Broadberry, 2013

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Source: Economic History Working Papers No. 184/2013; author Stephen Broadberry; topic: Accounting for the Great Divergence.
Purpose: summarize timing and drivers of Europe–Asia divergence using historical national accounting.

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Abstract: Great Divergence timing with two Little Divergences (Europe: Britain/Holland ahead of Italy/Spain; Asia: Japan ahead of China/India).
Great Divergence caused by Japan’s slower growth from a lower base.
Key turning points: ~1348 (Black Death) and ~1500 (new European trade routes to Asia/Americas).
Explanatory framework: shocks interact with economy structure; key shocks and structural factors identified.
Shocks: Black Death (mid-14th c.) and post-1500 global trade expansion.
Structural factors: type of agriculture, female marriage age, labor market flexibility, and state institutions.

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Restates abstract; emphasis on measurement and explanation in historical accounting.
JEL classifications: N10, N30, N35, O10, O57; keywords: Great Divergence, living standards, measurement, explanation.
Acknowledges collaboration and methodological context of the Figuerola Lecture.

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Introduction: Great Divergence debate reshaped by quantitative, long-run data.
Pomeranz (Eurocentric critique) vs. revisionist California School.
Two meanings of “accounting” here: measurement and explanation.
Conclusions: revisionists exaggerate Asia’s 1800 levels; regional variation is crucial; differences within Europe (North Sea vs. Mediterranean) and within Asia (Japan vs. China/India) matter.

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Further development of the introduction: Late medieval origins and early modern divergence; regional variation within continents shapes the global picture.
Japan’s position as an intermediate case relative to Europe and foremost within Asia; Great Divergence occurs alongside Little Divergences.

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Analytical framework: divergences arise from the interaction of structural factors with shocks.
Four structural factors:
1. Structure of agriculture (pastoral vs arable).
2. Age of first marriage for females (fertility/human capital investment).
3. Flexibility of labour supply.
4. Institutions and state capacity.
Two key shocks:
- Black Death: permanent upward shift in North Sea Area incomes.
- New trade routes opening after 1500: amplified divergence.

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Measuring growth before 1870: shift from qualitative to quantitative national accounting (Maddison vs. new estimates).
Maddison’s limitations: guesstimates and sparse year coverage; many observations set at low levels.
Introduction of historical national accounting tables (Table 2 for Europe; Table 3 for Asia).

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Europe’s Little Divergence: Britain/Holland data are strongest; short-cut methods used for others.
New estimates raise medieval Europe’s per capita income; Italy/Spain start higher before 1348.
Black Death produced different responses by region; by 1800 North Sea Area incomes exceeded Italy/Spain.

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Europe: pre-1348 incomes higher in Italy/Spain than England/Holland; post-1348 reversal favors North Sea; long-run trend shows rising incomes in North Sea vs stagnation elsewhere.
Data caveat: early long-run progress characterized by reversals rather than smooth growth.

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Asia’s Little Divergence: data show upward revisions to early GDP per capita; Japan remains low in 1000s–1600s but grows steadily; Meiji era builds on prior progress.
China’s per capita GDP declines from its Song Dynasty peak; India follows a similar downward trajectory from 1600.
Japan overtakes China in the 17th century; India lags behind.

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Asia’s Little Divergence continued: North Sea Area (Britain/Holland) shows continuous upward trajectory, Japan mirrors this pattern at a lower level; China/India stagnate or decline outside Japan.
Yangzi Delta vs. Netherlands comparison suggests regional differences within China; Bengal (1760s) likely 20% of British levels in 1760s.

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The Great Divergence (synthesis): Table 4 combines Europe and Asia to locate the divergence; Japan follows North Sea Area’s path but at a lower base and slower growth, leading to a gap by 1700–1800.
Conclusion: there was a Little Divergence within Europe and within Asia, but the frontier moved faster in Europe, generating the Great Divergence.

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Implication: Great Divergence and Little Divergences co-exist; timing and scale depend on region-specific shocks and structures.
Japan’s slower catch-up explains why Great Divergence persisted even as Asia showed internal divergence.

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Beginning of explanatory section on Europe’s Little Divergence: four structural factors interact with shocks to shape outcomes.
3.1 Agriculture: North Sea Area’s pastoral, capital-intensive agriculture linked to high-value-added production and non-human energy use.
3.2 Marriage patterns: Hajnal pattern (later marriage in NW Europe) linked to lower fertility and more human capital investment.

