Duty One-Liners:
Donoghue v Stevenson (1932)
– established Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle
Caparo v Dickman (1990)
– proximity, foreseeability and equitability indicate a duty
McLoughlin v O’Brian (1983)
- proximity is not solely about time & distance but also legal relationship
Bourhill v Young (1943)
- injury to miscarrying claimant was not foreseeable by an ordinary person
Haley v London Electricity Board (1964)
- injury to blind claimant was foreseeable by an ordinary person
Mulcahy v Ministry of Defence (1996)
- imposing a duty on a soldier in an active gun battle was not equitable
Hill v Chief Constable West Yorkshire (1988)
- police do not owe a duty to protect the public through the performance of their investigation of crime
Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (1991)
- Policy can prevent a duty even where Caparo Test met, e.g. lack of funds to pay all claims
Robinson v Chief Constable West Yorkshire (2018)
- Caparo only needed for novel cases – Police owe duty where injury caused by commission
Breach One-Liners:
Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Company (1856)
Breach is judged objectively. The company performed as any other would.
Roe v Minister of Health (1954)
Breach is assessed on the state of general knowledge at the time of the act or omission
Nettleship v Weston (1971)
A learner driver must also perform to the standard of an ordinary driver
Mullin v Richards (1998)
Children are judged to the standard of the ordinary child of their age
Bolam v Frien Barnet Hospital Management Committee (1957)
Professionals are judged to the standard of a reasonable body of their profession
Bolitho v Hackney HA (1996)
The opinion of that body of the profession must not be illogical or unreasonable but challenges will be rare
Bolton v Stone (1951)
Low likelihood of injury and disproportionate cost of preventing it suggests a duty is not breached
Paris v Stepney (1951)
High risk of serious injury which can be prevented with minimal cost indicates breach
Watt v Hertfordshire County Council (1954)
Saving life and limb justifies the taking of considerable risk & suggests no breach
Causation of Damage One-Liners:
Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington (1969)
- D must be the factual cause of C’s damage. The security guard had been fatally poisoned already
The Wagon Mound No.1 (1961)
- Damage can only be caused by D if it was reasonably foreseeable – crude oil igniting at sea wasn't
Hughes v Lord Advocate (1963)
- The type of damage must be reasonably foreseeable, not how it happened – a gas lamp could burn a child somehow
Jolley v Sutton London Borough Council (2000)
- As above, the type of damage must be reasonably foreseeable, not how it happened – a derelict boat could injure children somehow
Smith v Leech Brain (1962)
- If the type of damage is reasonably foreseeable, the severity of the injury is irrelevant. A burnt lip could recover, scar or become malignant – Thin Skull
Defences to Negligence One-Liners:
Watson v Gray (1999)
Volenti requires knowing & willing consent to all harm. Anything beyond that is actionable
Smith v Baker (1891)
Following an employer's orders does not necessarily imply consent
ICI v Shatwell (1965)
Disobedience of an employer’s safety procedures does imply consent
Haynes v Harwood (1935)
A rescuer performing their “general duty” at peril to themselves does not amount to volenti
Sayers v Harlow UDC (1958)
Damages to the claimant are reduced in proportion to the role their own fault played
Froom v Butcher (1976)
Not wearing a seat belt amounted to contributory negligence representing up to 25% of loss
Jayes v IMI (Kynoch) (1985)
Contributory negligence can be 100% but this does not amount to volenti
Economic Loss One Liners
Weller & Co. v Foot & Mouth Disease Research Institute (1966)
An auctioneers lost profit was pure economic loss and could not be claimed
Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co. Ltd (1972)
For acts & omissions, only loss which is a physical consequence of the breach can be claimed
Hedley Byrne v Heller & Partners Ltd (1964)
D can be liable for misstatement where there is a special relationship and no disclaimer
Caparo v Dickman (1991)
Establishes the five requirements of a special relationship where D can be liable for misstatement
White v Jones (1995)
Solicitor owed a duty to beneficiaries of a will having assumed the responsibility of drawing up that will.
Steel v NRAM (2018)
D’s reliance on a misstatement must be proper and reasonable
Banca Nazionale v Playboy Club (2018)
There can only be a special relationship where D knows the identity of the potential C.
Chaudhry v Prabhakar (1988)
Special relationships can exist even in a social context if all the Caparo criteria are met.
McLoughlin v O’Brian [1982]
Nervous shock must be based on psychiatric illness not mere grief or distress
Page v Smith (1995)
A primary victim is physically injured or reasonably feared injury & if physical injury was reasonably foreseeable, so too was psychiatric injury automatically
Paul v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust (2024) SC
Claims can only be made for accidents. Doctors do not owe duty to 3rd parties for trauma caused by medical crises
The traumatising event need not be sudden and shocking
Alcock v CC South Yorkshire (1991)
Establishes the hearness, nearness and dearness tests to restrict claims
Chadwick v BRB (1967)
Rescuers can claim for nervous shock where they are personally in harm’s way
Attia v British Gas (1987)
If Alcock criteria are met, damage to personal property can lead to psychiatric loss
Occupiers Liability One Liners
Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd (1966)
Occupier has control not necessarily ownership & there can be more than one
Wheeler v Copas (1981)
Even a ladder could be premises
The Calgrath (1927)
Lawful visitors become trespassers if they exceed permission
Laverton v Kiapasha Takeaway Supreme (2002)
Visitors need only be kept reasonably safe, not 100% so.
