Smart Power, Security, and the Return of History

The Return of History, US Hegemony, and Smart Power

Guiding Questions

• What is meant by the “return of history”?

• How is US hegemony tied to this concept?

• What challenges exist to US hegemony in the short and long term?

• How do authoritarian capitalism and information insecurity/cyberwarfare relate to this concept?

• What does a “smart power” strategy look like?

The Return of History?

• Kagan (2007):

  • In the 1990s, the 'end of history' concept resonated, fostering institutions and ideas promoting liberal democracy. This concept, popularized by Francis Fukuyama, suggested that with the fall of the Soviet Union, liberal democracy had emerged as the final form of human government.

  • This made sense when China and Russia were liberalizing, embracing aspects of market economies and showing tentative steps toward political openness.

  • Now witnessing a “return to history,” suggesting that the assumptions of the 1990s are no longer valid and that older patterns of great power competition and ideological struggle are re-emerging.

  • The US remains the dominant power but faces challenges to its unipolar stance.

  • Power is returning to relevance as a key factor in international relations. States are increasingly focused on their relative power and influence.

  • Nations deemed “strong” and regional powers jockeying for position, seeking to maximize their influence in their respective regions and globally.

  • There is a struggle between: liberalism and authoritarianism, reflecting fundamental disagreements about the best way to organize societies and govern.

  • There is a struggle between: modernity and traditionalism, highlighting tensions between secular, progressive values and more conservative, religious-based worldviews.

  • Authoritarian capitalism challenges liberal democracy by presenting a viable alternative model for economic development and political control.

The End of Dreams?

• Kagan (2007):

  • 1990s idealism is dissipating, witnessing a “return to history and the end of dreams.” The optimism that characterized the immediate post-Cold War era is fading as new challenges and threats emerge.

  • US hegemony is critical to ensure rivalries do not run rampant. Without US leadership, regional conflicts could escalate and destabilize the international system.

  • The US remains indispensable in international politics, playing a crucial role in maintaining peace, promoting economic stability, and addressing global challenges.

• Nye (2011):

  • “Return to history” is often associated with talk of US decline, as some analysts believe that the rise of new powers and challenges signals a weakening of US influence.

  • Usually linked to:

    • The rise of new military powers, such as China and Russia, which are modernizing their armed forces and asserting their interests more aggressively.

    • The rise of an alternative to liberal democracy (e.g., authoritarian capitalism), which offers a different model for development and governance that appeals to some countries.

    • The rise of new warfare techniques, such as cyberwarfare, which can be used to disrupt critical infrastructure and undermine national security.

Power Transition Theory

• Is the US in decline? The jury is still out, with experts offering different perspectives on the trajectory of US power.

• Organski (1968):

  • Predicted world leadership would pass from the US to China, based on the latter's rapid economic growth and increasing military capabilities.

  • China’s rise would provoke conflict, as rising powers often challenge the existing hegemon for dominance.

  • Formed the basis of power transition theory:

    • Conflict is likely when the most powerful state is challenged by a second-ranked state. This theory suggests that periods of power transition are particularly dangerous and prone to conflict.

US Decline? Not So Fast…

• Gelb (2009):

  • US leadership is still key for solving international problems but is in decline from within (e.g., deteriorating infrastructure, underfunded schools, deadlocked political system, etc.). These domestic challenges weaken the US's ability to project power and influence abroad.

  • It is NOT threatened from outside, as no other country currently possesses the economic, military, and cultural resources to replace the US as the global hegemon.

  • Weakening economic competitiveness and political deadlock are to blame for the internal decline.

  • The US is a debtor nation, with a large national debt that constrains its ability to invest in its future.

  • Republicans and Democrats do not cooperate, leading to political gridlock and an inability to address critical challenges.

  • “Demons of ideology, politics, and arrogance” are to blame:

    • Democrats are too afraid of looking weak and will not challenge the status quo.

    • Republicans engage in swaggering and are unwilling to accept facts and reality.

Decline? Not So Fast…

• Nye (2011):

  • The US is the pre-eminent power for the foreseeable future, despite the challenges it faces.

  • Must differentiate between relative and absolute decline. Relative decline refers to a decrease in US power relative to other countries, while absolute decline refers to an overall weakening of US capabilities. The latter is more problematic.

  • Rot “from within” is more likely than a challenge from outside. Internal problems, such as economic inequality and political polarization, pose a greater threat to US power than external rivals.

  • The US is more robust than described, with a resilient economy, strong military, and vibrant civil society.

  • Political revitalization is likely, as the US has a history of overcoming challenges and reinventing itself.

  • There are no real external challengers that can match the US's overall power and influence.

Return of History? Authoritarian Capitalism

• Gat (2007):

  • “End of history” posited no alternative to liberal democracy and capitalism, suggesting that these were the only viable models for development and governance.

  • Suggests something intrinsic to both dispatched its alternatives. The perceived superiority of liberal democracy and capitalism led to the decline of alternative ideologies.

  • Totalitarian ideologies fell for a number of reasons, including their inherent flaws and their inability to deliver economic prosperity and political freedom.

