On Knowledge

On Knowledge

• Epistemology is a description, as seen in chapter 10, question 1 or 42
• A short lecture providing context for Creel’s chapters 10 and 11
  • Three different senses of ‘knowledge’
  • Two different philosophical traditions and knowledge
• A traditional definition of knowledge that
• Investigating the nature of knowledge that with Creel, chs. 10-11

Epistemology

• That part of philosophy that treats:
  • (a) the of knowledge
  • (b) the of knowledge
  • (c) the for (i) _ knowledge and (ii) ___ knowledge claims.

Three Senses of Knowledge

• Knowledge __ __, e.g., __.
• Knowledge ____, e.g., ______.
• Knowledge _ ( _ ___ _____), e.g., _____.

Two Philosophical Traditions on Knowledge

• The Platonic-Cartesian-Anglo-American tradition:
  • Views knowledge as a problem, particularly concerning skepticism.
  • Key questions: What is ___? Do we __ anything at all?
• The Aristotelian tradition:
  • Treats the existence of knowledge as a given.
  • Key questions: What are the different kinds of ? What are the intellectual __, and how do we acquire them?

The Traditional Definition of Knowledge

• This section will likely delve into what constitutes the traditional understanding of knowledge.

On Belief

• Refer to question 2 or 43 on chapter 10.
• Belief, sense #1: Thinking that a proposition is true.
• Belief, sense #2: Roughly, a synonym for faith.
• Philosophers almost universally discuss knowledge that as a kind of true belief, they are using sense 1 of ‘belief’.

Possible Sources of Belief/Truth/Knowledge

• Questions (4)-(6) or (45)-(47).

Three Powers of Reason

• Apprehension:
  • The power that enables us to discern what something is.
• Judgment:
  • The power that enables us to consciously form a belief or a statement.
• Reasoning:
  • The power that enables us to draw an inference from other beliefs or sentences.

Illustrating the Three Powers of Reason

• An example-driven approach to understanding apprehension, judgement, and reasoning is considered:
  • Asking "What is Dr. Brown?"
  • Putting the answer in the form of a statement.
  • Saying something else true about Dr. Brown.
  • Drawing a valid inference from the two statements.

Additional Sources of Truth

• The question prompts reflection on whether there are sources of truth besides the six mentioned by Creel.

Three Internal Senses

• Memory
• Imagination
• The universal sense

The Universal Sense

• The concept of a ‘universal sense’ is explored through the example of blind sight:
  • Blind patient: Cannot see colors or shapes and is not aware of seeing them.
  • Fully functioning patient: Can see colors and shapes and is aware of their ability to see.
  • Blind sight patient: Claims not to be able to see colors and shapes despite having nothing wrong with the external sense of sight.

Creel on Truth and Error

• Creel notes that all six means of obtaining truth can also lead to error.
• Therefore, we desire truth in a special way.

Creel on Knowledge as Hope

• If I know I did well on the test, then I am that I did well on the test [assumption].
• If I hope I did well on the test, then I am not _ I did well on the test [assumption].
• If I know I did well on the test, then it is I did well on the test [assumption].
• If I hope I did well on the test, I may have NOT done well on the test (it may be that I did well on the test) [assumption].
• Therefore, hoping and knowing are very different [from (1) and (2); from (3) and (4)].
• If a definition is a good definition, then the definiendum [di-fin-ee-en-dum] (the term being defined) and the definiens [di-fin-ienz] (the definition of the term being defined) are logically equivalent, i.e., have the same properties, e.g., a triangle (in Euclidean geometry) is a three-sided, closed, plane figure with interior angles equaling 180 degrees.
• Therefore, knowledge is hope is not a good definition of knowledge [from (5) and (6)].

