All-Cold-War-Notes (1).docx

The Western Powers and Asia before 1950

Start of the cold war and impact on asia : potsdam and yalta

• Before WW2 Asia was mainly European Colonies
• WW2: Japan occupies areas of some of China, Korea, Philippines, most of Korea, Burma and Malaya
• Pacific War was particularly brutal
• Two conferences were held between the 3 main powers

YALTA

• 4^TH to the 12^th of February 1945
• Black Sea Resort of Yalta
• Proposed trusteeships for former European colonies
• Stalin in power- home turf- USA and UK need Stalin
• Great powers would supervise colonies progression towards full independence
• USSR agreed to enter war against Japan once Germany had surrendered
• Roosevelt promised easier Soviet Naval access to the Pacific
• Stalin promised to support the government of Jieng Jieshi- which was threatened by Mao Zedong and Chinese Communists
• Roosevelt and Stalin agreed to a Soviet- American- British- Chinese trusteeship of Korea that would steer Korea towards independence from Japan
• Russia would get territory from Japan- Sakhalin and Kurile Islands
• Agreed Germany would be divided into 4 zones
• Concessions made to China by Russia
• Railways in Manchuria, recognition of pre-eminent Soviet interest in Darien, lease rights to Port Arthur
• Personalities: Churchill, Stalin and FDR
• Overall a success with only one big disagreement: POLAND
• Ideologies continued to oppose eachother

POSTDAM

• 17^TH of July to the 2^ND of August 1945
• Berlin suburb of Potsdam
• Stalin reaffirmed his intention to enter the war against Japan
• Truman rejected Stalin’s suggestion that they would work out the details of the trusteeship of Korea
• Unlikely that the USSR could mobolise its Far East troops before the war against Japan was over
• Future of Korea was undecided
• Was agreed that following the Japanese surrender, China would occupy northern French Indochina, the British South East Asia Command (SEAC) would occupy Southern Indochina
• US retreated from its anti-colonial stance
• Wanted to retain control of strategically important Pacific islands
• Change of location: decreased dependency on Stalin, USA and UK stronger, war had ended, no longer needed to play nice
• Truman very confrontational in comparison to FDR- hawkish advisors
• Josef Stalin, Harry Truman, Churchill for 1^st half, Atlee for 2^nd half
• First and only time Stalin and Truman meet

PROBLEMS/ ISSUES IN POST WAR ASIA

• Conflicts between/inter countries due to colonial powers
• During Japanese occupation-resistance fighters already existed- prepared and able to fight
• Economic Problems- financial support of colonists weak- Stalin loved destablisation
• Rise of Communism- splits and conflicts in ideology- Indochina, China, Korea- Ideology of the poor
• Prestige of Colonial powers weakened- weren’t able to protect, loss of respect
• Vulnerable
• Why should the colonists return
• Opposition to occupation

How/Why Did the Cold War begin?

• 1917- saw Communist Power in Russia- America opposed this
• Before this, relatively friendly
• Russia sold USA Alaska
• Russian Civil War 191-1921
• America supported the Whites (Anti- Bolsheviks)
• Bolsheviks cancelled all the debts the Tsars built up to the USA- makes USA mad
• 1933, USA accept Communist Russia as a diplomatic state
• WW2: Common Enemy, Negative Cohesion
• WW2: 27 million Russians died
• 75% of German Army fought against Russians
• Ideological warfare
• New Nuclear warfare
• Could have started in WW2
• Berlin Blockade- Containment- Iron Curtain
• Hiroshima and Nagasaki to intimidate Russia
• Berlin Wall
• Europe was 1^st battleground- USSR had to rebuild themselves also
• Lead to USA victory- CIA interventions in elections- division of Germany
• Consumer expenditure lead to US strength
• Fear of Socialism taking over the world

Proxy Warfare: war fought by two independent factions but supported by greater powers, interference in two other people’s conflicts

Opposing Ideologies: USA vs USSR

What Caused Actual Outbreak

• War of Words from 1946: George Kennan’s Long Telegram Feb ’46, Truman Doctrine March ’47, George Kennan’s Mr X Article
• Tensions on Asia
• Confrontational Personalities
• Clashes of interest over territories- weakening of Capitalist aim
• Threat to Capitalism
• Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe- 1940s
• The Bomb
• Ideological Differences

GEORGE KENNAN’S LONG TELEGRAM

• Feb 1946
• George Kennan leading State Department expert on the USSR
• February 46- the State Department asked him for an explanation of the increasingly anti- American tone of Soviet speeches
• Responded in an 8000 word “Long Telegram”
• Said that Soviet antagonism was not a result of any American actions but due to the Soviet government’s need to exaggerate external threats in order to maintain domestic legitimacy
• Kennan depicted the Soviets as aggressive and this became the orthodox Western interpretation of the origins of the Cold War
• Successive US administrations would blame the conflict on Soviet expansionism

Martin McCauley (2003) Long Telegram as “the decisive factor” in the Truman administration’s increasingly tough line against the USSR

• Many members of the Truman administration had been coming to similar conclusions before the Long Telegram
• Soviet designs on the territory of oil-rich Iran had led Truman to write to Secretary of State James Brynes “I’m tired of babying the Soviets”

TRUMAN DOCTRINE

• Truman perceived the Soviets as aggressive over Iran, Germany, Greece and Turkey between late 1945 and early 1947
• Truman advised Congress in March 1947 that the United States would need to support “free peoples” resisting Communist pressures and attacks
• Truman Doctrine speech advocated the containment of Communism

“Nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life if based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom form political oppression.”

MR X ARTICLE

• Kennan popularized the word “containment” when he expanded upon his Long Telegram in his anonymous “Mr X” article in the prestigious Foreign Affairs journal in July 1947
• Kennan advised that there were centres of power in the world : USA, USSR, Britain, Germany and Central Europe and Japan
• United States should aim to keep Britain, Europe and Japan out of Soviet hands
• Emphasized the importance of island bases in the Pacific

“Main element of any policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies”

American Responses to the Threat from the USSR

CONTAINMENT

• Determination to maintain a presence in Germany
• Counteraction to USSR
• Motivation of all American action
• Containment of Communism
• Marshall Aid

STRONG ALLIANCES

• NATO: formed in 1949

ASIA

• Japan, centre of containment
• Philippines
• Island bases in Pacific

US FOREIGN POLICY IN ASIA, 1940s

• Growing threat from Communism in Asia
• North Korea under Communist rule of Kim Il Sung with support from Stalin and Mao
• Communist movements a threat in Southeast Asia eg: Philippines and Malalya
• Mao’s Communist Party threatened to defat Chiang Kai-Shek’s force in China

US STRATEGIES IN ASIA DEVELOPED IN LATE 1940s

• Create “Model States”- anti-Communist, Japan and Philippines
• Defensive Perimeter Strategy
• Colonial Powers to return to help uphold democracy
• Provide economic and military assistance to countries in Asia threatened by Communism, eg: China

DEFENSIVE PERIMETER STRATEGY

• Military bases along the perimeter
• A defensive “line in the sand” created by the US
• Designed to deter Soviet aggression in region
• Similar concept to the Soviet “buffer” in Eastern Europe
• Enabled US to control sea lanes between Japan and Southeast Asia
• 12^th January 1950: Secretary of State Dean Acheson made a public declaration of this defence perimeter strategy: if attacked UN should help

Japan

• Model State and Key Part of the DPS

AFTER WW2

• 3 million killed
• Large numbers of poor and homeless
• Shattered economy
• Country ripe for Communist takeover
• War ended after dropping of atomic bombs
• Emperor surrenders

DECISIONS AT YALTA

• Russia entered war, bomb dropped
• US troops rushed to Japan
• Ensured that they dominated surrender and occupation
• Douglas MacArthur (racist) became Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP)-Japan’s ruler

MODEL STATES

• Tried to create baby Americas
• Democratic and shared “American Values”
• Capitalist/ Anti Communist
• Pro-American and anti USSR
• Main focus: Japan and Philippines

Two Phases of American Rule:

Phase 1- 1945-47: disarmament and major political and social reform

Phase 2- 1947-51: “Reverse Course”- emphasis on economic development to create a strong and stable country which could contribute to fight against Communism

IMPACT OF PHASE 1- categorized by POLITCAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC EFFECT

• Japan to be a democracy with a constitutional monarch
• Purges of 250,000 former military, government and business elites
• Right to collective bargaining through trade unions
• New less elitist American style education system- vital for new educated workforce
• Gender and social equality established and decreased discrimination
• Emperor Hirohito demoted from God-like status to monarch
• Land redistribution programme reduced the power of the land owning elite
• Establishment of a two chamber elected legislature
• Yoshida Shigeru became Prime Minister in May 1946
• SCAP tried to break up the 83 zaibatsu companies which dominated the economy
• Freedom of speech and religion established
• Land distribution programme helped to increase agricultural productivity
• Marriage to require the consent of both parties
• Warfare was renounced
• Failure to convince Japanese to accept greater developed power to local authorities
• Much discrimination against women continued

“Soviet requests to occupy a zone of their own had been firmly refused” “Zaibatsus broken up in order to neutralize Japan’s war making capacity” -Edwards

CHANGE OF DIRECTION FOR JAPAN AFTER 1947

• Economic reconstruction
• Industrial destruction was diluted
• Restrictions on industry were relaxed
• Workers forbidden to strike
• Arrested Communist sympathisers
• Authorised $500 million in aid
• Less harsh
• Prosecution of war criminals scaled down
• American responsibility for day to day government was scaled down and handed over to the Japanese
• Police forces strengthened
• Plans for an eventual end to occupation
• Zaibatsus left alone

WHY DID THEY CHANGE?

• Increasing spread of Communism
• Communities more susceptible to Communism when weak
• Economy needed to be sorted out in order to legitimize Capitalism
• Capitalism jeopardized by economic situation

1950: TURNING POINT IN JAP/US RELATIONSHIP

• Mainly due to the Korean War
• Most of US soldiers in Japan were diverted to Korea
• SCAP created a 75,000 Police Reserve
• American military purchases stimulated the economy
• 1949, $510 million- 1950, $827 million
• MacArthur and Yoshida repressed Communists in Red Purge
• Sept 1951, US- Japanese Security Treaty which ended US occupation and gave US ongoing use of military bases in Okinawa

“between 1945 and 1950, Japan had developed from a defeated and hated enemy into a valued friend in Cold War. MacArthur and SCAP had remade Japan in America’s image. It was a model of democracy and Capitalism” –Sanders

LACK OF RESISTANCE DUE TO MACARTHUR?

WHY WAS JAPAN NOW AN ALLY?

• Shigeru: Prime Minister, got on well with MacArthur, wasn’t tyrannical, on board with economic recovery, repressed communists in Red Purge, signed peace treaty and defence treaty, lead effectively
• MacArthur: Seemed kind- army food supply donations, did not disrespect culture, prevented communism, rebuilt relationships carefully, ensured Japan paid minimal reparations, behaved well, created a model of democracy and capitalism, effective leadership, created a democratic country
• Marshall: Responsible for shift in policy, rebuilt economy, prevented Communism
• Korean War: catalyzed America leaving, American military purchases stimulated economy, independence, used bases, most troops moved to Korea, demonstrated military support

Independence in the Philippines

• 1936: Roosevelt had granted the Philippines Commonwealth status- elected president and congress, virtual control over domestic affairs
• Peasant unrest in 1930s (Luzon) due to pressure on land
• Invaded by Japanese but retaken by MacArthur in August 1944
• Commonwealth government re-established
• Gained independence 4^th July 1946
• Considered economic burden
• Wanted to halt Filipino immigration
• Wanted to halt free imports of Filipino goods such as sugar

REACTION TO THE TRADE ACT

• Roxas convinced the legislature to pass the Trade Act 2 days before independence
• After independence he had to gain a ¾ majority to passthe controversial concession granting American equal rights to resources
• Removed 11 opposition members from seats- led to Huk Rebellion
• Allowed his own supporters (many under indictment for collaboration) to sit
• Referendum was manipulated to ensure the vote was passed

US ACHIEVMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Political Motive: to create a democracy

• Excessive influence- election of Roxas
• Roxas was frequently undemocratic- excluded eleven elected representatives in 1946
• Many Filipino politicians were corrupt
• Official inquiry in 1947 revealed that $300 million worth of military equipment given by the USA to the Filipino Government had been stolen between 1945-7
• Amongst those indicted was Jose Arelino, Speaker of the Senate
• In 1949, President Truman urged President Quirino to end corruption and mismanagement
• The New York Times reported that an investigation into the ‘disappearance’ of millions of pesos of loans to tenant farmers had discovered ‘no tenants and no crops and the money could not be recovered’
• Presumably the US aid had been pocketed by officials and big landowners

Economic Motive: promote capitalism so that the USA would have countries with which to trade and supporters against Communism

• PTA, the Filipino economy was unbalanced
• There was no manufacturing industry and the balance of trade with the US was unfavourable
• USA profited from its economic relationship with the Philippines

Social Motive: develop and share American values such as freedom and individualism

• Society became Americanised in its materialism and consumerism
• Rich Filipino women ceremoniously served American canned fruit as a status symbol- even though the fruit was grown in the Philippines and could be obtained fresh

Impact of US Involvement

• Lack of political change- corrupt elite remains
• MacArthur’s support for Manuel Roxas ensured that he won (narrowly) in the 1946 election
• US obtained 99 year leases on 22 military and naval bases including Clark Field and Subic Bay: military impact in favour of the US
• Americans given equal rights over ownership of the Philippines’ natural resources
• US aid, including $300 million of military equipment, was stolen by corrupt officials 1945-7
• Roxas kept the traditional elite in power, resulting in continuing corruption and social injustice
• Manufacturing industry was destroyed by Trade Act
• America was prepared to grant aid to rebuild Manila and the agricultural areas of Leyte and Luzon
• Bell Trade Act restricted Filipinos to American imports and they were forbidden from selling any products that may compete with the US
• American consumerist society- canned fruit became status symbol
• Military bases now became sovereign US territory
• Philippines joined SEATO in 1954
• Philippine Trade Act (Bell Trade Act) 1946 basically controlled the Philippines economically
• Peso pegged to the US dollar to protect American businesses
• Many Filipinos felt they had been treated more harshly than Japan
• US spent over $500 million to help defeat the Huk Rebellion 1946-56

HUK Rebellion: 1946-56

HUKBALAHAP:

• Originaly the Filipino resistance, led by the leftist People’s Anti Japanese Army
• Guerilla Fightera
• The Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa Hapon: Hukbalahap
• Led by the leader of the PKP: Luis Taruc

LONG TERM CAUSES:

• Social, political and economic inequality underlay the Huk’s grievances
• Despite fighting against the Japanese, they sometimes clashed with the USA
• After Japan was defeated US ordered the Huks to surrender their arms and used violence against those whose refused
• After the war against Japan (which ended the power of the landowner) their power was restored and the peasantry were opposed by the military police

SHORT TERM CAUSES:

• Roxas had deprived the Democratic Alliance of the six legislative seats
• Rebels sought to end all US economic privileges
• Made worse by the government: prolonged the rebellion by using brutal repression and refusing to deal with peasant grievances
• Government troops, aircraft and artillery killed many citizens and arrested more for supposedly supporting the rebels

CENTRAL LUZON:

• 1948, 5000 guerillas-considerable popular support from the local peasantry
• 1950, 12,000 guerillas
• Rebellion continued to grow due to post war economic dislocation, domination of the political system by the socio-economic elite
• Governments continued and brutal attempts to defeat rebels

REASONS FOR DEFEAT:

• Did not spread beyond central Luzon because other regions lacked Central Luzon’s tradition of peasant radicalism and high proportions of tenant farmers, peasants elsewhere remained apathetic

HUK WEAKNESSES:

• Insufficient manpower and food supplies
• Alienated villagers with their brutality

US SUPPORT:

• Assisted Roxas and his successor Pres Elipido Quirino with the Joint US Military Advisory Group
• The Truman administration gave Roxas $7.2 million in military aid to combat the Communist Huks
• Over $500 million in financial aid between 1951-6

RAMON MAGASAY:

• Secretary of Defence
• Immediately persuaded Americans to step up its pursuit of the Huks
• Decreased the brutality that had led many peasants to join the Huks and offered an amnesty to the guerillas- depleted Huk ranks
• Convinced the government to force landlords to allow peasants to keep more

Assessing Model States

FREE AND DEMOCRATIC:

• Japan- until 1951, not free: US occupation, Japanese Security Treaty: ended the occupation, became democratic, political reform, freedom of speech
• Philippines- Manuel Roxas led corrupt government, corrupt elite STOLE

STRONG AND STABLE:

• Japan: yes, politically consistent
• Philippines: elite in power, continue of social injustice, elections rigged

PROSPEROUS FREE MARKET ECONOMY:

• Japan: right to strike, trade unions etc, decrease in land owning elite power, zaibatsus broken up- was this just a phase? Very strong economy appears
• Philippines: Peso pegged to dollar to favour USA, restricted to US imports, forbidden to sell products that could compete, manufacture industry destroyed, Bell Trade Act

AMERICAN VALUES:

• Japan: gender and social equality, universal suffrage, US education system, Freedom of Speech and Press
• Philippines: American consumerist society, Filipinos had felt they were treated harshly

CONTRIBUTION TO CONTAINMENT:

• Japan: booming economy, communism wasn’t attractive, communist sympathisers were arrested
• Philippines: obtained military and naval bases, sovereign territory

RELIABLE ALLY:

• Japan: Korean War, Shigeru was nice
• Philippines: Roxas was on side but still very corrupt, helped to remove Communism

British Policies in Malaya

• Little opposition to British rule before and immediately after WW2
• Key feature of Malayan history in the immediate post-war period was not so much the struggle for independence but rather the ethnically mixed population
• Greatly affected the relationship between the colonial power and the inhabitants of the colony
• Mid-twentieth century British Malaya contained indigenous Malays, Chinese and Indians
• Chinese and Indians has been brought to Malaya to work in the rubber plantations and tin mines and some became very successful in trade and business
• Some demanded equal citizenship rights but were not granted them because pre-war Britsh rule favoured the indigenous Malays
• British protected the impoverished Muslim Malay peasantry and many of the English-educated Malay aristocracy worked in the government
• During Japanese occupation, (1942-5) the Malays remained docile
• Sino-Japanese War: encouraged Japanese brutality toward the Malayan Chinese
• Many Chinese joined the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA)
• Dominated by predominantly Chinese Malayan Communist Party, (MCP) established in 1930
• British gave MPAJA military support during the war and on British return, the MPAJA didn’t resist
• Most of the indigenous Malay population welcomed the return of the British
• British had always favoured them over the Chinese population of Malaya
• Malays didn’t want the Chinese to have citizenship rights because the Chinese outnumbered them (in 1947, the population of British Malaya was 43.5% Malay, 44.7% Chinese and 10.3% Indian)
• WW2, ethnic groups had competed for jobs and food
• Chinese had resented the lack of Malay resistance to the Japanese
• During the last months of 1945, the MPAJA murdered Malay collaborators and Malayas retaliated by attacking Chinese
• British now seemed more favourably inclined toward the Chinese, because they resisted the Japanese
• Shows increased antagonism

BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION, 1945-6

• After the defeat of the Japanese, BMA was established in order to facilitate the return of civilian rule
• Confidence in Britain was damaged by the British surrender to the Japanese
• And by the BMA which failed to stop a minority of British soldiers in engaging in plunder and rape
• Was ineffective in handling economic problems and communal violence

Malayan Union 1946-8

• Britain proposed a Malayan Union consisting of the Malay Peninsula States
• BUT not the important port of Singapore with its majority Chinese population
• In which non Malays would have equal citizenship rights

WHY?

• More centralised government would help revitalise the economy and prepare Malaya for independence
• Britain appreciated Chinese opposition to the Japanese occupation
• British feared that without full citizenship, Chinese might transfer their loyalty to China
• Equal citizenship seemed to be the only way forward for a future independent Malayan state
• Malayan Union came into being on 1st April 1946, but most Malays opposed it because it removed the powers of their traditional rulers
• Had high religious, political and social status and granted equal citizenship rights to non- Malayans
• British dropped concept of the Malayan Union

WHY?

• Mass, peaceful Malay protests against it and anxiety lest the Malays turn Anti-British
• In May 1946 the United Malay National Organisation or UMNO, established to oppose the Union, gained considerable support
• The unenthusiastic Indian and Chinese response to the Union
• Some Chinese did not want to lose their Chinese nationality
• The British them replaced the ill fated Malayan Union with the Federation of Malaya Agreement (Feb 1948)

The Federation of Malaya

• Federation of Malaya Agreement restored the power of traditional Malay rulers
• Made universal citizenship rights dependent upon 15 year residence in Malaya for non-Malays (used to be 5 years)
• Increased Malay support for the proposal
• Especially as many were growing doubtful over retaining the British connection
• British anticipated and hoped that independence would be a long way off
• Malays were politically inexperienced
• Malayan tin and rubber earned Britain American Dollars

Malayan Communist Uprising

• Chinese dominated Malayan Communist Party did not oppose the return of the British in 1945
• Few and poorly equipped forces and the British assured them of a role in political planning
• MCP therefore collaborated in the united front policy to work non-violently for independence, but simultaneously encouraged working class discontent about food shortages and low wages
• Organised a series of strikes throughout 1946
• BMA used military force against strikers and arrested strike leaders
• MCP backed down and focused on gaining greater grassroots support among the Chinese population
• Especially through Chinese language schools that had inculcated Malayan Chinese Nationalism since the 1920s
• In June 1948 the MCP decided on armed struggle:

WHY?

• The British Administration was making life difficult for the Chinese trade unions and deporting Chinese Communist leaders
• Inspired by the CCP’s military progress in China
• MCP leader Lai Teck, who had masterminded the peace strategy, disappeared (along with MCP funds) in March 1947 while under investigation for having worked with the British
• Replaced with by more radical leaders who used his disgrace to discredit co-operation with British
• Federation of Malaya had restored Anglo-Malay collaboration and domination
• 3 British planters were murdered by the MCP’s Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) the government declared a State of Emergency under which membership of the MCP was illegal
• Initially the MRLA had around 2300 front line fighters (numbers peaked at over 7000 in 1951)
• Used weapons that the MPAJA had not surrendered in 1945
• At first, the British believed that this armed uprising was part of a Soviet backed anti-colonial strategy because there were simultaneous Communist insurgencies in British Burma, the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina and the Philippines
• By 1951, British concluded that the MCP had no support
• MRLA targeted mines, plantations and communications
• Assassinated owners, managers and members of the public
• Aiming to destroy the Malayan economy and the government
• Campaigns were directed from jungle camps situated near Chinese squatter areas where they had a great deal of support
• Possibly 250,000 Chinese squatters who had fled Malayan cities during the Great Depression now lived in forests and in European plantations abandoned during the war

THE EMERGENCY

• British had strong powers of arrest and large numbers of police and soldiers at their disposal
• 1948, Communist insurgents were outnumbered by 9000 Malay police and ten British infantry battalions, supported in search for insurgents by army reinforcements, armoured cars, artillery and aircraft
• Early 1950, 16,220 police- performance was greatly improved by Colonel W.N. Gray
• Malay police guarded plantations and mines and protected Malay villages

DEFEAT OF COMMUNISTS IN MALAYA

• Effectively defeated by 1955
• Emergency declared at an end in 1960

WHY?

