Takeyh__Ray_2010._The_Iran-Iraq_War_-_A_Reassessment._The_Middle_East_Journal__64__3__365_383

The Iran-Iraq War, as assessed by Ray Takeyh, marks one of the longest conflicts in modern Middle Eastern history, significantly shaping Iran's foreign policy. The conflict, which lasts for eight years, reveals a series of Iranian miscalculations and ideological missteps that resulted in a stalemate. Iranian leaders underestimated the complexity of the war, wrongly believing their military would be welcomed in Iraq and that a detailed occupation was unnecessary.

On its 30th anniversary, the war's implications are reconsidered beyond Iran's glorification of martyrs. Iran was at a disadvantage, lacking allies and military support while battling against Iraq's technological superiority. Despite these odds, the Iranian regime demonstrated resilience, mobilizing society under duress and effectively managing domestic challenges and international isolation.

The war transcended typical interstate conflicts, representing a struggle for ideological dominance rather than mere territorial or political gains. Led by clerics, the Iranian government conflated military efforts with revolutionary ideals, prioritizing martyrdom over military strategy. Ayatollah Khomeini hoped the war would help realize his ideological aspirations but ultimately it undermined Iran's broader revolutionary goals.

In the end, after a costly impasse, Iran was unable to achieve its objectives of defeating Iraq or exerting broader influence in the region. The Islamic Republic was forced to base its legitimacy on new foundations beyond revolutionary ideals, transitioning into a government focused on domestic governance and functioning within the international community.

The Iran-Iraq War: A Reassessment

• The Iran-Iraq War is significant in shaping Iran's foreign policy and was marked by several ideological missteps by Iranian leaders, leading to a prolonged stalemate rather than a swift victory.

• Iranian leadership believed in an Islamist cause, seeing any opposition as forces of disbelief, creating an elastic definition of enemies that included Gulf shaykhdoms, the U.S., and Western Europe.

• Despite the war's initial stages allowing the Iranian government to undermine moderate leadership, dissent and division persisted within the Islamic Republic.

• A counterattack from Iran began in January 1981, initially scoring gains against Iraq, but internal military coordination issues persisted.

• Human wave attacks were part of Iranian strategy, relying on extensive mobilization of Basij units, often resulting in significant casualties.

• Iran's military strategy combined ideological fervor with a disregard for conventional tactics, leading to costly improvisation and inefficient military operations.

• Political turbulence marked the war, with leaders like President Bani-Sadr often at odds with Revolutionary Guards.

• Diplomacy attempts through various channels consistently failed, with Iran refusing to negotiate without the complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces.

• The Gulf states wary of both Iranian ambitions and Iraqi aggression decided to support Saddam Hussein, forming the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to provide military assistance to Iraq.

• The U.S. also sided with Iraq, providing military intelligence, amidst apprehensions that Iran's victory could lead to the spread of its Islamic Revolution.

• By June 1982, Iran managed to expel Iraq from its territory and considered invading Iraq, with internal consensus shifting towards protraction of the war to spread revolution, despite deteriorating conditions.

• Iran underestimated the costs and misjudged the situation, believing its military successes could lead to a quick overthrow of Saddam.

• The continued aggression by Iran transformed the narrative, changing its role from victim to aggressor by pursuing the military campaign into Iraq while miscalculating regional dynamics.

The chapter discusses the Iran-Iraq War and its implications for Iran's foreign policy, highlighting the ideological missteps of Iranian leaders that led to a prolonged stalemate. Initially, Iranian leadership viewed the war as a means to spread their Islamist ideals, seeing their enemies—including Iraq and various nations supporting it—as inherently opposed to Islam. Despite early battlefield successes in 1981, internal coordination issues among Iran’s military factions, like the Revolutionary Guards and Basij units, hindered effective strategy. The Iranian government remained politically tumultuous, with leaders like President Bani-Sadr often clashing with revolutionary factions.

Diplomatic attempts to end the conflict were unsuccessful, as Iran demanded the total withdrawal of Iraqi forces before negotiations could begin. Meanwhile, Gulf states and the U.S. provided support to Iraq out of fear of an expanding Iranian revolution. By mid-1982, although Iran expelled Iraqi forces from its territory, it misjudged its capability for a successful invasion and overstretched itself in pursuing military campaigns into Iraq. This led to transforming Iran’s image from a victim to an aggressor in the eyes of the international community, solidifying the notion that the war was not merely about territorial gains but also about ideological supremacy.

A War of Attrition

Following the 1982 invasion, the dynamics of the Iran-Iraq War changed significantly. Initially, Iraq was the aggressor, engaging in extensive military offensives. However, when Iran crossed into Iraqi territory, Iraq retreated into a defensive posture, hoping Iranian forces would grow fatigued. As the war dragged on, both sides adapted their tactics, experimented with new weaponry, and sought out opposition forces, yet neither managed to secure a decisive victory. This led to a classic stalemate.

The Iranian regime framed the conflict as a struggle between Islamic purity and malevolent forces, tying its legitimacy to battlefield victory. Economic and social problems were secondary to the pursuit of victory over Saddam Hussein, with Khomeini asserting that a victorious end to the war was essential for resolving Iran's woes. The slogan “War, War until Victory” exemplified this rhetoric, justifying the regime's power through a narrative of a people's war.

As the war's toll increased amid stagnant progress, the regime changed its propaganda focus to stress teachings from the Qur'an about perseverance during crises, defining true faith as enduring prolonged sacrifice. Iraq, seeking to turn the tide, targeted Iranian cities and oil infrastructures, marking the onset of the "war of the cities," which aimed to demoralize the Iranian population.

