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DNA database retention policy varies by jurisdiction; concerns about privacy, function creep, and misuse.

Chapter 1: Introduction

  • Context: Week 9 in the course, focusing on experts, lay people, and forensics; acknowledgement of Indigenous Australian country (Wadawurrong) and paying respects to elders.
  • Course logistics touched on:
    • Assessment timeline: AT 2, AT 3 due on the same day; AT 4 due on October 1. Extensions require supporting evidence; otherwise unlikely to be approved.
    • AT 4: students choose one of the four questions; Harvard referencing as usual.
    • Read FAQs before posting on discussion boards or emailing the lecturer.
    • Submitting in the correct file format is mandatory; incorrect format likely results in a zero.
    • Next week schedule changes: Week 10 at 4 PM; Week 11 with Dr. Matt Mitchell; the current lecturer potentially not continuing beyond this series.
    • Final weeks: this is largely the last lecture; seminars continue but not all sessions.
  • Core questions introduced for the course: What is forensic science? How do forensics, experts, and laypeople relate to the criminal justice system? What are the types of forensic analysis? How do forensics function in the courtroom? What are the legal standards of reliability? Who are the experts and why are they important? Is forensic evidence reliable?
  • The CSI effect: the impact of crime dramas on jury members and other justice system participants (expectations about forensic evidence).
  • DNA collection on arrest as a privacy and civil-liberties issue; debates about why DNA is collected and how it differs by jurisdiction.
  • Key themes: discretion, accountability, and the idea that forensic science is not a flawless silver bullet.
  • Early reference to fingerprints as a focal point for reliability concerns; fingerprints are often trusted but can be fallible and require careful interpretation.

Chapter 2: Called Pre Crime

  • What is forensic science? See it as part of the criminal justice system (CJS) with functions that will be explored; acknowledge ongoing improvements and future potential in accuracy.
  • Definition (as given by lecturer): the application of science to criminal and civil law enforcement by police agencies within the CJS.
  • Primary functions of forensic science:
    • Informing law enforcement during the investigative phase: evidence collection, scene analysis, reconstructing events, estimating angles, etc.
    • Assisting in detection and prosecution of known offenders through various means (e.g., linking evidence to suspects).
    • Informing court decisions about guilt or innocence (guilt prospectively determined through a chain of evidence and legal standards).
  • Two logics driving forensic use in the CJS:
    • Policing logic (pre-crime): proactive risk assessment, safety discourses, potential interventions before an offense occurs. Highly controversial and ethically fraught because it risks arresting or intervening before any crime has occurred.
    • Security logic: broader state security and data retention considerations; linked to surveillance and intelligence frameworks.
  • Data retention and pre-crime concerns:
    • Minority Report-like debates about predicting crimes; current tech and ethics make such pre-crime predictions speculative and controversial.
    • Data retention: metadata and digital traces are held by service providers for long periods; access can be obtained via simple processes; privacy concerns are widespread. In practice, pre-crime uses of forensic data are limited and controversial.
    • The counterpoint: a presumption of guilt through mass data collection (i.e., collecting metadata pre-emptively) raises civil-liberties and accountability concerns.
  • Forensics in the post-crime process (retrospective use): most common mode of forensic use is after a crime has occurred (crime scene investigation, cyber forensics, etc.).
  • Historical context:
    • Late 19th century anthropological criminology: Lombroso and colleagues argued for born criminals based on biology/appearance (e.g., facial features, tattoos). This idea is now discredited, but it contributed to mugshots and the notion of identifying criminal types.
    • Legacy concerns: mugshots and labeling can drive stigma and bias; ongoing challenges with facial recognition technologies and their accuracy.