• Government force and power
• Isolation of the MCP through economic and political concessions to other Chinese: introduction of elected local government from 1952
• Opposition to the MCP amongst moderate Chinese
• Government’s detention of 6343 Chinese squatters
• Resettlement of many in areas free of MCP influence and repatriation of 9062 to China
• Sir Gerald Templer’s counterinsurgency campaign conducted from 1952
• Tactics included strategic hamlets that defended villages and cut them off from Communist guerrillas
• Communist divisions over leadership and doctrine
• Korean War, which generated demand for Malayan tin and rubber and caused a Malayan economic boom
• British announcement in 1952 that independence was imminent
• Malay support for Britain, which was the main reason for the Communist defeat

INDEPENDENCE

• 1957, Federation of Malaya gained independence from Britain
• 1963, Federation of Malaya combined with British territories in Borneo (including Sarawak) and Singapore to form the state of Malaysia
• Fear of Chinese domination led to the Malaysian parliament’s separation of Singapore from the Federation in 1965
• Anxiety about the Chinese population: major factor

US POLICY AND BRITISH MALAYA

• Administration believed that Britain’s post war recovery depended upon British access to the natural resources of South East Asia- especially Malayan rubber and tin
• Communist insurgency in Malaya was an important factor in convincing the Truman administration that Communism was on the march in Asia and needed to be contained
• Successful suppression of the Communist insurgency impressed many in Washington and in the government of South Vietnam and encouraged them to introduce strategic hamlets
• Strategy of isolating peasant villages from Communist insurgents worked in Malaya because the insurgents were predominantly ethnic Chinese who were detested by the Malay villagers
• Failed in Vietnam because both villagers and insurgents were Vietnamese

US and the Chinese Civil War, 1945-9

• GMD: Guomindang (KMT)
• CCP: Chinese Communist Party
• From 1930 onwards, GMD government led by Jieng Jieshi, increasingly challenged by the CCP and then by Japan
• From 1937, US secretly aiding Jiang and imposing sanctions on Japan
• From 1941, US and China wartime allies but Chinese war effort hampered by refusal of GMD and CCP to work together
• State Department (Foreign Office) strongly opposed large scale military involvement- no public support for militancy in 1945
• Republicans highly critical of Communism- wanted to save China
• LED TO INCONSISTENT POLICY

Timeline of Involvement

• Government of Jiang Jieshi challenged from 1930s onwards by the slowly growing CCP and Japanese imperialism led by Mao Zedong
• Japan had invaded China and had conquered Manchuria in 1931- conquered much of coastal China from 1937
• States sympathised with China and attempted to halt Japanese invasions by placing economic sanctions on Japan and giving Japan economic and military aid- Resentment was much of the reason for Pearl Harbour- owed much to iron and steel imported from the United States
• During WW2, Jiang and USA wartime allies
• Jiang was an irritating wartime ally- GMD and CCP hostility weakened Chinese war effort
• BUT Roosevelt publicly acted as if China was a vital ally so Chinese aid was of very low priority
• Jiang complained that the Americans gave him insufficient aid and treated him badly
• Evidenced by the fact that Roosevelt was so willing to handover Chinese territories to Stalin @ Yalta without consulting Jiang
• Some American observers though Jiang was capable others thought he wasn’t
• General Stilwell was sent to be Jiang’s Chief of Staff 1943-5
• Stilwell ridiculed the leadership qualities of Jiang
• Dismissed his regime as unpopular and corrupt
• Jiang hated Stilwell
• Roosevelt replaced him with Ambassador Patrick Hurley
• Admired and praised the leader but still failed to co-operate with CCP in war against Japan

1^st October 1949, Mao’s Communist Forces Declared the Establishment of :

THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Reasons For the Fall Of China in 1949

• Mao’s Leadership
• Japanese Invasion of China
• Communist Appeal to Peasantry
• Corruption in GMD Army
• GMD Strategies
• Jiang’s loss of middle class support
• Communist Strategies
• Impact of US and Soviet intervention

MAO’S LEADERSHIP

• Won more supporters than Jiang through his social and economic policies
• More flexible than Jiang
• Adjusting his land reform policies in order to maximise support
• Played more effectively upon Chinese nationalism
• Superior military strategy
• Trusted able generals: Lin Biao, Zhu De
• Seemed more democratic than Jiang
• Willingness to participate in coalitions
• Listened to the people
• 8 Rules
• Tactics

JAPANESE INVASION OF CHINA

• Japanese distracted Jiang
• Costed him many of his best troops and money
• Enabled the CCP to establish itself more fully in the countryside
• Before the major Japanese offensive of 1937, Jiang and GMD were in ascendancy
• Suggests that the Japanese played a crucial role in Mao’s rise to power
• Refusal to cooperate with the CCP when China was in mortal danger in war against Japan
• Made him look less patriotic

COMMUNIST APPEAL TO THE PEASANTRY

• Mao came from peasant stock
• Understood and wooed the peasantry in a way that the middle class Jiang never did
• Landlords and richer peasants consulted 10% of China’s population in 1^st half of the twentieth century- occupied 70% of land
• Many of the poorer peasants were forced to give between 50% and 80% of their crops as rent – 90% of population chronically in debt
• Communist emphasis on the equal distribution of wealth- great appeal to China’s poor
• Importance of peasant support demonstrated in crucial battle of Xuzhou in 1949- CCP was aided by 2 million peasant labourers- mobilised by Deng Xiaoping

CORRUPTION IN GMD ARMY

• GMD Army riddled with corruption
• Officers sold food on the black markets- leaving ordinary soldiers underfed- rice sacks often filled with corruption
• Years of war- lost hundreds of thousands of men through death and desertion rates at 70%
• Some GMD units had to tie up their soldiers overnight to stop them going home or joining the Communists
• Jiang’s conscription policies hit the peasantry hardest and encouraged many to switch alliance to CCP
• Morale was low by the final phase of war in 1949- Jiang’s generals surrendered Beijing to the CCP general Lin Biao without a fight
• Provoked a rebellion in Taiwan in 1947

GMD STRATEGIES

• Always deeply suspicious of generals who were “too” successful
• Refused to listen to the warnings of generals
• 1946, concentrated too many of his troops in the battle of Manchuria- without first gaining control of the parts of the northern and central China that lay between Manchuria and GMD- held southern China
• Refused to listen to the warnings of generals
• Always deeply suspicious of generals who were “too” successful
• Insufficiently suspicious of Communist spies- Assistant Chief of Staff, General Lui Fei
• Frequent, crucial strategical errors

JIANG’S LOSS OF MIDDLE CLASS SUPPORT

• Jiang Jieshi and the GMD rose to prominence on a tide of middle class and upper class support despair with prior government
• Hyperinflation : caused by Jiang printing vast quantities of banknotes- price rose to 6000 times the level of 1937
• Jiang made no attempt to stabilise the currency, different cities had different exchange rates, hit urban city dwellers hard, lost Jiang their support
• Government responded by raising taxes, particularly on peasantry
• Once in power, the GMD lost its revolutionary dynamism
• Employed many of the corrupt bureaucrats who had severed previous unpopular regimes
• GMD secret police were repressive
• Jiang contradicted promises of democratic government
• Supporters further disillusioned when Jiang refused to cooperate with the CCP

COMMUNIST STRATEGIES

• Mao’s 8 rules of conduct
• Ensured that the Communist soldiers had better relations with the peasantry than GMD soldiers
• Told to help the villagers, not molest, pay for what they damaged, not to dig latrines near homes
• Mao’s Red Army was better at mobilising the whole population, peasants who could not fight helped to distribute propaganda
• Communists knew better than to fight the Japanese head on, relied on guerrilla warfare, lost fewer men than the GMD
• Mao repeatedly used the effective strategy of withdrawal- enticing the enemy into over extension of its forces
• Zhu De knew when to defer the able generals

US AND SOVIET INTERVENTION

• Truman’s Republican opponents maintained that the Communist victory was due to ample Soviet aid to Mao and inadequate US aid to Jiang- INCORRECT
• Although the Soviets helped the CCP to acquire Japanese arms after the Japanese surrender in 1945, Stalin often a handicap to Mao
• 1949, Moscow ordered the Communists not to cross the Yangtze River
• Mao ignored the advice, proceeded south and finished off GMD resistance
• Soviet ambassador was one of the very last to recognise that the Communists were on the verge of victory in 1949, remaining with Jiang until a very late stage
• Stalin remained true to his Yalta promise to support Jiang’s government and he was neither keen on nor helpful to the CCP in the Chinese Civil War
• Truman administration always knew that nothing short of full US military intervention was not feasible
• WHY?
• The American public demanded the speedy demobilisation of American troops after the defeat of Japan
• The containment of the USSR in Europe was the administration’s priority between 1945 and 1949
• Too many American observers considered Jiang a hopeless case

US Reactions to the Fall of China to Communism

• Threatened the Truman Doctrine
• Why had Truman allowed China to fall to Communism if the Communists were such a threat
• Republicans, exasperated by more than a decade of Democrats in the White House, made a great deal of political capital out of Truman’s loss of China
• Republican attacks exacerbated the “Red Scare”- contributed to great changes in US foreign policy
• House Un-American Activities Committee
• Rosenbergs: killed by an electric chair

“The colonial-nationalist conflict provides a fertile field for subversion movements, and its now clear that Southeast Asia is the target for a coordinated offensive directed by the Kremlin” – Truman Administration, June 1949

• Combination of the loss of China, Republican attacks on Truman for losing China, Huk rebellion in the Philippines, communist activity in Malaya, Communist oppression to the colonial regime in French Indochina and desire to maintain Japan as a bulwark against Communism led Truman, 1950, to get involved in Korean War; Jieng Jieshi’s Taiwan and Vietnam
• More focus on DPS following Acheson Speech
• Memory of Republican attacks helped ensure that subsequent Democrat Presidents escalated US involvement in the Vietnam War
• Brought Cold War to Asia with a vengeance

NSC Policy Document April 1950- NSC 68

• Very similar views on Soviet threat to Long Telegram but context had changed
• NSC 68 exemplified the consistency of US objectives: containment, gradual erosion of Soviet influence and ultimately the downfall of the Soviet system
• This relied on US remaining ascendant
• Japan and her economy would play an important role in this
• However NSC marked a departure from existing policy in one important respect
• Previously USA had relied upon its position as the world’s dominant economy to wage the Cold War
• America’s armed forces had remained relatively small
• NSC 68 proposed a substantial increase in military strength
• In this sense, NSC 68 was a clear response to the passing of the atomic monopoly
• US officials believed that American successes prior to 1950 had been based on American dominance
• Now the only means of maintaining America’s relative advantage over the Soviet Union was a massive military build up

Truman’s immediate reaction to NSC 68 was to do nothing. In the end, events forced his hand… The Korean War was about to erupt and within two years almost every recommendation made in NSC 68 had been implemented.”- Oliver Edwards

Issues of DPS

• Implied a lack of US commitment to containing Communism on mainland Asia
• Greenlight to Communism, to attack the mainland
• Japan was dependent on South East Asia
• US became committed to supporting European colonial powers in their struggles against Communist struggles
• The US may need to intervene to the West of the Defensive Perimeter: Korea/Indochina, in order to protect Japan economically and politically
• Contributed towards the lack of commitment of protecting Jiang

IMPORTANT TURNING POINTS 1949-50

• Sino- Soviet Treaty 1950
• Fall of China, 1949
• North Korean invasion of South Korea
• Soviets successfully test nuclear device, 1949

Conclusions on the Fall of China

MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR

• Appeals of Communism to Chinese Nation
• Mao’s effective leadership
• A comprehension of what China needed
• Communism was attractive to the people
• External factors have no power if Communism wasn’t already desirable
• Corruption of Jiang

MAO WANTED TO:

• Transform old Chinese state and society
• Make China a superpower
• Rapid, radical changes
• Challenge the US takeover in Asia
• Possibly try and takeover themselves
• Influence other Asian countries to reject US imperialism

The Korean War

Background to the Korean War

• POWER VACUUM – instability
• Country very vulnerable to foreign rule
• During the 19^th Century controlled by Japan
• Defeat of Japan at WW2 left the future of Korea at the hands of the “Big Three”
• 1943, Cairo Declaration stated that Korea would become independent in “due-course”
• Roosevelt defined “due-course” as a period of up to 40 years
• British Foreign Secretary: Anthony Eden was cynical about the professed anti-colonialism of the Roosevelt administration, stated in 1943 that Roosevelt: “hoped that former colonial territories, once free of their masters, would become politically and economically dependent on the United States”
• At Yalta- 1945- it was agreed that post-war Korea would be governed by a 4 power trusteeship: USA, UK, USSR and China
• Roosevelt believed this offered the opportunity for US domination and would help restrict Soviet influence in East-Asia
• Potsdam, July- August 1945, the US rejected Soviet proposals that a detailed trusteeship plan be drawn up, confident that the Soviets would not be able to mobilize troops in the Far East before the Japanese Surrender
• 8^th August, Stalin declared war on Japan
• 10^th August, Soviet forces approached the northern part of Korea
• 10^th August, US proposed the 38^th parallel as a temporary dividing line between the American and Soviet armies taking the Japanese surrender in Korea
• Division put 2/3 of the Korean population and the Korean capital Seoul, under US administration
• Several American officials urged Truman to send US forces to occupy the Northern part of Korea
• Unaware of Soviet American discussions, Koreans celebrated the Japanese Surrender 15^th August
• Established a Korean People’s Republic (KPR)
• Included Communists and Syngman Rhee was elected

Causes and the Outbreak of the Korean War

• 38^th parallel was set as the dividing line between the Soviet occupied North and the USA in the South but the arrangement was NOT set to be permanent only to oversee the country until elections could be organised by the UN
• UN committee set up to oversee these elections: UNTCOK, dominated by the USA and its allies
• North Koreans refused to cooperate with its activities
• Elections held in 1948, on a restricted franchise and in the South only
• 95% participated in the elections and the UN Commissioners declared the vote represented a valid expression of the people
• Result was a forgone conclusion
• Republic of Korea formally established under the government of staunch anti-Communist Syngman Rhee- expatriate who had spent nearly forty years living in the USA
• Worried about the viability of his government
• End of WW2, much of Korea had been taken over by People’s Committees, left-wing groups which had a great deal of popular support for their aim of seizing control of the country and introducing land reform
• People’s Committees were dominated by communists and formed the basis of the government in the North
• Elections held 25th August 1948
• DPRK formally established 9th Sept 1948
• Became the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea led by the popular Kim Il Sung
• Hero of the resistance to Japanese rule
• South, People’s Committees were ruthlessly crushed by Rhee’s right-wing government
• Rhee had a limited base of support- made up of largely middle class business interests and landowners
• Faced several rebellions against his rule by remnants of the People’s Committees which had been established in the South
• October 1948, the new republic was recognised by the UN and thus ended the role of General Hodge and the US military government
• By June 1949, USA and the USSR withdrew their troops from Korea as previously agreed
• Government of South Korea dangerously exposed
• Left a 580-strong US Military Advisory Group
• Neither government recognised the other and both claimed to be the government of the whole of Korea
• Early 1949, skirmishes had taken place along the 38^th Parallel
• 400 soldiers had been killed in May 1949 alone
• Sparked by troops from BOTH sides of the border
• Clear that both North and South were unwilling to accept a permanent division of the country
• Rhee talked of using military force to unite Korea
• Realised the weakness of his position
• January 1950: USA implied that it considered Korea to be outside its defence perimeter in the Far East: Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, made it clear that US would promote UN intervention
• 1950, Dulles: US Special Envoy: visited Seoul in June 1950, Rhee asked for help, no promises
• The Democrat chairman of the influential Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Connally, made a speech that suggested acceptance of a possible Communist takeover of the whole peninsula: Rhee criticized the speech as foolish
• January 1950, the Republican- dominated Congress rejected a bill for aid for Korea. The Republicans were not opposed to aid to Korea (the bill passed in February) but were trying to make the point that they opposed the Democrat President Truman’s China policy
• North claimed it had been attacked by the forces of South Korea, who had begun by shelling an area on the Ongijn Penisula on 23 June and had invaded the town of Haeju
• Counter to that view accepted by the West that the North had sent its army across the 38^th Parallel on the Ongjin Pensinsula in order to seize the South
• Seizure of Haeju by South Korea’s 17^th Regiment has often been used to support the North’s claim that the South had started the war
• Bruce Cummings has pointed out that the 17^th Regiment was a crack unit made up of soldiers formerly from the North who hated communism and were keen to resist attack
• Capture of Haeju was therefore more likely to have been due to their initial success in combating an invasion from the North rather than the event that started the war
• Debate over who made the first move can detract from the context within which the invasion took place
• War had been initiated after a prolonged period of tension of skirmishes along the 38^th Parallel
• Both sides had a desire to unite the country and both sides were prepared to use force to do so
• Syngman Rhee would have launched an invasion of the North to complete reunification at some time
• Syngman Rhee’s government had done badly one month before the war started, and there was growing disillusionment with his rule, which Kim Il Sung could have exploited without the need to invade
• Rhee may have been pleased that the North had beaten him to it as their invasion allowed to play on western fears of the spread of communism in order to secure assistance
• Provided South Korea with the military commitment it was desperate to obtain from the USA for the defence of its country
• Traditional assessments of the origins of the war place responsibility on the North who were acting under instructions from Stalin to spread communism
• Viewpoint has been challenged by those historians who see Stalin as too cautious to risk an escalation of conflict with the USA
• Supported by Khrushchev’s memoirs, which state that Kim Il Sung had informed Stalin of his decision to invade the South but the Soviet leader had advised him “to think it over … Stalin had his doubts”.
• Memoirs are not altogether reliable source but do confirm the prudence Stalin took elsewhere with his foreign policy

Aims of Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee

US and UN involvement in the war

• On the face of it, a response to the invasion of South Korea by the North
• Supposedly, intervening to help a victim of aggression repel a deliberately provocative enemy
• Use of the United Nations to send troops to the aid of South Korea was possible because the war was framed in this manner
• Prompt and vigorous of action of the USA in committing itself to the assistance of South Korea was due less to the general principle of upholding democracy against the threat of an aggressor than to CONTAINMENT
• Bruce Cummings, American historian (1981) claimed the US bore greater responsibility for the outbreak of the ear because it supported Rhee’s unpopular, authoritarian regime in South Korea
• Peter Lowe, British historian (2000) also attributed greater responsibility to the United States, through an “unquestionably foolish” combination of US statements and acts
• Concept of a principle of deterring aggression
• USA used the United Nations to justify US intervention in the Korean War
• A UN resolution passed within a month of the war clarified the reasons for UN involvement
• “The armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace”
• Resolution also called on member states to “assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area”
• UN involvement had been important as a mechanism for securing firm support for US military intervention in the war under the aegis of acting in the interests of the wider principles of upholding democracy and peace against aggression
• Made America’s intentions and conduct look good
• Syngman Rhee’s regime: not a model of freedom and democracy but the US government was willing to overlook this fact because of Rhee’s anti-communist credentials
• Members of the UN, Egypt, Britain and France in particular were not convinced that the invasion by the North was unprovoked- due to the many breaches of peace that had occurred in Korea in the previous months
• When N Korea attacked S Korea, USA had 500 advisers in South as part of its Korea Military Advisory Group (KAMG)
• Advisers joined South Korean forces and civilians in rapid retreat
• US resolutions was passed by the UN
• Soviet Union absent from the UN at the time- boycotting the UN in protest that Communist China had no UN seat
• Able to use the organization to ratify its own decisions and involvement in the conflict
• UN was used to ensure its success in upholding peace against acts of aggression
• Able to gain the support of its allies for intervention in a foreign war
• 25 June 1950, UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie asserted: “This is war against the Untied Nations”
• Security Council resolution passed requesting that North Korea withdraw
• 27^th June passed a resolution declaring that the UN should oppose Korea
• USA would probably have preferred indirect intervention, offering supplies to the South
• South Korean army was disintegrating rapidly under the assault of the North’s People’s Army
• Urgency of the military situation in Korea required a swift and direct response
• Words and deeds might have suggested to some Communists that Korea mattered little to the United States and that an attack on South Korea would not be opposed
• No incontestable evidence that the Soviets or Chinese knew of or paid attention to the speeches of Acheson and Connally and Republican machinations in Congress
• Stalin and Mao had their own good reasons to assist and encourage Kim
• US had not always been so keen to intervene in the affairs of other states, but in the context of the Cold War, US involvement in Korea was seen as imperative
• American eyes, there was little doubt that the war had been started by the North under Stalin’s orders
• Perception was determined by their experience of, and attitudes to, communism during the development of the Cold War in Europe since 1945
• Aggressive nature of world communism confirmed
• Dramatically transformed by the communist takeover of China in 1949
• USA determined to halt the inexorable advance of world communism
• Korean War occurred less than a year after Soviet Union announced its development of the atomic bomb
• Era of US atomic monopoly over
• Soviet acquisition of nuclear tech weakened US position