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3.3 Labour flexibility: Industrious Revolution concept; reduction in holidays and greater work effort supported by higher incomes; increased short-run intensity, long-run capital deepening.
3.4 Institutions and state: balance between constraint on rulers and state capacity; England/Holland favor mercantile influence and tax capacity; Spain/Portugal less so.

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Continued discussion of institutional contrasts: parliamentary activity and state revenue capacity differ across regions; North Sea Area sustains high fiscal and political capacity.

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3.5 Black Death: catalyzed income gains in North Sea Area; Spain/Italy did not share the same rise due to different demographic and institutional contexts.
Álvarez-Nogal & Prados de la Escosura (2013) explain Spain’s plateau due to Reconquest frontier dynamics and land-labor ratios; Italy’s gains faded with post-1450 population growth.

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3.6 New trade routes: post-1500 long-distance trade shifts favor North Sea Area; Spain/Portugal lose relative gains; Britain/Holland benefit from institutional lead and mercantile power.

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4. Asia’s Little Divergence: agriculture in Asia less animal-oriented; marriage patterns show Japan intermediate between China/India and NW Europe.
4.2 Marriage patterns: Japan’s late but not extreme marriage age supports labor force participation in proto-industrial activities.
4.3 Labour flexibility: in Japan, female labor participation in silk/cotton industries supports an Industrious Revolution variant.

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4.4 Institutions: Asian states often centralized differently; Japan builds state capacity more effectively than China or India in the relevant period.
4.5 Black Death: largely absent in Japan; China experiences population decline but linked to Mongol disruption and weaker institutions.
4.6 New trade routes: China turns inward after early openness; Tokugawa seclusion reduces impact of earlier openness; India remains open but weak state capacity dampens benefits.

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Summary of Asia’s divergence: Japan’s path outpaced by Europe after Meiji, China/India fail to catch up; openness alone is insufficient without state capacity.

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The Great Divergence framework (reiterated): structural factors plus two shocks drive divergences; Asia’s internal differences can be substantial but do not erase Europe’s lead when shocks and institutions interact differently.

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Consolidation of conclusions: Great Divergence results from regional variation, with four structural factors and two shocks shaping trajectories.
Within-Europe Little Divergence and within-Asia Little Divergence co-exist with the broader world divergence.

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Final synthesis of conclusions: (1) Great Divergence has late-medieval roots; (2) regional variation matters; (3) Little Divergences exist within both continents; (4) Great Divergence arises from differential shocks and structural factors; call for further data and regional disaggregation.

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Table 1: Maddison’s GDP per capita estimates (1000–1870) for UK, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Japan, China, India.
Note: Maddison’s series are benchmarked to modern boundaries; many values are conjectural.

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Figure references: Figure 1 (Italy/Spain) and Figure 2 (Britain/Holland) show real GDP per capita trends; data sources include Malanima and Álvarez-Nogal & Prados de la Escosura.

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Table 3: Asia GDP per capita (1990 intl dollars) for Japan, China, India; data sources include Bassino et al. (Japan), Broadberry et al. (China/India).

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Table 4: GDP per capita in Europe and Asia (comparison table); highlights Japan’s parallel trajectory to North Sea Area but at lower levels; confirms Great Divergence timing.

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Table 5: Share of pastoral sector in English agriculture (10-year averages); shows North Sea Area pastoral dominance rising post-Black Death.

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Table 6: Annual days worked per person in England; demonstrates rise in labour intensity 1650–1900; links to Industrious Revolution and later capital deepening.

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Table 7: Parliamentary activity (12th–18th c.) as a proxy for political-institutional engagement; North Sea Area shows rising parliamentary activity post-1500; Mediterranean Europe lags.

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Table 8: Per capita fiscal revenues (grams of silver) 1500–1789; shows diverging state capacity evolution across regions.

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Table 9: Female age of first marriage (Europe, Japan, China, India); echoes Hajnal patterns and cross-regional fertility/human-capital implications.

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References: comprehensive bibliography spanning Pomeranz, Acemoglu et al., Maddison, and foundational works on European and Asian economic history.
Note on data sources: extensive cross-country/national accounting contributions underpin the analyses.

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Additional references and data sources: further readings and datasets cited; emphasis on the integration of national accounting with regional history.