Exam Structure: Multiple Choice, short answer, and long answer. Cumulative, but said he would weigh things equally, with an emphasis on recent thing

Exam Structure: 

Multiple Choice, short answer, and long answer. 

Cumulative, but said he would weigh things equally, with an emphasis on recent things. 

No graphs 

People:

Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality: 

Main Point: Affluent individuals have a moral obligation to prevent suffering and death caused by famine and poverty, as long as they can do so without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance. He argues that if we can help those in need without causing significant harm to ourselves, we are morally required to do so. This idea challenges the traditional distinction between duty and charity, suggesting that helping others in extreme need is not just a charitable act but a moral obligation.

Example used: He compresses ignoring global poverty to walking past a drowning child because saving them would mean getting your clothes dirty. Singer suggests we should also take action to help those suffering from poverty, even if it requires sacrificing some of our resources or comfort, because the cost to us is small compared to the benefits of saving lives.

Robert Faulkner, Lying and Deception: 

Main Point: Faulkner argues that not all lies are equal, and some can even be justified under certain circumstances. He emphasizes that we should carefully consider whether the lie is meant to protect others or if it's harmless in a particular situation. The morality of lying should be evaluated based on these factors rather than simply labeling all lies as inherently bad. 

Example: Faulkner uses a situation where someone lies to protect someone from harm. For example, lying to a would-be attacker about the whereabouts of a person they're looking to harm. In such cases, Faulkner suggests that the moral justification for the lie lies in the greater good it serves—protecting someone from harm outweighs the potential harm caused by the lie itself.

Kant shows up twice in On the Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy

Main Point: Lying is always wrong, even in situations where it could prevent harm. For example, if a murderer comes to your door asking if their victim is hiding in your house, Kant argues you should tell the truth, even if it leads to harm. He believes that lying goes against the moral law, which says we should always be honest. According to Kant, if everyone lied when it suited them, trust would be destroyed, and society would fall apart. So, for him, honesty is a must, no matter the situation. 

Example: Kant's example is when a murderer comes to your door and asks if their victim is hiding in your house. Kant argues that even though lying could save the victim's life, it would still be wrong to lie. He believes that you should tell the truth and not lie, even if it means the murderer finds the victim.

J Dancy, An Ethics of Prima Facie Duties 

Main Point: Moral duties are not absolute. Instead, they are prima facie, meaning they are duties we should follow unless there is a stronger duty in a particular situation. Dancy’s main point is that we need to balance conflicting duties and decide which one to prioritize based on the situation. 

Prima Facie Duties: 

Fidelity – Keeping promises and being honest.

Reparation – Making up for wrongs or harms you've caused others.

Gratitude – Showing appreciation for benefits or kindnesses received.

Justice – Distributing benefits and burdens fairly, ensuring people get what they deserve.

Beneficence – Helping others and promoting their well-being.

Self-improvement – Developing yourself morally and intellectually.

Non-maleficence – Avoiding harm to others.

Example: Imagine a doctor who needs to decide whether to break a patient's confidentiality to save their life. The doctor must keep the patient’s information secret but also must help them. The doctor must figure out which duty is more important at that moment.

W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good 

Main Point: Argues that there are several moral duties we must follow, called prima facie duties. These duties are not absolute but are binding unless they conflict with a stronger duty. For example, you might have a duty to keep a promise (fidelity), but if keeping that promise harms someone, your duty to avoid harm (non-maleficence) could override it. Ross believes we need to use our judgment to decide which duty is more important in any given situation. There is no prima facie good on pleasure, no prima facie duty to produce as much good as we can, no prima facie duty to produce pleasure which will be enjoyed by ourselves. A pro tanto reason can be overridden by stronger reasons.

Example: In this case, the prima facie duty to keep your promise (fidelity) conflicts with the duty to prevent harm (beneficence). Ross argues that in this situation, your duty to help the person in urgent need would likely override the duty to keep your promise, as the harm caused by not helping the person would be greater. However, this depends on the specific circumstances and requires moral judgment.