DOMESTIC PRESSURES

• Increase in US concerns about the direction of world affairs and put President Truman under pressure
• Republicans accused Truman of being too “soft” on communism and attempted to discredit his entire foreign policy
• Blamed for the loss of China
• McCarthy witch-hunt against those in the US establishment suspected of harbouring communist sympathies was evidence of the force of public concerns
• Pressure for firm, direct action against Communism from Hawks in the air force
• Truman was under immense pressure to show he would not capitulate to Communist aggression once again
• Internal politics of the USA impelled Truman to take a tougher stance when the Korean War started
• Pushed him towards an acceptance of the NSC paper 68 (NSC-68)
• Document had been produced in April 1950 and recommended a much stronger approach towards the Soviet Union in order to contain communism
• Increase substantially the USA’s military strength
• Truman agreed with the thurst of NSC-68
• Aware that taxes would have to be raised in order for the proposals to be enacted
• No tradition in the USA of heavy taxation to support a large peacetime army- measure would be politically unpopular
• Provided a useful opportunity to justify the implementation of NSC-68
• Invasion of S Korea was seized upon as tangible evidence of the threat of Soviet expansionism
• Allowed Truman to push through the measures needed to support a more active policy against world communism without risking the loss of support from Democrats
• Belief in domino effect- seemed to be confirmed by the events in the Far East
• Fall of China to communism put Korea at risk
• Barrier against communism had to be shored up by direct and forceful action
• Used this argument to justify US troops in Korea
• “Soviet Union needed to be shown that the USA meant what it said about supporting those who, in the words of the Truman Doctrine, were “resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside influences”
• Strength of the US commitment to the West was also viewed with some skepticism in western Europe and proof that the USA was offering more than mere words
• Help stem any tendency towards pessimism and defeatism in Europe
• Truman sent US troops to Korea on 30^th June and ordered the US troops to Korea on 30^th June and ordered the US 7^th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait- arrived on 3^rd July
• 7^th July UN Security Council resolution called for the creation of a United nations Command to defend South Korea
• UN asked Truman to select a UNC commander- Truman appointed MacArthur
• US resentment and fear at the loss of Eastern Europe was exacerbated by several events that suggested that the world balance of power was tilting in favour of expansionist Communism in 1948-9
• Early 48, Opposition to Communism in Czechoslovakia was quashed and Stalin’s Berlin Blockade blocked Western road, rail and canal access to West Berlin
• Americans felt greatly threatened when the Soviet atomic bomb test in August 49 ended the US atomic monopoly
• Truman admin believed US Cold War credibility was at stake in Korea
• Threat on Japan, increasingly perceived as a potentially valuable US ally in the Cold War
• Japan was only 100 miles from South Korea and within Acheson’s defence perimeter
• Safety of Japan would be jeopardised in the face of a Communist Korea peninsula with Communism apparently on the march
• Defence Department told Truman that Japan was vital for the defence of the West against Communism
• June 1950, several of Truman’s leading advisers said Communist control of South Korean airbases would greatly threaten Japanese security
• Collective Security: an international system whereby all countries agree to collectively protect any one of their number that is a victim of aggression. The League of Nations served as the first worldwide collective security organization between the two world wars, and the United Nations took up the role after 1945
• Truman felt that the 1930s had taught that collective security should be supported and appeasement should be avoided
• North Korean attack led Truman to believe that the League’s successor was being tested
• If he failed to support the United Nations and appeased aggressors, another world war might result
• Certain of support from Western Allies
• Viewpoint of the Communists the American entry into the Korean War was part of the US attempt at world domination

Significance and Impact of US Entry

• Change in emphasis of aims as the fighting progressed
• Failure of Stalin to aid North Korea or send them large amounts of military supplies- Soviet shipments to North Korea actually declined during the war)
• Provided Truman with the confidence that the war could be limited to the peninsula
• Early Sept 1950, South had been saved from North Korea’s forces
• Truman’s decision to authorize the invasion of the north marked a shift from the policy of containment towards one of attempting to roll back communism from the Korean peninsula
• Horowitz (1967) “MacArthur’s whole subsequent course of behaviour was consistent with a strategy designed to provoke and then escalate a war in Asia”
• Change to roll back however should not be taken as evidence that the US government has always intended to pursue such a policy
• Change that emerged from the specific situation and opportunity presented by the course of the military campaigns during the war
• Truman, was far more cautious than MacArthur and the divergence in approach led to the General’s dismissal in April 1951
• Intervention of China on the side of North Korea and their subsequent military success in driving the US army south was to lead to a further re-evaluation of US war aims
• Priority of the USA at the beginning of 1951 was to drive the communist armies north of the 38^th Parallel: an aim that was to last for the remainder of the war
• Immediate result was the saving of South Korea from the invasion by the North
• US troops arrived in Korea, South Korean army had been driven back to a small corner of the peninsula around Pusan
• Forces of the South had disintegrated under attack and had virtually given up fighting
• First Americans to arrive in Korea were ill-prepared for action
• US forces had reduced in size and resource since 1945 and this had left them unready for action
• Hickey: “ ill-disciplined, physically soft and dangerously under-trained.”
• Attitude was that regaining Korean soil for the South was not worth losing US lives
• Despite the reluctance and lack of preparedness of US forces
• Able to hold off North Korea long enough for the South to survive until the landings at Inchon
• US military involvement in the war was an essential factor in the survival of South Korea
• Provided the fire-power of tank and artillery support and a degree of accuracy that made a vital contribution in holding pack the communist armies
• Nearly 6 million US soldiers served in Korea
• 37 months of fighting, over 33,000 were killed
• Air power
• Air force was involved in over a million strategic and tactical operations
• Estimated that over half of the enemy casualties were due to air strikes
• Use of napalm was especially effective in destroying targets both human and material on the ground
• Aircraft also provided much- needed cover for US troops on the ground
• Aircraft carrier allowed air power to reach a greater range within North Korea than land hased planes
• Superiority of US military hardware enabled the South to hold out against the greater human resources of the communist forces provided by China
• US military had considered using nuclear weapons to halt the initial North Korean drive to Pusan in July 1950
• MacArthur asked for discretionary powers to use nuclear weapons in December 1950 to prevent the Chinese overwhelming the 8^th Army
• Later to state that his plan had been to drop fifty nuclear bombs on Chinese targets
• Ridgway, MacArthur’s replacement, also supported the use of nuclear weapons but only as a last resort
• US nuclear bombs were stored at Kadena air base in Japan and although extremely cautious, he knew they were available if there was a major deterioration in the US military position
• Important in widening the range of weaponry available for use in the war
• Greater potential for destruction
• Made clear to the forces of communism that the USA would not stand idly by when non-communist states in the Far East were threatened
• US policy towards Taiwan was altered radically by events in Korea
• Before the war the USA had not plans to aid Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist regime against a possible invasion by Mao’s communist forces
• 1950, Truman ordered the US Seventh Fleet to the seas around Taiwan to warn communist China that any attempt to seize the island would be resisted by the USA
• Emergence of China as a superpower of some potential was to have an important impact on US policy towards Indochina
• French were struggling to hold back communist insurgents in Vietnam and US attitudes to the predicament of the French were changed by the war in Korea
• Turned the French actions in Indochina into a crucial part of the struggle against world communism
• 1950, French campaign was financed largely by the USA
• Change in attitudes towards the spread of communism in the Far East caused by Korean War
• Produced the formation of military defensive alliance in South East
• Attempted to follow the example of NATO in Europe
• Result was the conclusion of the ANZUS Pact in September 1951
• Attempt by the USA to build an anti-communist alliance with Australia and New Zealand
• The formation of SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organisation) in 1954 was
• a bid to extend the coordination of defence of those Far East states that feared the spread of communism
• NATO was enlarged to include Greece and Turkey
• US aid to NATO was enlarged to include Greece and Turkey
• US aid to NATO was increased- $25 billion was given between 1951-55
• Structure of the organization was strengthened
• Korean War had greatly enlarged the military commitments of the USA to include the Far East
• Korean War marked a significant escalation in the Cold War
• Saw the first “hot” war since the Second World War
• Nonetheless, direct conflict between the USA and the USSR had been avoided and the fighting had been contained within the peninsula
• War in Korea established the trend towards the principle of limited war
• Situation where both superpowers were capable of unleashing nuclear weapons
• Establishing the unwritten rule of the deliberate limitation of the scale of warfare was to be an important consequence of the war
• USA needed to develop its efficiency in a range of military tactics and the concept of “flexible response” was developed
• Korean experience therefore produced a change in US military thinking that, in the words of the historian Bruce Cummings, “led straight to Vietnam”
• Popular attitudes within the USA had helped push Truman into a direct commitment to South Korea but the failure to secure a quick victory against the forces of communism caused disillusionment
• Desertions by the US troops, one indicator of growing disenchantment had increased dramatically in 1952
• As casualties mounted so did Truman’s unpopularity
• UN casualties were to reach their peak in June 1953 they rose to 23,161 for the month
• Critics dubbed Korea “Truman’s War” and the President never regained his earlier popularity with the US people
• Truman’s presidency ended in 1953, the effects of the Korean War on the USA were to be longer lasting
• War had militarized the USA, leading to a seven-fold increase in defence spending
• Concerns spreading, level of military spending would have to be maintained
• Recommendations of NSC-68 were implemented
• Congress voted to spend $10 billion on the army in 1950, additional $260 million
• Earmarked for the development of the hydrogen bomb
• Increases and strengthened the powerful interests of the military-industrial complex to the point where, by 1954, President Eisenhower raised concern at the political influence of the defence industry that was skewing political decision-making and leading to an unhealthy degree of economic dislocation
• Inability of the US public and soldiers to comprehend fully what the war was about
• Ignorance of the origins of the conflict in Korean terms was compounded by a failure to understand its South Korean allies
• Situation replicated during the conflict in Vietnam

Russian Support for Kim

• Needed Stalin’s approval for the invasion of South Korea because he viewed Stalin as the leader of world Communism and he wanted Soviet military aid (especially fighter planes)
• 1949, Stalin was unenthusiastic and repeatedly stopped Kim from attacking South Korea, probably because he feared an attack might prompt US intervention
• Stalin gave Kim the go-ahead in March 1950
• Reasons for his change of mind:
• China became Communist in late 1949, Communist parties worldwide wanted a reunified and Communist Korea
• Stalin told a Chinese visitor in spring 48, “the centre of the world revolution is transferring to China and East Asia”
• Soviet Union needed to demonstrate its Communist credentials, lest other Asian nations looked to Mao rather than Stalin for inspiration and leadership
• Felt the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet atomic bomb test in autumn 49 had tilted the world balance of power in favour of Communism
• Sin-Soviet alliance of February 50 had greatly strengthened the Communist bloc and Stalin and Mao believed it would deter Western aggression
• Yugoslav representative at the UN said Stalin encouraged Kim in order to get the US embroiled with Communist China
• China and the United States pre-occupied and weakened, the USSR would become more powerful, a Korean War would distract the US from Europe and enable Stalin to feel more secure there
• Stalin feared a resurgent Japan, developing from foe to friend of the United States
• About 100 miles from Korea
• Soviet Union and Communism would be safer if the whole Korean peninsula were Communist
• 28 January 50, Stalin received intelligence information indicating that the US would not defend South Korea if South Korea were attacked
• Based upon Acheson’s defence perimeter speech
• Stalin wanted to pre-empt a South Korean attack on North Korea
• North Korean attack would not cost Stalin much; he warned North Korea it “should not expect great assistance and support from the Soviet Union, because it had more important challenges to meet than the Korean problem”
• Stalin provided Kim with the tanks that were crucial to the North Korean advance in summer 1950, air support and Soviet military advisers, but no Soviet soldiers fought in Korea and the Soviet Navy remained inactive

Contributions of the UN

• 15 other members of the UN fought alongside the Americans and South Korean troops:
• Britain
• Australia
• New Zealand
• South Africa
• Canada
• France
• The Netherlands
• Belgium
• Colombia
• Greece
• Turkey
• Ethiopia
• The Philippines
• Thailand
• Luxembourg
• Roughly 4000 of their soldiers died in Korea
• Other UN members helped in different ways
• India, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Sweden sent medics
• Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Iceland, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Venezuela sent food and economic aid
• Panama provided transportation
• Soviets always said the “UN” efforts in Korea were triggered and dominated by the Americans
• US and South Korea provided 90% of the fighting men, and although the UN asked that the UNC commander have direct access to the UN
• Truman insisted that MacArthur communicate only with Washington
• Disagreement among America’s allies over many issues on which the US acted without reference to anyone else
• Britain and Canada were critical and anxious over:
• The dispatch of the US 7^th Fleet to the Taiwan Straits, which they viewed as America reinjecting itself into the Chinese Civil War
• The US decision to cross the 38^th Parallel, which they considered a threat to the moral superiority of the UN
• American talk of using atomic weaponry in Korea
• May 1953 American bombing of North Korean dams and irrigation systems, which adversely affected civilians
• US always did what they wanted to do without reference to the UN more often than not
• Truman had shown little interest in the UN prior to the Korean War, only using it to legitimize elections in South Korea
• MacArthur’s refusal to deal with the UN can be considered to be understandable
• Difficulties in co-ordinating the war effort
• Around 40,000 troops from other UN countries joined American troops in Korea and communications between forces of different nationalities proved difficult
• Lots of small problems over food supplies, clothing and shoes
• Other problems more serious
• British brigade took a hill, then called for an American air strike against North Korean positions, British identified themselves with white panels on the ground, but the North Koreans did that too, so the Americans bombed the British causing 60 British casualties
• Americans had the wrong radio frequencies and language barriers

The Korean War and the US Army before the Inchon Landing

• As a summary EARLY SUCCESS for North Korea
• North Korea crossed 38^th parallel into South Korea June 1950
• Late July 1950, General Walton “Bulldog” Walker made a stand at Taezon, strategically important- 1/3 casualty rate

REASONS FOR INITIAL US/UN/ROK RETREAT

• August 1950, US troops now pinned down in the Pusan Perimeter
• North Koreans now outnumbered, their supply lines were overstretched
• American control of skies and sea
• US could not be outflanked at Pusan
• Arrival of 6 US tank battalions

The Inchon Landing

• By September the US had suffered 8000 casualties
• 50 countries had pledged support, only British had arrived
• Military situation naturally aroused doubts back home
• Supporters of the war remained in the majority in Washington
• 15^th September 1950, military situation was suddenly and miraculously revolutionized by a stroke of MacArthur genius
• Against the advice of other military experts MacArthur undertook undertook what proved to be a highly successful assault on Inchon
• September 50, MacArthur advocated a landing 200 miles behind the North Korean lines at Inchon
• Generals, admirals, staff officers and the JCS produced countless objections (Inchon had no beach just a 15 ft sea wall that would need to be scaled or blown up)
• MacArthur contended that the “impracticalities involved will tend to ensure for the element of surprise”
• Despite every South Korean and American seeming to know and talk freely about the landing, the North Koreans were still taken by surprise and Inchon was soon taken
• As the Americans who landed at Inchon advanced towards Seoul, other Americans and South Koreans worked their way out of the Pusan Perimeter by late September
• Had been joined by some British troops
• As the US/UN/ROK forces advanced from behind the Pusan Perimeter they came across more North Korean atrocities
• MacArthur retook the South Korean capital, Seoul, and on 27^th September (my birthday wow yay) ceremoniously handed the capital building over to a grateful Syngman Rhee
• Rhee thanked MacArthur profusely on behalf of the South Korean people for saving their nation

Crossing of the 38th Parallel

• United States had declared its war aim to be the restoration of the Korean status quo
• UN had declared its war aim to be: “To repel armed invasion and restore peace and stability in the area”
• This vague wording was sufficiently vague to give respectability to the US/UN/ROK crossing of the 38^th parallel into North Korea on 30^th September
• US/UN/ROK now aimed to destroy the North Korean forces and to reunify the Korean peninsula
• South Korean forces did not wait for UN approval before crossing
• First, the UB approved the decision to invade North Korea
• Some American allies were unenthusiastic
• Britain felt that while the initial aim (the restoration of the status quo) was obviously defensive this new aim was perceived as aggressive
• Minority in Washington were also unhappy
• George Kennan recommended that the US get out of Korea as soon as possible because Korea was not that important and the US could get into trouble there
• MacArthur’s orders were not very clear during Sept and Oct
• 27^th September, JCS gave him a modified version of a UN Security Council resolution, which said his military objective was “the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces”
• Authorised him to conduct military operations in North Korea
• 29^th September, new Secretary of Defence George Marshall told MacArthur: “We want you to fell unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38^th parallel”
• But Truman ordered that only South Korean forces were to be used near the Chinese border
• UN resolution of 7^th October passed by a margin of 45-7 said, “all appropriate steps [should] be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea”
• No clarification of “appropriate steps”
• As yet though, MacArthur was optimistic
• 15^th October, meeting on Wake Island, a US base in the middle of the Pacific Ocean
• MacArthur assured Truman: “Formal resistance will end in North and South Korea by Thanksgiving”
• He said there was “very little” chance of Chinese or Soviet intervention
• If the Chinese did intervene, they would not fight very well anyway
• MacArthur’s optimism seemed justified: 19^th October, American and South Korean forces “liberated” the North Korean capital, Pyongyang
• Was the first and last time a Communist capital was liberated by the West in the Cold War and MacArthur’s reputation soared
• 24^th October, MacArthur reversed Washington’s orders that only ROK forces should operate near the Chinese border
• US forces headed for the Yalu River, border between North Korea and China
• MacArthur said this was a military necessity, but it represented a great change in US policy
• JCS said it was a “matter of concern” but did not stop him
• It was at this point that the Chinese stealthily moved 150,000 men into North Korea

Why had US war aims changed by Crossing of 38th Parallel

DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON TRUMAN:

• Republicans wanted more involvement
• Elections to congress coming up
• Red Scare

PRESTIGE:

• Wanted to seem powerful in comparison to the “small” Korean army
• Represented US determination to defeat Communism
• Revenge:
• American and South Korea casualties
• Loss of China
• Atrocities of North Korea

MACARTHUR:

• God complex, wanted to seem like the conqueror of the world
• Momentum- from Inchon
• Both wanted to reunify Korea

RHEE:

• South Korean forces crossed before
• Reunification of Korea

UN:

• Fluffy
• Waffley
• War aim= repel armed invasion
• Ambiguous target
• Initially approved movements north

Why did enter China the Korean War

• After Inchon, the Communist position had so deteriorated that Stalin was considering whether to abandon N Korea or to encourage Chinese intervention
• Chinese proved willing to intervene because the triumphant Americans had dramatically changed their war aims
• Several occasions the Chinese warned the United States that if Americans crossed the 38^th parallel, China would intervene in the war
• Truman ignored these warnings

SECURITY REASONS:

• The presence of American troops on the Chinese border was a threat to national security
• Truman had ignored repeated warnings from the Chinese
• Mao feared that Jiang might launch a counter-revolution with the support of US armed forces
• US had sent 7^th fleet to Taiwan
• MacArthur had publically declared his support for Jiang
• US troops nearing Chinese border

STALIN

• Stalin encouraged intervention by offering Mao shared command over the Chinese and NKPA troops
• Stalin felt that a Sino-American conflict would strengthen Russia’s position
• Kim asked Stalin for military assistance; Stalin was anxious not to engage in direct combat with the US and asked Mao to send divisions to support the NKPA
• Relationship with North Korea:
• Mao ‘determined early in the war that should the North Koreans falter, China had an obligation to come to their aid because of the sacrifice of so many Koreans in the Chinese revolution, the anti-Japanese resistance, and the Chinese civil war
• North Korea had a long-standing relationship with China

OTHER

• NSC-81, the rollback strategy itself, caused the Chinese intervention, and not the subsequent arrival of US troops at the Yaku river
• On September 30^th Mao told Stalin we have decided to send as many as 12 infantry divisions. The Kremlin…backed off from a previous commitment to provide airpower to protect China’s coat. China went ahead regardless
• Opportunity for China to re-establish its prestige
• Evidence suggests that the Chinese Politburo was reluctant to get involved

Impact of China’s entry

• US/ROK forces reached the Yalu River, the Chinese sent 150,000 men into North Korea
• US was blind to all the signals
• 12 October, despite Chinese troop movements to the border and statements and charges of border violations, the CIA said: “there are no convincing indications of an actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea”
• American air surveillance struggled to detect Chinese troop movements, because they marched overnight, had no cumbersome artillery and very few trucks, and used mountain trails, not roads
• When Walton Walker was faced with the first Chinese POWs, he thought they were Chinese who lived in Korea: “After all, a lot of Mexicans live in Texas”
• Battle hardened Chinese troops, who had fought a bitter civil war for many years, proved to be formidable opponents

MacArthur’s Response

• 1^st November, Americans already surprised to find themselves having to build defensive lines, found themselves surrounded by Chinese
• Some of the Chinese marched into the middle of American positions wearing ROK clothing discarded in the rapid South Korean retreat in the face of the Chinese advance
• Despite JCS opposition, MacArthur persuaded Truman to allow him to bomb the Yalu bridges in order to halt the Chinese troops at the Chinese border
• After one month of bombing, only four of the twelve bridges had been destroyed
• Persuading himself that the Chinese were in retreat, MacArthur decided that a big offensive would end the Korean War
• Wanted it to begin on 15 November, but General Walker knew he had insufficient supplies
• Attack was therefore delayed until 25 November, but even then Walker’s forces remained short of ammunition, winter equipment, and rations
• MacArthur talked of getting American boys back home by Christmas but made speedy victory unlikely when he broadcast the battle plan on Armed Forces Radio
• Infuriated his commanders and made the Chinese task a lot easier
• MacArthur reiterated US war aims in the broadcast
• Looking back on the failed offensive, Acheson explained that although the President’s advisers knew that MacArthur should have been restrained
• Did nothing: because, “It would have meant a fight with MacArthur, charges by him that they had denied his victory.”

US/UN/ROK Retreat

• January 1951, Chinese and North Korean troops had crossed the 38^th parallel and retake Seoul

• Truman tried to reassure the Chinese that there was no threat to Chinese territory, the Chinese thought otherwise and took advantage of the November delay to prepare an offensive
• Faced with 300,000 Chinese and 100,000 North Korenas, the 270,000 US/UN/ROK forces were outnumbered
• Out-generalled,as when Chinese pretended to retreat then awaited them with eager anticipation, Chinese believed that:
• American infantry is weak
• They depend on their planes, tanks and artillery
• They are very weak at night
• Infantry loses the will to fight
• Their men are afraid to die
• Their habit is to be active during the daylight hours
• When transportation comes to a standstill, the infantry loses the will to fight
• Chinese considered the South Koreans even weaker than the Americans, describing them as: “puppets deficient in warfare”
• As a result, the Chinese focused their attack on the South Koreans and opened up the UN lines
• MacArthur now admitted that he faced an “entirely new war” an “undeclared war by the Chinese”
• Necessitated more US forces
• Colonel Paul Freeman said the Chinese were “making us look a little silly in this God-awful country.”
• American troops were astounded by the North Korean winter
• Arrived before the US/UN/ROK forces received the proper winter clothing
• Sometimes -30 degrees and motor oil and weapons frequently froze
• Warming tents had to be use to defrost the men before they were sent out into the cold again
• Hair oil and urine kept frozen rifles going some of the time
• Plasma froze in the tubes of the medics, who had to dip their fingers into patients’ blood in order to keep their hands warm
• “The only way you could tell the dead from living was whether their eyes moved. They were all frozen stiff as boards”: said one American surgeon
• Chinese suffered even more, many froze to death in their foxholes
• One Chinese officer was surprised to see thousands of snowmen on the horizon: on closer inspection, they turned out to be entire platoons of Chinese soldiers who had frozen to death on the spot
• Chosin was one of the hardest fought battles was waged by 25,000 Americans surrounded by 120,000 Chinese in the mountains of North Korea, near the Chosin River
• Chief of Staff criticized the “insane plan” that had sent them there
• One captain felt as if they had run “smack into what seemed like most of the Chinese from China”
• US air supremacy saved many Americans lives at Chosin
• 12 GIs were burned by napalm dropped from their own planes
• Many were crying and hysterical, some sick and vomiting
• Some had so many wounds you could hardly touch them
• 6000 out of the 25,000 Americans troops were killed, captured or wounded
• 6000 others suffered from severe frostbite
• 50% casualty rate was far higher than that of the Second World War
• Chinese burned wounded POWs alive and danced around the flames, then bayonetted others who tried to surrender
• US/UN/ROK retreat would have been even worse without their superior mobility
• Chinese were on foot and could not keep up with the pace of the retreat
• Christened “the big bug out”
• Colonel Freeman, despondent: “Look around here. This is a sight that hasn’t been seen for hundreds of years- the men of a whole United States Army fleeing from a battlefield, abandoning their wounded, running for their lives.”
• General Oliver P. Smith, scolded the press when they used the word “retreat”:
• “We are not retreating. We are merely attacking in another direction.”