On Faith and Knowledge

• Creel on faith and knowledge
• Going deeper:
  • Four different senses of faith
  • A general schema for believing by faith that what someone says is true
  • Augustine on the ubiquity of believing by faith that what someone says is true
  • A hypothesis: faith that is—or can be—a form of knowledge that, but not the only kind of knowledge that

Creel on Knowledge as Faith

• If I know that the earth orbits the sun, then I __ believe that the earth orbits the sun [assumption].
• If I have faith that what John says happened is how it happened, then I ____ believe that what Johns says happened is how it happened.
• Therefore, knowledge that and faith that are significantly similar [from (1) and (2)].
• If I know that I did well on the test, then it is I did well on the test [assumption].
• If I have faith that John is trustworthy, it may be the case that John is NOT trustworthy (it may be __ that John is trustworthy) [assumption].
• Therefore, although knowledge that and faith that are significantly similar, they are different [from (3)-(5)].
• If a definition is a good definition, then the definendum [de-fin-i-en-dum] (the term being defined) and the definiens [dee-fin-iens] (the definition of the term being defined) are logically equivalent, i.e., have the same properties, e.g., a triangle is a three-sided, closed, plane figure with interior angles equaling 180 degrees.
• Therefore, knowledge is faith is not a good definition of knowledge [from (6) and (7)].

Four Senses of Faith

• Faith ____, i.e., confidently trusting someone’s character or competence, e.g., Susan: “Why do you believe Jim is telling the truth?” Sam: “I have faith in him.”
• Faith someone is (or was) _, i.e., (a) based on one’s experiences, which may include kinds of evidence, one believes—or chooses to believe—strongly or confidently that some person exists, although one does not have intellectual certainty about that person’s existence, or (b) based on someone else’s testimony one strongly or confidently believes something or someone was true or real, e.g., having faith that God is real; having faith there was a Roman general, Julius Caesar.
• Faith someone _ that p, i.e., (a) based on one’s experiences, which may include kinds of evidence, one believes—or chooses to believe—strongly or confidently that some person reveals that p, although one does not have intellectual certainty that that person reveals that p, or (b) based on someone else’s testimony one believes strongly or confidently that someone reveals that p, e.g., having faith that God inspires a passage in a book of Scripture and so reveals a truth about God, or Johnny’s having faith that his great grandmother wrote a particular book because his mother says so.
• Faith someone is true (see slide 22)

Schema for Believing by Faith

• Person R reasonably believes that person S reveals that p, e.g., Jasmine reasonably believes Jane has said to her, “I grew up in Bakersfield, CA.”
• Person R believes person S is a reliable authority where the truth or falsity of propositions such as p is concerned, e.g., Jasmine believes Jane is a reliable authority on the correct answers to questions such as, “where did Jane grow up?”
• Primarily in light of (1) and (2), person R believes what S says is true, e.g., primarily in light of Jane’s revealing to Jasmine she grew up in Bakersfield, CA, and Jasmine’s (implicit) belief that Jane is a reliable authority on matters such as where she grew up, Jasmine believes that Jane grew up in Bakersfield, CA. Jasmine’s belief here is a kind of faith that, namely, a faith that what someone reveals is true.

Aquinas on Human vs. Divine Faith

• (1 *) Human Faith: John believes Jasmine reveals ‘I went to school in Dresden’.
• (2 *) Faith in Authority: John has faith that Jasmine is a reliable authority about where she went to school.
• (3 *) Faith in Revelation: John believes that what Jasmine reveals is true.
• (1
  ) Divine Faith: Dante believes by faith that God reveals that God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through Scripture.
• (2
  ) Belief in God's Reliability: Dante believes that if God exists, then God is a perfectly reliable authority.
• (3
  ) Faith in Divine Revelation: Dante has faith that what God reveals is true.

Human Faith vs. Divine Faith

A table comparing human faith, divine faith, and non-faith kinds of knowledge. The table considers several factors, including whether the belief involves a firm assent that p is true, the basis for that assent, compatibility with evidence and falsehood, and the ability to freely choose not to believe.

Divine Faith vs. Other Means

• If Seraphina knows p by divine faith (e.g., ‘Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God’):
  • (a) She reasonably believes that Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God.
  • (b) By an act of her will.
  • (c) Her act of will is due to God’s grace moving her to believe.
  • (d) In light of her faith that God reveals this.
• Seraphina does not so clearly see with her own intellect that JN is true that it would be impossible for her at some point to choose not to believe it (contrast this case with believing propositions such as ‘1+1=2’ or, at least for non-skeptics, ‘there are other human persons in the world’).
• If Seraphina knows p by means other than divine faith:
  • (a) She trusts a human authority (without God’s grace).
  • (b) It is evident to her intellect, and she cannot help but believe it.

