Compatibilism

Overview of Compatibilism

• Core Idea: Determinism may be true, yet moral responsibility remains intact.
  • Rejects the necessity of metaphysical free will for holding agents morally accountable.
  • Key claim: the meaningful sense of “freedom” is not the power to do otherwise in a metaphysical vacuum, but the capacity to act on one’s own reasons, desires, and deliberations.
• Central Figures Covered
  • David Hume (18th c.)
  • Harry Frankfurt (1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”)
  • P. F. Strawson (1962, “Freedom and Resentment”)

Hume’s Re-Framing of Freedom

• Distinction Introduced
  • Freedom vs. Constraint, not freedom vs. determinism.
  • Freedom = ability to follow through on one’s decisions.
  • Constraint = external impediments (e.g., prison, physical restraint).
• Key Moves
  • Treats deterministic causation as a given backdrop of nature.
  • Shifts philosophical attention to the ordinary, practical sense of liberty: “walking around and doing what we want.”
• Consequence
  • By redefining the debate, Hume claims the “free will problem” dissolves; what we truly care about is the absence of coercion, not cosmic indeterminacy.
• Perceived Weakness
  • Critics: Hume “changes the subject,” avoiding the deeper metaphysical question.

Frankfurt’s Compatibilism: The Importance of Self-Determined Motivation

• Famous Thought Experiment (Evil Neuroscientist / “Frankfurt Case”)
  • Characters: Neera (voter) & an evil neuroscientist.
  • Setup:
  1. If Neera intends to vote for Candidate A, neuroscientist flips the neural switch, forcing choice of B.
  2. If Neera independently intends B, no intervention occurs.
  • Outcome: Neera in fact chooses B on her own; intervention never happens.
• Analysis & Moral Intuition
  • Despite lacking alternate possibilities (couldn’t have done otherwise), we still regard Neera as responsible because the final decision stemmed from her deliberation.
• Lessons Drawn
  • What grounds responsibility = authorship of the decision, not the modal ability to do otherwise.
  • Determinism, brain‐manipulating potential, or blocked alternatives are morally irrelevant if the agent’s actual decision process is authentically hers.

Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes & Interpersonal Practice

• Reactive Attitudes: Resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, love, contempt, etc.
  • They structure everyday interpersonal relationships.
• Quality of Will
  • We evaluate agents by the motives we attribute to them (intent to help, harm, deceive, etc.).
• Key Claim
  • Our moral practices hinge on perceived motivation, not on metaphysical source‐criteria (e.g., whether motives were deterministically caused).
• Excuses vs. Determinism
  • Genuine excuse: “I didn’t try to hurt you; the wind knocked me.” Removes attribution of malicious will ➜ reactive attitudes dissolve.
  • Deterministic backstory: “I was determined to hurt you.” Does not erase the quality of will ➜ resentment remains justified.
• Practical Up-shot
  • Human moral life proceeds on assessments of intention; hypothetical debates about determinism leave these practices untouched.

Common Compatibilist Insights

• Motivation Centric
  • Agency is defined by acting on one’s own reasons and desires.
• Freedom As “Non-Interference” (Hume) & Freedom As “Self-Governed Will” (Frankfurt, Strawson)
• Independence from the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP)
  • Frankfurt: Moral responsibility possible even when \text{AP} = \emptyset (no alternative possibilities).
• Continuity With Ordinary Moral Life
  • Strawson: Our entrenched practice of praise/blame presupposes only motivations, not indeterminacy.

Objections & Ongoing Debate

• “Changing the Subject” Charge
  • Critics argue compatibilists sidestep the original metaphysical worry (true freedom) and instead deliver a “pale shadow.”
• Justification of Practices
  • If determinism holds, are our reactive attitudes really justified or merely ingrained habits?
• Deep vs. Surface Freedom
  • Skeptical worry: Without indeterminacy, agents lack ultimate authorship; compatibilist freedom may be insufficient for desert‐based moral responsibility.

Study & Exam Tips

• Be ready to define compatibilism succinctly: “Determinism + moral responsibility are compatible.”
• Memorize the Frankfurt case mechanics; many exam questions pivot on whether lack of alternatives undermines responsibility.
• Understand Strawson’s distinction between excuses (erase quality of will) vs. mere causal explanations (don’t erase).
• Anticipate critique essays: articulate how compatibilists might reply to the “changing the subject” objection (e.g., practical indispensability of reactive attitudes, or revised concepts of freedom).