-persuaded. Leo and Ofshe (1997) and Ofshe and Leo (1997) agree with Kassin and Wrightman (1985) that a voluntary false confes- sion can arise from the accused being manipulated in some fashion - either by legal police tactics or their own perceptions - but add that this type of confession might be rooted in other motivations such as a desire to help the real perpetrator. Ofshe and Leo also agree with Kassin and Wrightman that a coerced-compliant false confession is the result of classical coercive police tactics. According to Ofshe and Leo (1997), a stress-compliant false confession is the result of the accused feeling the effects of excessive physical or mental stressors during the interrogation, but they make a point to note that this is distinct from a coerced-compliant false confession where threats and/or prom- ises are made by the interrogator. Finally, as the terminology suggests, the difference between a noncoerced-persuaded false confession and a coerced-persuaded false confession is simply whether any strong-arm- ing practices on the part of the police are applied (Leo & Ofshe, 1997; Ofshe & Leo, 1997; see also Leo, 2009). Gudjonsson (2003) further added to the classification debate for false confessions. Specifically, Gudjonsson maintains that there are three types of false confessions as proposed by Kassin and Wrightman (1985) - albeit, he uses the lan- guage "pressured" versus "coerced" when referring to internalized and compliant false confessions (e.g., pressured-internalized false confession; pressured-compliant false confession) - but added that consideration of the potential sources of influence (i.e., pressure) to give a confession can come from internal (e.g., pressure from within the individual, such as the need to confess for notoriety or the mistaken belief that they committed the crime when in fact they did not; applies only to voluntary false confession), custodial (e.g., pressure from the police during the interrogation, such as applying coercive persuasive tactics; applies to pressured-internalized and pressured-compliant false confessions), or noncustodial sources (e.g. pressure from sources outside of the police, such as family, friends , jail cellmate, undercover Police officer; applies to pressured-internalized and pressured-compliant false confessions; see Gudjonsson, 2003). Despite there being some debate among scholars about the best classification system to use for false confession, there is certainly agreement that false confessions do occur and can be the initial catalyst that leads to wrongful convictions To be clear, none of the above false confession case examples (real or fictionalized for illustrative purposes) employed the Mr. Big tech- nique. The atmosphere of criminality surrounding Mr. Big, however, is designed to entice individuals to admit the truth about their sup- posed crimes - similar to that of a coercive police interrogation. That same atmosphere, however, can entice a lie, especially if a suspect is seeking admiration, affirmation, friendship, or financial gain. False confessions long predate Mr. Big operations, of course. Broth- ers Jesse and Stephen Boorn each confessed to the murder of their brother-in-law, Russell Colvin, and narrowly escaped hanging. Colvin disappeared from Manchester, Vermont, in 1812 only to reappear seven years later, alive and well (Bluhm Legal Clinic Center on Wrongful Convictions, n.d.). Renowned Harvard University psychologist Hugo Münsterberg (1909) warned that "untrue confessions" can be the result of being "under the spell of overpowering influences" (p. 147). Mün- sterberg was troubled by the hanging of a youth who had confessed to a crime that Münsterberg and others were convinced he had not com- mitted. Arguments in defence of the youth were challenged repeatedly with the assertion that it would be "inconceivable that any man who was innocent of it should claim the infamy of guilt (Münsterberg 1909, p. 142). The prevalence of false confessions in wrongful convic- tion cases was not understood, however, until the 1980s and the advent of DNA evidence, Today, we know that false confessions are common, accounting for approximately 15-30 per cent of DNA-exoneration cases (Garrett, 2008; Scheck et al., 2000; see Innocence Project, 2022),.

