(Kopnina) Path Toward Ecocentrism
Introduction
central question: What is anthropocentrism, and is it adequate for guiding environmental protection?
historical debate: anthropocentrism (human-centered) vs ecocentrism/biocentrism (nonhuman-centered).
key turn: ecosystem services (MEA 2005) broadened the debate beyond purely moral philosophy to conservation practice.
divergent views:
some argue anthropocentrism is inevitable or benign for protecting nature (Norton 1984; Weston 1985; Grey 1993).
others argue anthropocentrism is inadequate for biodiversity conservation (Rolston 2012; Cafaro & Primack 2014; Shoreman-Ouimet & Kopnina 2016).
aim of Kopnina et al.: analyze Tim Hayward’s Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem, assess his arguments, and offer four counterarguments.
broader context: rising interest in animal rights/welfare (Singer 1977; Regan 1986; Borrás 2016) and biodiversity conservation (Tallıs 2014; Doak et al. 2015; Kopnina et al. 2018; Piccolo et al. 2018).
Hayward’s four claims (as interpreted by Kopnina et al.)
1) anthropocentrism is often misused; the term should be about humane concern, not a wholesale judgment on humanity.
2) addressing human inequalities as a precondition for environmental protection implies biodiversity protection will be delayed.
3) anthropocentric motivations only work when people see direct self-benefit.
4) self-love is an inadequate basis for environmental concern.
Kopnina et al.’s plan: summarize Hayward’s arguments, then present four counterarguments and discuss agency, shared responsibility, and blame for environmental predicaments.
Key concepts and definitions
Anthropocentrism: traditionally, the view that value is centered on humans; other beings are means to human ends.
Ecocentrism/Biocentrism: value resides in ecosystems or all living beings, not only in humans.
Speciesism: privileging human interests over nonhumans in ways deemed morally arbitrary.
Human chauvinism: another label for privileging humans without adequate justification.
Industrocentrism: focus on industrial neoliberal ideology as a root of suffering, contrasted with pre-industrial ecocentric worldviews (Kidner 2014).
Self-love: the idea that caring for oneself can be a precondition or catalyst for caring about others.
Life-support system: ecosystem services argument that ecosystems sustain human life.
Pragmatic environmental ethics: use of anthropocentric or ecocentric motives to achieve similar environmental outcomes.
Earth justice: ethic that extends value and protection to nonhuman life and ecosystems.
Global Deal for Nature: proposed international framework for protecting nature, akin to global climate agreements.
Hayward’s four arguments (as presented by Kopnina et al.)
Argument 1: Redefining anthropocentrism to mean humane concern risks erasing the traditional, broader meaning of the term
Hayward suggests a definition based on humanity viewed as the center or product of natural evolution; Kopnina et al. argue this redefinition omits nonhuman welfare and can be used to justify cruelty or neglect of nonhumans.
Kopnina et al. emphasize that, historically, anthropocentrism has included the privileging of human welfare over nonhumans; redefining it to approve compassionate care for people collapses two distinct meanings.
They argue: anthropocentrism fundamentally involves human-centered valuation, including but not limited to humane concern; distinguishing bad from good forms (speciesism, human chauvinism) is not the same as redefining the term.
Argument 2: Addressing human inequalities as a precondition for environmental protection risks excluding biodiversity from ethical consideration for an indefinite period
Hayward suggests focusing on human welfare could indirectly protect ecosystems (e.g., via self-interest).
Kopnina et al. counter: prioritizing human equality without integrating biodiversity risks leaving nonhumans out of ethical consideration and may delay genuine conservation.
They point to evidence that inequality and environmental degradation are not simply separable; however, reducing inequality does not automatically solve biodiversity loss, and reliance on Kuznets-like dynamics has not proven effective for biodiversity (see Kuznets curve critique).
Argument 3: Anthropocentric motivations can only contribute to environmental protection when there is a direct self-interest benefit
Hayward’s view: self-interest drives protective behavior.
Kopnina et al. counter: even if self-interest helps, it is not a sufficient or universal driver; ecological integrity cannot rely solely on direct human benefits.