Western Divisions

• Gave Truman several great problems in late 1950
• Poll ratings were falling and his Democratic Party suffered losses in the November 1950 elections
• Washington was in a state of panic: the JCS feared a Soviet attack in Europe, and on 15^th December 1950, Truman declared a state of national emergency
• When Truman told a press conference, he had “always” considered using atomic weapons in Korea, and that “the military commander in the field will have charge of the use of weapons, as he always has”
• British Clement Atlee rushed to Washington, fearful that MacArthur had his finger on the nuclear button
• Truman had to hastily reassure everyone that he was in ultimate control of the use of all weapons
• General MacArthur publically critical

Truman vs MacArthur

• Long and major disagreements over: relative strategic importance of Asia and Europe, use a nuclear weapons in the Korean War, whether or not the UA should further provoke Communist China
• Truman: committed to limited war in Korea
• MacArthur: spoiling for an al out fight against Communist China
• Clashed as early as August 1950
• MacArthur issued an unauthorized statement on the need for the US to defend Taiwan
• Truman subsequently said he should have sacked MacArthur then and there
• December 1950, MacArthur told journalists that Asia was the main Cold War battleground and that “limited” war was wrong
• Spring 1951, MacArthur committed two acts of insubordination that saw him relieved of command:

MacArthur and Truman’s Peace Initiative

• March 51, Truman administration recognized that the war had stalemated, and under pressure from Western allies, was willing to discuss peace
• Truman made it clear no one was to release policy statements without State Department clearance, because the situation was highly delicate
• Felt when MacArthur then issued a “communiqué” that publicly insulted China, he had sabotaged Truman’s plans

MacArthur’s message to Congress

• This was MacArthur’s second act of insubordination
• Spring 1951, sent a letter to Republican congressman Joseph W. Martin and gave Martin permission to read it out in Congress
• MacArthur wrote that “if we lose this war to Communism in Asia” the fall of Europe would inevitably follow
• Letter made it very clear that he opposed Containment (which he likened to appeasement) and policy of limited war in Korea
• In allowing this letter to be read out, MacArthur violated the JCS directive of 6^th December 1950
• Said that all government officials had to obtain clearance before they published any comments on the war
• April 1951, Truman relieved MacArthur of his command in the Far East

US Public Opinion

• Chinese intervention in the Korean War dramatically affected American public opinion
• Public support for Korean War was initially great
• US/UN/ROK retreat polarized it
• Some turned against Truman’s way of waging the war
• December 1950, Republican Senator William Knowland, whose support for Jieng Jieshi earned him the nickname “Senator from Formosa”
• General Curtis (Mr Atom Bomb) LeMay supported MacArthur in demanding tougher actions against China
• Others turned against the war itself
• Chinese took Seoul in 1951, a poll revealed that 49% of Americans felt sending troops to Korea had been a mistake, and 66% believed the US should abandon South Korea
• Truman had no intention of getting out
• Truman and the JCS told MacArthur:
• “ It is important to United States prestige worldwide, to the future of UN and NATO organisations, and to efforts to organize anti-Communist resistance in Asia that Korea not to be evacuated unless actually forced by military considerations, and that maximum practicable punishment be inflicted on Communist aggressors”
• Overall, American public opinion had played a very important part in the war:
• Truman had entered the war in June 1950 partly because he feared looking “soft” on Communism
• Truman decided upon crossing the 38^th parallel partly because he anticipated a public outcry if he failed to follow up the US/UN/ROK advantage
• Main reason Truman took so long to relieve MacArthur was the general’s popularity back home
• Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur further damaged popularity

Why was MacArthur sacked in April 1951

CLASHES WITH RIDGWAY

• MacArthur tried to claim credit for starting Operation Killer
• Earned great praise in WW2
• Willing to challenge MacArthur
• Thorough and imaginative
• Troops liked him- called him “Iron Tits”- made them feel cared for
• Kept officers on their toes- sacked one who give him a plan for a 2^nd retreat to the Pusan Perimeter
• Criticized war of attrition
• 55 year old

MILITARY FAILURES

• Spent most of the war in Japan
• Overconfident that the Chinese would never intervene in Korea then mismanaged their onslaught
• Did not relieve ineffective officers
• Lost Pyangyang
• Broadcast plans
• Wouldn’t allow retreat
• Trapped at Chosin
• Behind the 38^th parallel by early December 1950
• Chinese were caught up in the same kind of optimistic military momentum that had encouraged the Americans to cross the 38^th parallel in September 1950
• In January 1951 the Chinese crossed the 38^th parallel into South Korea- “just walking there” would take it, said Peng, the top Chinese general
• Nearly half a million Chinese drove toward Seoul, in the vicinity of which were American, ROK, British, British Commonwealth, Greek and Filipino forces
• Chinese aimed at the ROK forces, whose panicky retreat shocked Ridgway
• Seoul was lost to the Communists yet again, and 100s and 1000s of South Korean refugees poured southward for the second time in six months

DISAGREEMENTS WITH TRUMAN OVER OBJECTIVE

• Wanted to destroy North Korea, unleash Jiang Jieshi’s forces on China and institute an American blockade of China
• Wanted to use Jiang Jieshi’s forces- Truman did not
• Wanted atomic weapons
• Long term disagreements over the relative strategic importance of Asia and Europe, the use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War, whether or not the US should further provoke Communist China

JCS FEARS

• MacArthur’s fighting the Chinese increased scale of war
• Feared escalation

NUCLEAR

• Insubordination
• Issued an unauthorized statement on the need for the US to defend Tawain - Truman made it very clear that no one was to release policy statements- MacArthur issued a communiqué that publically insulted China
• Told not to use US troops near Chinese border
• MacArthur told journalists that Asia was the main Cold War Battleground-limited war was wrong, 1951 sent a letter to Republican congressman Joseph W. Martin
• And gave Martin permission to read it out in Congress, letter criticizing Containment
• TOO POWERFUL
• Command of the US forces in the Pacific
• His great prestige
• Role in Japan, publicly attacking the president’s wartime policies, openly criticizing Truman
• Command of UNC combined to make it difficult for any politician or military leader to oppose him

Impact of Truman’s Dismissal of MacArthur

ON THE KOREAN WAR:

• Demonstrated Truman’s commitment to limited war
• Truman had rejected MacArthur’s desire to enter into a full scale war with China
• War was now unlikely to severely develop
• Stabilised relationship with China

ON US FOREIGN POLICY:

• Demonstrated Truman’s commitment to his doctrine of containment of Communsim and limited war
• Signalled that Western Europe remained vital to US security, as JCS chairman Omar Bradley attested before Congress in May 1951
• Bradley denied that China was the greatest threat to the US
• Soviet Union greatest enemy and Europe biggest prize
• Korean War had shifted the storm centre of the Cold War from Europe to Asia

ON TRUMAN DOMESTICALLY:

• MacArthur was VERY popular in America
• Truman’s approval rating sank as MacArthur and his admirers engaged in dramatic and emotional farewell
• 2 million Japanese people lined his route to the airport
• Met by over half a million supporters in San Fran
• Given a record breaking ticker tape parade in NYC
• An unprecedented 3249 tons of ticker tape thrown for MacArthur in his triumphant motorcade through the city
• Very famous and genuinely good speech to Congress: gained impressive and repeated Congressional applause
• Truman received 27,000 letters and telegrams, vast majority of which were critical
• Over 100,000 letters reached Congress demanding Truman’s impeachment
• Successfully asserted the constitutional principle of presidential control over the military
• Senator MacArthur called Truman a “son of a bitch”
• Blamed the firing on Truman’s Missouri friends: all “stoned on bourbon and Benedictine”

Support for MacArthur’s Dismissal

• Some contemporaries supported Truman
• Democrat Senator Robert Kerr: “I do not know how many thousands American GIs are sleeping in unmarked graves in North Korea. But most of them are silent but immutable evidence of the tragic mistake of “The Magnificent MacArthur” who told them that the Chinese Communists just across the Yalu would not intervene”
• Leading newspapers felt that the President had preserved the constitutional principle of civilian control over the military
• JCS fully supported Truman, fearing that MacArthur might deliberately provoke an incident in order to widen the war into an all-out conflict between the US and Communist China
• JCS position was evident in the congressional hearings on the war in May 1951
• JCS Chairman Omar Bradley explained that he disagreed with MacArthur over the importance of China
• Secretary of Defence George Marshall registered his disapproval of MacArthur’s rejection of a limited war strategy
• After the JCS testimonies, the MacArthur controversy died down

Assessing MacArthur

• “Humiliated, debased, overwhelmed and routed”

Reasons for stalemate Summer 51-Summer 53

• Terrain suited trench warfare
• Failure of Chinese offensive 22^nd April
• Sides equally matched
• Americans and Soviets unwilling to unleash full military
• War prolonged by slow process of peace talks
• Prior to spring 1951, the Korean War had been characterized by rapid advances and retreats
• Between June 1950- March 1951 Seoul changed hands 5 times
• 22^nd April Chinese launched another offensive on South Korea but the cost in lives was too high
• 12,000 Chinese troops died on the 1^st day alone
• Combatants’ front lines stabilized near the 38^th parallel
• Dug in and engaged in trench warfare
• Americans had by far the more advanced technology and weaponry
• Chinese had seemingly inexhaustible supply of manpower
• Americans and Soviets were unwilling to use their full military capability
• Ridgway’s replacement, General Matt Clark, wanted to attack Chinese Manchuria and use atomic weapons in order to end the stalemate
• Washington rejected this
• Soviets were even more careful
• While encouraging the Chinese efforts (in December 1950, Stalin urged Mao to “liberate Seoul”) the Soviets always limited their own involvement.
• Stalin gave Kim war materiel, advisers and Soviet pilots to fly Soviet planes, he kept Soviet troops and the Soviet navy out of the conflict
• War was further prolonged by the slow progress in the peace talks that took place between 1951-53
• Bitter fighting continued and it was concluded that two soldiers died for every minute the peace talks were on

Why were the combatants willing to discuss peace?

• May 1951 Secret Contact US/ Soviets/ China indicating US willingness to end the conflict along the 38^th parallel
• Broadcasts by Soviets and China
• US: Costs of war, Changing public opinion, Pressure from America’s allies, Accusation of chemical weapons were damaging America’s reputation, Fear of escalation, May 1951, General Bradley told congress that China was not the greatest threat – needed to have troops available for Europe
• Eisenhower-President from January 1953: Eisenhower promised Rhee financial aid and defence if S. Korea was attacked, He repeatedly said he was prepared to use atomic weapons to end the war quickly, and American public opinion supported him in that
• USSR: Stalin died March 1953, Georgy Malenkov emphasized peaceful co-existence and wanted to reduce the risk of war, focus shifted to new leadership rather than Asia
• China: 85,000 casualties in spring/summer offensives 1951, China about to begin first Five Year Plan- needed to redirect resources away from military spending (48% of budget in 1951), UN embargo on sale of goods to and from China
• North Korea: Kim realised he was not going to achieve unification, North Korean morale “at breaking point by the summer of 1953”, national income had dropped by third, inflation and food shortages, attacks on N Korea from May 1953 caused major problems in the countryside, particularly the attacks on 20 dams, Toksan Dam near Pyongyang flooded rice fields and submerged 70 villages. Famine and political unrest
• Peace: Chinese conceded POWs could go to a neutral state, important work done by George Kennan and the Soviet ambassador to the UN Jacob Malik, agreements for an armistice concluded 16 June 1953, but Rhee opposed much of the compromises made at Panmunjom- fierce fighting. US responded with intensified air war
• WAR “ENDED” 27^TH JULY 1953

Why was Peace so Slow?

• Mao’s initial demands December 1950:
• UN/US forces out of Korea
• US 7^th fleet to leave Taiwan
• Communist China allowed a seat at the UN
• Failure of spring 1951 offensive made China more amenable- requested an armistice June 1951 that would remove most of the US troops from Korea
• Took two years to finally sign the armistice
• Military negotiators rather than diplomats
• Both sides determined to “win the peace”
• Distrust and one-up-man-ship: had to move talks from Kaesong to Panmunjom.
• Both sides used lulls in the fighting to modernize forces/ tactics
• Peter Lowe: Americans were simplistic, Communists inflexible and Rhee obstructive
• Truman: wanted to give Chinese POWs a free choice about whether to return to China
• Breakdown of Talks: August 1951- late October 1951, “Operation Strangle” May 1951 and Summer 1952, US escalation of air attacks on North Korea to attempt to make China more amenable, but attacks on civilian targets and use of napalm made Mao less inclined to co-operate
• Each side was anxious not to give the other any advantage
• June 1951, both the Americans and the Chinese issued public statements about the desirability of ending the conflict, but the Chinese suggested laying down arms and then talking, while the Americans feared that China would use such a pause to prepare for another offensive and said agreement on armistice terms had to precede the cessation of hostilities
• Time taken up with saving face
• Bitterness engendered by the war made it difficult for the participants to agree on peace
• Ridgway worked hard to ensure that Chinese “face” was satisfied, but he found the process repugnant
• Americans simplistic, Communists inflexible and Rhee obstructive
• US considered replacing Rhee
• American position hardened as the negotiations wore on
• NSC originally hoped to continue to inflict heavy losses upon the Chinese that would stop them causing trouble elsewhere
• Republicans such as Senator Knowland pressed Truman to adopt MacArthur style policies
• Acheson wanted to build up the South Korean Army to assist in America’s global containment of Communism and did not want to alienate Rhee
• Summer 1952, US greatly escalated its air attacks on North Korea
• Hoping to making China more amenable
• Bombing of a dam and power station and multiple bombings of Pyongyang made Mao less inclined to cooperate
• Stalin prolonged the war by pressuring Mao and Kim to continue as to distract the US from Europe

How was Peace Eventually Achieved?

• New leaders of the USA and the USSR had neither started nor sustained their nation’s involvement in the war
• Prestige was not at stake in the way that their predecessors’ prestige had been
• Soviet politicians wanted to focus on the succession to Stalin
• The Chinese conceded that POWs unwilling to be repatriated could be handed over to a neutral state that would decide their fate
• American public trusted Eisenhower’s judgment in matters of war
• Eisenhower effectively bought off Rhee by offering him financial aid and a promise to defend South Korea if attacked but not help South Korea if it attacked North Korea
• Eisenhower administration and some historians believed that Eisenhower repeatedly saying that he was prepared to use atomic weapons helped to persuade the Chinese to sign the armistice
• Much credit was due to backroom talks at the UN between George Kenna and the Soviet ambassador to the UN, Jacob Malik
• Talks, away from public posturing characteristic of many peace negotiations, did important groundwork for the eventual armistice

The Impact of the Korean War for participants

NORTH KOREA + SOUTH KOREA:

• North Korea lost $1.7 billion in property
• War now very unlikely to repeat
• Kim Il Sung led a large negotiation for long term military economic and cultural cooperation between the DPKR and DRC
• Country remained divided
• Economic downfall
• South Korea lost $2 billion in property
• Koreans themselves were the losers, Koreans were TOTALLY involved
• 3 million killed, missing, wounded

THE UN:

• Made them seem weak and incapable
• Reached their peak in June 1953
• Rose to 23,161 for the month
• Did not enhance their reputation

USSR:

• Position as world leader of Communism suffered notable setback
• Sent a message suggesting failure to intercede by providing direct support for N. Korea

US DOMESTIC POLICIES:

• As casualties rose, Truman’s popularity fell
• 7 fold increase in defence spending
• Levels of military spending would have to be maintained
• Concerns over the possibility of having to fight future wars to prevent Communism spreading
• Disillusionment
• Had militarized the USA, leading to a 7 fold increase in defence spending
• Desertions by US troops increased massively in 1952
• As casualties mounted so did Truman’s unpopularity
• Never regained the popularity he once had
• Congress voted to spend $10 billion on the army in 1950 and an additional $260 million was earmarked for the development of the Hydrogen Bomb
• Recommendations of NSC-68 implemented
• Unhealthy degree of economic dislocation
• Militarization in the conduct of affairs
• Skewing political decision making due to the political influence of the defence industry
• Strengthened the powerful interests of the military industrial complex to the point where by 1954, Eisenhower raised concern
• Truman accused of being “too soft” on Communism

US FOREIGN POLICY:

• Sent a message to Communist leaders that the USA was willing to make a stand
• Hardening in the US government’s determination towards the commitment of combating Communism
• Achieved the aim of deterring aggression and prevented the overthrow of Syngman Rhee
• Shown credentials as leader of the free world
• Success in Korea led to failure in Vietnam

Wider Impact of the Korean War

• General Examples of the Impact on International Relations:
• US involvement in Vietnam until 1975
• The rearmament of Japan and West Germany
• The Sino-American hostility that kept Communist China out of the UN for 2 decades
• Soviet American arms race
• Strengthening of the Sino-Soviet alliance
• Development of the non-aligned movement

Non-alignment

• Koreans viewed themselves as victims following the war
• Korean War encouraged many other nations emerging from colonialism to avoid a similar fate
• Complex relationship between independent Asian and African nations and Cold War
• Cold War hastened decolonization: imperialist powers such as Britain, France and the Netherlands already weakened by the Second World War, faced great and successful American pressure to increase their defence expenditure and to grant their colonies independence
• Cold War perpetuated Western attempts to dominate Asia, as with US involvement in Vietnam
• Those struggling to free themselves from Western colonialist masters and their capitalism found the Communist ideology more appealing
• Many didn’t want to have to chose Cold War sides
• Some 3^rd World leaders aimed at non-alignment and a good relationship with both East and West
• Sought economic and technological aid from as many countries as possible and felt that Cold War divisions would hamper their progress
• First international indication of this mindset came at Bandung

The Bandung Conference

• April 1955, many of the newly independent countries and nationalist movements in Africa and Asia sent representatives to a conference at Bandung in Indonesia
• Moving force behind the organization of the conference was Burma, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia and Pakistan
• 29 Countries represented at Bandung constituted nearly half of the world’s population
• Conference aimed to promote five guiding principles in international relations: sovereignty, independence, equality, non-aggression, non-interference in the affairs of other nations
• Principles promoted by Nehru and were clearly aimed against intervention of Cold War protagonists
• Participants at Bandung declared their opposition to:
• Racism
• Colonialism
• Soviet-American expenditure on nuclear weapons while much of the rest of the world suffered from poverty and needed aid
• Hoped that the increased Afro-Asian economic co-operation would decrease Third World economic dependence upon the great powers
• Nehru thought dialogue with China would be more helpful than isolation and at his insistence and despite the reservations of the many participants who faced Communist insurgencies, China was invited to Bandung
• Chinese had already declared their acceptance of Nehru’s 5 principles in an April 1954 Sino-Indian trade agreement and Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai made a favourable impression at Bandung
• Seemed moderate and accommodating as when he signed the declaration that Chinese living overseas owed their first loyalty to the nation where they lived and not to Mao’s China
• First major meeting of the developing nations
• Demonstrated the resentment that many newly emerging nations felt about Soviet and Western policies in areas such as Asia
• Bandung demonstrated the difficulty of a large number of countries attempting to gain agreement:
• North Korea and South Korea were not invited: seen as potentially diverse
• Conference implicitly criticized the Soviets when it denounced “colonialism in all of its manifestations”
• Proved difficult to reconcile the conflicting feelings of participants about the West and the Cold War
• US had feared that the Bandung conference would demonstrate and increase antagonism towards the West
• Presence of pro-Western nations such as Japan and Philippines helped modify anti-Western sentiments of some of those who attended
• Difficulties in agreement meant that from Soviet and American perspectives, Bandung had no adverse impact on the Cold War

Response to Bandung

• Within weeks of the conference, Nehru visited the USSR and obtained Soviet acceptance of his 5 principles
• Khrushchev also visited India
• Americans inspired to take greater interest in, and provide more aid for, developing nations
• Seen as forerunner of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
• NAM still hampered by divisions between participants

Non-Alignment post Bandung

• September 61, Yugoslavia, India and Egypt led a meeting of non-aligned leaders in Belgrade
• Yugoslavia and Egypt were uneasy about the strong anti-Western positions of China and Indonesia
• Helped development of the idea of a 3^rd World independent of the Soviet and American bllocs
• Movement more popular in the 1970s
• Post war bipolar world order had declined

Summary of Long Term Impact

• Encouraged US involvement in Vietnam to 1975
• Japan and Germany rearmed
• Generated Sino-American hatred and exclusion of China from UN until 1971
• Accelerated Soviet-American arms race

The Vietnam War

France and Indochina

• By 1887, Vietnam, Cambodia & Laos were under the control of the French. Puppet emperors were established
• Exploitative rule, particularly in the resource-rich Southern part around Saigon which was directly ruled and known as Cochin China
• This area was the most “French” and developed a wealthy Vietnamese middle class
• Moderate reformers developed in that class but were ignored
• Indochina was dominated by the Japanese during WW2
• Further damaged the reputations of the French and of the emperor Bao Dai
• Pushes reformers towards extremists

The Viet Minh

• Revolutionary League for the Independence of Vietnam, established 1941, had 2 main aims:
• Independence from foreign domination
• Social reform- more equal redistribution of wealth and power
• Ruthless but cared about the peasantry
• Led by Ho Chi Minh- the Viet Minh worked with other nationalist groups to fight against the Japanese
• STRONG CULTURE OF GUERILLA WARFARE
• America valued the assistance of the Viet Minh- Viet Minh very strong fighting force- relations were cordial
• Ho hoped to gain American support for independence as FDR was very anti-colonial
• Ho declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 2^nd September 1945, quoting the American Declaration of Independence and Roosevelt
• Between October 45 and February 46- 8 friendly messages from Ho to Washington were ignored
• Clashes with the French had begun within days of the declaration with Britain transporting French troops, and Truman unwilling to alienate the French
• Jan 1850, having failed to obtain American recognition in return for Cold War neutrality, Ho persuaded China and the USSR to recognize his country
• Ho Chi Minh is NOT a hard line communist- advocates FREEDOM more than anything else

Why Did the USA Start Supporting the French

• Developing Cold War had led the Truman administration to conclude that Ho was probably Stalin’s puppet
• BUT the USSR still recognized French rule over Vietnam so that is a very misplaced assumption
• Also some State Department specialists pointed out in 1948 that Ho had made friendly gestures to America and that the Vietnamese Communists were not subservient to Moscow
• The US saw Vietnam as a Cold War battleground
• Failed to see that Ho Chi Minh’s supporters sought social justice and national sovereignty
• 1949-50 winter, propelled Truman towards aiding the French in Indochina
• Because the Communist threat had greatly increased when China became Communist in Oct 1949
• Truman was:
• Under attack from the Republicans for “losing” China and from Senator McCarthy for supposedly harboring Communists in the State department
• Informed by the JCS that the world power balance was at state in SE Asia, where there were strategically vital materials such as rubber and American allies such as Japan and Australia that might be vulnerable to Communist attack
• French puppet state in South Vietnam so Truman was under pressure from France
• French claimed Ho to be part of the Communist conspiracy led by Moscow, French linked cooperation with US in Europe to US aid in Vietnam
• Red Scare
• China supplying for the Viet Minh

Summary by the end of Truman’s presidency

• Truman gave $2 billion in military aid
• Was paying nearly 80% of the French bill
• $50 million in economic aid
• MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group) in Saigon

Why Did the French leave Indochina in 1954?