Stephen Darwalls, Philosophical Ethics 

Main Point: Metaethics explores what morality is and where it comes from. People believe ethical disagreements have right or wrong answers. Ethical beliefs aren’t as easy to prove as science. Science proves things through evidence, but with ethics, feelings and beliefs affect what people think is right or wrong. Metaphysical Naturalism: Everything in reality can be understood through science. Nihilism: No Real moral facts exist; moral beliefs are just emotions we project onto the world, not facts. Non-Cognitivism: Moral statements are not true or false; they are just expressions of feelings. Moral Realism vs. Anti-Realism

Moral Realism: Morality is objective—there are right and wrong answers.

Anti-Realism: Morality is subjective—based on human beliefs, emotions, or society.

Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism

Cognitivism: Moral statements express facts that can be true or false (e.g., "Murder is wrong" is either true or false).

Non-Cognitivism: Moral statements are not facts, but express emotions or commands (e.g., "Murder is wrong" is like saying "Boo murder!").

Relativism vs. Objectivism

Relativism: Morality depends on culture or individual beliefs.

Objectivism: Some moral truths exist no matter what people think.

Example Darwall Discusses:

Is morality like math (objective)? Or like taste in food (subjective)?

He examines different theories that argue for and against moral truths being universal.

Bottom Line:

Darwall’s discussion in these chapters is about metaethics—where morality comes from and whether moral claims are facts or opinions.

Guy Fletcher, The Philosophy of Well-Being: An Introduction

Main Points: Fletcher focuses on well-being and what makes life go well for a person. First, he talks about Hedonism, which is pleasure is good/ pain is bad; it's the simplest theory of well-being.  

Chapter 2: Desire Fulfillment Theory: getting what you want is good for you, and not getting what you want is bad for you. There are two types of desires: non-instrumental ( things you want just for their own sake) and Instrumental Desires( Things you want because they help you get something else). Objective List theory: Pro Accounts for a wider range of what makes life good. Solves bad or irrelevant desires, who creates the list? Motivation problem: I don't care about it, why should it improve my well-being? It explains why an unplugged life is better than a clogged life. 

Main point Objective List Theory: Assumes there is a single, universal list of what makes life good. But who decides what goes on that list? Different people value different things, so a one-size-fits-all approach doesn’t work well. He claims this makes the theory rigid and unresponsive to individual differences.

Main Point: Guy Fletcher’s main point in "Well-Being and the Shape of a Life" is that the order of good and bad events in a person’s life matters for their overall well-being. A life that improves over time may be better than one that starts great but declines, even if both lives contain the same total amount of good and bad experiences. Examples of Uppi and Downey Uppi has a hard start in life, but then life goes well, and vice versa. 

Example 1: Raj is on the roller coaster; his well-being goes up and down as his desires are fulfilled or frustrated. Raj’s well-being is exclusively determined by his demonic level. 

Example 2: Trudy and Flora: Trudy is living the normal life, and Flora, connected to the experience machine, does the same things as Trudy. They both live lives that are equally high level in being. 

Example 3 for Desire Fulfillment: Life on Mars. Hilary believes that there is life elsewhere in the universe. This is a non-instrumental. 

He also critiques desire satisfaction by showing that some desires might not improve well-being (e.g., wanting to count blades of grass all day).

T.M. Scanlon, What we Owe to Each Other 

Main Point: An action is wrong if someone has a good reason to reject it. Morality is about what we can justify to others. Morality comes from mutual respect and justification, not just consequences or personal feelings. We should act based on principles that everyone affected could agree to. Argues that the question of well-being and the question of experiential

quality are not the same question

Example: There is reason to choose a certain life because of its great value, even though it involves a low level of well-being, or that the value of a life did not make it worth choosing given the sacrifice in well-being that it would involve.4 So, choice worthiness is a different notion from any of the other four taken alone. 