CLINICAL FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY AND MR. BIG OPERATIONS

Saul Kassin maintains that "[t]here's no one kind of person who can give a false confession. It can happen to anybody" (Starr, 2019). While that may be true, some people are simply more vulnerable than others to becoming ensnared in Mr. Big stings and then falsely con- fessing to crimes for which they are not responsible. A comprehensive review by Kassin et al. (2010) identified certain factors that increase one's risk to falsely confess in certain situations. These include youth and immaturity, intellectual disability, mental illness, and personality traits (e.g., suggestibility, compliance). Situational risk factors for false confessions include prolonged interrogation time, presentations of false evidence, and tactics like "maximization" (intended to convey the interrogator's conviction that the suspect is guilty and can exaggerate the seriousness of the offence) and "minimization" (offers the suspect moral justification and face-saving excuses for criminal conduct) - all features of Mr. Big operations. Kassin et al. (2010) maintain that inter- rogation techniques that combine psychological pressures ("we know you did it) and escape hatches ("but we understand why and can help") can easily entice an innocent person to confess. ther risk factors for false confessions include stress, fatigue, and history of trauma. Even innocence can be a risk factor for false confessions. As Kassin (2008) explains, innocent people tend to believe that truth and justice will pre- vail and that their innocence will be apparent to juries and others. Moore (2019) characterized Mr. Big operations as being psycholog- ically manipulative. Manipulative effects would be exacerbated with vulnerable suspects (immature, compliant, rendered desperate by greed or need). Kassin et al. (2010) found youth and mental impair- ment to be significant vulnerabilities for police-induced (coerced) false confessions. Of the first 200 DNA exonerations in the United States, 35 per cent of the false confessors were 18 years or younger and/or had a developmental disability. One sample of wrongful convictions found that 44 per cent of the exonerated juveniles and 69 per cent of exoner- ated persons with mental disabilities were wrongly convicted because of false confessions (see Gross et al., 2005). In Canada, Kyle Unger was only 19 when he became the target of a Mr. Big operation. Though he repeatedly declared his innocence and contradicted himself on the de- tails of the crime, Unger's false confession sealed his fate. He served 14 years in prison for the 1990 murder of 16-year-old Brigitte Grenier, before being exonerated based on DNA evidence (see Innocence Canada, 2022).

In an opinion editorial on the Central Park Jogger case, Kassin (2002) explained how attributes associated with young age (e.g. heightened suggestibility and obedience to authority, immature decision-making abilities) can be perilous when confronted with prolonged and manipulative interrogation tactics. This 1989 case in- volved five Black and Latino youth from Harlem - Kevin Richardson (14), Raymond Santana (14), Antron McCray (15), Yusef Salaam (15), and Korey Wise (15)

being convicted of raping and assaulting

White woman in Central Park, NY. Four of the five youth confessed to the crime and all served between 6 and 12 years before their sen- tences were vacated when DNA evidence linked a convicted serial rapist and murderer (Matias Reyes) to the crime (for more informa- tion on the Central Park Five, see the Netflix documentary When They See Us: Skoll et al., 2019).

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Individuals with intellectual and cognitive disabilities are overrep- resented in false confession cases (see Gudjonsson, 2003). Like youth, these individuals can be imperiled by greater suggestibility and sus- ceptibility to influence, desire to please and reliance on authority fig ures, tendency to feign competence, and willingness to accept blame for negative outcomes (Perske, 2004, as cited in Kassin et al., 2010). Personality traits like conscientiousness and agreeableness are associ- ated with greater compliance and increased risk for false confessions (Bègue et al., 2015). Certain types of psychopathology have also been linked to false confessions. Disorders characterized by disruptions in neurodevelopment (e.g., attention deficit hyperactivity disorder [ADHD] - see description of ADHD below); disturbances in mood, anxiety, perception, cognition (e.g., schizophrenia spectrum), and conduct (e.g., impulse control); trauma- and stressor-related disorders (e.g., PISD); personality and substance use disorders all have been linked to false confessions (see Kassin et al., 2010). See the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiat- ric Association, 2013) for more information on these disorders. ◦ The distinguishing features of ADHD - inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity - make it a particularly risky disorder with regard to false confessions, and its prevalence among incarcerated populations (see Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 1994) suggests the potential magni- tude of the problem. Research shows that people with ADHD are in- clined to cope with persistent questioning by uttering "don't know" replies, which can make them appear to be evasive and raise police suspicions (Gudjonsson et al., 2007). At the same time, they may be more compliant. The rate of self-reported false confessions in one in- carcerated sample was significantly higher among those who were currently symptomatic for ADHD than others (41% and 18%, respec- tively; Gudjonsson et al., 2008). Individuals with prominent traits of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) tend to lie for short-term in- strumental gain with little consideration to longer-term consequences Perhaps unsurprisingly, they are inclined to make false denials but also to make false confessions - depending on their need at the time (see Kassin et al., 2010).

