The article, "Military Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think)" by Daniel W. Drezner, explores the relationship between military dominance and economic benefits in the context of U.S. national security, particularly following the Great Recession. Drezner argues that while military primacy has been foundational for U.S. global influence, its economic dividends may be overstated.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the fiscal situation of the United States deteriorated significantly, with the debt-to-GDP ratio more than doubling. Critics of defense spending emerged as budgetary constraints intensified, particularly as U.S. military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan decreased. Fiscal conservatives see targeting the defense budget as a rational response to these economic pressures, arguing that despite extensive military spending, security threats have diminished, and that the U.S. maintains an overwhelming military advantage.
The U.S. federal government allocated over $685 billion for defense in the fiscal year 2013, with total military-related expenditures exceeding $725 billion when including intelligence and nuclear forces.
Historical military engagements are cited as having contributed to the overspending and ongoing concerns about national debt worsening security implications.
Drezner evaluates whether possessing military primacy truly yields significant economic advantages. He identifies three main arguments for this link:
Geo-economic Favoritism: The idea that military strength attracts foreign investment.
Geopolitical Favoritism: The concept where security partnerships lead allies to economically support the U.S.
Public Goods Benefits: Stability and economic benefits generated by U.S. military presence worldwide.
The premise of geo-economic favoritism hinges on the belief that U.S. military prowess translates to market confidence, thereby attracting investment. However, Drezner highlights empirical evidence suggesting that it is actually economic strength that often underpins military capacity rather than vice versa. Military force does provide some degree of security which may enable economic activity, but claims that military primacy is a fundamental prerequisite for attracting investment lack robust support.
Geopolitical favoritism posits that allies will provide economic support to the U.S. due to its military umbrella. There are historical examples of nations offering financial support in return for defense, such as during the Gulf War. Nonetheless, Drezner notes that while this may hold true in bipolar contexts, it appears less effective under unipolar conditions where dependencies and motivations differ markedly, particularly in the post-Cold War era.
The public goods argument suggests that U.S. military primacy leads to a more stable and prosperous global economy by maintaining order and reducing conflicts. Drezner asserts that military superiority can stabilize regions, encouraging trade and reducing barriers; however, it does not guarantee direct economic benefits, particularly in the absence of economic primacy.
Drezner contends that while military predominance certainly confers political and strategic advantages, overreliance on military solutions can be detrimental in the long term. The law of diminishing returns indicates that excessive military investment could detract from other sources of power necessary for U.S. global leadership. Effective foreign policy should focus on rejuvenating the economy and fostering innovation rather than merely maintaining military dominance.
The article concludes that the anticipated benefits of U.S. military hegemony are often overstated and paradoxical. Policymakers arguing for continued high levels of military expenditure may overlook the integral connections between economic health and national security. While military strength does provide certain advantages, achieving a balance between military and economic strategies is crucial for the future stability and prosperity of the United States, especially amid growing challenges from countries like China.