Kelly, What Should a Desire Theorist say about Ill being

Main Point: Argues: Desire theory, not getting what you want isn’t necessarily bad, getting something you really dont want is what's truly bad. Desire theory says well-being comes from not getting what you want. A complete theory must include both well-being (what's good) and ill-being (what's bad ). There are different ways to define and refine this theory. Arguments for Aversion Desire Theory: Not getting what you want is bad, but not getting something you don't want is what's bad for you.  Desire theorists must choose between two choices on what is bad for a person. 1) Frustration view: not getting what you want is bad, 2) Aversion View: getting what you strongly dislike is bad. 

Example 1) Frustration view: Jason wants to be an architect, but he does not have what it takes. Frustration from not getting what you want is bad.

Example 2) Jason wants to be an architect and realizes that sometimes a person's desires don't align. 

J David Velleman, Well Being and Time 

Main Point: Argues: a good life isn’t just about collecting happy moments. What matters is the overall story of one's life. Being wise means making choices that improve life as a whole, not just picking short-term gains over future ones. The same thing applies to death; it's not about adding or losing moments but what makes a meaningful ending.

Example:  A bad childhood does not permanently lower a person’s life value, just as a good childhood does not guarantee a good life. This challenges the idea that well-being is merely additive, suggesting instead that life structure and narrative influence its overall value.

Rosenkoetter, Well being, the shape of a life, and learning

Main Point: Rosenkoetter argues that the shape of a life (whether it improves or declines over time) does not inherently determine well-being. Instead, our preference for lives that improve over time comes from biases, external factors, and how we frame life narratives, rather than from the actual prudential value of a life’s shape. He also suggests that learning and life stages matter more for well-being than simple upward or downward trends.

Main Example: He discusses how people prefer lives that improve over time, like experiencing increasing sensory pleasure, but this preference is shaped by how we think about the future, cognitive biases, and how the life story is presented, rather than by any intrinsic benefit of an upward trend itself.

Richard Taylor, The Meaning Of Life 

Main Point: Argues that life has no inherent meaning but that we can create our meaning through our actions and passions.

Example: The meaning of life Myth of Sisyphus is a representation of meaningless, repetitive toil with no purpose or hope of redemption where nothing ever changes or imposes his existence is stuck on an endless cycle. He is rolling a ball; life feels repetitive and pointless like Sisyphus' endless task and can seem meaningless because we keep striving for goals that don’t lead to anything. We work hard, but our efforts lead to more of the same. 

Susan Wolf, Meaning in Life and Why it Matters 

Her main takeaway: A meaningful life is not just about feeling good—it’s about contributing to something valuable. She argues that a meaningful life is actively engaged in something of value beyond oneself—not just for personal pleasure but because it genuinely matters. Meaning comes from loving something worthy and being actively involved in it. Both subjective passion (caring about something) and objective value (that thing being worth caring about) are needed.

Main Example: Susan Wolf uses the example of The Blob—a person who sits on the couch all day, drinking beer and watching TV, completely passive and disengaged. Even if this person feels content, their life lacks meaning because they are not actively involved in anything of real value. She contrasts this with someone passionately engaged in meaningful activities, like an artist dedicated to their craft or a scientist making real contributions. This example shows that meaning in life requires both active engagement and the pursuit of something that has genuine worth beyond just personal pleasure.

• Bernard Williams criticizes Susan Wolf by asking: 

Who decides what counts as meaningful? He argues that meaning is more about what matters to the individual, not some outside rule. 

Meaning is personal, not just about “worthy” activities.

Even if something is valuable, it might not feel meaningful to everyone.

Meaning doesn’t have to be tied to morality.