Iraq also escalated attacks on Iranian oil facilities after acquiring French Super Étendard aircraft, thus threatening critical economic resources for Iran. Despite damage to oil installations, Iran remained undeterred, retaliating against Gulf shipping that sustained Iraq’s war efforts.

Importantly, Iraq resorted to chemical warfare in 1983, initially aimed at countering Iran's human wave tactics but eventually became a strategic advantage. The U.S., fearing Iranian dominance, provided Iraq with military support and intelligence, complicating its stance on chemical weapons use.

As the war progressed, internal divisions in Iran’s leadership became apparent. While some factions sought diplomatic solutions, hardliners pushed for continued military engagement. In response to declining public support for the war, Iranian leaders called for mass mobilization and a transformation of the war effort into a people's war.

Despite the devastation, Khomeini favored radical elements within the government, believing that stronger military efforts could still bring victory. The ongoing conflict reflected the complexities of both internal Iranian politics and the multifaceted nature of international relations during the war.

Internationalization of the War

The final years of the Iran-Iraq War were characterized by challenges for the Islamic Republic, which had made the overthrow of Saddam Hussein a central strategic goal. Despite facing significant isolation, economic problems, and public discontent, Iran managed to sustain the war amidst a stalemate on the battlefield and escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf, which eventually involved the United States.

Internal factionalism hindered Tehran's decisive action, but a more pragmatic faction emerged, convincing leaders to end the conflict. By 1987, Iran shifted towards an expanded conflict at sea, targeting Kuwaiti shipping due to its historical conflicts and its support for Iraq. Kuwait leveraged Cold War tensions to secure U.S. protection for its vessels, compelling the Reagan Administration to re-flag Kuwaiti ships to prevent Soviet influence in the region.

This U.S. involvement heightened internal debates within Iran, with moderates fearing confrontation with the U.S. and hardliners advocating resistance. Iranian naval aggression against U.S. forces increased tensions further. On the battlefield, Iraq regained territory, including the strategically significant Faw Peninsula, which was a blow to Iranian morale after years of fighting. Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and American support heightened the stakes.

By 1988, Iran faced exhaustion from prolonged conflict without substantial international support. The psychological impact of Iraq's missile attacks and the depletion of volunteer forces strained Iran's war efforts, leading to the call for diplomatic resolutions; however, Iran had previously dismissed peace proposals due to its ideological framing of the war.

The U.S. drafted UN Resolution 598 to pressure Iran into negotiations, which posed a dilemma for the Islamic Republic. Internal tensions grew, and a coalition of more pragmatic forces advocated for peace, with Khamenei eventually shifting away from rigid demands for Saddam’s removal as a prerequisite for ending hostilities.

Iran’s leadership ultimately accepted the UN resolution following a series of defeats and the realization that continued warfare threatened the regime's stability. Khomeini's consent to ceasefire was framed as a necessary sacrifice for the survival of the Islamic Republic, though it was met with internal resistance. In Khomeini's view, accepting a ceasefire felt like a defeat but was necessary for the country's interests.

The war's legacy endures within Iran, shaping national identity and policy. Despite the regime's efforts to promote martyrdom and glorify the war experience, unresolved traumas and ideological reflections continue to influence Iranian politics. The conflict not only changed military and political landscapes but also underscored the regime's commitment to self-reliance in the face of international disregard for its sovereignty during the war.

Answers to Test Questions on the Iran-Iraq War

(a) The Iranian leadership framed the war with Iraq as a struggle for ideological dominance and a means to showcase Islamic purity. The conflict was portrayed in propaganda as a heroic defense against malevolent forces intent on undermining the Islamic Revolution. The regime mobilized society around the narrative of martyrdom and sacrifice, justifying continued military engagement through the slogan "War, War until Victory."

(b) Saddam Hussein declared that Iranian territory was to return to Arab hands due to the historical and ethnic composition of the region. The Iranian leadership's aspirations for regional influence and the spread of their revolutionary ideals posed a threat to Arab sovereignty, and Hussein positioned himself as a defender of Arab nationalism against perceived Iranian expansionism.

(c) The tactics of human wave attacks were employed by Iran in the early 1980s, particularly after the initial stages of the war where Iran sought to regain lost territories. These attacks involved mass mobilization of Basij units and were intended to overwhelm Iraqi defenses through sheer numbers. However, they led to high casualties and highlighted the Iranian regime's ideological focus over effective military strategy.

(d) The U.S. played a complex role in the Iran-Iraq War, providing military intelligence and support to Iraq partly due to fears that an Iranian victory could lead to the spread of its Islamic Revolution. The U.S. preferred to see a balance of power maintained in the region and viewed the Iraqi regime as a counterbalance to Iranian expansionism.

(e) Khomeini's desire to reach Jerusalem via Karbala was rooted in the ideological belief that the Iranian Revolution represented a broader Islamic struggle. The connection between Iran's attack on Iraq in 1982 and Israel's invasion of Lebanon that same year lay in shared regional dynamics; both actions were seen as efforts to reshape the Middle East. Iran did not end the war after pushing Iraqi forces out due to the desire to further promote its revolutionary ideology and extend influence, despite internal and external pressures.

(f) During the stalemate, Saddam Hussein shifted tactics by utilizing the "war of the cities," which involved targeting Iranian urban centers and oil infrastructure. This approach aimed to demoralize the Iranian population. The protracted conflict reflected the Islamic Republic's ideology by emphasizing resilience and the importance of martyrdom, with leaders framing the ongoing battle as a sacred struggle that justified sacrifices and hardship for the nation.