February 1945: Yalta Conference had set tentative post-war arrangements.
Germany & Berlin temporarily partitioned into occupation zones.
Promise of “free elections” in Eastern Europe—soon contested.
Two immediate, game-changing developments as the war closes:
Death of Franklin D. Roosevelt (April 12, 1945) → Vice-President Harry S. Truman becomes president.
Truman had served as VP only since January 1945; met FDR just 2 times (one strictly a photo-op).
Unbriefed on major secrets; unaware of the Manhattan Project until assuming office.
Final collapse of Nazi Germany → unconditional surrender (May 8, 1945).
Lack of preparation → initially “blind” on foreign policy.
Immediately exposed to competing views inside Washington:
Hard-liners (military & civilian) argue FDR “appeased” Stalin, “gave away” Eastern Europe.
They counsel: “No further compromises, no negotiations.”
Truman adopts this hard-line posture, accelerating Cold War tensions.
Location: Potsdam (suburb of Berlin) inside defeated Germany.
Initial participants:
Winston Churchill (UK), Harry Truman (USA), Joseph Stalin (USSR).
Mid-conference UK election: Churchill replaced by Clement Attlee (Labour Party).
Key issues & confrontations:
Trinity Test success (July 16, 1945) secretly relayed to Truman during sessions.
Confirms viability of the atomic bomb; perceived by Truman as diplomatic “ace in the hole.”
Further reduces U.S. incentive to seek Soviet aid against Japan.
Eastern Europe: Truman demands “immediate free elections” in Poland & others; Stalin refuses, stating: “Any freely elected gov’t would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot allow.”
Atmosphere: Heated arguments, mutual suspicion, Soviet eavesdropping (bugged rooms).
Outcomes/Failures:
No major issues resolved; conference ends in stalemate.
Truman cancels Lend-Lease shipments to USSR—symbolic rupture.
Military demobilization begins—Truman views the bomb as force multiplier.
Bombings of Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) & Nagasaki (August 9, 1945):
Originally planned invasion → estimated 1,000,000 Allied casualties.
Additional motive: end war before Soviet entry; secure U.S. control over post-war Japan.
Post-war policy:
Refusal to share nuclear secrets with the U.N.
U.S. maintains monopoly until Soviet test (August 29, 1949).
Onset of nuclear arms race → increasingly powerful warheads stationed across Europe & USSR.
George F. Kennan—U.S. chargé d’affaires in Moscow.
The “Long Telegram” (February 1946, 8,000 words):
Diagnoses Soviet behavior:
Driven by profound, “almost paranoid” fear of encirclement by capitalist West.
Communism likened to a fanatical religion—appeals to poor, war-ravaged societies.
Prescription: CONTAINMENT.
Economic aid as primary tool (stabilize societies → sap communist appeal).
Diplomacy/negotiation second.
Military action last-resort.
Kennan’s analysis impresses State Dept. & Truman, becoming cornerstone of U.S. grand strategy.
Context: Greek Civil War (1946–1949) – communists vs. royalist/nationalists.
Truman’s address to Congress:
“It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.”
Never names USSR/communism, but implication clear.
Implementation:
Immediate \approx400,000,000 in aid to Greece & Turkey.
Outcome: By 1949, anti-communist forces prevail in Greece → early proof that economic/military aid could “contain” communism.
Architect: Secretary of State George C. Marshall.
Rationale:
War-torn Europe = breeding ground for communist parties (even in France, Italy, Belgium).
Rebuild economies → restore hope, blunt radical appeal.
Mechanics:
Low-interest loans / grants, with encouragement to purchase U.S. goods.
Total disbursed: \approx13,000,000,000 ( \sim \$130 billion in today’s dollars).
Visible results:
Dramatic urban reconstruction (e.g., Stuttgart pre-1945 rubble vs. vibrant 1955 cityscape).
GDP growth, industrial output rebound across Western Europe.
Soviet reaction:
Stalin forbids Eastern bloc participation; sees plan as capitalist infiltration & a revived Germany threat.
Solidifies East–West divide.
Background partitions (Yalta):
Germany split: East (USSR) vs. West (USA/UK/France).
Berlin, deep inside East Germany, similarly split into East Berlin vs. West Berlin (tri-zone enclave).
Trigger: West consolidates zones into proto-West Germany & extends Marshall Plan aid.
Soviet move (June 24, 1948): Land blockade—rail & road access to West Berlin severed; goal: force Western evacuation or capitulation.
Truman’s response: Berlin Airlift (“Operation Vittles”).
Continuous U.S./UK flights from West Germany deliver food, coal, medicine.
At peak: one plane lands every 45 seconds.
Duration: \approx 11 months; 2.3 million tons of supplies.
Outcome: May 12, 1949 USSR lifts blockade; West Berlin remains an “island of freedom.”
Crisis demonstrates risk of escalation; both sides avoid direct military clash.
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) formed April 4, 1949.
Members: USA, Canada, UK, France, Benelux, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, later Greece & Turkey.
Article 5: attack on one = attack on all.
Warsaw Pact established May 14, 1955.
USSR + Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania (initially).
Practical effect: Europe locked into two antagonistic, heavily armed blocs.
Soviet A-bomb test (RDS-1) at Semipalatinsk—August 29, 1949.
U.S. reaction: accelerate thermonuclear (H-bomb) research → Ivy Mike test (November 1, 1952).
USSR answers with own H-bomb (August 12, 1953).
Doctrine of “Massive Retaliation” emerges—nuclear threat substitutes for large conventional forces.
Atomic monopoly vs. sharing with UN: Truman chooses secrecy, fueling mistrust.
Debate over bomb timing: Did U.S. rush strikes in Japan to pre-empt Soviet influence?
Containment’s moral burden: supporting “free peoples” sometimes entails backing authoritarian, but anti-communist, regimes.
Arms race paradox: weapons intended to deter war also raise stakes of any confrontation.
Containment becomes through-line for Cold War conflicts: Korea ( 1950–1953 ), Vietnam ( escalates 1960s ), interventions in Latin America, Middle East, Africa.
Economic aid as foreign-policy tool: Marshall Plan prototype for later programs (Point Four, Alliance for Progress, USAID).
Institutional architecture (NATO, NSC, CIA) created in late 1940s underpins U.S. security state for decades.
Long-term European integration (OEEC → OECD, ECSC → EU) partly seeded by Marshall funds.