They highlight the limits of pragmatic or utilitarian justifications for protecting nonhumans, especially when keystone species or ecosystem processes may not yield obvious short-term human benefits.
Argument 4: Self-love is an inadequate basis for environmental concern and action
Hayward’s claim: self-love could promote caring for others if humanity is at peace with itself.
Kopnina et al. caution that self-love in consumerist societies can be narcissistic and may undermine collective action; self-love does not automatically translate into concern for nonhumans; protection of ecosystems requires more than self-centered motives.
The counterarguments (Kopnina et al.’s four challenges)
Counterargument 1: The Definition of Anthropocentrism
Hayward presents a fragmented, sometimes positive view of anthropocentrism (care for human welfare) and a negative, broader view (humane concern, humane treatment).
Kopnina et al. argue this is a mischaracterization: anthropocentrism is a human-centered valuation; the term should not be redeployed to justify a narrow, non-problematic form of humane concern.
They reference standard definitions (Oxford English Dictionary: regarding humankind as central) and argue that two concepts are being conflated: (a) genuine human-centered valuation and (b) benevolent care that can apply to nonhumans. Redefining anthropocentrism to exclude its ‘bad’ aspects distorts the debate.
They emphasize the need to preserve the traditional sense of anthropocentrism while acknowledging legitimate concerns about human welfare; recognizing ecocentric alternatives helps address nonhuman welfare without moral inconsistency.
The discussion also introduces the idea that there is a spectrum of anthropocentrism from benign to harmful (including speciesism and human supremacy), and there is no clear cut dichotomy between good and bad forms.
Counterargument 2: The “Utopia of Peaceful, Equal and Unified Humanity” is unrealistic
Hayward argues that a unified, peaceful humanity would be more likely to protect ecosystems.
Kopnina et al. challenge this by noting: humans have unequal impacts; equality in theory does not guarantee lower ecological footprints. They cite Sponsel (2014) and others to show that even egalitarian societies have substantial environmental footprints.
The eco-modernization narrative and Kuznets curve hypotheses have been questioned: rich and egalitarian countries still show high material consumption and biodiversity loss; raising living standards without efficiency gains may not reduce, and may even worsen, ecological impact.
They argue that simply reducing inequality without sustainable practices is insufficient; a sustainable path must address overall consumption and resource use, not just distribution of wealth.
They critique “sustainable development” rhetoric (People, Planet, Profit) as often aligning with growth-focused economic models that exceed ecological limits; reducing inequality must be paired with deep reforms in production, consumption, and governance to avoid increasing total ecological pressure.
Counterargument 3: Self-interest and the life-support argument are limited; the long-term fate of nonhumans is uncertain and vulnerable to misjudgments
Norton’s convergence theory and the life-support rationale suggest protecting ecosystems because they sustain human well-being; this is pragmatic but risks overlooking intrinsic value of nonhumans.
Kopnina et al. argue: relying solely on human self-interest to justify conservation ignores the intrinsic value of nature and may fail to protect nonhuman interests in the long term, especially if keystone species or ecological processes become influential only over long horizons or through complex interactions.
They critique the reliance on ecosystem services as an anthropocentric framing that instrumentalizes nature, potentially neglecting rights, welfare, and intrinsic value of nonhuman life.
The argument that nonhuman value is contingent on direct benefits to humans is rejected; nonhumans have value beyond instrumental use.
They emphasize the need for ecocentric foundations (earth justice) to counterbalance anthropocentric distortions and to secure protections that do not depend on short-term human gains.
Counterargument 4: Self-love as a motivational basis can be shallow or misguided in practice
Hayward argues self-love can promote care for others, including nonhumans, if humanity achieves internal peace.
Kopnina et al. challenge this by highlighting that self-love can be a goal in itself (consumerism, individualism) and may undermine collective action and altruism needed for ecological protection.
They caution that even if self-love encourages humane behavior toward other humans, it does not automatically translate into ecological concern or nonhuman welfare; the protective frame must explicitly value nonhumans and ecological integrity.
They warn against assuming that “self-love” will automatically produce environmental ethics; without institutional support, law, and cultural shifts, self-love alone is unlikely to drive broad conservation outcomes.