Jolley v Sutton LBC (2000)
Allurement can prevent a child being a trespasser
Bourne Leisure v Marsden (2009)
To prove they are not liable for the injury to a child, occupiers need no prove the parents were negligent.
Roles v Nathan (1963)
Trades people expected to guard against risks of their profession
Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants (1983)
Fire presents unforeseeable risks which cannot always be guarded against
Haseldine v Daw (1941)
Liability can be avoided where complexity of the task makes it reasonable to contract work out
Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust (2002)
Checking the competency of a contractor extended to checking insurance, etc.
Woodward v Mayor of Hastings (1945)
Complex work could contracted out & liability avoided under s.2(4)(b)
Rae v Mars (1990)
Unusual dangers require more than just a warning sign, e.g.. a barrier
Staples v West Dorset District Council (1995)
An obvious risk requires no warning sign
Rhind v Astbury Water Park (2004)
No liability to trespassers where the risk is unknown
Higgs v Foster (2004)
No liability to trespassers where their presence is not reasonably anticipated
Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council (2003)
Danger must originate in the defective premises not the dangerous activity & preventing danger altogether must be reasonably achievable
Nuisance One Liners
Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997)
The presence of a building on land is not a nuisance unless something emanates from it and claims can only be made by those with a legal interest in land.
Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather (1994)
Damage caused by nuisance must be reasonably foreseeable
Robinson v Kilvert (1889)
Nuisance will not protect extraordinarily sensitive claimants
Sturges v Bridgman (1879)
Locality can make use of land unreasonable & coming to the nuisance is not a defence
St Helen’s Smelting v Tipping (1865)
Indirect physical damage will be a nuisance regardless of location
Halsey v Esso Petroleum (1961)
Time of day can make use of land unreasonable
Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett (1936)
A malicious motive can make the use of land unreasonable
Miller v Jackson (1977)
Coming to the nuisance is not a defence but acting in the public interest may at least avoid an injunction
Leeman v Montague (1936)
The method chosen for an activity can make the use of land unreasonable
Andreae v Selfridge (1938)
Temporary interference with enjoyment of land is not a nuisance unless the defendant fails to take reasonable steps to minimise it
Spicer v Smee (1946)
The presence of an ongoing danger on another’s land can be deemed a nuisance
Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd (1981)
If Parliament permits construction of a building for a purpose, it has permitted the activity associated with it and there is no nuisance
Wheeler v Saunders (1996)
Planning permission will only act as a defence where it expressly changes the nature of activity that is acceptable in a locality
Coventry v Lawrence (2014) SC
A victim of nuisance is prima facie entitled to an injunction but the burden then passes to the defendant to show why damages are more appropriate, e.g. planning permission, etc.
Rylands v Fletcher One Liners
Dunne v North West Gas (1964)
Thing needed to be brought onto the land for D’s own purposes.
Read v J Lyons & Co (1947)
Thing must escape from land to another’s and only damage to other land is actionable
Stannard v Gore (2012)
Fire damage, will generally only be the basis of a successful claim where the fire itself was the thing brought onto the defendant’s land
Rikards v Lothian (1913)
Unnatural use of land means to un-ordinary use as opposed to contrary to nature
Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather (1994)
The damage the escape might lead to must be reasonably foreseeable
Transco PLC v Stockport MBC (2003) HL
Danger and the “unnatural” element should be extraordinarily high or unusual for liability
Perry v Kendricks Transport Ltd (1956)
The act of a stranger can be a defence
Stage 1 – Relationship capable of vicarious liability
Ready Mixed Concrete v Ministry of Pensions (1968)
Three stage “Economic Reality” of employment = (1) wage for service, (2) control and (3) other provisions consistent with employment, e.g. PAYE, job description, etc.
Catholic Child Welfare Society v Various Claimants (2012) SC
“Christian Brothers Case”
Vicarious liability can exist in relationships “akin to employment” if two stage test met and more than one party can be vicariously liable
Cox v Ministry of Justice (2016) SC
Confirms test above and points out that furtherance of the defendant’s aims is important regardless of whether they are commercial
Stage 2 – Close connection between tort & relationship
Limpus v London General (1862)
A defendant is liable for an employee undertaking an act authorised by an employee but done in an unauthorised mode.
Lister v Hesley Hall (2001) HL
For vicarious liability to exist, a tortfeasor’s actions must be closely connected to the relationship between them and the defendant, e.g. warden cares for residents
Mohamud v W M Morrisons (2016) SC
A tortfeasor’s actions can be closely connected if they are within the field of the activity assigned to them, even if contrary to the defendant’s aims
W M Morrisons v Various Claimants (2020) SC
Where the employees unauthorised actions are solely for their own personal motive, the close connection test is not met. It is not merely causal and temporal