L18 game theory
Microeconomics Lecture Overview
Course: ECA002
Topic: Game Theory
Lecturer: Luke Garrod
Aims of the Lecture
Understand Game Theory which:
Highlights strategies for maximizing gains and minimizing losses within constraints.
Helps predict behavior of economic agents in various situations.
Has applications in politics and psychology, making it a transferable skill for everyday life.
Focus on representing strategic interactions as games and generating predictions about behavior.
Lecture Outline
Introduction to Game Theory
Simultaneous-Move Games and Normal Form (Strategic Form)
Dominant Strategy Equilibria
Nash Equilibria
Sequential-Move Games and Extensive Form
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
Reading Materials:
Core: Lipsey & Chrystal, ch. 8, 185-190
Extra: Perloff, Ch. 14
Introduction to Game Theory
Game Theory models strategic interaction:
GAME: All interactions considered as 'games'.
PLAYERS: Individuals making decisions.
STRATEGIES: Choices players can make.
INFORMATION: What players know when making decisions.
TIMING: When players can make their decisions.
PAYOFFS: Outcomes determined by players' strategies.
Examples:
Game: Rock-Paper-Scissors
Players: Children
Strategies: Paper, Scissors, Rock
Payoffs: Bragging rights
Game: Oligopoly
Players: Sellers
Strategies: Pricing decisions
Payoffs: Profits
Representation of Games
Need a convenient representation including:
Players, Strategies, Information, Timing, Payoffs
Approaches:
Extensive Form
Normal Form
Example Game 1:
Players: A (Up, Down), B (Left, Right)
Payoff matrix:
(U, L): 10, 10
(U, R): 8, 0
(D, L): 5, 6
(D, R): 5, 5
Simultaneous-Move Games and Normal Form
Represented via a Matrix.
Example Payoffs:
(U, L): 10, 10
(U, R): 8, 0
(D, L): 5, 6
(D, R): 5, 5
Matrix Representation:
Player A's payoff written first, followed by Player B's:
LEFT
RIGHT
UP
10,10
8,0
DOWN
5,6
5,5
Dominant Strategy Equilibria
Dominant strategy: provides highest payoff regardless of opponent's strategy.
Example Analysis:
Player A:
Compare payoffs against Player B's strategies.
Best response determination:
If Player B plays LEFT, Player A's best is UP.
If Player B plays RIGHT, Player A's best is DOWN.
Resulting Dominant Strategy: LEFT for Player A.
Dominant Strategy Equilibria for Player B
Assessing Player B's strategy:
If Player A plays UP, Player B’s best response.
If Player A plays DOWN, Player B’s best response.
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium: Signify equilibrium with a star.
Nash Equilibria
Nash Equilibrium Concept (introduced by John Nash in 1950):
Occurs when no player can benefit from changing strategy given other players' strategies.
Requirements for Nash equilibrium:
Each player must play a best response to others.
Beliefs about other players' strategies must align.
Multiple or No Nash equilibria possible.
Example of Nash Equilibrium
Game 2 Example:
Payoff Matrix:
(U, L): 3, 10
(U, R): 4, 0
(D, L): 4, 4
(D, R): 5, 5
Sequential-Move Games and Extensive Form
Example of sequential moves: Player A moves first, then Player B.
Payoffs:
(U,L): 10, 10
(U,R): 16, 12
(D,L): 12, 16
(D,R): 14, 14
Predicting outcomes with consideration of sequential nature.
The Extensive Form Representation
Represent games using tree diagrams to reflect decision-making.
Player's moves and corresponding payoffs illustrated clearly.
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
Refines Nash equilibrium for better predictions in sequential games.
Requires a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
Solved using backwards induction:
Start at end and solve for best responses; move backwards.
Backwards Induction Method
Analyze Player B's response after Player A's action, then identify Player A's best response.
Outcome: Unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium detected.
Summary of Game Theory Concepts
Game Theory: Represents strategic interactions among players.
Key Elements:
Players: Decide strategies impacting payoffs.
Game Rules: Specify timing and sequence of moves.
Dominant Strategy: Best choice regardless of others.
Nash Equilibrium: Best strategy considering other players' behaviors.
Subgame Perfection: Nash equilibrium applies in every subgame.
Expected Outcomes Post-Lecture
Ability to represent strategic interactions as games in both extensive and normal forms.
Understand differences between dominant strategy equilibria, Nash equilibria, and subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Derive equilibria for both sequential-move and simultaneous-move games.