Returning to Creel’s Discussion

• Question set (57): is knowledge belief based on evidence?
• The John’s on trial for murder counter- example

Philosophical Methods

• Conceptual analysis
• Deductive argument
• Falsifying a hypothesis by thought experiment or counter-example

Falsifying Hypotheses

• A hypothesis H about knowledge:
  • Knowledge is belief based upon evidence.
• To show H is false:
  • Provide an example where a person S believes that p and has evidence that p, but S does not know that p. This is a counter-example to H.

Counter-Example

• If knowledge is belief based upon evidence, then in any case where Sally has a belief that p, based upon some evidence, then Sally knows that p.
• Sally believes that John is guilty of a particular crime, Sally has some evidence for such a belief, but John is not guilty of that particular crime.
• Whatever else knowing p is, it entails believing truly that p.
• Therefore, Sally does not know that John is guilty of that particular crime, despite the fact that she believes he is, and she has some evidence for her belief [from (2) and (3)].
• Therefore, it is false that in any case where Sally has a belief that p, based upon some evidence, then Sally knows that p [from (4)].
• Therefore, it is not the case that knowledge is belief based upon evidence (from (1) and (5), MT].

Is Knowledge True Belief?

• The Judah example

Is Knowledge True Belief Based on Evidence?

• The 5th century Pythagorean argument

Heliocentrism

• (1) If the sun is a divine being, then the planets, including the earth, revolve around the sun rather than the sun revolving around the earth [assumption].
• (2) The sun is a divine being [assumption].
• (3) Therefore, the planets, including the earth, revolve around the sun rather than the sun revolving around the earth [from (1) and (2), MP].

Is Knowledge Justified Belief?

• This section likely explores whether knowledge can be defined as justified belief.

Definitions of Justification

• Two definitions of ‘justification’:
  • John is justified in believing that p if and only if John has STRONG EVIDENCE for p.
  • John is justified in believing that p if and only if John has evidence that p such that he is REASONABLE in believing that p.

Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?

• Consideration of whether knowledge is justified true belief.

The Gettier Counter-Example

• Mike and Joe are introduced within the context of the Gettier problem.
• Mike: The guy who walks past Joe’s room.
• Joe: Taking a class in paper mâché modeling.

Epistemology After Gettier

• Two general approaches to defining knowledge after Gettier:
  • An example of the justification approach: knowledge as conclusively justified true belief
  • A different approach after Gettier: causal or externalist theories of knowledge

Defining Knowledge

• Justification Approach:
  • Knowledge = x + justified true belief.
• Causal Theory Approach:
  • Knowledge = true belief _ in the right way.

Approaches to Gettier Counter-Examples

• Two approaches to responding to Gettier counter-examples:
  • An example of the justification approach: knowledge as conclusively justified true belief
  • A different approach after Gettier: causal or externalist theories of knowledge

Conclusive Justification Account of Knowledge

• Joe knows that p iff:
  • Joe _ that p;
  • p is _;
  • Joe possesses a certain kind of strong evidence E that p, i.e., conclusive justification that p;
  • Joe understands how E provides __ that p.

Meaning of Conclusive Justification

• Joe is conclusively justified in believing that p iff:
  • Joe has evidence that p such that he is _ that p, i.e., it’s not possible, given his evidence for p, that Joe is mistaken in believing that p.

A Problematic Implication of the CJTB theory

• The Brain in the Vat thought experiment and skepticism about knowledge

Skepticism Argument

• If the conclusive justification theory is correct, then, in order to know that p, e.g., that we have arms and legs, we have to be absolutely certain that p [self-evident].
• We can’t be absolutely certain we are not brains in vats [assumption].
• If we can’t be absolutely certain we are not brains in vats, then we can’t be absolutely certain of (much of) anything [assumption].
• Therefore, we can’t be absolutely certain of (much of) anything [from (b) and (c), MP].
• If the conclusive justification theory of knowledge is correct, then we don’t know (much of) anything [from (a) and (d)].
• The conclusive justification theory of knowledge is correct [assumption made by skeptics and some opponents of skepticism, e.g., Rene Descartes (1596-1650)].
• Therefore, we don’t know (much of) anything [from (a) and (b), MP].