  • US advantages (i.e., power) are critical for the advancement of capitalism and liberal democracy, as the US provides security, promotes free trade, and supports democratic values around the world.

  • Liberal democracy is facing challenges from political alternatives, such as authoritarian capitalism, which offer a different vision of modernity.

  • Enter authoritarian capitalism, a system that combines strong state control with market-based economics.

Return of History? Authoritarian Capitalism

• Gat (2007):

  • It is not “a given” that autocracies with advanced economies will democratize. Some authoritarian regimes have been able to maintain power while achieving significant economic growth.

  • Creates an alternative vision of modernity that could resonate given recent economic crises in the West. The economic success of some authoritarian countries may lead others to question the necessity of democracy for prosperity.

  • The appeal of liberal democracy is tied to US success. If the US is seen as declining, the appeal of its political system may also diminish.

  • If the US weakens, the appeal of liberal democracy weakens, potentially leading other countries to embrace alternative models of governance.

Return of History? Authoritarian Capitalism

• Nye (2011):

  • Contends that authoritarian capitalism does not really challenge US hegemony, as these regimes lack the values and institutions to become true global leaders.

  • BRICs can frustrate US foreign policy goals BUT lack the ability (and/or desire) to challenge the US. While these countries may have different interests and priorities than the US, they are not necessarily seeking to overthrow the existing international order.

  • Authoritarian regimes lack the soft power to provide a real alternative to the US. Soft power, which includes cultural influence and ideological appeal, is essential for global leadership.

  • Democratic regimes lack the incentive to provide a real alternative to the United States, as they generally share similar values and interests.

Information Security

• Reveron and Mahoney Norris (2018):

  • Advancements in communications technology create opportunities for states, international organizations, and citizens, enabling greater connectivity and access to information.

  • Growing dependence on information environment/cyberdomain also creates concerns over information security, as critical infrastructure and sensitive data become vulnerable to attack.

  • Information security: The presence of a secure cyber-environment for citizens, ensuring that individuals can safely access and use online resources.

Information Security

• Reveron and Mahoney Norris (2018):

  • The post-Cold War era creates new challenges as new actors threaten information security.

    • Criminal networks use the cyberdomain to steal identities and engage in fraud, causing significant economic damage and eroding trust in online systems.

    • Hackers/hacktivists can hack into databases to gain access to privileged information, which can be used for political purposes or sold for profit.

    • Terrorist organizations use the cyberdomain to spread narratives and mobilize recruits, using social media and other online platforms to spread propaganda and incite violence.

    • States use the cyberdomain to engage in espionage and cyberwarfare, seeking to gain a strategic advantage over their rivals.

    • States use the cyberdomain to make sure critical infrastructure functions, protecting essential services such as power grids and water supplies from cyberattacks.

  • Impacts economic transactions, natural resources, weapons systems, etc., as all of these are increasingly reliant on digital systems.

  • Ensures that information security is increasingly tied to national security, as cyberattacks can have devastating consequences for a country's economy, military, and critical infrastructure.

Return of History? Cyberwarfare

• Nye (2011):

  • The cyberdomain “is unique in that it is human-made, recent, and subject to even more rapid technological changes than other domains.” This creates both opportunities and challenges for states.

  • States have to be concerned with cyberpower, as the ability to control and manipulate information becomes increasingly important in international relations.

  • States shape the cyberdomain, BUT dependence creates vulnerabilities, as reliance on digital systems makes countries susceptible to cyberattacks.

  • Given the ease of access and low cost of entry, the cyberdomain allows non-state actors (and weak states) to play a large role in international politics at a relatively low cost as strong state monopoly over the use of force is absent in cyberwarfare. This can challenge the traditional dominance of powerful states.

  • Does cyberwarfare weaken great powers? The answer is complex, as cyberattacks can be both a threat and an opportunity for great powers.

Cyberwarfare

• Arquilla (2012):

  • Not (currently) a proxy for traditional conflict but can have devastating effects (e.g., 2007 cyberattacks against Estonia, 2008 Russian/Georgian conflict, 2010 Stuxnet attacks against Iran, etc.). These examples demonstrate the potential of cyberattacks to disrupt critical infrastructure and undermine national security.

  • Cyberattacks could cripple the military/economy by disrupting communication networks, disabling weapons systems, and stealing sensitive data.

  • Classified as a “war fighting domain” by the US Department of Defense, recognizing the importance of cyberwarfare in modern conflict.

  • NOT definitive in and of itself, but the attacker can remain anonymous and cannot be “punished”. This makes it difficult to deter cyberattacks and hold perpetrators accountable.

Cyberwarfare

• Arquilla (2012):

  • Given increased dependence on technology, it is likely to “scale up”, becoming an increasingly important aspect of international conflict.

  • Already observe a propensity for conflict using social media, as states and non-state actors use social media to spread propaganda, incite violence, and interfere in elections.

  • Cyberattacks favor offense; defense is always playing catch up, as attackers are constantly developing new techniques to exploit vulnerabilities in computer systems.