Iwenty-year-old Cody Bates (R. v. Bates, 2009) had diagnoses of both ADHD and ASPD when he became the target of a Mr. Big opera- tion. He also had a severe substance use disorder; indeed, he operated a cocaine ring in Calgary. Bates's mental health deteriorated following the Mr. Big operation as he became more paranoid and distrustful of others, unable to distinguish police from non-police (Bates, 2018; R. v. Bates, 2009). Today, the former "cocaine king" is helping others who struggle with addictions (Nelson, 2018; see Bates, 2018). Andy Rose who confessed to shooting two German travellers in Chetwynd, BC, in 1983, only to have DNA evidence prove otherwise in 2001, was an alcoholic. At one point in the operation, Mr. Big operatives insisted that Rose have a drink and reconsider his story. Rose was adamant that he was telling the truth and that a beer would not change his story; nonetheless, the pressure persisted. After hours of drinking Rose complied with the two officers' request and stated: "We'll go with I did it, okay?" (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 10). Kyle Ledesma also suffered with addiction, both personal and fam- ily. His mother was a crack-cocaine user, which led to her incarcera- tion, and his father suffered with addiction related to his residential school experience (R. v. Ledesma, 2020). Throughout his time as the target of a Mr. Big operation, Ledesma was addicted to alcohol and cannabis and used both substances daily. Undercover officers often provided him with money to purchase alcohol and transportation to liquor stores to procure it. Reportedly, Ledesma was highly intoxi- cated during many of the undercover scenarios. On one occasion, undercover officers plied Ledesma with so much alcohol prior to his meeting with Mr. Big that he vomited twice before arriving at the lo- cation. Upon arriving for his interrogation, he was given even more alcohol by Mr. Big (R. v. Ledesma, 2020, p. 13). Many of these risk factors for false confessions would apply in the Nelson Hart case. Hart's chronological age seems to have exceeded his social, emotional and intellectual maturity. His development may have been impacted by his chronic and severe epilepsy. His mother described him as being "like a child in

man's body" and his wife,

Jennifer, commonly referred to him as "my son" (Köhler, 2013). Hart struggled to live independently; he was poorly educated, rarely em- Ployed, and often reliant on social assistance. Although he may not a Problem with substances, he did have a problem with have had

gambling. Jennifer described him as "demanding, morose, uncommu- nicative, and obsessed with video lottery terminal gambling at the 1o- cal bar" (Stobbe, 2021, p. 67). A person with Hart's profile would have relished the attention and friendship of someone like Steph Sauve (a name that suggests smoothness and sophistication) and would have found it hard to resist invitations to collaborate. Like Cody Bates, Hart grew paranoid in the aftermath of the Mr. Big sting and was resistant to offers of assistance from lawyers, thinking that, like the Mr. Big op- eratives, they were part of a conspiracy to betray him

A recent book by Mark Stobbe (2021) titled The Mr. Big Sting: The Cases, The Killers, The Controversial Confessions characterizes the Hart case as a "murky" one. At the end of the day, there are no clear villains or victims other than Karen and Krista. Nonetheless, the case changed Canadian legal history and will impact future cases - or not. Interest- ingly, since R. v. Hart (2014), only one Mr. Big confession has been ex- cluded due to abuse of process (R. v. Laflamme, 2015; see Lutes, 2020).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A confession provides powerful evidence of guilt, but only ifit is true. -( (R. V. Hart, 2014)

The R. 7. Mack (2014) case clearly outlines the many ramifications of a guilty confession:

