Chapter 10 – “Military Necessity”: Uprooting of Japanese Americans (U.S., Canada, Latin America)
This chapter focuses on the events leading to and the implementation of the forced removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans, Canadians, and Latin Americans during World War II, under the justification of “military necessity.”
• Pre-war demographics
– In the U.S. mainland, the Japanese population on December 7, 1941, was approximately 125{,}000, with over 80\% residing in California, Oregon, and Washington states.
– Canada had an estimated 23{,}000 Japanese residents, 95\% of whom lived in British Columbia.
– Peru's Japanese population was around 17{,}500, primarily concentrated in Lima.
• Pre-war surveillance & lists
– The 1940 Alien Registration Act mandated fingerprints and annual registration for all aliens aged \ge14.
– The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the FBI compiled ABC “enemy-alien lists,” targeting community leaders, teachers, and Buddhist clergy.
– Camp blueprints were already prepared by 1941, indicating pre-planning for potential mass incarceration.
• Actual espionage evidence
– Despite Japan having planted spies, only 19 U.S. citizens were convicted of spying for Japan, and all of them were white.
– A Presidential report by Munson concluded there was “no Japanese problem” and estimated loyalty among Nisei (second-generation Japanese Americans) to be 90-98\% .
– Ringle of the ONI reported that \gt90\% of Nisei and approximately 75\% of Issei (first-generation Japanese immigrants) were loyal.
• Pearl Harbor to EO 9066 chronology
– The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, resulted in 2{,}403 dead, 1{,}178 wounded, 188 aircraft lost, and 21 ships sunk or damaged.
– Within 48 hours of the attack, 1{,}291 arrests were made (367 in Hawai‘i, 924 on the mainland).
– Bank assets belonging to Issei, including approximately 27.5\,\text{million} in business and real estate, were frozen.
– General John L. DeWitt of the Western Defense Command infamously stated, “A \text{Jap} is a \text{Jap}.”, reflecting the prevailing prejudice.
– Public and press hysteria grew, fueled by sentiments like a Dr. Seuss cartoon (PM Mag, 2/13/1942) and Henry McLemore's column urging to “Herd ’em up.”
– After initial resistance, Attorney-General Biddle eventually yielded to the War Department as Stimson's stance flipped, leading FDR to sign Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942.
• Canadian & Latin-American parallels
– Canada issued PC 1486 on February 24, 1942, mandating removal from ‘protected areas’ and popularizing the slogan “No Japs from Rockies to Sea”.
– The U.S.–Latin American program, established by the Emergency Advisory Committee in 1942, led to the deportation of approximately 2{,}118 Japanese Latin Americans (around 1{,}800 from Peru) to the U.S. for potential hostage exchange.
• Peruvian details
– U.S. diplomat John Emmerson played a key role in shaping the perception that approximately 30{,}000 Nikkei Peruvians posed a “menace.”
– A blacklist issued on December 24, 1941, resulted in the expropriation of businesses and the jailing of community leaders.
– The first ship, Etolin, sailed on April 5, 1942. Four U.S. transports (Etolin, Shawnee, Cuba, Frederick C. Johnson) transported deportees between 1942 and 1944.
– Of the approximate total of 2{,}118 Latin American Nikkei held in U.S. camps, over 84\% were Peruvian.
Chapter 10 – “Military Necessity”: Uprooting of Japanese Americans (U.S., Canada, Latin America)
This chapter focuses on the events leading to and the implementation of the forced removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans, Canadians, and Latin Americans during World War II, under the justification of “military necessity.” The concept of “military necessity” was broadly applied despite a lack of concrete evidence, serving as the basis for policies that curtailed civil liberties.
• Pre-war demographics
– In the U.S. mainland, the Japanese population on December 7, 1941, was approximately 125{,}000, with over 80\% residing in California, Oregon, and Washington states.
– Canada had an estimated 23{,}000 Japanese residents, 95\% of whom lived in British Columbia.
– Peru's Japanese population was around 17{,}500, primarily concentrated in Lima.
