Filer v. Adams Case Notes

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York

### Case Overview

Case Name: Andrea FILER et al., Respondents, v. Megan ADAMS, Appellant.

Case Number: 515403

Date: May 30, 2013

Synopsis

• A horserider and her husband filed an action against a jogger, claiming the jogger's dogs barked and caused the horse to bolt, leading to the horserider's injuries.

• The incident occurred on a public highway.

• The Supreme Court initially denied the jogger's motion for summary judgment.

• The Appellate Division reversed this decision.

Holdings

1. The doctrine of primary assumption of risk did not apply to shield the jogger from liability.

2. The horserider was required to bring a claim for strict liability, not ordinary negligence, to recover for injuries caused by the dogs' barking.

3. The jogger did not breach any duty to the horserider to minimize the reaction of the horse to the jogger's presence.

Key Points

Assumption of Risk

• The doctrine of primary assumption of risk was deemed inapplicable in this scenario.

• This doctrine is typically reserved for specific athletic or recreational activities.

• In this case, the horserider was not engaged in a qualified activity sponsored or supported by the jogger.

• The injury did not occur in a designated athletic or recreational venue.

Negligence and Strict Liability

• A claim for ordinary negligence does not apply to the owner of a domestic animal (like a dog) that causes injury.

• The only viable claim is for strict liability.

• To establish strict liability, there must be evidence that the animal's owner had prior knowledge of its vicious propensities. This is governed by McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 108(7).

• Strict liability, rather than ordinary negligence, is the appropriate claim even if the claim is based on the owner's negligence in not preventing the dogs from barking or being unleashed.

Application to the Case

• The horserider was required to bring a claim for strict liability against the jogger because the injuries were allegedly caused by the dogs' barking.

• The jogger's alleged failure to leash her dogs was not the proximate cause of the horserider's fall.

• There was no evidence that the dogs ran away from the jogger or came into contact with the horse or horserider.

• It wasn't shown that the leashes would have prevented the barking, which was the alleged trigger for the horse's reaction.

Duty of Care

• The court found that the jogger did not breach any duty to the horserider to minimize the horse's reaction to her presence.

• The jogger, having no prior experience with horses, slowed down to assess the situation.

• She was still 50 yards away when the horserider lost control of the horse.

Legal Arguments

• The defense of primary assumption of risk was a central focus.

• The court determined that this defense did not apply because the horseriding activity was not sponsored or supported by the jogger and did not occur in a specified athletic or recreational venue.

• Because the primary assumption of risk doesn't apply, the defendant remains potentially liable for the plaintiff's injury.

• Comparative negligence CPLR 1411 may operate to reduce the plaintiff's recovery based on her own conduct.

• The court referenced several cases to support its reasoning, including:

  • Trupia v. Lake George Cent. School Dist., 14 N.Y.3d 392, 395, 901 N.Y.S.2d 127, 927 N.E.2d 547 [2010]

  • Custodi v. Town of Amherst, 20 N.Y.3d 83, 88, 957 N.Y.S.2d 268, 980 N.E.2d 933 [2012]

  • Roe v. Keane Stud Farm, 261 A.D.2d at 801, 690 N.Y.S.2d 336

Negligence Claim

• The court stated that a cause of action for ordinary negligence does not lie against the owner of a domestic animal which causes injury.

• The only viable claim is for strict liability.

• This requires evidence that the animal's owner had notice of its vicious propensities.

• This principle applies where the plaintiffs' claim is grounded in the defendant's alleged negligence in not preventing her dogs from barking or allowing them to be unleashed.

• The plaintiffs did not allege that the defendant should be strictly liable for the injuries caused by the barking actions of her dog or that the defendant had knowledge of any vicious propensities on the part of her dogs.

Proximate Cause

• There was no evidence to prove that the defendant's failure to leash her dogs was a proximate cause of the accident.

• The plaintiff did not claim the dogs ran away from the defendant, came into contact with the horses or plaintiff, or that the horses were aware the dogs lacked leashes.

• It wasn't demonstrated that leashes would have prevented the dog from barking.

Duty to Minimize Reaction

• The court addressed whether the defendant had a duty to take efforts to minimize the reaction of the plaintiff's horses to her presence.

• The court found that the plaintiffs had not alleged any facts from which it could be concluded that the defendant breached any such duty.

• The court stated that the mere act of walking in close proximity to an unknown horse does not present an issue of negligence as a matter of law.

• The defendant was walking on a public highway, where she had every right to be, according to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1156[b].

• She slowed down to evaluate the horses and riders ahead of her and was still 50 yards away when the plaintiff and her daughter lost control of their horses.

• The court found that the plaintiffs' negligence claim fails because they alleged no facts suggesting the defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

Outcome

• The court reversed the order, granted the motion, awarded summary judgment to the defendant, and dismissed the complaint.

Here is the breakdown of the case using the IRAC method:

Issue:
Is the jogger liable for the horserider's injuries when the jogger's dogs barked and caused the horse to bolt, leading to the horserider's injuries? Does the doctrine of primary assumption of risk apply? Can the horserider bring a claim for ordinary negligence, or is a claim for strict liability required?

Rule:

1. The doctrine of primary assumption of risk typically applies to specific athletic or recreational activities.

2. A claim for ordinary negligence does not apply to the owner of a domestic animal (like a dog) that causes injury; the only viable claim is for strict liability.

3. To establish strict liability, there must be evidence that the animal's owner had prior knowledge of its vicious propensities, as governed by McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 108(7).

4. The defendant must have breached a duty of care, and that breach must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

Application:

1. The doctrine of primary assumption of risk does not apply because the horserider was not engaged in a qualified activity sponsored or supported by the jogger, and the injury did not occur in a designated athletic or recreational venue.

2. The horserider was required to bring a claim for strict liability against the jogger because the injuries were allegedly caused by the dogs' barking. However, the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendant should be strictly liable for the injuries caused by the barking actions of her dog or that the defendant had knowledge of any vicious propensities on the part of her dogs.

3. There was no evidence to prove that the jogger's failure to leash her dogs was a proximate cause of the accident. It wasn't demonstrated that leashes would have prevented the dog from barking.

4. The jogger did not breach any duty to the horserider to minimize the horse's reaction to her presence. She slowed down to assess the situation and was still 50 yards away when the horserider lost control of the horse.

Conclusion:
The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court's decision, granted the motion for summary judgment to the jogger, and dismissed the complaint. The jogger is not liable for the

horserider's injuries because the doctrine of primary assumption of risk does not apply, the horserider was required to bring a claim for strict liability (which they did not properly do), there was no evidence of proximate cause, and the jogger did not breach any duty of care.