• Robert M Adams: Adams comments on Susan Wolf’s view

 I generally agree with her, but I am adding some important points: Adams suggests that meaning might come from a connection to something beyond human life, such as God or a higher purpose, which Wolf does not focus on.  He agrees that meaning involves engaging with valuable things but questions how we determine what is truly valuable—could divine purpose play a role? While Wolf sees meaning as partly personal, Adams leans toward the idea that meaning might be grounded in something greater than individual perspective. 

Thomas Nagels, The Absurd 

The main point is that human life is inherently absurd because we take our lives seriously, but we can also step back and see that nothing we do has ultimate significance. Step back and see that nothing is truly meaningful in the grand scheme. Absurdity is just part of being human, and we can't escape it.  We should accept the absurdity and even find humor in it.

Example: Nagel uses the example of a person endlessly climbing a ladder. Imagine someone climbing a ladder with great dedication, thinking it’s extremely important. Then, they reach the top and realize that it doesn't matter because the ladder is leaning against a building that leads nowhere. This symbolizes how our efforts in life can feel important, but from a larger perspective, they lack ultimate significance. The absurdity comes from the tension between our serious commitment to these pursuits and the realization that they are ultimately insignificant.

Samuel Scheffer, Death and the Afterlife 

Main Point: Death argues that what gives our lives meaning is the survival of humanity after our deaths rather than personal immortality. We care more about future generations continuing to exist than about living forever ourselves. Our Motivations Depend on Future Generations – Knowing that others will continue life after us gives purpose to what we do today.  The real “afterlife” that matters is not personal immortality but the continuation of human civilization.

Example: The Doomsday Thought Experiment – If we knew humanity would go extinct soon after we died, many of our current projects (art, science, culture) would feel meaningless.

Main themes: 

Metaethics, Hedonism, desire for full fulfillment, death, ethics, Grice’s maxim of quality (Falkner), prima facie duties, moral realism  pro tanto reason, nonreductive realism, well-being Hedonism (happiness/pleasure is all that matters)

• Desire Satisfaction Theory/Desire fulfillment theory: Getting what you want is good for you, not getting what you want is bad for you. 

• Objective List Theory (certain things, like knowledge and relationships, make life good, regardless of your desires) 

Handouts: 

Handout 1: 

Three types of investigation that belong to ethics : 

Normative Theory

Metaethics 

Axiology 

Axiology is the study of good and bad things. 

Two Options in Axiology: 

1. Hedonism: Only happiness (or pleasure is good and only unhappines is bad). 

2. Pluralism: Umbrella terms for axiological positions that grant more thant one kind of thing good/ bad. 

Normative Theories: 

1. Consequnetilsim: The rightness and wrongness of acts is ultimately based on consequences. 

Act- Consequentialsim AC: Rightness and wrongness of acts is determined by looking at the consequences of that very act. 

Indirect Consequneces: Rightness of an act is determined by the consequences of something different from that very act.

The most important form of indirect consequentialsim is 

• Rule Consequentialsim (RC) the rightness or wrongness of an act is determined by the consequences of nearly everybody internalizing a rule that would allow that act. “ The Ideal Code” rules that if adopted by everyone, would have the best consequences. 

2. Deontology: Provides decidable rules for the rightness and wrongness. Its about following rules ( like don’t lie or don’t commut suicide) no matter what the consequineces are. The rules tell you what is right and wrong. They focus on what the act itself is.  

Reontology mix ideas of deontology do what creates the most good. Follow rules, but when rules don’t apply, choose what leads to the best outcome. 

Different Versions of Consequentialsim. 

Partial Consequentialsim: Egoism is one of the most partial versions of this.Some people’s well being counts moer than othters based on personal relationships or group membership. Families well being matters more than strangers well being. 

Impartial Consequentialsim: Everyones well being should matter equally when deciding what is morally right. 

Expected vs Actual Conseqences Consequentialsim: 

Expected Conseqences Consequentialism: Ac act is right or wrong based on what a reasonable person would have expected to happen. 

Actual Conseqences Consequentialsim: An act is right or wrong based on what really happens. 

