What is Epistemology? Why Does it Matter to Philosophers?
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that deals with knowledge
broken into three categories: knowledge of the self, knowledge of others, knowledge of the world around us
beliefs have to follow certain epistemic norms to be considered rational\
have to respond to evidence
Justified True Beliefs and Knowledge
want people to hold justified true beliefs (jbt’s) to claim they know something
Gettier Problem
claims that having JTB is not sufficient for knowledge, epistemic agents need something more.
has to respond to external questioning about jtb
10 coins in your pocket gets you a job
Who Am I? Dominant Views on Personal Identity
how do we know we’re the same person we were last week, last month, last year?
The Physical Continuity View
“I am the same person that I was a week ago because I have the same body.”
Intuitive and helps us establish that even when someone lacks mental capacity they once had, they are still the same person
The Psychological Continuity View
the most popular theory
“I am the same person that I was a week ago because I have the same memories, desires and beliefs.”
If I lose those, I no longer qualify as the same person. No longer the same person if I have amnesia or somethin
The Extended Mind Thesis
The mind is not exclusively made up of cognitive functions because we offload many tasks to objects
journaling, offloading thoughts onto paper
using phone to keep track of what you need to be doing in a day
cannot be identified with our body or mind alone because we do do this offloading
Self-Knowledge
What is self-knowledge?
concerns our articulatable beliefs, desires, feelings and thoughts
“I think therefore I am” - Descartes
We’re in a privileged position on what we know about ourself as opposed to what we know about others
“first-person authority”
What debate is there surrounding self-knowledge?
Externalist view
the meaning of our words and contents of our thoughts are determined by external factors (social environment/physical environment/both)
we seem ignorant on how these factors develop our beliefs
bc of that, there seems to be nothing different about our first person knowledge
we have to give up the externalist position or give up the theory of first person authority
Cartesian Picture
“I think therefore I am”
We can only be sure our minds exist
Compatibilist (Middle Ground)
first person authority can be reconciled with externalism once we reject an internalist conception of how claims to self knowledge are justified
if the contents of our beliefs are puzzling to us, its not because we don’t know what we believe, its because we don’t know what to make of what we believe based on the world around us
our judgements about ourselves are systematically reliable
What is Bilgrami's position on self-knowledge?
its the default position to assume first person authority
we can only be held responsible for acts if we know we are doing
in order to know what acts we are performing, we must understand the intentions behind those acts
the point of first-person authority and self-knowledge is to hold ourselves accountable
What problems are there with self-knowledge?
We can and do go wrong about ourselves in the same way we do others
conflicting intuitions: we know ourselves best and yet we are fallible
consistent disassociation between what people believe and how they act
First person authority is disputed in 2 ways
first order intentional states (I want pistachios) are determined in part by external factors (someone said pistachios enhance brain health)
assumes that individuals have control over first-order and second order thoughts, but that’s been disputed by developmental psychology
Why should we grant first person authority Models
Reporter Predictor Model (opposed to McGeer) (fails to explain why we should grant first person authority)
Hierarchy involves first order thoughts (facts), second order thoughts (beliefs), and opinions
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Since first order states are those that cause behavior, one can be a pretty good indicator of one’s future behavior to the extent that the second-order beliefs one expresses are reliably accurate
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As we have seen though – the beliefs people hold in light of facts are not always reliably accurate
Agency Model (McGeer)
Intentional states are dispositional
I can and should act in ways that fit with the claims I make about myself
An agents bundle of feelings/thoughts/actions come together in parts because of the agents
Self-ascriptions are in many cases commissive
if knowledge of our own minds consists mainly on claims we make of ourselves then they are commissive (they commit us to future action)
similar to promise
Disimilar as they lack specificity/the same moral dimension as promises
first-person authority is an acquired capacity instilled and preserved by us only to the degree we act and expect other to act as responsible, self-directed agents
essential for ensuring we create and maintain a stable environment where we can predict what we and others do with reliable success
Summary of Argument
We know our minds because we have been trained to take on responsibility for making sure our words match our deeds
This knowledge of our own minds is agential, it relies on us being more agents and acting responsibly and responsively to those around us
McGeer: Self Knowledge Empirical Problem (AI)
Main Argument:
Victoria McGeer argues for a reconceptualization of self-knowledge, challenging traditional philosophical accounts that treat self-knowledge as privileged and direct. She proposes an "agency model" of self-knowledge, emphasizing that self-knowledge is not merely observational but actively constructed through our role as responsible agents. McGeer contends that self-knowledge is shaped by our commitments to act in ways that align with our self-ascriptions, rather than being based on unmediated access to mental states.