• Pre-war surveillance & lists
– The 1940 Alien Registration Act mandated fingerprints and annual registration for all aliens aged \ge14.
– The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the FBI compiled ABC “enemy-alien lists,” targeting community leaders, teachers, and Buddhist clergy. These lists, compiled well before U.S. entry into the war, indicate a pre-existing framework for potential mass detention.
– Camp blueprints were already prepared by 1941, indicating pre-planning for potential mass incarceration.
• Actual espionage evidence vs. “Military Necessity” Justification
– Despite Japan having planted spies, only 19 U.S. citizens were convicted of spying for Japan, and all of them were white. This fact directly contradicted the notion that Japanese Americans posed a significant espionage threat.
– A Presidential report by Munson concluded there was “no Japanese problem” and estimated loyalty among Nisei (second-generation Japanese Americans) to be 90-98\% . This report, intended to inform policy, was largely disregarded in favor of the “military necessity” argument.
– Ringle of the ONI reported that \gt90\% of Nisei and approximately 75\% of Issei (first-generation Japanese immigrants) were loyal. These intelligence assessments provided no basis for mass incarceration, yet policymakers proceeded under the guise of security.
• Pearl Harbor to EO 9066 chronology
(Application of “Military Necessity”)
– The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, resulted in 2{,}403 dead, 1{,}178 wounded, 188 aircraft lost, and 21 ships sunk or damaged. This event served as the immediate trigger for escalating anti-Japanese sentiment and the appeal to “military necessity.”
– Within 48 hours of the attack, 1{,}291 arrests were made (367 in Hawai‘i, 924 on the mainland). These swift arrests, often of community leaders, were justified as a protective measure under “military necessity.”
– Bank assets belonging to Issei, including approximately 27.5\,\text{million} in business and real estate, were frozen. This economic measure was also conducted under the umbrella of wartime necessity.
– General John L. DeWitt of the Western Defense Command infamously stated, “A \text{Jap} is a \text{Jap}.”, reflecting the prevailing prejudice. Such sentiments, while not directly “military necessity,” fueled the public and political environment that allowed such justifications to take hold.
– Public and press hysteria grew, fueled by sentiments like a Dr. Seuss cartoon (PM Mag, 2/13/1942) and Henry McLemore's column urging to “Herd ’em up.” This hysteria created a climate where “military necessity” was uncritically accepted by many.
– After initial resistance, Attorney-General Biddle eventually yielded to the War Department as Stimson's stance flipped, leading FDR to sign Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942. EO 9066 legally authorized the forced removal and incarceration, effectively codifying “military necessity” as the justification for these actions.
• Canadian & Latin-American parallels
– Canada issued PC 1486 on February 24, 1942, mandating removal from ‘protected areas’ and popularizing the slogan “No Japs from Rockies to Sea”. This mirrored the U.S. approach, using similar “national security” or “military necessity” arguments.
– The U.S.–Latin American program, established by the Emergency Advisory Committee in 1942, led to the deportation of approximately 2{,}118 Japanese Latin Americans (around 1{,}800 from Peru) to the U.S. for potential hostage exchange. This drastic measure was also framed as a wartime necessity, despite its violation of international norms.
• Peruvian details
– U.S. diplomat John Emmerson played a key role in shaping the perception that approximately 30{,}000 Nikkei Peruvians posed a “menace.” This manufactured threat provided the “necessity” for their removal.
– A blacklist issued on December 24, 1941, resulted in the expropriation of businesses and the jailing of community leaders. These actions were taken under the pretext of national security.
– The first ship, Etolin, sailed on April 5, 1942. Four U.S. transports (Etolin, Shawnee, Cuba, Frederick C. Johnson) transported deportees between 1942 and 1944. The logistics of these deportations were carried out under the directive of wartime necessity.
– Of the approximate total of 2{,}118 Latin American Nikkei held in U.S. camps, over 84\% were Peruvian. Their detention was justified by the overarching “military necessity” argument for national security.