Disaster Amerlioration Consequentialism: We are morally required to act only to prevent or reduce really bad things from happening. 

Handout 2: Faulkner on Lying and Deceit: 

 2 important concepts: 

Misleading: No intentionality is required for a lie. 

Deceit: Intentional, someone  on purpose makes another person believe something false. 

S devices A if and only if S intentionally causes A to believe something false that S knows is false. 

Williams definition of lying: A statement is a lie if all three conditions are met. 

S asserts something (makes a claim) 

S wants A to believe it (intends A to think its true) 

S knows its false ( believe it’s not true).

Why Somethings don’t count as a lies : 

A suitcase can’t lie, it doesn’t “assert” anything. 

Someone over hearing a statement: If S didn’t tend for them to belvie it it’s not a lie. 

Being Mistaken: If S truly believes what they said they’re just wrong not lying. 

Jokes: The intent isn’t to deceive, so they’re not lies.

Revised Definition ( lies as tellings) 

Telling broader category

Faulkner diagnosis: Liar tend that he, the liar be belived. 

Bluffing and Trust: 

Lying works because ppl believe the liar. 

If the listener already distrusts the speaker, than the speaker can’t truly lie to them bc it depends on trust. 

To Assert something you must say it directly. 

To tell something, you don’t need to say it out right. 

What is wrong with lying: 

Platonic Tradition:  Lying is wrong bc it involves deception lying does not equal deception. 

Falkners tae: lying is wrong bc it damages trust. 

Aristoleian Tradition: Lies are wrong in themselves, no matter the consequences. View focuses on the nature of the lie itself being wrong. 

Faulkner’s synthetic position ( A mix of both views) 

Faulkner agrees with platonic traditions that some lies are acceptable, but he also agrees with Aristoleian traditionsn unique moral problem with lying beyond just deceptions.

Norm of infromativesness: Don’t deceive or withhold important information. Say what you believe is true. 

Alternative Position: Wrongness lying part of broader issue of deception. 

Factors Affecting wrongness of deception: Significant vs trivial matters: important things the small things. More effort in deception worse feeling, lies gain trust and betraying it makes it harmful.

Handout 3 

W.D. Ross and Moral Theory: 

Moral Decison aren’t always simple. 

Moral rules can’t be reduced to one single idea, instead we have multiple moral duties that sometimes conflict. 

Pro tanto reason can be overriden by stronger reason. 

Non reductive: You can’t reduce moral truths to something else. They are not based on science or relgion. 

3 Aspects of Ross Position: 

1. Structure of his normative ethics. 

2. Explain on why there are pro tanto reaons. 

3. Ross metaethics. 

Pro tanto Reasons ( Prima Facie Duties): Moral duties you have in specific situations. You ahve to figure out whihc one is stronger. 

Russian Pluaralism: We have multiple moral duties ( pro tanto reason) and we should follow the one that is strongest in a given time. 

Theological Voluntarism: Moral duties from God, while reduvtive naturalsim say they come from human nature. 

Ross and Dancy: Ross suggest that our moral duties ( pro tanto reasons) come from relationships. Dnay thinks theres nothing deeper. 

Consequnetialsim ignores specific duties and just focuses on producing the best outcome. 

Ross thinks lying is usually wrong bc it breaks a duty of fidelity (truthfullness) 

Problem: Not clear which pro tanto reason is stronger. 

Background: 

Duty that does not admit of exceptions 

Imperfect duty: Duty has expectations or can be flexible. 

Ideal Utilitarsism: Says there are multiple types of good things, not jsut happiness. 

Handout 4 

Help with Metaethics, including the “open question” argument. 

Metaethical Naturalism

• Moral truths are based on natural facts (things we can observe in the world).

• It reduces moral facts to non-moral facts (e.g., happiness, well-being).

• Types:

  • Ideal Observer Theory: An action is morally right if an ideal observer would approve.

  • Human Flourishing Theory: An action is morally right if it promotes human well-being.