Agency, responsibility, and the politics of blame
The article questions how agency and responsibility for environmental problems are assigned
Is responsibility primarily with elites, corporations, or with humanity as a whole?
The text argues against blaming “innocent” people and against a simplistic divide of innocent vs guilty, urging a more nuanced, shared responsibility framework.
It argues that both ecological damage and social injustice are connected; solutions should address both environmental justice and social justice.
The authors discuss the possibility of a rights-based, ecocentric legal framework to address nonhumans
They reference Earth jurisprudence (Higgins 2010) and the evolving field of animal law (Borrás 2016; Sykes 2016).
They note debates about representing nonhumans in governance and law (Wandesforde-Smith 2016) and discuss the limits of speaking for nonhumans while affirming the moral significance of nonhuman welfare.
Connecting the dots: empirical and normative implications
Several empirical tensions are raised:
Inequality does not automatically guarantee biodiversity protection; equalizing wealth without altering consumption patterns may fail to reduce ecological impact.
Economic growth and the Kuznets curve do not reliably map onto biodiversity outcomes; higher income does not guarantee better conservation in practice.
The “new conservation” (eco-modernism) often blends anthropocentric human-benefit motives with aggressive management, while some leftist approaches critique conservation as a barrier to development; both camps are criticized for prioritizing human interests over nonhuman life.
Normative implications:
A robust ecocentric foundation (earth justice) is proposed as a counterweight to anthropocentrism; it values living beings with no instrumental value to humans and seeks legal protections accordingly.
The authors advocate a Global Deal for Nature grounded in both scientific understanding and ethical commitments to nonhumans, akin to climate governance.
They argue for a shift in human identity away from anthropocentrism toward ecocentrism, fostering humility, gratitude, and responsibility within a planetary context.
The ecological ethics debate: terminology and conceptual clarity
Key terms clarified:
Anthropocentrism: human-centered valuation; often linked with using nonhumans as means to human ends; includes legitimate and illegitimate forms depending on how it treats nonhumans.
Human chauvinism and speciesism: negative forms where human interests are privileged for morally arbitrary reasons; condemned by Hayward and others as objectionable.
Ecocentrism/Biocentrism: valuation that gives intrinsic worth to ecosystems or all living beings, not just humans.
Industrocentrism: ideology prioritizing industrial growth and capitalist development as drivers of social and environmental outcomes; discussed as a potential root of environmental problems.
Ecosystem services framework: a widely used, often anthropocentric, lens that emphasizes benefits to humans from ecological processes; criticized here as still anthropocentric because it centers human welfare.
The authors argue for keeping a clear, historically grounded definition of anthropocentrism, while recognizing the spectrum of related critiques and sub-meanings (e.g., humane concern, animal welfare orientation, species-specific moral status).
Ethical, philosophical, and practical implications
Ethical implications:
Ethical obligation to nonhumans cannot be reduced to human self-interest; there is a moral argument for intrinsic value and rights of nonhuman life.
The transformation of anthropocentrism into a humane-centred but still ecologically extractive framework is ethically problematic; a genuine ecocentric stance would resist instrumentalizing nature for human ends.
The pursuit of ecocentrism requires rethinking political economy, law, and governance to extend moral consideration beyond humans.
Philosophical implications:
The debate engages core questions about the source of value, the nature of moral considerability, and the legitimacy of distributive burdens (blame, responsibility) across species.
It challenges the adequacy of pragmatic, interest-based ethics (Convergence Theory) as a sole basis for conservation.
It calls for a coherent framework that integrates moral consideration for nonhumans with human needs and social justice.
Practical implications:
Policy: A Global Deal for Nature would need to designate large areas for protection based on both scientific and ethical grounds; emphasize earth justice and intrinsic value of nonhuman life.
Law: Development of animal and environmental rights within national and international legal systems; shift toward recognizing rights of nature and responsibilities of humans as stewards.
Conservation practice: Integrate ecocentric principles into conservation planning (beyond baraous, productivist, or purely utilitarian logics); embrace compassionate conservation that protects species, habitats, and ecosystems as wholes.
