Thomson's Defense of Abortion

She points out the Standard Argument Against Abortion

• Premise 1: Intentionally killing an innocent person with a Right to Life (RTL) is morally wrong.

• Premise 2: Zygotes, embryos, and fetuses are innocent persons with a RTL. (This is the argument this critics challenge and that Thompson doesn’t believe is true, but she still entertains that it’s true)

• Premise 3: Abortion is the intentional killing of a zygote, embryo, or fetus.

• Conclusion: Therefore, abortion is morally wrong.

Thomson's Strategy

Thomson's approach does not aim to disprove that a fetus is a person with a right to life but rather challenges the conclusion that abortion is morally wrong, even assuming the fetus has an RTL.

• Assumption: For the sake of argument, Thomson assumes that a zygote (or embryo, fetus) is an innocent person with a RTL. (2 is true)

• Methodology: Thought Experiments. Intended to reveal what you actually think

  • Purpose: Thought experiments are hypothetical scenarios designed to isolate key moral variables, test our intuitions (intuition pump), and challenge presuppositions in an ethical argument. They help us reason about complex moral dilemmas by stripping away distracting details.

  • Criticisms: Thought experiments can be criticized for being unrealistic, having irrelevant details, or leading to conflicting intuitions among different individuals. Intuitions are not rational arguments, they are feelings as a result of being socialized.

• Application: Thomson applies the results from these thought experiments to the specific case of abortion to demonstrate that even if a fetus has a right to life, this right does not necessarily entail a right to continued use of the pregnant person's body.

Analogy 1: The Famous Violinist

• Details: You wake up one morning to find yourself surgically connected to a famous violinist. He has a fatal kidney ailment, and you are the only person with the right blood type to save him. The Society of Music Lovers kidnapped you and attached you to him; you must remain connected for nine months, during which time he will recover. If you detach yourself, he will die.

• Violinist's Status: The violinist is an innocent person with a RTL.

• Question of Duration: Is the moral situation different if the period of attachment is nine months versus a shorter duration? How can a need translate to a right?

• Thomson's Conclusion: The violinist's RTL does not give him a right to your body or compel you to provide life support. While remaining connected might be a kind act, it is not a moral obligation stemming from his right to life in this scenario. The act of carrying that person is supererogatory

• Distinction: This analogy highlights the difference between a moral obligation (something you must do) and merely being nice or performing an act of charity (something praiseworthy but not strictly required).

• Application to Abortion: This analogy is applied to cases of pregnancy resulting from rape. Just as the kidnapped individual did not consent to the use of their body to sustain the violinist, a woman who is pregnant due to rape has not consented to the use of her body for the fetus. Therefore, the fetus's RTL does not grant it a right to her body in this involuntary circumstance.

Analogy 2: The Violinist Again (Self-Defense)

• Details: Imagine a variation of Analogy 1 where staying attached to the violinist for nine months would not only be a severe burden but would actually kill you.

• Conflict of Rights: This scenario pits your RTL against the violinist's RTL.

• Thomson's Conclusion: In this extreme case, your RTL justifies detaching yourself in self-defense, even if it results in the violinist's death. Your right to life outweighs any perceived right the violinist might have to your body when your very survival is at stake.

• Application to Abortion: This analogy applies to abortions performed when the life of the mother is endangered by the pregnancy. The mother's RTL justifies the abortion as an act of self-preservation.

Analogy 3: The Coat

• Details: Jones and Smith are fighting over a coat. Smith is the rightful owner of the coat but is losing the fight. A third party observes the situation.

• Question of Intervention: Does the third party have a right to intervene?

• Thomson's Conclusion: Yes, a third party does have a right to intervene because Smith is the rightful owner of the coat. The third party is justified in helping Smith assert his right to his property.

• Application to Abortion: This analogy suggests that if a pregnant woman has a right to decide what happens to her body (akin to Smith's right of ownership), then third parties (such as physicians or the state) have a moral right to perform or allow abortions, respecting her bodily autonomy.

Analogies 4a and 4b: Interpreting the Right to Life

Thomson’s Fonda Analogies (4a and 4b)

The Thought Experiment

• You are sick and about to die.

• The cool touch of Henry Fonda’s hand will heal you.

Case 4a:

• Henry Fonda is far away, not in your part of the country.

• He refuses to travel to heal you.

• Analysis: Fonda has not violated your rights by not traveling to you.

Case 4b:

• Henry Fonda is right outside the hall.

• He refuses to come in and touch your hand.

• Analysis: Here, it seems he would be unjust if he refused to heal you.

The Question

What does the difference between 4a and 4b show us about what a right to life entails?

Three Possible Interpretations of a Right to Life

(A) Right to the Bare Minimum for Survival

• Interpretation: Your right to life gives you a right to whatever is the bare minimum you need to survive.

• Problem: If this were true, then in Case 4a, you would have a right to Fonda’s touch even if he had to travel across the country.

• But intuitively, that seems false — his refusal is not a violation of your rights.

• Therefore: (A) is too strong.

(B) Right Not to Be Killed by Anyone

• Interpretation: A right to life means no one may actively kill you.

• Problem: In Case 4b, Fonda does not kill you — he merely refuses to save you.

• But it still feels unjust. So (B) is too weak.

(C) Right Not to Be Killed Unjustly

• Interpretation: A right to life means a right not to be killed unjustly (rather than a right to be provided with whatever sustains life).

• Why this works:

  • In 4a: No injustice if Fonda refuses (he has no obligation to cross the country).

  • In 4b: His refusal would be unjust, but not because of your “bare minimum right to life.”

  • Instead, his obligation in 4b comes from something beyond the right to life — perhaps proximity, relationship, or moral decency.