• Mainly due to the STRENGTHS OF VIET MINH
• HO:
• Seen as a patriot
• Cared about the ordinary people
• Fairer redistribution of land etc
• US noted unpopularity of Bao Dai
• GENERAL GIAP:
• Willingly suffered for country and freedom
• Self criticism sessions
• Trained and commanded VM forces from 1944- 5000 of them
• 19520 militia nearing 2 million
• From age of 13, French seen as a threat
• Strategy was to start with guerilla warfare to wear down the enemy and then more set piece battles
• ARMY TACTICS AND MORALE:
• Guerilla
• Utilised physical geography
• Fought for an inspiring cause: Vietnamese freedom and social justice
• The army CARED
• SUPPORT FOR PEASANTRY:
• Each army division was supported by 40,000 porters carrying rice or ammunition along jungle trails and other mountain passes- mainly unmarried women
• Giap paid great attention to winning over the ordinary people and his soldiers followed his rules when dealing with civilians:
• Be polite and fair
• Do not bully
• Do not fraternize with women
• Try not to cause damage, if you do pray for it
• Very similar to Mao’s 8 rules of conduct
• SUPPORT FROM CHINA:
• Gave diplomatic recognition, armaments, advice and sanctuary in China if Vietnamese soldiers were in trouble
• Supplied with weapons
• Also due to FRENCH WEAKNESSES
• LACK OF SUPPORT FOR BAO DAI:
• French puppet
• Wanted effective leadership
• Lack of support
• Government had no appeal to masses
• Unpopular
• Exasperated with his foreign collaboration
• PROBLEMS IN THE ARMY:
• 0 morale
• Tried “yellowing” their army- enlisting native Vietnamese, new recruits not trusted given little responsibility
• LOSS OF SUPPORT AT HOME:
• Many people were beginning to lose heart and interest in Indochina
• Needed justification for being there
• As civil war dragged on it became clear to the French that victory was impossible against a guerilla force that was often difficult to locate

Battle of Dien Bien Phu

• France attempted to draw the Viet Minh into open warfare to bring about a heavy defeat and easier peace negotiations- General Henri Navarre
• In order to force them to the negotiating table and secure a compromise which would allow the French to withdraw with some honour
• Heavily fortified French strongfield at Dien Bien Phu
• French were outnumbered and outgunned
• THEY FAILED: Giap surrounded the 13,000 French with 50,000 well-armed Vietminh and heavy guns which had been dismantled and carried into the hills by volunteers
• French pressure on US to initiate air strikes against the Viet Minh, but Eisenhower resisted
• Why- Eisenhower had been elected on the basis of ending the Korean War in 1953
• Certainly adversely affected his chances of gaining a second term in office
• US had still become more heavily involved in the region, even overcoming its anti-colonial beliefs in order to contain Communism
• Britain refused to support it
• Fighting had just ended in Korea
• US wanted to maintain anti-colonial image
• NSC decided against immediate intervention-to wait for the Geneva Conference
• 7^th May the French surrendered after 55 days of resistance

Geneva Accords

• A truce between the French and Vietminh
• Temporarily divided Vietnam the 17^th parallel, with the Viet Minh leading the North and the French in the South
• Elections to be held in July 1956 to reunify the country
• No foreign alliances/ foreign troops on Vietnamese soil
• The US agreed to respect but not to sign the agreements, and chose to misinterpret the ceasefire line as a permanent division

Results of Geneva Accords

• Bao Dai installed the staunchly anti-Communist Ngo Dinh Diem as P.M. as an attempt to win further US support
• By Oct 1954, the French were no longer prepared to work with Diem and withdrew from Vietnam
• SEATO was a direct result of the perceived failure at Geneva and protocol agreed to protect South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos

Extent of US involvement between 1950-54

• To strengthen the Bao Dai government and increase its popular appeal between 1950 and 52, the US spent more than $50 million on economic and technical assistance
• US experts provided seeds and fertilizer to increase agricultural production
• Introduced health programmes aimed at reducing malaria and distributed health care to refugees coming to the South from the North
• US administration insisted that all the aid should go directly to local government
• Largely, as a result of French obstructionism, the aid programme touched only a small number of the people
• A small US Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) had been sent to Vietnam to assist in the training of the VNA (Vietnamese National Army) as well as providing bombers, cargo planes, tanks, naval craft, automatic weapons, arms and ammunition, hospitals and engineering equipment
• Between 50-54 it is estimated that the US investment in the war reached approximately $3 billion
• Despite US aid and military support to contain the war, by 52 the conflict had spilled into Laos and Thailand
• Represented an even greater threat to stability in Indochina

Domino Theory

• China > Korea > Vietnam > Laos > Cambodia > Thailand > Malaysia > Indonesia > Burma > India
• Dwight Eisenhower, President from Jan 1953 coined the “domino theory: to justify increasing his commitment to containing Communism in Vietnam
• By 1954 America had spent $3 billion supporting the French
• “Sometime we must face up to it; we cannot go on losing areas of the free world forever”

Which did more to end the French Colonial Government in Indochina?

Eisenhower’s Support for Ngo Dinh Diem

• Diem slid into a leadership due to a leadership vacuum- most other potential leaders either supported the Viet Minh, had been killed or left politics
• He rejected nationwide elections
• Diem ruthlessly rigged the elections he called in October 1955 (against Bao Dai) to make himself undisputed leader of South Vietnam (claimed 98.2% of the vote)
• Impressed, Eisenhower increased aid to his regime
• Nation Building= aimed to ensure that Diem promoted social reform and economic development to win popular support for the regime- US policy until 1960
• Diem preferred to use the financial aid to strengthen his personal power and ignored the advice of US advisers
• Direct military aid from 1955, training for ARVN, USA’s Colonel Edward Lonsdale sent to advise Diem on consolidating power, other advisers followed
• US government had failed to prevent Diem’s regime acting in a manner that actually lost support
• OUTBREAK OF COMMUNIST GUERILLA ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM IN 1957

Why was Diem so Unpopular

• REPRESSIVE DICTATORSHIP:
• Nepotism
• Brothers who ruled provinces as local dictators
• Arrested and executed thousands of Southern Communists in activists in open revolts
• RELIGION:
• Repressive to Buddhists
• Cao Dai- national religion off shoot of Buddhism- and Hoa Hoa sects crushed- leaders executed in the 1950s
• Diem was a strict Catholic in a country where non-Catholics were the majority
• LACK OF REFORM:
• North: Land was distributed to the peasantry
• Ensured a decent source of income for majority of population
• South: Diem demanded payment fro land peasants had been given by Viet Minh in war against the French
• Land reform was limited- used as a device to reward rich Catholic supporters
• Peasantry made up about 5% of the South population
• Became alienated

By the End of 1960:

• Diem had received around $7 billion in US aid
• There were 685 US advisers in South Vietnam
• 4000 NLF guerillas were waging a terror campaign in the South
• Over 400 of Diem’s officials had been assassinated
• An attempt had been made by the ARVN to remove Diem from power
• North Vietnamese had declared a “People’s War” to unite the country and created the Ho Chi Minh Trail to send men and supplies to the South via Laos

Critiques of Eisenhower’s Policy

• Eisenhower set up America to only be able to be military involved due to their support of a corrupt government
• Clear that Eisenhower’s actions were directly against the Geneva Accords
• Made Vietnam more important than it actually was and made the situation inescapable
• BUT must remember that he rejected making the war atomic

Eisenhower and Laos

• French returned to Laos with minimal opposition
• Franco-Vietminh war led to Vietminh entering NE Laos where they worked with the Pathet Lao
• By 1954 Geneva Conference: the Pathet Lao independence movement controlled about half of Laos
• Eisenhower anxious about Laos
• Laos had no nationalist pre-war independence movement
• Small opposition group developed during the war under Prince Souphanouvong
• Group took refuge in the jungle and maintained close contact with the Viet Minh
• Franco-Viet Minh war, Viet Minh sought sanctuary in Northern Eastern Laos, where they worked closely with the Laotian Communists: Pathet Lao
• After Laotian independence was confirmed under the Geneva Accords, the Pathet Lao rejected suggestions that they integrate with Royal Lao Army
• Eisenhower administration incorporated Laos in SEATO
• Sent in billions of dollars in military aid and advisers to assist pro- Western Laotian politicians and generals
• Winter of 1959-60 States gave considerable aid to General Phoumi Nosavan
• By that time, 3 factions were engaged in Laotian Civil War:
• General Phoumi’s pro-Western group
• The Communist Pathet Lao
• Neutralists who sought to keep out of the Cold War
• Soviets and Chinese assisted Pathet Lao and neutralists and forces against General Phoumi’s and supplied troops
• By 1961, Pathet Lao seemed on verge of victory
• “We cannot let Laos fall to the Communists even if we have to fight… with our allies or without him”
• President- elect Kennedy met outgoing President Eisenhower in Jan 1961- Kennedy said Laos topped his list of 8 areas of foreign and defence policy importance.”
• Eisenhower told Kennedy that Laos was “the cork in the bottle”- vital domino
• US had to preserve independence in face of Chinese, North Vietnamese and Soviet domination
• Eisenhower advised Kennedy not to opt for neutralisation
• Would simply have to act alone

Why Did He Feel Pressure to Intervene?

• Perceived it to be a greater threat than the UN did
• Urged by the State Department, CIA, JCS and Close Advicsers
• Eisenhower’s Advice would have also played a big role in Kennedy’s decision making

Why Didn’t He Send in Troops?

ISSUES WITH LAOS:

• Landlocked, Laos was relatively inaccessible
• Leader of the pro-American faction, Phoumi was unpopular- “total shit”

PUBLIC OPINION:

• Knew the American people and important allies opposed the idea
• Not enough soldiers and aircraft limited

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT:

• Congress feared intervention might lead to a clash with China
• US involvement in unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Castro

Can Laos be Considered a Success?

• May 1961: Soviets suggested a ceasefire then agreed with the Americans that Laos should be neutralized in the Cold War
• Different Laotian factions continued to fight
• October 1961, Kennedy sent 300 US military advisers to assist Phoumi, emboldened general to provoke a battle with the Pathet Lao at Nam Tha in May 1962- believing Americans would send support
• Forces did badly- one of his US military advisers saw cause for hope
• Kennedy moved 300 US troops to Thailand which prompted the Soviets to quickly reaffirm their support for a neutral Laos
• July 1962, Laotians agreed to a coalition government under Souvanna Phouma
• 16 nations (USA and USSR) signed declaration on the neutrality of Laos but that was not the end of the story for Kennedy
• Although Kennedy withdrew around 600 members of the US armed forces from Laos after the Geneva Conference of 1962
• 7000 or so North Vietnamese forces there did not leave
• US quickly initiated another military assistance programme to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, now opposed by both the Pathet Lao and neutralists
• In contrast, the Soviets really had got out of Laos
• In July 1963, Khrushchev said: “I have no interest in Laos”
• Although the neutralisation of Laos did not cause the great Cold Warrior outcry in the United States that many in the Kennedy administration had feared, it nevertheless impacted greatly upon Kennedy’s Vietnam policies

Kennedy and Vietnam- Quick Summary:

• Became more important during Kennedy’s presidency
• Debate over Kennedy in Vietnam has become contrived and convulted by the knowledge that it became controversial under LBJ
• Supporters argue that he was trying to get them out
• Failures of perception and massive increase in military commitment

Early Ideas About Vietnam

• Agreed with Truman that the expansion of Communism must be contained
• Attacked him for losing China in 1949
• Wants to prove himself
• Believed in Domino Theory but criticized Eisenhower for allowing the rise of Communism in Third World
• “South Vietnam was an important domino, the fall of which would threaten countries such as India, Japan, Philippines, Laos and Cambodia”
• Said the country needed a president to get America moving again

Advisers, McNamara and Rusk

• Kennedy was very sensitive about his youth- made him want to seem assertive in foreign affairs
• President with much to prove
• Impatient with State Department, frequently looked to Sec of Defence: Robert McNamara for advice on Vietnam
• Naturally more inclined to see problems in terms of military solutions
• Friend and powerful personality- made him important
• McNamara’s influence was unfortunate in Vietnam
• Always had military solutions
• Commanded for efficiency but worried about his closed mindness
• Tended to look at stats rather than think about motives
• Subsequently admitted that his weakness proved disastrous
• President keen to be assertive who listened to those most likely to push for war, also very frustrated over events in Cuba and Laos
• Led to increasing US military involvement
• Commitment Trap- seeing as Eisenhower had spent $7 billion
• Failure at Bay of Pigs and in Laos led to a conviction that he had to win somewhere: Vietnam
• Suggested that advisors would only accept neutrality in Vietnam if there was an activist policy in Vietnam, long coastline- good for naval supremacy

Kennedy’s Options:

EXIT VIETNAM:

• October 54, Eisenhower told Diem that aid was dependent on Diem undertaking reforms
• 1961, US ambassador to South Vietnam Elbridge Durbow informed Kennedy that these conditions had not been met
• Could have cited this as US reason for withdrawal
• JCS warned Kennedy that any reversal of US policy could have disastrous effects on relations with allies
• Rusk and McNamara suggested it would cause him to lose face
• Give Republicans a chance to attack
• Leaving Vietnam was not given much though

PEACE:

• Opposed any meaningful negotiations unless the Saigon regime was clearly winning the war
• Kennedy sanctioned unofficial peace talks in the summer of 62
• Hanoi’s position was that America must exit before any meaningful negotiations could take place

MILITARY SOLUTIONS:

• McNamara, General Maxwell Taylon, JCS and NSC Diem’s 250,000 soldiers still couldn’t wipe out the Viet Cong
• Recommended putting US ground troops in
• At Kennedy’s accession, were around 700 military advisers in South Vietnam
• Sprayed defoliants to strip the tress and enable better aerial observation
• On the ground more and more American advisers accompanied ARVN units
• Transported troops, undertook reconnaissance missions, provided fire support for Army of Republic of Vietnam units
• American helicopter pilots were actively involved in the war
• Increasing quantities of American weaponry flooded into South Vietnam which Kennedy publically denied
• Kennedy preferred to increase the number of military advisers- 12,000 by 1962
• 1961, massive increase in American aid which seemed to be paying off:
• Unprecedented mobility provided by the helicopters proved particularly useful to Diem’s troops
• McNamara, General Maxwell Taylor, JCS and NSC recommended putting US ground troops in
• McNamara said it should be done even if It meant Chinese and Soviet intervention
• In November 1961, Kennedy sent trusted friend Kenneth Galbraith to Saigon to address the situation:
• Verdict: Political not military problem, Diem was a loser, Americans looked like French colonialists, Vietnam was not important, Increased involvement only ends in defeat and humiliation
• Battle of Ap Bac- January 1963
• Diem’s forces continued to lose ground
• Weakness and role of the US military under Kennedy was demonstrated in Ap Bac Jan’63
• VC forces located in Ap Bac near Saigon
• 2000 ARVN troops accompanied by 113 American armed personnel carriers
• American operated helicopters and bombers
• American advisers surrounded Ap Bac
• Unaware that they were as many as 350 guerillas there
• Saigon controlled 49% and VC 9% the remaining ground in dispute
• Despite ever increasing aid Diem was incapable
• Drew unprecedented attention in the US, where the South Vietnamese performance was unfavourably reviewed
• Failed due to multiple reasons:
• VC unexpectedly strong and prepared
• Americans claimed ARVN General Cao was unwilling
• Had delayed the attack to allow pilots to sleep off a heavy NYE
• Diem refused to listen to American advice on the deployment of his troops preferring to use his best CIA trained soldiers as bodyguards
• ARVN troops refused to mount a rescue mission
• ARVN troops refused to attack the Viet Cong at Ap Bac, 3 pilots lost and 5 US helicopters lost

REFORM:

• Kennedy administration frequently advised Diem that one of the best ways to defeat the Communists was to introduce greater, political, social and economic equality to South Vietnam
• Diem ignored the advice
• Increased coverage in American press about Diem’s ineptitude
• Not questioning involvement just tactics and results
• Spring 1963, relations between Diem and US very tense
• He resented their advice
• The shared Catholicism between Kennedy and Diem played a big part in Kennedy’s support
• Catholics were the minority
• 1962, Diem introduced strategic hamlets, fortified villages in which the Vietnamese peasants would be isolated from the VC
• Operation Sunrise- effectively building prison camps
• Years later it was revealed that Nhu’s deputy was a Communist
• VC frequently joined other residents and played on their discontent at having to pay for and build the stockades
• Strategic Hamlet scheme run by the unpopular Ngo Dinh Nhu
• Nhu ignored American advice about introducing social, economic and political reforms within the hamlets and about where to establish them
• USA provided the building materials but Nhu took these supplies and made the peasants pay
• 70% of peasants had to pay for building materials
• Nov 61, Kennedy’s negotiator over Laos, Averell Harriman told the President that Diem’s regime was repressive, dictatorial and unpopular
• America should not stake its prestige in Vietnam

REPLACE DIEM:

• Jan 1963, State Department report had said the US lacked vision and planning in its Vietnam
• Recommended appointment of strong ambassadors
• Rusk told newly appointed Ambassador Lodge that Vietnam was a great burden to the president and that he should be tough, act as a catalyst and not to refer questions to Washington
• Lodge was convinced that the US had to help SV by removing Diem
• Anti-Diem group in Kennedy administration agreed that Diem must go unless he initiated dramatic change
• Kennedy criticized Saigon regime in September- Diem “out of touch with his people”
• Needed to be a change but shouldn’t remove troops due to DOMINO
• September 1963, sent more observers
• Reported optimistically on US military efforts but negatively on Diem’s regime
• Nhu was negotiating with Hanoi
• Diem resisted American pressure to remove him
• Bobby Kennedy floated the idea that it was perhaps time to get out but this was ignored

Catholics vs Buddhists

• Spring 1963, Diem allowed the flying of Catholic flags to honour his birthday but didn’t allowe flags for the Buddha’s birthday
• 10,000 Buddhists protested- Diem sent in soldiers
• 7 Buddhists were killed
• June 63 Buddhist priest- 73 year old, set himself alight in protest
• Flesh burned away leaving only his heart, became an object of worship to the Buddhist majority
• Protest made headlines in America
• Other such deaths followed and Nhu’s unpopular wife made things worse through references to BBQs
• Kennedy pretended to not know
• Possibly just deflecting the blame, if not then he was STUPID
• August, Diem effectively waging war against the Buddhist majority
• Kennedy thought it time to replace Ambassador Frederick Notting (unknowledgeable about Asia) with Henry Cabot Lodge II

Diem’s Assassination

• Absence of firm leadership in Washington as Lodge had considerable control over US policy in Vietnam
• Turned Congress and American public opinion against Diem and Nhu through press leaks
• Happy to learn of an ARVN plot against Nhu
• Coup occurred on 2^nd November 1963, collusion from Lodge
• Diem and Nhu found dead
• Claimed that they thought it was just a coup
• POSSIBLE GET OUT MOMENT: America helped organize new government so stuck again

Following Kennedy’s Assassination:

• LBJ left with a military force of 16000 advisors
• Belief that a non-Communist government in S Vietnam was vital to global interests of the US
• US now assumed direct responsibility for the South Vietnamese government
• Situation far more dangerous than the one Kennedy had inherited from Eisenhower

Verdict on Kennedy:

• Kennedy administration was presented with a number of oppurtunities to reduce military escalation
• Call for international conference in 1962 by Vietminh- supported by China, on the neutralisation of Vietnam
• Successful resolution of Cuban Missile Crisis
• Buddhist Crisis
• Chose to defend because he believed the Communists posed a real challenge to US global position
• Tantamount to surrender to Sov Un and China
• 1961, strategy of counterinsurgency – hoped to contain the communist threat
• DID OPPOSITE
• Escalated the war
• Forcing LBJ to do the same
• Successes: Seemed like an effective leader, counteracting Communism, still no troops
• Failures: Didn’t help, America had adopted the policy of treating every Asian Domino as the same
• ARVN still weak
• Escalated the war
• Ignored obvious oppurtunities to exit
• Turned leaving Vietnam into something of a weakness

Why Did Johnson Escalate Involvement

• 1964, 56000 Viet Cong guerillas in the South, aided by NVA coming in from the North along the Ho Chi Minh
• Defence Secretary Robert McNamara= had urged Kennedy to send in troops
• US Military Commander in Vietnam: Lt Gen William Westmoreland
• Both saw success in Vietnam as essential to the US’s global prestige and Johnson’s reputation
• Ho Chi Minh trial: peasants on bicycles, huge effort from the general population, story of true resilience
• Patriotism
• Domino Theory
• Believed Ho Chi Minh was another Hitler, appeasement doesn’t work
• “Commitment trap”
• Felt he had to continue Kennedy’s policies- McNamara and Rusk, no new ideas
• Influence of generals who wanted to win the only war they were in
• Escalating problems in South Vietnam- by early 1964, Diem’s replacement Minh had been replaced by Khanh, US air power increasingly ineffective, VC controlled about half of South Vietnam
• Anti- Aircraft Missiles against America
• July 1964, 200 Americans had died and 2500 “advisers had been added but it was decided that swatting flies in South Vietnam was no longer enough
• “We should be going after the manure piles and bombing N Vietnam itself” (Curtis LeMay, airforce chief)

Gulf Of Tonkin Incident and Resolution

• On the 2^nd August, USS Maddox was in North Vietnamese waters, had been running survelliances, raids for 6 months etc
• Took fire and Maddox fired back sinking 1 Vietnamese destroyer and crippling 2 others
• 4^th August supposedly took bullets again
• LBJ LIED
• Told the people that it was unprovoked and both incidents happened
• 7^th August: LBJ used this to confirm containment with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
• War not officially declared but the President allowed to escalate it without the congressional support
• President allowed to take all necessary steps
• Immediate 5 hours raid on N Vietnam which helped in the following election
• Victory in the 1964 election after 1^st bombing made him look tough, had a 72% approval rate
• VC attack on US airbase near Saigon
• Working Group (Defnce and State Dpts, CIA and JCS) emphasized escalation and heavier bombing of North Vietnam