Public discourse: Avoid oversimplified demonization of humanity; emphasize shared responsibility across all humans and a move toward a more ecocentric collective identity.
Representative references and context for further study
Foundational debates in environmental ethics: Goodpaster (1978), Rolston (1983, 2002, 2012), Taylor (1983, 2010, 2013, 2014).
Anthropocentrism and misinterpretations: Hayward (1997) – Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem; Kopnina et al. engage critically with his definitions and aims.
Ecosystem services and conservation policy: MEA (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment) 2005; Kareiva & Marvier (2012).
Biodiversity and inequality relationships: Holland et al. (2009); Haupt & Lawrence (2012); Mikkelson et al. (2007); Gren et al. (2016).
Alternative conservation strategies and critiques: Crist (2012, 2015, 2016); Doak et al. (2015); Marvier (2014); Brockington (2002); Chapin (2004); Bakker et al. 2015 (various).
Legal and planetary governance: Higgins (2010) on ecocide law; Sykes (2016) on globalization and animal protection; Wandesforde-Smith (2016) on wildlife governance; Earth jurisprudence literature (Burdon 2011).
Contemporary ecocentrism statements and commitments: Washington et al. (2017a, 2017b); Kopnina et al. (2018); Taylor et al. (2016).
Closing synthesis and stance
The authors argue that redefining anthropocentrism to center compassion for humans alone distorts the traditional meaning and undermines robust environmental ethics.
They present four counterarguments: (i) the term should remain anchored in a human-centered valuation; (ii) ignoring nonhumans while addressing human inequality risks perpetuating biodiversity neglect; (iii) self-interest can sometimes motivate conservation but is not universally reliable or sufficient; (iv) self-love is an inappropriate sole driver for environmental care.
The recommended path is to embrace ecocentrism as a more coherent ethical foundation for conservation and planetary stewardship, including a global governance framework (Global Deal for Nature) and stronger nonhuman rights protections.
Acknowledge that humans do care for nonhumans (love of animals, trees, rivers, landscapes) and that ecocentrism can help reframe human identity away from domination toward interdependent responsibility within the web of life.
The ultimate aim is a balanced, just, and sustainable relationship with the rest of life on Earth, not a hollow redefinition of a misleading term; ecocentrism is proposed as the path toward meaningful ecological justice and a sustainable future.
Notes on terminology used in the article
Anthropocentrism: used in its traditional sense as a human-centered valuation; the authors caution against a bland or universalist redefinition that erodes its critical meaning.
Ecocentrism/Biocentrism: frameworks that recognize value in ecosystems and nonhuman life beyond instrumental human benefits.
Speciesism and human chauvinism: moral failings to be avoided; central to the critique of purely anthropocentric ethics.
Earth justice: ethical framework advocating intrinsic value of nature and rights for nonhumans; links to legal protections and rights-based discourse.
Pragmatic ethics vs intrinsic value: a key contrast in the debate; the authors critique instrumental justifications that ignore intrinsic value of nonhumans.
Representative examples cited in the text
The World Charter for Nature (UNGA 1982): supports non-wasteful use of resources and recognizes humanity’s dependence on healthy ecological processes.
The “empty forest” syndrome (Crist & Cafaro 2012): illustrates how poverty and subsistence pressures can drive biodiversity loss locally.
The Kuznets curve critique (Mills & Waite 2009; Gren et al. 2016): questions the idea that wealth and development automatically yield biodiversity gains.
The debate over “new conservation” vs ecocentric approaches (Crist 2012; Marvier 2014; Doak et al. 2015): highlights tensions between human-centered development and nature-centered protection.
Concluding takeaway
Anthropocentrism is an ideology with a long and contested history; its traditional meaning centers human value, but debates have introduced values and practices that blur lines with speciesism and human supremacy.
Ecocentrism offers a robust ethical frame for protecting nonhumans and ecological integrity, advocating for legal and political structures that recognize intrinsic value beyond human utility.
A holistic approach to environmental protection should integrate human welfare with nonhuman welfare, promoting shared responsibility, planetary stewardship, and a Global Deal for Nature rooted in earth justice.