  • Defense requires recognizing threat and pre-emptive action, identifying potential vulnerabilities and taking steps to mitigate them before an attack occurs.

  • State agreements may be useful but would not limit non-state actors, as these actors are not bound by international law and may be difficult to track and punish.

Not So Fast…

• Rid (2012):

  • Cyberwarfare is more hype than reality, with the potential consequences of cyberattacks often being exaggerated.

  • War must be “potentially violent, purposeful, and political”. Cyberattacks may not always meet these criteria.

  • May be a nuisance but does not meet traditional definitions of attacks, as they may not cause physical damage or result in loss of life.

  • The anonymity of the attacker further weakens the case for cyberwarfare, as it makes it difficult to attribute attacks and hold perpetrators accountable.

Not So Fast…

• Rid (2012):

  • Fears that cyberattacks will “scale up” are overblown; very difficult to mount, requiring significant resources and expertise.

  • Cybersecurity is always being strengthened, making it more difficult for attackers to penetrate computer systems.

  • Cyberattacks do not incur massive collateral damage, as they typically target specific systems or data.

  • Loss of human life has not been proven, as cyberattacks have not yet resulted in widespread casualties.

  • Viruses tend to focus only on the target; ignore other electronic resources, limiting the potential for widespread disruption.

  • Cyberwarfare does NOT favor the offense, as defense can be highly effective in protecting computer systems.

  • Requires skill and resources, and threats to replicate are not credible. Not all actors have the ability to launch sophisticated cyberattacks.

  • International agreements could backfire, as they may be used by countries to restrict internet freedom.

  • Used by autocracies to stifle free speech rather than prevent future attacks, using cybersecurity as a pretext for censoring dissent.

Conclusions: The Return of History and US Hegemony

• Kagan (2007):

  • “Return to history” focuses on whether “power matters” in the current context. Are states still the primary actors in international relations, or are non-state actors becoming more important?

• Nye (2007):

  • “Return to history” is linked to external challenges to US hegemony, systemic alternatives to liberal democracy, and/or the rise of new warfare techniques that weaken the role states play in international politics. These factors could all contribute to a decline in US power and influence.

Conclusions: The Return of History and US Hegemony

• US hegemony is central to explaining the post-Cold War international context, shaping the global economy, promoting democracy, and maintaining peace.

• Critical for international security and the global economy, providing a stable framework for trade and investment.

• Critical for avoiding:

  • Balancing against the West, as other countries may seek to counter US power if they feel threatened.

  • Alternatives to liberal democracy, as authoritarian regimes may seek to challenge the dominance of democratic values.

  • Weakness from cyberattacks, as cyberwarfare could undermine US power and influence.

• The “end of hegemony” would definitely impact international politics, potentially leading to a more multipolar world with increased competition and conflict.

• Gelb (2009):

  • The US cannot perform all of its “required” roles in this new international context if it does not engage in internal reform, addressing its economic, political, and social challenges.

Conclusions: American Decline? Not So Fast…

• Nye (2011):

  • Any discussion of post-Cold War international politics and US hegemony requires an understanding of power in the current era, recognizing the importance of both hard and soft power.

  • The US has no military rivals that can match its overall capabilities.

  • BUT must worry about non-state actors and ideas, as these can pose a significant threat to US security and influence.

  • US immigration policy, economic growth, and university system enhance its soft power, making the US an attractive destination for talented people from around the world.

  • Competitors have economic + political impediments which “complicate” rise. These challenges may prevent them from fully realizing their potential.

  • Combining hard power resources while enhancing soft power resources (i.e., smart power) is key for maintaining hegemony, using both military and economic strength as well as cultural and diplomatic influence.

Conclusions: Smart Power in the Post-Cold War Era

• Nye (2011):

  • “Smart power” grand strategies require knowing when (and how) to use hard, soft, and “smart” power, using a combination of tools to achieve foreign policy goals.

  • Grand strategy: How to provide for security, welfare, and identity, setting priorities and allocating resources to achieve national objectives.

  • Smart power strategies are not confined to the US, as other countries can also use a combination of hard and soft power to advance their interests.

  • Small states: Singapore, Switzerland, Qatar, which have used smart power strategies to achieve economic prosperity and political influence.

  • Rising states: Bismarck’s Prussia, Japan post Meiji, China under Mao, which have used smart power strategies to transform their societies and become major players on the world stage.

  • How the US wields power has internal consequences AND systemic ramifications, affecting both its own society and the international system.

Conclusions: Smart Power in the Post-Cold War Era

• Nye (2011):

  • Smart power strategies answer five questions:

    1. What goals/outcomes are preferred? Recognize the tradeoffs which exist and the structure of relations between different actors.

    2. What resources are available and in which contexts? Assess the strengths and weaknesses of different tools of power.

    3. What are the preferences of the targets? Understand the motivations and interests of those you are trying to influence.

    4. Which forms of power behavior are most likely to succeed? Must understand context and tailor your approach to the specific situation.

    5. What is the probability of success? Weigh the risks and benefits of different courses of action.

• Gelb (2009):

  • Smart power is just “sou