Initial Assesment of Sides

Chronology of Involvement:

• 27^th January 65: Johnson’s aides, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, sent a memo to the President stating that America’s limited military involvement was not succeeding, and that the US had reached a “fork in the road” in Vietnam and must either soon escalate or withdraw
• 6^th February 65: Viet Cong Guerillas attacked the US military compound at Pleiku in the Central Highlands, killing 8 Americans, wounding 126 and destroying 10 aircraft. Johnson agreed to sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam
• 2^nd March 65: Operation Rolling Thunder began as over 100 American fighter bombers attacked targets in North Vietnam. Scheduled to last eight weeks, Rolling Thunder would instead go on for three years
• 8^th March 65: The 1^st US combat troops arrived in Vietnam when 3500 Marines landed at China Beach to defend the American air base at Da Nang. They joined 23,000 American military advisors already in Vietnam
• Another military coup led to Nguyen Van Thieu (head of state) and Nguyen Cao Ky (PM) leading the country even more ineffectively
• 28^th July 65: During a noontime press conference, President Johnson announced he would send 44 combat battalions to Vietnam increasing the US military presence to 125,000 men
• December 65: Nearly 200,000 American troops were in Vietnam. 80% public support for sending US soldiers into Vietnam
• “We cannot be defeated by force of arms. We will stand in Vietnam”

US Tactics

• Johnson was fighting a limited war to support the Saigon Regime
• Bombing of South Vietnam to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail and drive VC fighters out
• Bombing of military and industrial targets in North Vietnam
• He refused calls to escalate to a full declaration of war on North Vietnam
• Why Bombing?: Desire to limit US casualties, Aim to force VC into surrender, Bombing the North in order to cease the aid access, Can’t guerilla, US tech superiority

SURGICAL BOMBING:

• Claimed to be keeping up with humanitarian rights-military and industrial bombing only but this was highly theoretical
• In reality, bombing locations of no strategic relevance
• Bombing everything to try to emulate the guerilla attrition and try to force a surrender
• More bombs (x3) than all sides put together in WW2
• Cluster bombs

NAPALM:

• Burnt you horrendously
• Destroy forests and jungle
• Famous photo of girl running with the clothes having be burnt off
• Sticks to surfaces- flammable
• Clearing out the jungle
• Inevitably on villages

DEFOLIATION: AGENT ORANGE

• Latterly left population ridden with birth defects
• Targeted rice fields- Agent Blue- starvation
• Stayed in the soil
• Clearing out the jungle
• Kill off forests- Agent Orange- dioxin- pilots and soldiers got leukemia- horrific birth defects- orphanages full of them
• WAR OF ATTRITION

REACTION? VIETNAM:

• Stiffens resolve= changed times that they treat patients for bombing= worked around the bombs- North Vietnamese constant teams to keep roads fixed

US:

• Protests, outrage, credibility gap = what people are being told and what is happening, relationship between people is jeopardized

HEARTS AND MINDS:

• NLF good at winning the hearts and minds of people= gave land, buried dead, built huts, should have worked harder on “Pacification”, Some areas where squadron’s did help= schools, positive credibility, STILL BOMBING, even in pacified areas= still support for NLF

Search and Destroy:

• General Westmoreland’s strategy was to seek out and destroy the NVA and VC forces in the South
• Doomed as he was frustrated and frightened soldiers settled on searching out villages and destroying them instead
• Zippo Raids
• Operation Cedar Falls 1967: evacuated 6000 people, defoliants, bombs and bulldozers cleared the land North of Saigon
• Only a few VC were found
• “We kill more civilians here per day than VC, either by accident or on purpose and that’s just plain murder […] We make more VC than we kill by the way these people are treated.”
• Became a bodycount war
• America claimed Search and Destroy to be civil and calm
• My Lai Massacre: 16^th March 1968
• Lieutenant William Calley= regard anyone there as VC and kill whole village
• 400 peasants killed
• On trial- got let off- public protest both ways
• Just there to destroy Communism

Problems Within The US Army:

LOW MORALE

• Drafted soldiers simply didn’t want to be there
• On helmets soldiers wrote: UUUU- Unwilling, led by the unqualified doing the unnecessary for the ungrateful
• Some felt America had no right to intervene
• Especially disproved of their treatment of civilians
• Horrible conditions, wet, hot, bugs and booby traps
• Green Berets aroused jealousy and antagonism
• Marines not keen to obey orders from the US army
• Some Americans disliked their country’s manner of waging war, confused about what they were fighting for

FRAGGING

• Unpopular officers were often shot in the back in action or had fragmentation grenades thrown at them
• Between 1969 and 1971, 730 instances of fragging
• 83 officers died
• Often just trying to get men to fight

ONE- YEAR DRAFT “CHERRIES”

• New arrivals seen as a liability
• Ordinary soldiers served for 365 days
• Marines for 13 months
• Left soldiers really inexperienced
• Short term of service meant that units never attained the feeling of unity vital to morale and performance
• Most likely to be killed in their first 3 months of draft
• Became extremely risk averse
• To be an officer- 5 months in the front line- probably less experienced than some soldiers he commanded
• Lack of camaraderie

RACIAL PROBLEMS

• African-Americans constituted 13% of Americans in Vietnam
• Disproportionate- 28% of those in combat units
• Prejudice in terms of employing black people to positions of authority
• More dangerous patrols
• Time of Civil Rights etc
• Far more likely to be drafted if poor and black
• Black soldiers wrote on helmets: “No Gook Ever Called Me Nigger”

ARVN

• Leaders appointed for political reasons – high command spent more time fighting among themselves
• Performed badly
• Distrusted by USA- Khe Sanh 1968
• Very low wages
• 80% of army were Buddhist- 5% of the army leaders were Buddhist
• Officers took pay of dead, ill and deserters
• Americans described their tactics as “search and avoid”
• Retreat in order to avoid losses, lack of true commitment
• Invasion of Laos, retreated halfway to their objective
• Compromised in the eyes of the Vietnamese people by their links to America
• Westmoreland hid nozzles to spray elite ARVN guards
• Americans frequently unwilling to use their assistance

DRUG ABUSE

• Drug abuse grew common
• 1970, estimate 58% of Americans in Vietnam smoked marijuana
• 22% used heroin
• One colonel was court marshalled for leading his squadron in pot parties
• 1971, 5000 needed treatment for combat wounds
• 20,529 for serious drug abuse
• Difficult to take action over the drug market as so many government officials in Saigon were involved
• Army discipline deteriorated
• Particularly bad under Nixon

R&R

• American desire to keep soldiers as comfortable as possible
• Every week several 1000 combat soldiers were sent for R&R in Saigon and Japan
• 159 basketball courts
• 85 volleyball fields
• 71 swimming pools
• 40 ice-cream plants
• 2 bowling alleys
• Led to an air of unreality and disorientation
• Soldier could be airlifted from the horrors of the jungle to a luxurious base
• Sometimes cigarettes and iced beer were dropped by helicopters in mid-siege
• Hot meals were landed at remote jungle camps
• One colonel got a Silver Star bravery award for delivering turkeys by helicopter for Thanksgiving
• Typical American soldier served short term in Vietnam, had good food and medical treatment
• Westmoreland said this was the only way to get Americans to fight
• Around ¼ caught STDs

Viet Cong Tactics

• Based on those used by Mao
• Small groups of between 3-10 soldiers- groups were called cells
• Cells worked together but the knowledge they had of each other was kept to the bare minimum
• Confessions of tortured guerrillas didn’t damage the NLF much
• Gain support of the peasants
• Peasants were the sea in which the guerrillas needed to swim
• NLF obeyed a strict code of behaviour, “directives”

1. Not to do what is likely to damage the land and crops or spoil the houses and belongings of the people
2. Not to insist on buying or borrowing what the people are not willing to sell or lend
3. Never to break our word
4. Not to do or speak what is likely to make people believe that we hold them in contempt
5. To help them in their daily work (harvesting, fetching firewood, carrying water, sewing etc)

• Most peasants were extremely poor
• Believed that their poverty was a punishment for crimes committed by their ancestors
• NLF educated the peasants in economics and explained how poverty was the result of their landowner’s selfishness
• 50% of the agricultural land in South Vietnam was owned by 2.5% of the population
• 2/3 of peasants owned no land at all
• NLF took the property of the large landowners and distributed it amongst the peasants
• Some cases, landowners were executed as a punishment for the way they had treated the peasants in the past
• Peasants agreed to help the NLF by feeding and hiding them
• Peasants also agreed to take up arms with the NLF and help “liberate” other villages
• Peasants motivated by fear and a sense of gratitude
• US sometimes tortured peasants
• NLF would send out patrols to government controlled areas
• Described as the war of the flea:

“The flea bites, hops, and bites again, nimbly avoiding the foot that would crush him”- Robert Taber

• Guerrillas dictate the terms of war
• NLF were told not to go into combat unless they outnumbered the enemy and were certain of winning
• Concentrated on attacking small patrols or poorly guarded government positions
• NLF relied heavily on night attacks
• Used hand-made weapons such as spears, daggers and swords
• Built up a large supply of captured weapons, 90% of weapons that the USA took from the NLF has previously been ARVN and US weapons
• NLF employed booby traps- sharpened bamboo staves and fragmentation mines
• “Bouncing Betty”- every step created tension
• Most of the mines came from unexploded bombs dropped by the United States
• 800 tons of bombs dropped on Vietnam every month didn’t explode
• Temptation for patrols to take anger and fear at comrades being killed out on villages
• Increased peasants hostility towards Americans
• All dressed alike
• Innocent civilians often killed consequently
• NLF built underground tunnels
• Tunnels led out of the villages into the jungle
• Contained caverns where they stored their printing presses, surgical instruments and the equipment for making booby traps and land mines
• NLF could easily hide from US
• Tunnels often too small for the much larger American soldiers
• Involved the enemy in a long drawn out war
• Gradually wear down the larger and stronger enemy
• Began by taking control of the villages in the rural areas, as their strength grew and the enemy retreated, they began to take the small towns

HO CHI MINH TRAIL

• First constructed in 1959, came southward via Cambodia and Laos
• Both sides knew keeping the trail was vital for the Communist war effort
• Men and materials came South on it
• Trail was never a single route
• Several branches along which were dotted repair workshops, stores, depots, hospitals and rest camps
• 50,000 women employed at one time to repair road
• Traffic switched to other branches whilst they were being repaired
• Couldn’t be destroyed

AIMS, MORALE AND RESILIENCE

• Complete and utter determination
• Continuous struggle in the face of adversity
• Fighting in order to achieve freedom for their own country
• Increased degree of resolve and commitment
• Prepared to lose thousands of men for the cause
• Not drafted but actually wanted to be fighting in defiance of the Saigon regime
• Morale and resilience remained undefeated

BATTLE OF LA DRANG

• 1965, PAVN vs the US Army
• 34 day battle
• 305 Americans and 3581 N. Vietnamese died
• Both sides thought they had won, because the other would not be able to sustain such losses
• N. Vietnamese proved right
• La Drang is an example of the Communist determination which helped to ensure their eventual victory
• Americans did not understand such determination
• American strategy never took this into account and this was an important factor in their inability to win

Divisions In Government

• 1967: Escalation of protest
• August 1967: Senate hearings attempted to force Johnson into lifting restrictions on bombing N Vietnam
• November 1967: McNamara’s resignation condemned:

“The goddamned Air Force and its goddamned bombing campaign that had dropped more bombs on Vietnam than in Europe in the whole of WW2 and we hadn’t gotten a goddamned thing for it” – McNamara

• Replaced by Clifford Clark

January 1968: The Tet Offensive

• Battle of Khe Sanh: to distract US troops (and Westmoreland) from the Tet Offensive: 500 Americans died and 10,000 Communists
• 11,000 US/ARVN troops took 3 weeks to clear Hue of Communsit forces
• TET: US Embassy in Saigon attacked- 3894 US killed, 4954 ARVN killed, 14,300 civilians killed, 58,373 VC/ PAVN killed
• Tet is the Lunar New Year festival consequently not expected to attack
• Walter Cronkite: “Most trusted man in America”, journalist that the public LOVED
• Walter Cronkite said that they were completely stuck in a stalemate and needed to negotiate=CHANGED PUBLIC OPINION

“If I’ve lost, I’ve lost America”- LBJ

• Backfire of Government’s optimistic reports
• Questioning of credibility
• Change of heart of W.C. meant that America’s heart had changed
• Ability to rally people was POOR
• Credibility Gap

IMPACT OF TET

• Huge losses for Communists, but did seem to show that there was little support for the Saigon regime, which strengthened their position
• Westmoreland was replaced
• Huge impact on American public opinion- increased credibility gap
• Johnson’s approval ratings fell from 46% to 36% and he withdrew from the 1968 Presidential campaign
• Clark Clifford (McNamara’s replacement) turned against the war
• The “Wise Men” who had previously supported the war now advocated retreat
• Johnson rejected repeated JCS demands for 200,000 more troops

“I’m taking the first steps to de-escalate the conflict”- LBJ, 31^st March 1968

• Peace talks began May 1968

The Home Front

SUPPORT FOR THE WAR

• Initially…
• Supported because of: the Cold War context; Patriotism; Domino Theory
• More likely to support the war if younger- younger want to “do their bit”, older are more realistic in terms of desirability of a lack of war: 1968, support decreases
• Educated were more likely to support the war
• White Americans more likely to support the war than Black Americans
• Men more likely to support the war than women

OPPOSITION TO THE WAR

• Increasingly came from different groups
• Pacifists: never wanted war
• Socialists/Liberals: more sympathetic to Communists, believe in free rights
• Black Americans: deliberately mistreated, wanted to solve American Civil Rights
• Poorer Americans: needed the money for social welfare issues, not wanting to be called up, knew they would be
• Scientists: knew about the possible impact of chemical weapons
• College Students: globally aware: radical, don’t support injustice
• Families of Soldiers: came home battered and traumatised, shell shocked, drug addled and amputated
• Veterans: AGAINST WAR, KNEW WHAT IT WAS LIKE AND WHAT THEY HAD DONE

CHANGING OPINIONS

• When asked if Vietnam was a mistake:
• Aug 1965: 61% said no
• May 1967: 50% said no
• August 1968: 35% said no
• May 1971: 28% said no

Protest

• Oct 1965: Draft Dodgers- got married, went to Canada etc in order to not fit criteria
• Oct 1967: 100,000 protesters outside Pentagon
• Nov 1969: Up to 500,000, largest anti-war demonstration in US history
• May 1970: Protest at Kent State University: 4 students were killed, sparked protests at 450 other universities and colleges
• April 1971: “Veterans’” March, 300,000 protesters including veterans who had thrown medals away

“As the casualties mounted, however, the demonstrations got bigger and bigger. Over 100,000 protesters demonstrated outside the Pentagon in 1967”

Reasons for Opposition

THE DRAFT

• From 1967 about 2 million men were conscripted, average age of 19
• One Year Drafts
• Those who had places at college could delay the draft, therefor the majority of the infantry were black, Hispanic or poor whites

“Very few believed that they were defending democracy or even cared”- DeMarco

RACE AND CLASS

• 1967- 30% of black young men were conscripted compared to 19% of whites
• Black soldiers also more likely to be killed
• Johnson had promised decent welfare and housing for the poor as part of his “Great Society” programme but the war cost $20 billion a year

“By 1969, these men were more interested in their civil rights than in fighting a war which they knew was lost”- DeMarco

THE MEDIA

• Living Room War
• TV brought these images into American homes
• Made complete outrage become national
• Brought things home literally and physically
• Increased awareness

SLOGANS

“Hey LBJ pull out like your father should have done”

“Hey Hey LBJ how many kids did you kill today”

“Draft beer not kids”

“Bombing is like fucking for virginity”

• Songs like 19- general dismay
• Opposition against the war intensified in 1968
• There were violent protests against the Vietnam War at the Democratic Party Convention in Chicago
• General sense that America was coming apart and needed change

Richard Nixon

• Initially a true Cold Warrior- role in HUAC
• Containment advocate
• Eisenhower’s VP, had advocated for airstrikes at Dien Bien Phu
• Pushed Johnson for escalation as the main Republican spokesman on foreign policy
• TET WAS TURNING POINT
• Nixon became President and focused on Vietnamisation
• Vietnamisation:

“The nation’s objective should be to be able to help the South Vietnamese fight the war and not fight it for them. If they do not assume the majority of the burden on their own defence, they cannot be saved”- Nixon

KEY TACTICS

• Madman bombing
• Diplomacy
• Use China and the USSR in order to pressure Hanoi
• PEACE WITH HONOUR

Paris Peace Talks

• Began May 1968: role of Tet in exhausting Hanoi and changing Johnson’s perception of the War
• Washington demanded North Vietnamese withdrawal and rejected Communist participation in the South
• Hanoi demanded American withdrawal and insisted on Communist participation in the South
• Nixon privately encouraged Thieu to agree to a coalition with North Vietnamese
• Rejected by Thieu
• Talks continue intermittently for 5 years

Why Did Nixon Actually WANT to Leave

• Tet convinced Nixon that Vietnam was unwinnable
• Improved relations with China and USSR and peace in Vietnam would reinvigorate America and ensure Nixon’s place in the history books
• Knew Vietnam war had ruined Johnson’s presidency

“I’m going to stop that war. Fast!”- Nixon

• US withdrawal from Vietnam and détente with both the Soveits and the Chinese were facilitated by the Sino Soviet split
• Cold War world had changed
• Sino-Soviet disagreements shattered the threat of a monolithic Communist bloc
• Nixon decided that America could play off the two rival Communist giants against eachother
• Good relations with China and USSR= support in pressing Hanoi to a “peace with honour” settlement in Vietnam
• Soviets had considerable leverage over Hanoi because of aid they contributed

USSR’s Influence in Southeast Asia

• Initial focus on Burma and Indonesia- little achieved
• More success in Vietnam
• Moscow not Beijing was Hanoi’s main ally
• Soviet aid to North Vietnam was motivated by ideology, anti-Americanism and rivalry with China
• Moscow supplied diplomatic support and several billion dollars worth of economic and military aid: high-quality jet fights, bombers, anti-aircraft systems, tanks and artillery
• Sometimes uneasy relationship
• Khrushchev infuriated Hanoi- called for the admission of both Vietnams to the UN in 1957
• Reluctant to provide Hanoi with sufficient diplomatic and military support for the reunification of Vietnam
• 2^ND Period of tension: developing Sino-Soviet split, which prompted deep divisions amongst the Communist leadership in Hanoi
• 1963, Ho Chi Minh praised Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence with the West
• BUT HCM retried from day-to-day policies- pushed away by the pro- Chinese faction
• Soviet aid increased again after Khrushchev’s fall
• Late 1968, clearly the major suppliers of aid to N. Vietnam
• Chinese continued to be vital source of food, consumer goods, military equipment, anti-aircraft weaponry, troops and foreign currency
• Moscow advised Hanoi to negotiate a peace settlement with South Vietnam and the Americans
• Hanoi always disregarded such advise
• Nixon’s détente policy prompted heavy Sino-Soviet pressure on North Vietnam to allow the Americans to exit Vietnam with some honour
• Nixon era: Soviet Union and China prioritised their relationship and individual concerns rather than Communist countries

Sino-Soviet Relationship

• Soviets never particularly helpful to the Chinese Communists
• Stalin’s advice nearly ruined the fledgling Chinese Communist party in the 1920s
• Stalin’s ambassador was the last to recognise Jiang Jieshi as no longer ruler of mainland China
• Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was signed in Moscow on 14^th February 1950
• Stalin maintained a cautious attitude
• Soviet economic aid to China was minimal
• Stalin considered Mao a potential rival for the leadership of world Communism
• Soviets main supplier of Communist forces in the Korean War
• Soviets let China do blood-shedding and take all risks
• USSR made China repay the massive loans borrowed to finance Chinese fighting in the war
• Khrushchev recorded a clear personality clash between himself and Mao:

“His chauvinism and arrogance sent a shiver up my spine…The Chinese have little in common with our people”- Khrushchev

• 1955, Bandung conference, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai persuasively aligned China with other nations who had suffered at the hands of imperialists
• Soviets DID give diplomatic support for the non-aligned movement
• Khrushchev still competitive with the US over the 3^rd World
• Irritated that Chinese seemed to be muscling in

IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES

• Mao’s insistence on importance of peasantry WHEREAS Soviets followed the Marxist-Leninist emphasis on the industrial-proletariat
• Khrushchev criticised Stalin without any consultation with Mao in 1956
• Mao was greatly offended
• Considered himself the world’s leading Communist after the death of Stalin
• Mao resented not having been consulted about this dramatic ideological statements, and had emulated many of Stalin’s policies
• Mao and Khrushchev disagreed about relations with the West
• Khrushchev spoke about peaceful relations with the Wet
• Considered Mao’s aggressive anti-Western rhetoric dangerous and provocative

QUEMOY AND MATSU CRISES

• Quemoy and Matsu Islands: in the Taiwan Strait
• Occupied by Jieshi’s Nationalist forces
• Mao repeatedly threatened to invade Taiwan and incorporate it into Communist China
• Seemed as if he was about to do this in 1954 and again in 1958 when he ordered the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu
• Eisenhower administration clarified his defence commitment to Taiwan
• Chinese backed down and stopped the shelling
• Soviets declared support for China in both instances
• Made it clear that they would fulfil their defence obligations under the 1950 treaty
• 7^th September 1958, Khrushchev warned Eisenhower that any US attack on China would be considered an attack on the Soviet Union
• Tensions behind the scenes
• Moscow disliked China’s way of proceeding
• Mao had been provocative but more so he had failed to consult Moscow about his actions
• Zhou Enlai told Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in September 1958 that Soviets should not respond to American use of tactical nuclear weapons against China
• Soviets disliked China taking this lead in foreign and defence policy and dictating when they should or should not use nuclear weapons

SINO-INDIAN DISPUTES

• Sino-Indian border tensions came to a head in 1959 after an unsuccessful Tibetan rising against Chinese rule
• Dalai Lama took sanctuary in neighbouring India, helped prompt Sino-Indian border clashes that culminated in a war in September-November 1962
• Chinese humiliated the Indian Army
• China rightly perceived the USSR as unsupportive in its struggles with India
• Moscow had no wish to alienate India
• India= leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement
• Moscow sought good relations with Non-Aligned Movement
• September 1959, Soviet news agency Tass called for a peaceful resolution of the Sino Indian dispute
• Chinese= mad, wrote a stiff letter to the Soviets