Metaethical Supernaturalism

• Moral truths come from supernatural facts (e.g., God’s will) instead of natural facts.

• Same structure as naturalism but with a divine source.

Analytic vs. Synthetic Truths

• Analytic truths: True by definition (e.g., "A bachelor is an unmarried man").

• Synthetic truths: True based on observation (e.g., "Water is H₂O").

• Why this matters: Metaethical naturalists say moral truths are synthetic, meaning we can discover them through experience.

Non-Reductive Metaethical Realism (Rational Intuitionism)

• G.E. Moore rejects naturalism.

• Moral truths exist on their own and can’t be reduced to natural or supernatural facts.

The Open Question Argument (Moore’s Critique)

• For any definition of "good" in natural terms, we can always ask, "But is it really good?"

• If naturalism were true, this question wouldn’t make sense—but it always does.

• Conclusion: Moral facts are not the same as natural facts → Naturalism is incomplete.

Paper Topics 

Paper 1: Kelly saying that the Aversin theroy was better for the desire fullfillment theory compared to the Frustration Theory.

Paper 2: Alvy Singer Problem Schefler does not want to do his hw bc the universe is expanding. Des it matter if the world ends tomorrow or in 1 billion years, why do people react in certian ways. 

Syllabus themes of each week 

Normative Ethics

Jan. 7 (Tu): Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”; and Handout 1

Jan. 9 (Th): Faulkner, “Lying and Deceit”; and Handout 2 (Faulkner on Lying and

Deceit)

Jan. 14 (Tu): Dancy, “An Ethic of Prima Facie Duties,” pp. 219-226¶4; and Ross, The

Right and the Good, excerpt from Ch. 2, pp. 16-41¶1; and Handout 3 (Ross and Moral

Theory)

Metaethics

Jan. 16 (Th): Darwall, Philosophical Ethics (entire book on Canvas), Ch. 2; excerpt from

Ch. 3 (pp. 27-29); and Chs. 4-5 (pp. 39-54).

Jan. 21 (Tu): Darwall, excerpt from Ch. 3: pp. 34¶3-38, skipping 36¶2; Chs. 6-7; excerpt

from Ch. 8: pp. 71-75¶4; and Handout 4 (Some help with metaethics, including the Open

Question Argument).

Well-being

Jan. 23 (Th): Fletcher, Philosophy of Well-Being, pp. 1-26.

Jan. 28 (Tu): Fletcher, Ch. 2; and Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 111-13

(=Ch. 3, Sec. 2).

Jan. 30 (Th): Fletcher, pp. 49-63 (objective list theory)

Feb. 4 (Tu): Kelley, “What should a desire theorist say about ill-being?”

Feb. 6 (Th): Velleman, “Well-Being and Time”

Feb. 11 (Tu): Fletcher, pp. 132-137¶1; and Rosenkoetter, “Well-being, the shape of a life,

and learning”

Meaning in Life

Feb. 13 (Th): Taylor, “The Meaning of Life”; and Wolf, Meaning in Life, pp. 1-33.

Feb. 18 (Tu): Wolf, Meaning in Life, pp. 34-63; Robert Adams, Comment on Wolf, pp.

75-84; and Wolf, from responses to commentators, pp. 102-115.

Feb. 20 (Th): Nagel, “The Absurd”

Feb. 25 (Tu): Scheffler, Death and the Afterlife, Lecture I and Lecture II, §§1-4 (in sum,

pp. 15-64¶1)

Feb. 27 (Th): remainder of Scheffler's Lecture 2 (pp. 64-81); Susan Wolf's and Harry

Frankfurt's responses (pp. 113-41); and Scheffler's responses to Wolf and Frankfurt (177-

91).

March 4 (Tu): Scheffler, Lecture 3; Seana Schiffrin's comment on Scheffler (pp. 143-58);

and Scheffler's response to Schiffrin, pp. 191-196