Responding to Gettier

• The JTB theory predicts that in the Gettier cases the protagonist does know what he believes.
• But we have the intuition that the protagonist does not know what he believes in the Gettier cases.
• Therefore, the Gettier cases are counter-examples to the JTB theory; they show the JTB theory is inadequate.
• Therefore, we need an account of knowledge that makes the right prediction, namely, that the protagonist does not know what he believes.

Defining Knowledge

• Can we define knowledge in such a way that does not lead to skepticism?

Causal Theories of Knowledge

• Joe knows that p iff:
  • (a) Joe believes p,
  • (b) p is true and
  • (c) Joe’s belief that p is __.

Two Causal Theories

• A Goldmanian causal theory:
  • Goldman’s definition of knowledge: Joe knows that p iff p is true and p’s being true is causally connected _ to Joe’s belief that p.
  • Illustrating Goldman’s theory:
    • Examples of causal connection
  • Causal theories as externalist (rather than internalist) theories of knowledge
  • The Blow to the Head Cases and “the appropriate way” clause
  • How Goldman’s theories can make sense of the Gettier cases
  • The John and it’s Raining in Martin case: an advantage for the Goldman’s theory over the CTJB theory
  • The Trudy/Judy Case as a problem for Goldman’s theory
• Alvin Plantinga’s causal theory: warrant and proper function
  • Plantinga’s core description of knowledge
  • Illustrating proper function theory
  • Plantinga’s theory and the Trudy/Judy case

First Example of Causal Connection

• Consider the true proposition ‘the sun is shining’.

• What is the causal connection between the sun’s shining and Joan’s believing ‘the sun is shining’. Perhaps:

  Joan’s believing ‘the sun is shining’ \hat{ }

  |

  Joan’s seeing that the sun is shining \hat{ }

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  The sun’s shining

Second Example of Causal Connection

• (a) Gary’s believing the hypotenuse of a particular right triangle T is 50 meter long \hat{ }
• (b) Gary’s believing that one side of T—not the hypotenuse—is 40 meters long and another side of T—also not the hypotenuse—is 30 meters long. + (c) Gary’s believing that 30 squared is 900 and 40 squared is 1600. + (d) Gary’s believing that 900+1600=2500. + (e) Gary’s believing the Pythagorean theorem. + (f) Gary’s believing that the square root of 2500 is 50. + (g) Gary’s believing T is a right triangle.

Another Causal Connection

(b) Gary’s believing that one side of T—not the hypotenuse—is 40 meters long and another side of T—also not the hypotenuse—is 30 meters long \hat{ }

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• Gary’s measuring that one side of T—not the hypotenuse—is 40 meters long and another side of T—also not the hypotenuse—is 30 meters long. + (2) One side of T—not the hypotenuse—’s being 40 meters long and another side of T—also not the hypotenuse—’s being 30 meters long.

Another Causal Connection Example

John’s believing it is raining in Martin, even though John is not currently in Martin \hat{ }

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Jane’s telling John on the phone that it is raining in Martin \hat{ }

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Jane’s believing it is raining in Martin \hat{ }

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Jane’s seeing it is raining in Martin

Internalism and Externalism

• Internalism =(df) The view that says that inspecting one’s reasons for believing some proposition p is an essential aspect of all knowledge. Internalists accept something such as the following “epistemic access requirement” for knowledge:
  • (I) John has knowledge of p only if John has reasons, e.g., an account of why one believes that p, or arguments for believing that p, and
  • (II) John understands why those reasons or arguments show that p is true.
• Externalism =(df) the view that rejects internalism. Although certain some kinds of knowledge require (I) and (II), not all kinds of knowledge do.

Externalism

• How do we know the sun is shining right now where we live?
• If Susan is a geologist, how does she know the earth is roughly 4.5 billion years old?

Importance of Appropriate Way.