Of all types of evidence tendered by the Crown in criminal pros- ecutions, confessions are the most persuasive. The power of a confession, in effect, is akin to reversing the burden of proof. The presumption of innocence gives way to an assumption of guilt An accused who has confessed will never be treated the same as an accused who either denies commission of the offence or exer- cised the right to remain silent, and will be met with suspicion and judged more harshly throughout the trial process. Not the least of which is because, if the accused hopes to counter the confession, he must enter the witness box, but does so with his credibility already greatly compromised. If a recantation of the confession is what the accused offers, it is natural for such evidence to be disbelieved, and that the accused be found to be deceptive and/ or lying under a sworn oath to avoid a murder conviction. (R. 0. Mack, 2014)

Police argue that Mr. Big operations solve cases that lack forensic evidence or have gone cold. If not for a Mr. Big operation on Michael Bridges, teenager Erin Chorney might still be considered a missing person (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 15). Sometimes Mr. Big yields surprising results, such as in R. v. Yakimchuk (2017), when the target confessed to a murder from years earlier that was not the focus of the undercover operation. Mr. Big operations also can establish a suS- pect's innocence, as in the case of Gregory Parsons In 1994, Parsons was convicted for the 1991 murder of his mother, Dolly Carroll, who had been stabbed 52 times. Four years later (1998), Parsons was exon- erated based on DNA evidence, and four years after that (2003), Brian Doyle (a "friend" of Parsons) was convicted based on the results of a Mr. Big sting (see R. ¥. Doyle, 2003). Police cite impressive conviction rates (e.g., 75%) as a result of Mr. Big operations and maintain that such operations are better than the alternative of doing nothing. Police contend that they are seeking the truth when they imple- ment Mr. Big stings. But Mr. Big operations come at a cost, and those costs can be substantial. The financial costs of Mr. Big operations can range from thousands to millions (Keenan & Brockman, 2010). The R. v. Ledesma (2020) case is considered inexpensive at roughly $37,000. The hree-year Mr. Big operation to find those responsible for the murder of four RCMP officers in Mayerthorpe, AB, in 2005 was $2 million, and eliciting a confession from Vancouver crime figure Sal- vatore Ciancio for the murder of seven individuals cost $4 million. Nelson Hart's Mr. Big operation cost over $400,000. Most recently, the Nova Scotia case of R., v. Buckley (2018) exceeded $300,000 (R. v, Buck- ley, 2018; Murphy & Anderson, 2016). Expenses included running job fairs, smashing cars, and paying for tripS to see the Montreal Cana- diens Play. Buckley confessed to killing his mother, but his confession was deemed inadmissible.

Paramount among the costs of Mr. Big operations are suspects' loss of legal rights, including loss of liberty and security of person (CCRF, S.7. In

democracy, the loss of one person's rights is a threat to all persons' rights. Mr. Big operations are shrouded in secrecy, not sub- ject to judicial authorization, and not easily monitored or scrutinized. "Secrecy in any government is an invitation to an abuse of power" (C.E.S.Franks, as cited in Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 21). The lack of oversight means a high potential for abuse of process, including en- trapment, coercion, railroading, and taking advantage of a suspect's vulnerabilities (e.g., mental health and addiction problems, financial need, or social isolation). According to Dalhousie University law pro- fessor Adelina Iftene (2016, p. 168), by employing Mr. Big operations, "the state is virtually taking control of one's life, takes advantage of his greed or addictions, and uses them to obtain indirectly what it is forbidden by law to obtain directly."'

In addition to financial and legal costs, Mr. Big operations can impose severe psychological costs. Targets of the operations can suffer the Lucifer effect (i.e., when good people do bad things due to the influence of iniquitous social contexts on behaviour; Zim- bardo, 2007) and the Hawthorne effect (i.e., when individuals mod- ify their behaviour in response to being observed; Landsberger, 1958). Targets also can suffer deleterious mental health effects - such as increased paranoia, distrust, avoidance of others, or fear of betrayal - after discovering that their new "friends were not real, their new circumstances were an elaborate ruse, and they them- selves were pawns in an undercover operation. Nelson Hart, Cody Bates, Kyle Unger, and others must have questioned their own san- ity. When someone is presented with a false narrative designed to make them question their own reality (perceptions, memories, be- liefs), it is disorientating and distressful. Colloquially it is called gaslighting" and is considered to be a malicious power tactic (see Abramson, 2014, p. 2). It is no less malicious if implemented by the state