Chapter 3: Used Post Crime

  • Mugshots: origin linked to early attempts at identification; they became a standard tool though the assumption that “you can tell a criminal by appearance” is now rejected.
  • Fingerprints: central to investigations and trials, but not without flaws:
    • Time spent at scenes: roughly about 70% of investigative effort.
    • Types of prints:
    • Plastic prints: left on malleable surfaces (e.g., putty, soft surfaces).
    • Visible prints: easily seen prints on surfaces.
    • Latent prints: require powders or chemical development to visualize.
    • Post-crime use: fingerprints are a tool for post hoc identification; pre-crime utility is extremely limited.
    • Privacy concerns: collecting fingerprints raises civil-liberties issues when individuals have not committed a crime; potential for surveillance overreach.
    • Database matching is not automatic or purely automated; final matches are typically made by human examiners who assess print quality and context; eyewitness-like biases and errors can occur.
    • Displacement and adaptation: offenders may wear gloves or otherwise avoid leaving prints; partial prints are common and can lead to false or uncertain identifications.
  • Handwriting analysis: presented as highly specialized and not as reliable as DNA/prints; handwriting is subject to variability (illness, haste, etc.) and is prone to biases.
  • Trace evidence (Chapter 4):
    • Biological trace forensics: hair follicles, skin cells, blood, body fluids; largely post-crime use; requires databases for comparison; often limited in preventative capacity.
    • Non-biological traces: e.g., paint or other materials; used to link materials to sources or contexts.
  • Firearms and ballistics: forensics in firearms are portrayed in media as highly definitive; in reality, they are useful but require appropriate conditions to be reliable:
    • Match from bullets and cartridge cases relies on markings on the bullet, rifling impressions, and other microscopic features that may or may not be uniquely identifying.
    • Trajectory and wound analysis provide circumstantial evidence; can be inconclusive without complementary evidence.
    • Post-crime utility depends on having the firearm and ballistic evidence present; if the weapon is missing, usefulness decreases.
  • Cyber forensics: a growing field with potential pre-crime applications (e.g., monitoring communications) but still faces challenges like dynamic, borderless crime spaces, deleted data, and the need for specialized skill sets.
  • Biometric surveillance: a controversial area with privacy and civil-liberties concerns; facial recognition and other biometrics can enable efficient monitoring but raise risks of misidentification, bias, and mission creep; modern surveillance databases are vulnerable to hacking, and there is an ongoing arms race between offense and defense in cyber contexts.

Chapter 4: Relation To Not Send it to Trace (Trace Evidence)

  • Trace evidence category split:
    • Biological trace: e.g., hair, skin cells, body fluids; mostly post-crime use; requires reference databases for comparison; limited preventative capability.
    • Non-biological trace: e.g., paint, fibers; helps link a suspect to a scene or object.
  • Firearms and bullets reiterate cautions about over-reliance on weapon-based matches; readiness to contend with incomplete or altered evidence.
  • Cyber forensics and cyber surveillance: emphasizes growing need for expertise; pre-crime potential exists in monitoring communications, but evidence collection is complicated by deleted data, cloud storage, and cross-border issues.
  • Biometric surveillance and privacy concerns expanded:
    • Surveillance can improve efficiency (e.g., at airports) but also creates bias, potential discrimination, privacy invasion, and the risk of mission creep (growing use beyond original intent).
    • Databases can be hacked; biometric data is not immune to breaches; there is no absolute security in cyberspace.
  • Governance questions:
    • Who controls data? what accountability mechanisms exist? how do we prevent abuse and bias? how do we ensure proportionality and necessity?

Chapter 5: Admitted DNA Evidence

  • Core function of forensic evidence in court:
    • Distinguishes factual guilt (actual crime) from legal guilt (proving guilt under the law);
    • Onus of proof is high; in many jurisdictions, beyond reasonable doubt requires substantial corroborating forensic evidence alongside other evidence.
    • Forensic evidence is typically used as corroborating rather than sole proof of guilt; many cases require multiple lines of evidence.
  • For evidence to be admissible, three conditions must be met:
    • Admissible: legally permissible under Evidentiary rules.
    • Credible and reliable: reliability of the method and proper handling of samples.
    • Obtained in a fair manner that respects the accused and public interest.
  • Legal standards of reliability:
    • FRI standards (note: discussed in lecture) require that evidence has gained acceptance in its field, the expert verifies it, and often it is doubly verified; the debut standard requires evidence to be peer-reviewed, generally accepted, with sound methodology and an unknown error rate.
    • In practice, juries must be informed about error rates; lack of transparency about error rates can mislead juries.
  • The Evidence Act 1995 (Australian context) governs admissibility and provides guidelines for evaluating relevance, admissibility, and challenges to DNA evidence.
  • Experts in court: criteria include:
    • Clear demonstration of formal qualifications and direct experience with the evidence type;
    • Independence from prosecution or defense; potential bias is a well-known risk.
    • Ability to explain complex science to laypersons (the jury);
    • Distinguishing between scientific conclusions and opinion; judges must beware of experts moving from data to opinion.
  • Current challenges and debates:
    • The rise of non-human AI-based experts (e.g., predictive policing like PredPol) raises concerns about bias in training data, lack of transparency, and potential misuse in decisions such as bail or parole.
    • The US Innocence Project has highlighted that many forensic methods lack robust validation and credible quality-assurance standards; some studies show jurors become more likely to convict when DNA evidence is admitted—even when the evidence quality is limited.
    • The CSI effect: jurors’ expectations shaped by media can lead to biased verdicts; some scholars challenge the universality of the CSI effect, arguing variation across contexts.
    • The role of DNA databases: debates over DNA collection at arrest versus conviction; variations across Australian states/territories illustrate differences in privacy and civil-liberties protections:
    • Victoria and New South Wales: DNA removed from the database if no charge concludes (after investigation).
    • Northern Territory: DNA may stay on file after arrest for serious crime even if cleared.
    • Queensland: similar arrest-based retention for serious crimes; indefinite retention by some jurisdictions like South Australia; policy debates about