Federalist No. 10 and Brutus No. 1 & 6: Debates on Republics and Faction
The Problem of Faction (Madison)
Definition: A group of citizens, whether majority or minority, united by a common passion or interest adverse to the rights of other citizens or the community's interests.
Dangers: Instability, public good disregard, and decisions based on the force of an interested majority rather than justice.
Causes: Largely inherent in human nature (fallible reason, self-love, diverse faculties); the "most common and durable" source is the "various and unequal distribution of property."
Impossibility of Removing Causes: Cannot be removed by destroying liberty (worse than the disease) or enforcing identical opinions, passions, and interests (impracticable).
Conclusion: The causes of faction are inherent and cannot be removed; therefore, relief must be sought in controlling its effects.
Madison's Solution: A Large Republic
Controlling Effects:
For minority factions, the republican principle (majority vote) defeats their views.
For majority factions, the objective is to secure public good and private rights. This is achieved by either preventing a common oppressive passion/interest in a majority or rendering such a majority unable to act effectively.
Democracy vs. Republic:
Pure Democracy: (Small, direct governance) Cannot control faction; common passions easily lead to turbulence and are incompatible with personal security or property rights.
Republic: (Representation) Offers a cure by "refining and enlarging the public views" through elected representatives who are more likely to discern the true national interest.
Advantages of an Extensive Republic (Union):
Greater Variety of Interests: A larger sphere encompasses more diverse parties and interests, making it less probable that a majority will share a common motive to oppress others.
Difficulty of Cohesion for Unjust Purposes: Even if a common motive exists, a large number of people across an extensive territory makes it difficult for them to discover their strength and act in unison, especially when purposes are unjust, as communication is checked by distrust.
Better Representation: A larger number of constituents for each representative requires candidates to possess more "attractive merit" and "diffusive and established characters," making it harder for unworthy individuals to gain office.
The Union magnifies these advantages, preventing local factions (e.g., religious sects, calls for "paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property") from spreading across the entire nation.
Republican Remedy: The "extent and proper structure of the Union" provides the ideal "Republican remedy for the diseases most incident to Republican Government."
Brutus's Concerns: Consolidation of Power
Fundamental Question: Whether the thirteen states should form "one great republic" (consolidated government) or remain "thirteen confederated republics" under a federal head for defined national purposes only.
Fear of Consolidation: The proposed Constitution, while presented as a confederation, "approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in" a complete consolidation.
Mechanisms for Consolidation:
Federal Supremacy: The "Necessary and Proper Clause" (Article ext{ }{1}, ext{ } Section ext{ }{8}) and the "Supremacy Clause" (Article ext{ }{6}) grant the federal government absolute legislative, executive, and judicial power over objects of its jurisdiction, nullifying inconsistent state laws.
Unlimited Taxation: The federal power to lay and collect taxes is "unlimited" and "perfect and absolute," enabling it to subsume state fiscal capacity. This "most important" power will eventually draw "almost all other powers" to the federal government.
State Annihilation: States, limited to direct taxation and financially constrained, will "dwindle away" as their powers are "absorbed" by the general government.
Other Powers: Federal control over armies, militia, and the judiciary (which will "swallow up" state courts) will further erode state authority.
Inherent Desire for Power: Those in power inherently seek to increase it, leading the federal legislature to "lessen and ultimately to subvert the state authority."
Conclusion: The Constitution is objectionable because it is "calculated to consolidate the thirteen states into one," thereby establishing a single, supreme government.
Brutus's Critique of a Large Republic
Historical and Philosophical Opposition: Citing Montesquieu, a "free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent." Historical examples (e.g., Grecian, Roman) show that large republics tend to devolve into tyranny.
Representation Inadequacy: In a vast and diverse country, a truly representative body that reflects the "sentiments of the people" would become "so numerous and unwieldy, as to be subject in great measure to the inconveniency of a democratic government." The diverse "manners, sentiments, and interests" of a large republic would lead to "constant clashing of opinions," hindering public good.
Execution of Laws and Public Confidence:
A free republic must rely on the "confidence, respect, and affection of the people," not a standing army (which is "abhorrent to the spirit of a free republic").
In an extensive republic, people cannot know their rulers, monitor their conduct, or effectively hold them accountable, leading to a lack of confidence and an "inefficient" government, or one resorting to dreaded "armed force."
Officer Accountability: Great officers of government in a large republic would become "above the control of the people," prone to abusing power for personal gain, with accountability being "scarcely possible."
Overall Argument: The immense size and diversity of the United States are fundamentally incompatible with a free republic, and the proposed Constitution's consolidating nature will inevitably lead to the destruction of liberty.