NUCLEAR PROBLEMS

• Mid 1950s, Soviets signed several agreements with the Chinese: promised to aid China’s development of nuclear weapons
• 1959, Khrushchev had become uneasy about that prospect
• Mao described imperialist America as a “paper tiger”
• Khrushchev pointed out that the tiger had nuclear teeth
• October 1959, Khrushchev visited Beijing to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the People’s Republic of China
• Discussions over Taiwan and the Sino-Indian border issues went badly
• Moscow opposed any Chinese attack upon Taiwan and was concerned about Sino-Indian tensions
• Soviets wanted to control Chinese foreign policy and nuclear warheads
• When this appeared an unlikely eventuality, USSR withdrew 1390 scientific and technological advisers from China in late 1960
• Soviets explained this by pointing out that Chinese officials had tried to indoctrinate the Soviet advisers on disputed ideological issues
• Departure of the advisers damaged Chinese economic development and increased Chinese determination to go ahead without Soviet aid

PROPAGANDA

• Growing Sino-Soviet war of words
• Spring 1960, Chinese published an article in the newspaper Red Flag entitled: “Long Live Leninism”
• Article contained a coded attack on Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence
• During the conference of Communist parties at Bucharest in June 1960, the Chinese delegates attacked Khrushchev and his policies
• Khrushchev responded by threatening that he would withdraw his scientific and technological advisers from China
• October 1960, official Soviet newspaper Pravda made its first major criticisms of China
• November 1960, Deng Xiaoping visited Moscow, Khrushchev described Mao as a

“megalomaniac warmongers”

“wanted someone you can piss on…If you want Stalin that badly you can have him-cadaver, coffin and all” – Khrushchev

• Each side made veiled criticism of the other, usually through attacks on eachother’s allies
• Chinese publications attacked “revisionist” East European ideological errors-veiled attack on the Soviets
• Criticisms of “ultra-leftism” and “adventurism” were aimed at Chinese policies
• Moscow tried to end propaganda war in 1962-3
• Infuriated Chinese by signing a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the United States
• Beijing saw this as a Soviet attempt to stop China becoming a nuclear power
• Border clashes in 1962
• 1969, 658,000 Soviet troops faced 814,000 Chinese troops in Xinjiang
• Border Clashes on the Ussuri River
• China and USSR regarded eachother as the world’s greatest threats to peace
• Gave Nixon opportunity to improve Sino-American relations

Sino-American Relations to 1968

• Mao found it difficult to forgive and forget US involvement in the Chinese Civil War during 1945-8
• US particularly resented their erstwhile protégé China becoming Communist
• Believed Beijing was Moscow’s puppet
• Feared other Asian countries might follow China’s lead
• Taiwan and Korean War really embittered relations

TAIWAN AND KOREA POLICIES

• State Department declared Taiwan strategically unimportant to America in December 1949
• US still recognised Jiang Jieshi as representing “China” in the UN
• US interpreted Korean War as a sign that Chinese-sponsored Communism was expansionist and threatened US security
• China interpreted Korean War as a sign that America was aggressive and anxious to get a foothold on the Asian mainland and likely to attack China itself
• Truman had also sent the US 7^th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait
• Mao viewed this as US reinjecting itself in the Chinese Civil War
• Fears of American aggression confirmed by US crossing Yalu River
• After Korean War, 1953, US put a trade embargo on China
• Ensured China’s continued exclusion from the UN
• Established bases on Taiwan
• US-Taiwan Defence Treaty, 1954: Infuriated Mao

QUEMOY AND MATSU

• US-Taiwan Treaty prompted Mao to shell the Chinese Nationalist Islands of Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-5
• President Eisenhower publicly hinted that he was considering atomic weapons to protect Taiwan
• Chinese backed down
• 1958, Similar event again
• Mao shelled, America threatened, Mao backed down
• Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: Chinese communism more threatening than Soviet Communism- greater influence in Asia, more people, major Chinese minorities in Asian countries
• US convinced by the Chinese involvement in Vietnam and Malaya that China was prepared to aid revolutions world wide
• Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 and Invasion of India in 1962, suggests aggressive expansionism
• Chinese viewed Vietnam involvement as a demonstration of the US’ imperialist aggression
• Makes détente revolutionary

CHINA VISIT, 1972

• 1969-1970, President Nixon relaxed trade and passport restrictions on China
• April 1971, China invited the American table tennis team to China and amidst much talk of “ping-pong diplomacy”
• Nixon lifted the 21 year old trade embargo on China
• February 1972, visited Beijing
• Nixon’s China visit made worldwide headlines
• Crowds of thousands gathered to watch his plane take off for China
• President compared his trip to the moon flights
• Plane was full of newsmen, left audience spellbound
• Nixon shook hands with Zhou Enlai= Dulles famously refused not to in 1954
• Nixon and Kissinger visited Mao in his study
• Mao was a sick, old man barely able to stand
• Final communiqué at the end of the visit was significant
• Joint communiqué said that both opposed any country attempting to seek hegemony in Asia
• Chinese repeatedly accused the Soviets of doing just that, coded reference to the Soviets
• Each inserted a separate paragraph on Taiwan
• Chinese paragraph said the Communists were the sole legitimate government of China, that Taiwan was a part of China, and that US military forces should be withdrawn from Taiwan
• American paragraph carefully phrased and didn’t give much away
• State Department considered the joint communiqué a disaster because it contained no American reaffirmation of the defence treaty with Taiwan
• Kissinger got over this by an oral commitment before the American party left China in what Nixon called “the week that changed the world”

NIXON’S RELATIONS WITH CHINA

• Conservatives considered Nixon’s Cold Warrior pedigree impeccable
• Americans thought that if Nixon said détente was right, it must be
• Nixon’s conversion to détente deprived the conservatives of their leader
• Mao believed Chinese trade and industry would benefit from the stimulus afforded by contact with the West
• Mao could see that Nixon was determined to get American troops off the Asian mainland
• US less of a threat to China than the USSR was
• September 1973, Zhou Enlai said that it was acceptable to negotiate with the US
• Decreased threat to world peace due to their decline in power since the Korean War

HOW HAD NIXON MANAGED TO INITIATE RAPPROCHEMENT?

• He believed that allowing ideology to dominate foreign policy was unrealistic and a BIG ERROR
• Knew American power was in relative decline:
• Budgetary problems
• Soviet nuclear and naval parity
• Economic rise of the European Community and Japan
• 1968, Nixon concluded that the Cold War had changed
• No longer a bipolar world: America had to adjust its foreign policy
• New friends were needed because relationships with old friends were deteriorating
• West Europeans were critical of the Vietnam War
• He recognised that the Sino-Soviet split meant America was no longer faced with a monolithic Communist bloc and it made sense to change America’s relationship with the two leading Communist nations
• He wanted to use China to counter Soviet power
• Wanted to force Moscow into détente
• Wanted to help America win peace with honour in Vietnam
• He felt it was foolish and even dangerous to leave a potential superpower such as China outside the community of nations
• He rightly anticipated that détente with China would make him look like a peace-loving world statesman
• Would help him win re-election in November 1972 and end the Vietnam War
• China considered Sino-American détente as a success in that it greatly increased China’s international standing and prestige
• October 1971, People’s Republic of China took its seat in the UN
• Taiwan was expelled

Soviet-American Détente

• 1968 suited the two most powerful nations to improve their relationship

AMERICAN VIEWPOINT

• Some commentators detected a growing American desire to retreat from international affairs
• Kissinger said détente was a new tactic for “managing” the emergence of the USSR as a truly global power
• By the late 1960s the Soviets had attained nuclear and naval parity
• Nixon knew that the American public and economy made it impossible to counter increased Soviet power by a massive arms race or by increased US global commitments
• Containment had to be pursued in a different manner- by making a deal with the enemy
• Kissinger wanted America to forget the old idealistic and legalistic foreign policy style that had sometimes gone against American national interest
• Felt America’s prime concern should be maintaining the world balance of power, while recognising that American power was limited
• Nixon had privately concluded “there is no way to win the war”
• He knew that decreased involvement in Vietnam would make it easier to improve relations with the Soviets, who could then be used to put pressure on North Vietnam to agree to a settlement, which would enable the US to get out of Vietnam without losing face
• America seemed to be losing old friends within the Western alliance
• Increasing anti- American feeling within France
• Made sense to gain new friends
• Nixon believed that the increasing economic and military power of Western Europe and Japan had created a multipolar world wherein America would have to readjust its position and policies

SOVIET VIEWPOINT

• Wanted détente in order to cut their military expenditure which had left them with great economic problems
• Wanted more economic contacts with the West because Soviet technological backwardness
• Believed they had attained nuclear parity and therefore felt more secure about negotiations
• Feared China and therefore wanted to decrease tension with the West
• Wanted to gain recognition of the European status quo- especially their domination of Eastern Europe
• Pleased the US that a dialogue had been opened with a potentially dangerous power
• Chinese pressure was helpful in pushing Hanoi towards a peace settlement
• America and China remained wary of eachother, particularly over the Taiwan issue
• China was resentful when Nixon insisted that he would maintain the close US-Taiwanese relationship
• Tenuous nature of the détente was demonstrated in December 1975, President Gerald Ford got a lukewarm welcome on a visit to Beijing
• Reason for this cooling of Sino-American relations was that the Chinese felt that the Soviet-American détente was too successful

Main Problems in Vietnam

• President = Nixon
• Kissinger= National Security Advisor
• William Rogers= Secretary of State
• Kissinger, great believer in personal and secret diplomacy, distrusted bureaucrats, commonly said in Washington that he treated his staff as mushrooms: kept in the dark, stepped on and frequently covered with manure
• Didn’t always explain their policies and thereby ensure popular support for them
• American foreign policy became what some considered immoral in its emphasis upon the ultimate survival and strength of American power
• Neither seemed to worry about the deaths of Vietnamese civilians or American soldiers
• Wanted Communist agreement that Thieu remain in power in an independent South Vietnam

“I want the North Vietnamese to believe … I might do anything … and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace”- Nixon

• America also needed peace at home
• Nixon wanted “peace with honour” so badly
• Took time and tremendous effort to persuade Hanoi to agree to allow Thieu to remain in power
• Nixon had to use military and diplomatic pressure
• Nixon had also to take into account American left-wing opposition to the war, and right wing opposition to losing it

Nixon Policies During : 1969

MILITARY

• February 1969, Communists launched another offensive on South Vietnam “Rolling Thunder”
• Nixon tried a secret bombing offensive against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Cambodia in March
• Nixon hoped the bombing offensive would: sever enemy supply lines, encourage Hanoi to agree to an acceptable peace, destroy the supposed Vietnamese Communist headquarters in Cambodia: COSVN
• Bombing failed to destroy COSVN or slow traffic on the trail
• Nixon escalated bombing in late April
• Kissinger advocated blockading Haiphong and invading North Vietnam
• Nixon feared domestic opposition to this
• Nixon deliberately leaked to the press that he was considering it- madman tactic

DIPLOMATIC

• Nixon suggested that there should be secret Washington-Hanoi negotiations
• Hanoi favoured this option- excluded Saigon
• Secret talks in Paris in May
• Nixon offered Hanoi new peace terms: although still insistent that Thieu remain in power, he dropped Johnson’s insistence that American troops would only withdraw months after the PAVN and he offered simultaneous withdrawal
• N. Vietnamese delegation was unimpressed
• Nixon fear mongered again
• Kissinger set Hanoi a 1^st of November deadline
• Hanoi insisted that they had no troops in South Vietnam and that Thieu must give way to a coalition government
• Nixon turned to Moscow and in October promised détente in exchange for Soviet assistance in ending the Vietnam War- called this exchange “linkage”

DOMESTIC

• In order to keep the home front quiet Nixon: made a series of troop withdrawals- timed the announcements to defuse public opposition
• As anti-war activists prepared to protest in September, Nixon announced withdrawal of 60,000 troops
• Kissinger opposed troop withdrawals- decrease American bargaining power with Hanoi
• Judged that the heart of anti-war movement was male college students threatened by the draft
• Adjusted draft so that older students were less hard-hit: temporarily decreased protests and Nixon got a 71% approval rating
• Tried to keep actions secret: forestall the anti war protesters, same with bombing in Cambodia: British correspondent in Cambodia publicised it, Nixon ordered large-scale wiretapping
• Tactics failed to halt the protesters
• Numbers were growing, Congress was increasingly obstructive
• Oct 69, campuses were in uproar and largest anti-war protest in American history took place
• “Moratorium” protesters took to the streets in every major city
• Millions participated: lots who were middle class and middle aged
• More radical waved VC flags, chanted defeatist slogans and burned American flags
• Nixon consequently dropped the 1^st November ultimatum to Hanoi
• Backed down to keep public happy
• Nixon used speeches to keep the home front quiet
• 14^th and 16^th November, 250,000 peaceful protesters took over Washington
• 40,000 marchers carrying candles filed past the White House each saying the name of an American soldier
• Nixon wondered whether he could have thousands of helicopters fly low over them to blow out their candles and drown their voices
• News of My Lai massacre surfaced
• Nixon reminded everyone that the VC often behaved similarly many though that the price of war was too high if it was making murderers out of American youths
• Torn between the demands of the protesters and need to seem loyal to American soldiers
• Congress responded to unconfirmed press reports of US activity in Load
• October, closed congressional hearing on the US involvement in Southeast Asia resulted in the first detailed official information on Laos and demonstrated congressional unease about the “secret war”

Nixon Policies During : 1970

VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA

• Wanted Hanoi to release American prisoners of war (POWs)
• Only means of persuasion were “Mad Bomber” performances and linkage, and neither worked in 1970
• Announced the withdrawal of 150,000 American troops from Southeast Asia
• Nixon nevertheless appeared to be extending the war in January 1970, escalated the air offensive
• Ordered heavy bombing of the trail in Laos and Cambodia, and of North Vietnamese anti-aircraft bases, believing that demonstrations of American power would:
• Counter Saigon’s pessimism about American troop withdrawals
• Helped protect the remaining Americans in Vietnam
• Intimidate Hanoi
• Gain better peace terms
• North Vietnamese launched another great offensive in Laos on 12^th February
• Congress was considering cutting off his money, so, Nixon sent 30,000 American and ARVN forces into southwestern Cambodia
• Encountered neither enemy resistance nor COSVN
• Nixon argued that his Cambodian offensive had been successful
• Destruction of vast quantities of Communist war material rendered Hanoi incapable of launching another major offensive in South Vietnam for two years
• Theoretically gave the ARVN time to go stronger
• Nixon claimed that intervention in Cambodia had occupied PAVN troops who would otherwise be killing Americans
• COSVN had still not been found
• Americans expected to find a mini Pentagon but actually just a few hunts
• 334 Americans and 818 ARVN died and 1592 Americans and 3553 ARVN were wounded
• Critics said that it had widened the war
• New York Times queried whether the offensive had won time for America or boosted Hanoi by revealing American divisions and the restraints on the President
• Forced the Communists further inland, destabilised Cambodian government and made Cambodian Communists more popular
• LOTS OF OPPOSITION ON THE HOME FRONT

DOMESTIC

• Nixon tried to defuse unrest with a speech in April
• Said that America had respected Cambodian neutrality for five years- he lied
• Vietnamese Communists had vital bases there, the US wanted to do a clean up operation
• Denied that this constituted an invasion of Cambodia
• Going off a basis of pride internationally

“If…the world’s most powerful nation, the United States of America, acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.”-Nixon

• Speech was popular but the success was short lived
• Cambodian offensive sparked student protests
• 5^th May 1970, 4 students at Kent State University, Ohio were shot dead by the National Guard
• Some had been participating in an anti-war rally, some just changing classes
• Student protests increased- Ronald Regan (leading Conservative) had to close all Californian Colleges
• Nixon backed down and declared that he would get American troops out of Cambodia by June
• NYC, 100,000 pro-Nixon people demonstrated in support of policies
• Clashed with and beat up students from the East’s leading colleges
• Polls showed Cambodia policies to divide public opinion
• Aggravated relations between President and Congress
• President had been acquiring ever greater power and America had been developing into what contemporaries christened the “Imperial Presidency”
• Inevitable that Congress would attempt to reassert its power
• Presidential policies were unpopular
• Congress rightly said that the constitution gave them ALONE the right to declare war and to raise and to finance the armed forces
• Nixon’s point was that he had inherited a war and the constitution gave him power as Commander in Chief
• Senate enthusiastically encouraged bills to stop Nixon waging war in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 1970-1
• Nixon couldn’t get re- elected without extricating America from Vietnam, but he would not be able to save Thieu and American honour if he just withdrew

Nixon Policies During : 1971

LAM SON OFFENSIVE

• Nixon: determined not to be first US President to lose a war and desperate to gain peace with honour
• May 1970 US/ARVN invasion of Cambodia and Cambodia’s closure of its ports to Communist shipping had left the North Vietnamese Communists heavily reliant on the HCMT
• JCS had long been tempted to attack the trail in Southern Laos
• 1^st January 1971, Congress forbade the use of American ground troops in Laos and Cambodia
• Lam Son Offensive became a test of Vietnamisation
• Westmoreland said it would require 4 American divisions
• JCS argued that ARVN could do it if protected by American air power
• Cutting the HCMT would help ARVN morale, show Vietnamisation was working, damage Hanoi’s ability to stage an offensive in 1971
• Rogers warned that Hanoi expected it and that Nixon sending only one ARVN division to do a job which Westmoreland refused to do without 4 US divisions
• Nixon and Kissinger ignored him
• Lam Son Offensive began on 8^th February 1971
• 600 US helicopters backed 17,000 ARVN troops
• Faced 30,000 PAVN troops – supported by 20,000 logistics troops
• ARVN did well at first but PAVN got the upper hand -> armoured units using Soviet equipment
• 2 weeks, ARVN heavily defeated
• ARVN fought eachother for places on American helicopters
• American crews coated the skids of helicopters with grease so the South Vietnamese would stop hanging on in numbers sufficient to bring down the choppers
• Thieu had refused to send the number of troops the US recommended
• Casualty rate in Lam Son Offensive: 1402 American, 7683 ARVN
• 100 US helicopters destroyed, 618 damaged
• Morale hit very hard
• Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma refused to participate in the offensive- keen to be seen as neutral
• Royal Lao Army: unenthusiastic and BAD
• Hmong tribe bore brunt of anti-Communist operations in Laos- suffered manpower problems and had to call up 13 year olds
• Morale of US also very low- 18 year olds being asked to fight a war that everyone in America agreed was finished
• Nixon warned West Point that it was no secret that they would be leading troops guilty of drug abuse and insubordination

DIPLOMATIC

• Détente with USA and China was becoming a reality
• Moscow and Beijing were urging Hanoi to stop insisting upon Thieu’s removal as a prerequisite for peace
• Paris Peace Talks in May- Nixon offered Hanoi the concession that the US would get out by a set date without demanding mutual withdrawal
• In return, Hanoi should stop sending additional troops or materials to South Vietnam, observe a ceasefire, and guarantee the territorial integrity of Laos and Cambodia (Communists just about to win in both countries)
• Thieu would stay in power and American POWs would be returned
• Hanoi unimpressed, no mention of stopping the bombing

DOMESTIC

• Approval rating down to 31%
• Spring Protesters: 300,000 marched in Washington DC
• Some senators tried to halt all aid to South Vietnam unless there was a presidential election
• Thieu held election in October: only he ran

Nixon Policies During : 1972

ELECTION

• Needed a great breakthrough to ensure Nixon’s re-election
• USSR and China still pressuring Hanoi to let Nixon exit and let Thieu remain for a while- Hanoi didn’t want to face an equipped ARVN perpetually supplied by America
• PAVN began a great March offensive against South Vietnam
• Used tanks and artillery in MASSIVE quantities
• ARVN collapsed
• Policy of Vietnamisation discredited Nixon’s presidential election

“These bastards have never been bombed like they are going to be bombed this time”- Nixon

• B-52S used on North Vietnam- 1^st time since 1968- inflicted heavy casualties
• Bombed oil depots around Hanoi and Haiphong
• 16^th April, US bombers hit 4 Soviet merchant ships at anchor in Haiphong
• Soviet protests low due to the planned Moscow summit
• Nixon mined North Vietnam’s ports
• Moscow was tired of financing Hanoi’s war, desperate for détente and impressed by a great Nixon concession- willing to accept a coalition containing Communists
• Said that if America was strong- world would remain half Communist rather than wholly Communist
• Approval rating at 60%

BOMBING

• Disguised concessions with simultaneous shows of force
• While continuing the bombing throughout the Moscow summit (May 1972), he secretly offered Hanoi the concession of PAVN staying in South Vietnam
• Hanoi finally being driven towards a settlement by: American concessions, Soviet and Chinese pressure, the failure of their offensive to take big cities, Operation Phoenix, B-52s and re-election of Nixon
• Second half of 1972, Nixon was running out of time and money
• Congress could no longer be shamed into granting funds to help “our boys in the field”
• Nixon claimed it would be immoral to walk away from Vietnam as there would be a bloodbath for former Thieu supporters
• Polls show majority of Americans to agree with Nixon
• 55% supported continued heavy bombing of North Vietnam
• 64% supported the mining of Haiphong
• 74% thought it important that South Vietnam shouldn’t fall to Communism
• Operation Phoenix: 1968, introduced by the CIA
• 10s of 1000s of VC were sought out and interrogated
• Few of those interrogated came out alive
• Torture was the norm
• Nixon delighted with Operation Phoenix

“We’ve got to have more of this. Assassinations. Killings. That’s what they [the Communsits] are doing”- Nixon

• Caused public outrage, Nixon had to cancel Phoenix Operations in 1972

DIPLOMACY

• Hanoi would let Thieu remain in power while America would let the PAVN stay in South Vietnam and not insist upon a ceasefire in Cambodia and Laos
• Hanoi insisted on a voice in the Saigon government
• Thieu refused to accept that, despite Nixon’s promise that America would never desert him
• Kissinger rejected the idea of a coalition government but offered a Committee of National Reconciliation (1/3 South Vietnamese, 1/3 Communist & 1/3 Neutral) to oversee the constitution and elections
• Kissinger thereby agreed that the Communists were a legitimate political force in South Vietnam, which Thieu had always denied
• Nixon shared Thieu’s doubts- felt that Thieu had to make some concessions so therefore threatened him with the withdrawal of American support
• Nixon threatened a tearful Thieu with a reminder of what had happened to Diem
• Kissinger in October was under the impression that there was an agreement of the following terms:
• America would withdraw all its armed forces but continue to supply the ARVN
• There would be a National Committee of Reconciliation with Communist representation
• Hanoi would release American POWs
• Thieu would remain in power
• The PAVN would remain in South Vietnam
• America would help with the economic reconstruction of North Vietnam as a humanitarian gesture
• Nixon got cold feet and rejected the terms
• Feared accusations that he had given in to protesters, or that peace at this time was an electoral ploy
• Some adviser feared that if peace came before the election, people might vote Democrats- Democrats considered better at peacetime governing
• American Cold Warriors and Thieu opposed the National Committee
• Also desperate to have the PAVN out of South Vietnam
• Nixon thought that the fact that Kissinger assured the press that “Peace is at hand” would make Hanoi and Thieu more intransigent
• Doubts about why peace was made on the eve of the Presidential election
• Kissinger suggested that it was Hanoi’s concessions that allowed PEACE
• November 1972, Nixon defeated Democrat liberal George McGovern, but the Democrats controlled Congress, they were not going to carry on funding the war
• Only way forward was to force Thieu to accept the unacceptable
• Nixon gave Thieu his word that if Hanoi broke peace USA would retaliate
• Some of Kissinger’s staff suggested assassinating Thieu
• Hanoi willing to accept the October agreement that Nixon and Kissinger had initially considered satisfactory but because the US rejected it once they couldn’t accept it without looking foolish