Reasons for the Argument:
Critique of Traditional Accounts:
Traditional views of self-knowledge rely on the idea of privileged access, where individuals are thought to have direct and infallible knowledge of their own mental states. McGeer challenges this by highlighting evidence of systematic first-person errors, as demonstrated by psychological studies (e.g., children's inability to report false beliefs accurately).
Role of Folk Psychology:
McGeer argues that folk psychology is a normative practice that teaches individuals to act as responsible agents. Self-knowledge is acquired through participation in this practice, where individuals learn to use intentional self-ascriptions to regulate their behavior and make themselves intelligible to others.
Agency Model of Self-Knowledge:
Self-knowledge is not merely descriptive but commissive, meaning that self-ascriptions commit individuals to act in ways that align with their claims. This active role in shaping one's behavior explains the authority of first-person claims, even in the face of occasional errors.
Questions for the Author:
How does the agency model account for cases where individuals fail to act in ways consistent with their self-ascriptions? Does this undermine their authority as self-knowers?
Could the agency model be applied to individuals with cognitive impairments or mental health conditions? How would their self-knowledge be understood within this framework?
How does the agency model interact with scientific advancements in neuroscience and psychology? Could these fields reshape the norms of folk psychology?
Notes for College Students:
Key Concepts:
First-Person Authority: The idea that individuals have a privileged position in knowing their own mental states.
Agency Model: A view that self-knowledge is actively constructed through commitments to act in ways that align with self-ascriptions.
Folk Psychology: A normative practice that shapes how individuals understand and predict behavior, both their own and others'.
Psychological Evidence:
Studies show systematic errors in self-reports, such as children's inability to accurately report false beliefs or past desires. This challenges the idea of unmediated access to mental states.
Philosophical Implications:
McGeer critiques the "privileged access" model and argues that self-knowledge is better understood as a product of active engagement in social practices and responsible agency.
Practical Applications:
The agency model emphasizes the importance of self-regulation and accountability in shaping self-knowledge. It suggests that self-knowledge is not static but evolves through interaction with social norms and practices.
Comparison with Traditional Views:
Traditional views treat self-knowledge as observational and infallible, while McGeer emphasizes its constructive and normative dimensions.
Summary:
McGeer challenges traditional accounts of self-knowledge, proposing an agency model that emphasizes the active role of individuals in shaping their self-knowledge through commitments and responsible agency. She integrates insights from philosophy and psychology to argue that self-knowledge is not privileged access but a dynamic process tied to social practices and norms.
Epistemic Injustice (Fricker)
can people be harmed as knowers?
hermeneutical injustice
you lack the resources to adequately explain your experience
1984
testimonial injustice
a speaker is dismissed based on class, race, gender or another demographic
Self-Regarding Attitudes
the relationship between attitudes we hold about ourselves and the kind of knowledge we can generate
when there are more positive self-regarding attitudes, we are more certain of ourselves
self trust, self love, self esteem, self respect
negative self-regarding attitudes can be stuff like self deception, disrespectful towards ourselves (not taking care of ourselves, not following own ethical code), and self loathing or the kind of treatment we accept from other people
if we hold more negative self regarding attitudes like self deception, we are going to be dismissed more because we dont take our own knowledge as serious as we ought to
no self trust, no self love, no self esteem, no self respect
Self-Deception (Orlandi)
What qualifies a habit as self-deceptive?
self deception involves:
1. an individual holding a belief
2. the individual encounters strong evidence to dispute the belief
3. the individual choosing to hold on to the belief even though it runs contrary to strong evidence
conspiracy theorists
The Motivationist Account of Self-Deception
Holding a false but comforting belief that results in a knowledge search where you seek out evidence in favor of the comforting belief
Motivationist response 1 to the problem of "I knew it all along" statements: treat them as suspicions
post self-deceptive statements
suspicions are different than beliefs
suspicions held to a lower threshold than beliefs are
1. They can admit self-deceived individuals may suspect the true belief but just not believe it
2. accords to the phenomenology of self-deception
Motivationist response 2: what happens if "I knew it all along" statements are beliefs?
hindsight bias: the belief that an event is more predictable after it becomes known than it was before it became known
(memory distortion, inevitability, forseeability)
Objection to her account: What incentive is there to saying "I knew it all along"?
individuals engage in self-deceptive habits because there is usually an incentive to do so
its less painful than believing the truth and its more flattering to the individual
Summary of Orlandi's argument
motivationalism as an account of self-deception can adequately explain post self-deceptive judgements like “I knew it all along”
by showing that if these judgements track a suspicion the theory can explain them by appealing to integral claims of the motivationalist account
if tracked as a belief, can argue that the judgements are instances of self deception caused by hindsight bias
important upshot of her account is that these kinds of judgements often has negative consequences for the self deceived future learning
Making sense of post-self-deception judgments: Orlandi (AI)