Connection to Abortion

• If a fetus’s right to life meant a right to the bare minimum needed to live (A), then abortion would always be unjust, because the fetus’s “bare minimum” is the use of the mother’s body.

• If it just meant a right not to be killed (B), that wouldn’t explain why some abortions could still be unjust (e.g., killing without cause).

• Thomson concludes: the right to life must mean the right not to be killed unjustly (C).

  • Abortion is not automatically unjust killing.

  • Whether it is unjust depends on whether the fetus actually has a rightful claim to the mother’s body (which she denies in many cases).

Summary Table

Thomson’s Chocolates Analogies (5a and 5b)

The Setup

• Imagine two brothers and a box of chocolates.

• Question: Does the second brother have a right to some of the chocolates?

• Thomson uses this analogy to probe what we mean when we say someone has a right to life — does that mean a right not to be killed, or a right to be provided with what is necessary for survival?

5a. Joint Gift

• Scenario: The box of chocolates was given to both brothers jointly.

• Refusal: One brother refuses to share and keeps the box all to himself.

Moral Interpretation

• Since the chocolates were a joint gift, the second brother does have a right to some of them.

• The first brother wrongs him by withholding them.

Applied to Abortion

• If life-support (the use of the mother’s body) were something the fetus had an equal right to by default, then withholding it would be like wrongfully depriving a sibling of their chocolates.

• But is that the correct way to frame the fetus’s “right to life”?

5b. Individual Gift

• Scenario: The box of chocolates was given only to one brother.

• Refusal: He refuses to share with the other.

Moral Interpretation

• Here, the brother who did not receive the chocolates has no right to them.

• It may be selfish or unkind for the other not to share, but it’s not unjust or a violation of rights.

Applied to Abortion

• If the use of the mother’s body belongs to her alone — like chocolates given solely to her — then the fetus does not have an automatic right to that use.

• Refusing to provide bodily support (via abortion) may be uncharitable, but it is not a violation of rights.

Thomson’s Larger Point

• People ought to be minimally decent Samaritans, but the rights of another person don’t generate a requirement of a higher standard of obligatory personal sacrifice.

• You only need to remain attached to the violinist for one hour

• The “right to life” should not be understood as the right to be given whatever you need to stay alive (like someone else’s body, or someone else’s chocolates).

• Instead, it is better understood as the right not to be unjustly killed.

• In pregnancy, abortion may end the fetus’s life, but not all killings are unjust killings — if the fetus had no rightful claim to the mother’s body in the first place, abortion is not an injustice.

• Social contract theory: Moral obligations come about through contract/agreement which can be explicit or implicit. This can be applied to Thompson’s theory in that if a woman hopes to have a baby, she has conceded the rights to her body because it’s implied. Terminating it at that point is like a breach of contract.

• Laws forbidding abortion demand that women become super samaritans to do “supererogatory actions.”

Critiques of Thomson’s Defense of Abortion

1. Utilitarian Reply to the Violinist Case

• Thomson’s point: You are not obligated to stay plugged into the violinist — doing so would be generous but not required.

• Utilitarian critique:

  • From a utilitarian perspective, what matters is maximizing overall well-being, not strictly rights.

  • If staying plugged in for 9 months saves one life (the violinist’s) at the cost of some inconvenience or discomfort to you, then utilitarianism might argue you should remain connected.

  • The sacrifice of liberty or bodily autonomy may be outweighed by the benefit of saving a life.

• Tension:

  • Thomson grounds her argument in rights-based reasoning (bodily autonomy), whereas utilitarianism emphasizes outcomes.

  • Thus, a utilitarian may say abortion is often morally wrong if the loss of fetal life outweighs the burdens on the mother.

2. Kant and the Violinist

• Kantian ethics emphasizes duty and the categorical imperative:

  • Treat humanity, whether in yourself or another, always as an end, never merely as a means.

• Kantian critique:

  • By unplugging, you may be treating the violinist merely as a burden, not respecting his inherent dignity.

  • Kant might say you have a duty of beneficence to help others when you can do so without unreasonable sacrifice.

  • Some interpretations: continuing the pregnancy could be seen as a duty not to instrumentalize or discard the fetus’s humanity.

• Counterpoint:

  • Other Kantians argue that forcing someone to remain plugged in would also treat them as a mere means — violating the mother’s autonomy.

  • So the Kantian framework is contested: does it emphasize duties of aid, or duties of respecting autonomy?

3. Kinship Matters?

• Critique: The violinist is a stranger, whereas pregnancy involves a unique kinship relationship (mother and child).

• Implication:

  • Parents often have special moral obligations toward their children that they do not have toward strangers.

  • For example: a mother may be morally required to feed and care for her newborn, not because of “rights to life” in the abstract, but because of her parental role.

  • Thus, critics argue Thomson’s analogy fails, because it compares pregnancy to a case involving a stranger, ignoring the moral weight of family ties.

• Counterpoint (Thomson): She acknowledges kinship may increase obligations but insists it doesn’t automatically erase bodily autonomy.

4. Directly Killing vs. Letting Die (Active vs. Passive Killing)

• Thomson’s view: Abortion = unplugging from the violinist. It is refusing life support, not unjust killing.

• Critique:

  • Abortion often involves directly killing the fetus (e.g., dismemberment, lethal injection), not just passively letting it die.

  • In the violinist case, unplugging is withdrawing aid (letting die), not actively killing.

  • Many hold a strong moral distinction between active killing and passive letting die.

• Implication:

  • If abortion counts as active killing, then it may be morally worse than Thomson’s analogy suggests.

• Counterpoint:

  • Some ethicists argue the distinction is morally weak; withdrawing life support and giving a lethal injection may be equivalent if the result (death) and justification are the same.

  • But critics maintain the distinction is widely recognized and intuitively important.