• The importance of the “in the appropriate way” clause:

  • A minute later, Jones believes he just fell down the stairs \hat{ }

  • A minute later, Jones remembers that he just fell down the stairs \hat{ }

  • Jones falls down the stairs

  • A minute later, Smith believes wolves are snakes, iceberg lettuce is the most flavorful of all foods, and that he just fell down the stairs. \hat{ }

  • Smith has a brain lesion \hat{ }

  • Smith falls down the stairs

Goldman’s Theories

• How Goldman’s theories can make sense of the Gettier cases:

Mike believes Joe is in the room \hat{ }

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Mike’s seeing the life-like paper mache model of Joe Joe’s being in the room

The John and Raining Case

John’s believing it is raining in Martin, even though John is not currently in Martin \hat{ }

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Jane’s telling John on the phone that it is raining in Martin \hat{ }

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Jane’s believing it is raining in Martin \hat{ }

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Jane’s seeing it is raining in Martin

Luck

• If a person S simply gets lucky in having a true belief that p, then S does not know that p, e.g., Judah in the Judah Case.
• If there is an example such that a theory of knowledge T predicts that S knows that p in that example, even though in the example S simply gets lucky in having a true belief that p, then that case is a counter-example to T [from (1)].

Warrant and Proper Function

• Joe knows that p iff Joe believes that p, p is true and Joe is warranted in believing that p.
• Joe is warranted in believing that p iff:
  • (a) Joe’s belief that p is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties, i.e., not subject to disease or dis-function,
  • (b) where those faculties are operating in an environment or set of circumstances consistent with the design plan of God and/or nature such that
  • (c) the function or purpose of the faculties in question is the production of true beliefs, and
  • (d) the faculties in question successfully produce true beliefs.

Cognitive Faculties

• Discussion on cognitive faculties

Illustrating Proper Function Theory

• Joe is blind. He is in a room where Jane is giving a lecture. Joe believes Jane is in the room and this belief is produced by cognitive faculties, e.g., his hearing Jane, that are functioning properly and successfully, in the sort of environment in which those faculties were designed to operate, according to a design plan the purpose of which is to produce true beliefs. Is Joe’s belief warranted? Does he know Jane is in the room according to Plantinga?

• Mike (who is blind) believes there is a woman in the room. There is a woman in the room speaking to him. However, his belief that there is a woman in the room is caused by a brain tumor and not by his properly functioning cognitive faculties. Does Mike know there is a woman in the room according to Plantinga? Why or why not?

• John believes he hears his father calling from three miles away (although human hearing, at best, can pick up sounds from about a mile away). His father is calling from three miles away. Does John know he hears his father calling from three miles away according to Plantinga?

• Smith believes Trudy is across the street; he does see Trudy, but it is also the case that Trudy’s identical twin Judy is visiting Trudy right now, and even the mother of Judy and Trudy couldn’t tell them apart at the distance in which Smith sees Trudy (Smith doesn’t even know Trudy has a twin sister). Had the circumstances been only slightly different, it would have been Judy that Smith saw from across the street.

• John’s father apparently abandoned his family when he was a young boy. When John is sixteen, he strongly believes his father is clandestinely supporting and helping his family (let us say) simply because John has a cognitive faculty that naturally causes him to do so (call that faculty, the power of wish fulfillment), but the purpose of this faculty is not the production of true beliefs; rather, the cognitive faculty naturally produces beliefs that help a human being such as John cope with the cold, cruel environment in which John lives. Is John warranted in so believing?

• Leo believes the Cardinals won, without watching the game, reading the paper, etc. They did win. He believes the Cardinals won because he has been given a faculty to close his eyes and intuit whether the Cardinals won any given game by an infant deity, which said faculty is designed by such a deity to function in the environment Leo is in. The purpose of the faculty is to produce true beliefs. The faculty is functioning properly. Unfortunately, this infant deity did a poor job designing Leo’s whether-the-Cardinals-won-a-game-intuiting- faculty. When it comes to intuiting whether the Cardinals won, Leo usually gets it wrong. (He would be better off guessing!)

Philosophical Methods

• Conceptual analysis, e.g., describing two different senses of ‘belief’
• Deductive argument, e.g., the friends and family problem for hedonism and egoism
• Falsifying a hypothesis by counter-example, e.g., Gettier examples as counter-examples to the JTB theory of knowledge.
• Inference to the best explanation: arguing for the strength of a philosophical view by noting its explanatory power and fewer weaknesses in comparison to other views

Evaluating Theories

A table evaluating different contemporary theories of knowledge.