CHRISTMAS BOMBING

• 18^th December, Nixon bombed and mined Haiphong again
• 1000 civilians died in Hanoi
• North Vietnamese shot down fifteen B-52s with 93 American airmen , a roate of losses that was unsustainable
• No public explanation for the Christmas Bombing, worldwide uproar
• Kissinger was cracking: linked to the press that he opposed the Christmas bombing (lie)
• Bombing was probably initiated in order to reassure Thieu of American strength and support, weaken Hanoi so that it could not speedily threaten South Vietnam after peace was concluded, disguise American retreats and compromises in the negotiations
• Several Congressmen and influential newspapers disapproved
• Some questioned Nixon’s sanity

Nixon Policies During : 1973

PARIS PEACE TALKS

• January Peace Settlement basically the same as that of October 1972 with a few cosmetic changes for both sides
• Nixon had to tell Thieu that he was going to sign with or without him
• 22^nd January, Thieu agreed, although he regarded it virtual surrender
• 27^th January, Paris Peace Accords declared a ceasefire throughout Vietnam (not Cambodia and Laos)
• POWs would be exchanged, after which America would remove the last of its troops
• PAVN was not required to leave the South, but had to promise not to take advantage of the ceasefire or increase its numbers
• Thieu remained in power
• Committee of National Reconciliation contained Communist representation and would sponsor free elections
• Nixon secretly promised billions of dollars worth of reconstruction aid to Hanoi
• Kissinger was awarded the highly prestigious Nobel peace prize for ending the Vietnam War

NORTH VIETNAMESE VICTORY

• Hanoi remained determined to reunify Vietnam
• Thieu remained determined to maintain a South Vietnamese state
• Fighting continued in South Vietnam
• Spring 1973, American troops were withdrawn and only 159 Marines remained to guard the embassy
• Although, of the 10,000 US civilians remaining many were military men who had been hastily discharged in order to enable them to stay
• Nixon had promised continued aid to South Vietnam when he bombed Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia
• 15^th August 1973, Congress cut off his money
• Hanoi: Soviets and Chinese less forecoming with aid, US had left and both wanted to maintain improved relations
• Hanoi’s problems were nothing compared to Thieu’s
• ARVN’s million soldiers outnumbered the 100,000 PAVN and PLAF in South Vietnam, Communists soon sent tens of thousands of reinforcements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail
• ARVN, trained in US style warfare, ran short of petrol, ammunition and spare parts once America left
• South Vietnamese economy was badly hit by the loss of American money, poor rive harvest of 1972 and the global rise in oil prices in 1974
• Economic hardship led to large scale protests against Government corruption
• December 1974, Communists began to attack the lightly defended Phuoc Long province and then moved South
• America did nothing
• South Vietnam collapsed
• Nixon resigned because of Watergate in 1974
• 1977, Nixon said that he did not think he could have saved South Vietnam because Congress opposed any more American actions there
• Congress rejected President Ford’s requests for aid for South Vietnam
• Ford sent Army Chief of Staff Frederick Weyand to visit South Vietnam in April 1975
• Weyand reported that even with increased American aid, the Saigon regime’s chances of survival were minimal at best
• 21^st April 1972, President Thieu resigned and fled the country, blaming Americans for the collapse of South Vietnam
• Communists just outside Saigon, US helicopters airlifted 5000 people (900 Americans, 4100 South Vietnamese) out of Saigon, via US embassy roof
• 25^th April 1975, Communists took Saigon
• Vietnam united with a Communist government

LAOS

• Communists triumphed in Laos and Cambodia as US departed Vietnam
• Laos was supposedly neutral from 1962
• North Vietnamese and Americans continued to support the factions they favoured in the Laotian Civil War
• America dropped over 2 million tons of bombs on Laos, large scale devastation, and they supported anti Communist forces
• North Vietnam aided the Pathet Lao and transported men and materials on the parts of the HCMT in Laos
• Johnson and Nixon’s involvement in Laos was dominated and motivated by events in Vietnam
• 17,000 US-financed Thai troops left Laos after the Americans exited Vietnam in January 1973
• Kissinger visited Souvanna Phouma and told him there would be no more American aid and that he should make the best deal possible with the Pathet Lao
• Royal Laotian government speedily negotiated a coalition with the Pathet Lao in February 1973
• Pathet Lao, assisted by the Vietnamese Communists moved to take control of Laos
• August 1975, they had succeeded
• Destabilisation, devastation and deaths through Laos
• Could be argued that it was the destruction through Vietnam that led to Laos’ fall
• New Communist regime in the “Lao People’s Democratic Republic” killed as many as 100,000 of the Hmong (had been funded by the CIA when they fought the Communists)
• Over 20,000 civilian supporters of the old Royal Laotian government were sent to “re-education” camps

Cambodia

Context of the Country

• 80% Peasants, ethnic Khmers
• Capital of Phnom Penh was extremely diverse: 80% were either Vietnamese, Chinese, Lao, Thai or Cham
• Ruled by the French before WW2
• Supervised by Japan during WW2
• Nordoom Sihanouk ruled as king from 1941, revered as demi-god by the peasantry
• Anti-colonial movement “Issarak” was encouraged by the Viet Minh

Growth Of Communism

• 1949, first significant Vietnamese intervention: 3000 troops in Cambodia to “help”
• September 1951, establishment of Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP), 1000 Khmer and 3000 Vietnamese members- brutal anti-colonial rebellion
• 1952, nearly 10,000 rebels: mixture of Issarak groups, Cambodian Communists and Viet Minh
• 1952, Sihanouk dismissed the weak and incompetent Democratic Party government, instituted personal rule and promised independence within three years: “Royal Crusade for Independence”
• 1954, Geneva conference gave Cambodia independence, Cambodian Communists didn’t attend and Viet Minh made decisions for them
• China pressed the Viet Minh to stay out of Cambodian affairs (in an attempt to limit US involvement in SE Asia)
• Viet Minh largely avoided Cambodia for the next decade

Successes of Sihanouk’s Government 1955-66

POLITICALLY

• Announced his abdication and consequently his freedom to participate in politics- “Citizen Sihanouk”
• Decrease in ceremonial duties and limitation on freedom but still had the traditional respect of a monarch
• “People’s Socialist Community”- Membership open across the political spectrum
• 1958, young leftists in government- Tries to be inclusive
• 99.8% of voters approved of him
• Politically stable decade
• Referendum on “Royal Crusade” which he claimed had won him independence from the French

SOCIALLY

• Silencing of opposition groups through censorship, arrests and executions
• Relative calm
• Improvement in education policies
• Number of high schools rose from 8 (1953) to 200 (1967)

FOREIGN POLICY

• Attempt to maintain Cold War neutrality
• Refusal to join SEATO
• Accepted US military aid
• Friend of countries not a device
• Viet Minh didn’t invade
• Good relations with China
• Took a leading role in the development of the new Non-Aligned Movement- Bandung

Failures of Sihanouk’s Government- 1955-66

POLITICALLY

• Showed films of executions
• “Intermittently repressive”
• Government was undemocratic
• Shamelessly rigged elections in 1995

ECONOMICALLY

• Over ½ of peasantry were chronically in debt
• 1950-70, proportion of landless farmers rose from 4%-20%
• Serious problems in the countryside
• Economy underdeveloped for new education standards

SOCIALLY

• Peasantry failed to prosper
• Education contributed to growing political ferment
• Education acted against Sihanouk
• Literate young Cambodians tended to turn to Communism – poorest peasants
• Little bit pointless as there were no jobs for the new Cambodians

FOREIGN POLICY

• Deterioration of relationship with America
• Concerned about Diem
• Removed lots of diplomatic relations
• Expelled US citizens
• Allowed sanctuaries in Cambodian, N. Vietnamese borders for the NLF

How Did the Escalation of the Vietnam War under Johnson Destabilise Cambodia

POLITICALLY

• Search and Destroy drove NVA soldiers over the border into Cambodia
• Coincided with the growth of Cambodian Communists- Khmer Rouge
• Anti Vietnamese, pro Chinese

ECONOMICALLY

• Cambodian rice was smuggled into Vietnam leading to a drop in tax revenue

SOCIALLY

• Influx of Ethnic Khmer from the Mekong Delta, fleeing the Saigon regime
• Bombing of Ho Chi Minh Trail

Civil War, 1967-70, Reasons?

ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT

• Election of the very Conservative politician: Lon Nol
• Angered the peasants
• Troops expropriated peasant land and killed peasants
• Promised money for each revel they killed
• Increased repression of the left between 1962-6
• Insufficient to destroy, sufficient to inspire

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

• Pol Pot’s more militant stance was encourage by China
• VIETNAM
• Increasingly obstructive US involvement in Cambodia

CHANGING NATURE OF CAM. COMM.

• Increasing influence of anti-Vietnamese
• Much less friendly
• Violence

Reasons for Pol Pot’s Failure

The Impact of the Civil War

• Sihanouk decided the Communists were his biggest threat
• Moved away from a relationship with China and towards reconciliation with USA
• Jackie Kennedy came to visit
• Indicated to Johnson that anti-Communist activity would be acceptable
• Bombing continued on the border
• Nixon operation Menu March 1969-70 extensive bombing raids and mine-laying on the border
• Communists retreated deeper into Cambodia and further destabilised the regime, increasing support for the Khmer Rouge

Sihanouk’s Overthrow

• By 1970, the country was thoroughly destabilised
• March 1970, Sihanouk was abroad- Paris- and was replaced in his absence by the pro- American faction led by General Lon Nol
• Personal extravagance whilst the economy was struggling
• Middle Class and military sought to fully align Cam with the US, partly in the hope of winning lucrative military contracts
• Lon Nol was encouraged by the US military and the right wing National Assembly

Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic

• Spring 1970: anarchy
• Pro- Sihanouk demonstrations
• Brutal attacks by rival gangs
• Growing anti-Vietnamese sentiment and violence from both the government and the public, exacerbated by the incursions of both North and South Vietnamese troops into Cambdoia
• US and ARVN invasion of Cambodia to attack Communist sanctuaries, support Vietnamisation and “do something symbolic” to support a pro- US Cambodian government
• $2 billion in US aid, but large scale bombing “ killed and alienated many Cambodians”
• Khmer Rouge rose in numbers aided by the NVA and helped by the alliance with Sihanouk
• By Jan 1971 the Communists controlled half the country
• During 1972, the number of rebels opposing Lon Nol rose to 200,000
• By 1975 they had overthrown Lon Nol’s regime in a horrific civil war

“Out of all the foreign interventionists, the Unites States was probably the most destructive and Cambodia was perhaps its greatest victim because US policies were a major reason for the rise to power of Pol Pot” (Sanders)

Reasons for Lon Nol’s Overthrow

GOVERNMENT WEAKNESSES

• Forces were largely conscripts
• Lon Nol sprinkled “magic sand” around Phnom Penh to ward off enemies
• Lon Nol had a stroke in 1971
• Lon Nol fled as the Khmer Rouge launched a great offensive in 1973
• Lon Nol led a corrupt, unpopular and incompetent regime

KR STRENGTHS

• Communists were well organised and determined
• Khmer Rouge kept Sihanouk out of Cambodia for as long as possible to avoid the people uniting behind him
• Communists used American bombing as propaganda “the cadre tell the people that the Government of Lon Nol has requested the air strikes”
• The Khmer Rouge was supported by the Vietnamese Communists
• Peasants who had revered Sihanouk who supported the Khmer Rouge from Beijing. They believed he made it rain for their crops
• Peasants supported the Communists due to their land redistribution and helpfulness

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

• As the Americans exited Vietnam in the Paris Peace Accords, they only offered evacuation to the government in Cambodia
• American bombing alienated many Cambodians “some ran away…others joined the revolution”
• ARVN troops behaved appallingly in Cambodia
• 1969-73 American bombing killed between 50,000 and 150,000 people and about half the population became refugees

Policies of Pol Pot’s Regime, 1975-8

EVACUATION OF PHNOM PENH

• From 1973, Khmer Rouge started evacuating urban centres
• Phnom Penh shocked by the behaviour of K.R. peasants
• K.R. troops loathed the corrupted urbanites
• Quickly deported 2 million residents
• Refugees fleeing from American bombing had made the Phnom Penh population quadruple to 2.5 million
• Evacuees included over 15,000 people who had been in hospitals
• Reasons: thought that PP was vulnerable to Vietnamese invasion, Pol Pot claimed that a “food shortage was imminent”- more field labourers, troops jealous of wealth, cities were centres of capitalism
• Population forcibly resettled in the countryside and worked like slaves in agricultural labour camps- frequently with bare hands- planting crops and digging irrigation channels
• Early 1979, roughly 650,000 of these evacuees had died: starvation, execution, overwork, disease and lack of medical care
• Cannibalism grew rife in the province of Pursat: one mother seen eating her own child
• Food was short as a dispirited population produced less
• Estimated more died from starvation than execution
• Crops were exported to gain the regime foreign currency
• Foraging considered “anti-revolutionary”

ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM

• Estimated that roughly 2 million of Cambodia’s 8 million population died under Pol Pot
• Between 500,000 and 1 million of those were executed
• Executed those who were educated
• Khmer Rouge supporters were illiterate peasants
• Executed were most likely the educated and elite urban population
• If you spoke a foreign language or wore spectacles were accused of being “parasitical intellectuals”
• More likely to voice or organise dissent
• Had looked down upon Pol Pot for academic failings
• 95% of Doctors were murdered
• 80% of Teachers were murdered
• Public buildings were converted into torture chambers: S-21, former high school
• Men, women and children executed
• Dr Haing Ngor survived Pol Pot years by discarding his spectacles and demonstrating no evidence of medical qualifications: let his wife die in childbirth

CHINESE CAMBODIANS

• Over ½ died because of the Khmer Rouge
• Most of the 500,000 ethnic Chinese in Cam were involved in traded or moneylending
• Chinese found it hard to adapt to peasant life: branded lazy
• Considered to be diehard capitalists
• Wasn’t ethnic cleansing

THE CHAM

• Muslims: constituted the largest ethnic minority
• Early as 1970, many had actually joined the Communists
• November 1973, some Cham revolted against the K.R.
• K.R. attempting to make them abandon customs and religion
• Revolted again in Summer 1975
• Pol Pot ordered 150,000 of them to be dispersed
• Ethnic repression was justified by the claim that all Cham were middle class
• Different customs meant that they were a threat to uniformity
• Buddhists were also targeted
• Mosques closed, Islam completed banned- Some Muslims forced to eat pork
• By January 1969, roughly 100,000 of the 250,000 Chama were reported to have been killed

VIETNAMESE CAMBODIANS

• 1974, ¾ of the estimated 450,000 ethnic Vietnamese in Cam fled to Viet
• 1975, KR expelled most of the remaining Vietnamese
• Most of the 10,000 Vietnamese left were hunted down and murdered 1977-8
• Victims of cleansing

KHMER KROM AND TRIBAL MINORITIES

• Ethnic Khmers who had lived in Vietnam
• Spoke Cambodian with a Vietnamese accent despite being Cambodian
• Many massacred between 1975-77
• Small Thai and Lao minorities were persecuted
• Hill Tribes: Jarai, allowed to continue using their own languages- Pol Pot had lived amongst them between 1967-70
• Held similar class hatred to the Communists

FOREIGN POLICY

• Broke off diplomatic relations with all Capitalist states in 1975
• Also with Albania, Vietnam, Cuba and Laos
• China was the most supportive foreign power
• Pol Pot was most wary of the Vietnamese
• Cambodian-Vietnamese border clashes began in Spring 1977
• Prompted Pol Pot to execute those with Vietnamese minds in Khmer bodies, conduct purges in the zones bordering Vietnam, show the people Sihanouk, make the regime more open and tolerant, win foreign and domestic support
• Border wars constituted in another Cam. Civil war which greatly weakened the K.R.
• Deng Xiaoping promised support but scolded Pol Pot for excessive radicalism, anarchic behaviour of troops and failure of the government to unite the country behind the Khmer Rouge
• Contributed to the Vietnamese invasion

COLLECTIVISATION

• 1976, 4-year plan
• Stressed collectivisation of property and expansion in cultivation of rice
• Goal was to achieve on average yield of 3 tons of rice per hectare
• Cambodians required to bring their private possessions to be used collectively
• All labour harnessed in service of the state
• Achieving the goal was likened to a military campaign

OVERALL AIMS

• A Cambodia free of foreign influence
• Self sufficiency of Food Production- autarky
• A new cleansed socialist society
• Enemies to be taken to S-21, everyone was photographed
• Held those who had once been supporters- more than 1,400 passed through
• Only 7 survived- often completely unaware of what they had done
• Taken to the cells, close interrogation held on their own, tiny cells chained by the foot to the floor, needed to ask permission to turn over

The Vietnamese Invasion and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea

• Vietnamese invasion began on Christmas Day 1978 due to:
• Khmer Rouge’s anti-Vietnamese purges
• The Cambodian refugees fleeing into Vietnam
• KR’s border clashes, atrocities and refusals to respond to suggestions for talks to solve border disuptes
• Vietnamese fear of the Sino-Cambodian alliance
• The Vietnamese army quickly defeated the Khmer Rouge and established a new Cambodian government under Heng Samrin

Response To The New Government

• China, USA and ASEAN, 30,000 Khmer Rouge (who were no longer Communists), Khmer People’s National Liberation Front led by Lon Nol’s officers and Sihanouk VERSUS New Vietnamese government, supported by the USSR

WHY DID CHINA SUPPORT POL POT

• Traditional Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge
• Chinese gave the K.R. forces an estimated $100 million worth of weapons each year during the 1980s
• Soviet support for Vietnam (Soviets were given control over the Vietnamese naval base at Cam Ranh Bay)
• Chinese belief that the Vietnamese should defer to Chinese supremacy
• Several warnings China had issued since 1975 against Vietnamese expansionist ambitions
• Sino-Vietnamese territorial disputes over their borders and the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea
• Mostly barren islands gave strategic command of the South China Sea and contained great offshore oil reserves
• In 1974, China occupied the Paracels, and Vietnam, and the Philippines each occupied several of the Spratly Islands
• Over 1 million Vietnamese of Chinese ethnicity, who fled the persecution of the Hanoi government
• February 1979, the Chinese invaded Vietnam
• Aim was to teach Vietnam a lesson for having invaded Cambodia
• Chinese called it a “punitive war”
• China sent 33,000 ground troops into Vietnam
• Hampered by antiquated equipment, brief incursion destroyed 6 Vietnamese missile sites and countless bridges, roads, railways and buildings
• Vietnamese fought well, and the Chinese suffered heavy casualties
• Both sides claimed victory
• UN criticised the Chinese, Soviets supported Vietnam

ASEAN’s RESPONSE

• ASEAN, established in 1967 in order to promote economic co-operation
• Pro Western members were Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand
• Communist takeover of all of Indochina in 1975 inspired ASEAN to hold its first summit (1976)
• Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 further strengthened its determination to co-ordinate political and economic policies
• Members disagreed about the Chinese threat ASEAN issued a joint statement deploring Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia and subsequently supported opponents of Heng Samrin’s regime

US RESPONSE

• Inaugural address, President Jimmy Carter (77-81) had said that his policy on human rights would be “absolute” and indicated that any nation that abused human rights would arouse American wrath
• In 1979, Carter referred to Pol Pot as the “worst violator of human rights in the world”- his representative at the UN
• Condemned the Vietnamese invasion that had overthrown the mass murderer Pol Pot
• Supported a Chinese attack on Vietnam, even though that attack was designed to restore Pol Pot to power
• Declared the Khmer Rouge to be Cambodia’s true government
• US obtained international aid for Khmer Rouge camps
• Supported Khmer Rouge possession of Cambodia’s UN seat
• USSR had entered a great expansionist phase in the wake of America’s failure in Vietnam
• Carter considered it the greatest threat to US security and sought to improve Sino-American relations
• China was Pol Pot’s ally, Carter found himself in the bizarre position of appearing to be pro-Pol Pot
• Improved relations with PRC necessitated a “betrayal of Taiwan”
• Reagan administration (81-9) supported KR possession of Cambodia’s UN seat
• Persuaded American allies to do likewise
• Sihanouk: “America was bringing Pol Pot back to life”
• US sought to weaken Hanoi and Moscow- Pol Pot helped
• US policy changed with the send of the Cold War

SOVIET RESPONSE

• Brezhnev (64-82) USSR role in Asia became the rival of China
• Soviets triumphed in relationship with Vietnam
• 1978, full member of Comecon & Signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the USSR
• Only pro-Soviet state in Southeast Asia
• Soviets sent a naval force to the Vietnamese coast and provided Vietnamese with armaments
• Gorbachev (85-91) advocated “New Thinking” in Soviet foreign policy
• Emphasised global interdependence
• Believed he could make the USSR and the world safer by decreasing Soviet American and Sino Soviet tensions
• Help the struggling Soviet economy
• Encouraged Gorbachev to cut aid commitments to countries such as Vietnam and to press the Vietnamese to withdraw their forces from Cambodia
• For their part, Vietnamese were glad to exit withdrawal of Soviet aid left the Vietnamese economy in dire straits

Role Of the UN

• 1979, condemned Vietnamese overthrow of Pol Pot
• 1979-1992, the US and China persuaded the UN to support Pol Pot’s exiled government
• ASEAN initiated talks from 1989-90
• End of Cold War brought the superpowers into negotiations
• March 1990, UN Security Council proposed formation of a new coalition government, with elections supervised by a UN peacekeeping force
• PARIS PEACE SETTLEMENT OCT 1991
• Both sides to demobilise
• National elections to be held in 1993 and the UN to administer Cambodia until then
• In reality, the UN never had enough funding Hun Sen (leader from 1986) remained in power alongside with UN and Khmer Rouge violence continued against UN workers
• 1993 elections, Sihanouk’s son Prince Ranariddh won despite Hun Sen’s corruption
• Agreement for Sihanouk, Hun Sen and Ranariddh to govern together
• Corruption, undemocratic, Khmer Rouge resistance continued until the late 1990s