IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

The US eco, which seemed so strong and influential, collapsed in 1929. American industries were heavily dependent on the export market, their output vastly exceeding what could be sold within the USA itself. USA practiced protectionism, imposing high taxes on foreign imports in order to protect its own industries from competition. Effectively prevented other countries from making profit in USA. Wo these profits, countries couldn’t afford USA products. In retaliation, some countries imposed high taxes on USA imports. As a result, foreign demand for USA goods fell. As investors realised the potential implications of this, they rushed to sell their shares, creating a panic on the New York stock exchange mon Wall Street. By 29 Oct 1929 ‘Black Friday’ shares in hundreds of businesses had become worthless. Thousands of USA citizens were financially ruined. Many banks were forced to close down as ppl withdrew all their savings. This was the Wall Street Crash. The Great Depression that followed affected not just the USA, but the whole world.

Demand fell so manufacturers produced less. Many workers lost their jobs and there was no unemployment benefit. As more families had to reduce their spending, the demand for goods fell further. Vicious cycle continued, spiralling the USA into a economic depression that lasts until ww2 in 1939.

Other countries were affected bc they relied on USA loans, which would not longer continue. G eco collapsed and they couldn’t pay reps. This effected B, F and I, who relied on reps to pay their own loans to USA maintain eco.

As int trade declines, all industrialised countries suffer from the same neck problems. Spiralling deflation affected Europe and J alike. High unemployment soon followed, leading to social unrest.. Everywhere, the threat of revolution seemed greater than ever before. It is in such circumstances that political extremism thrives. As poverty and hardship increased, the poor became disenchants w the gov, who they believed to be incapable of solving their problems, or were even responsible for them. Instead they became extremists- e.g communist or fascist. Middle class wanted govs who would restore order and protect interests.

Even in countries w well-established forms of constitutional gov, e.g B, F and USA, support for fascist and communist organisations grew during the 1930s. In these countries, democracy was able to survive. However, in countries that asked a strong democratic tradition e.g G, J and S, democratic forms of government collapsed.

HITLER

Impact of GD on pol extremism was most clearly evident in Hitler’s rise to power in G.

As a unemployed soldier w a limited education and little hope of finding employment, he seemed like an unlikely political leader. However his skill in delivering frenzied, almost hypnotic, speeches gained him a small following, and by 1921 he was the leader of the National Socialist German Worker’s Party (Nazis). To begin w, its members were mainly unemployed youths and soldiers returning from ww1. Disenchanted and w little hope, they may have joined the commies, but were drawn to H’s magnetic speeches, In spite of the falsity of his arguments, many ppl found the simplicity of them appealing.

H was heavily critical of G’s democratic post-war Weimar constitution. W so many political parties, he argued, none of them could gain an overall majority in elections, leading to weak govs and growing threat of commies. He claimed politicians betrayed the country by seeking peace when G still could have wi the war. These same politicians had agreed to the humiliating ToV, which was the cause of all G’s post-war problems.

Well organised and violent gangs of Nazi supporters known as Stormtroopers, attacked the meeting of rival political parties, and in 1923 the NP attempted the Munich Putsch, which was easily put down, and H was arrested and sentenced to prison.

Upon his release, H found G somewhat revitalised. A loans under the Dawes Plan (1924). USA loans under Dawes Plan helped stabilise eco, and G had better relations bc Locarno Treaties. With better situation on G, less support for extremism. In may 1928 elections, NP had only 810000 votes out of 31m.

Wall Street Crash and the ensuing worldwide GD that breathed new life into H’s pol career. USA loans, on what G prosperity was entirely dependent, suddenly stopped. Country was plunged back into a period of eco chaos and massive unemployment. Support for NP began to grow and in 1932 elections, NP gained 37% of the vote. Still didn’t have majority in the reichstag, was largest single party. Jan 1933, H appointed Chancellor.

H was Chancellor of G through legal and constitutional means, exploiting weaknesses of the G consitution that he had criticised previously. Once Chancellor, it wasn’t difficult to remove all pol opposition, end the constitution through which he had originally been elected and establish the Third Reich. G became a one party, totalitarian state founded on extreme nationalism and the use of violence to maintain order and obedience.

IMPACT OF THE RISE OF DICTATORSHIPS ON RELATIONS BETWEEN POWERS

By 1933, four of the world’s leading nations- I, J, USSR and G, were governed by dictatorships through which the state controlled all aspects of life. These dictatorships maintained popular support by the extensive use of censorship and propaganda, crushing opposition through control over armed forces This has a huge impact on the lives of ppl living in those countries, but also had an adverse effect on int relations. Tensions bt the major powers, which has been gradually reduced throughout 1920s, were renewed in the wake of the GD and the establishment of dictators.

NAZISM IN GERMANY

H’s rise to power was a major cause of concern across EU. Although issue of reps has caused tension w other countries esp F, G has developed better foreign relations during 20s, e.g locarno and joining LoN. Clear H had no intention of continuing this- made views v clear since early 1920s- wanted G restored to rightful position aa a major Euro power and to destroy ToV. Such views were v popular in G.

While H’s statements were popular in G, they caused great alarm elsewhere in EU, especially F. Consistently aimed to keep G weak as a safeguard against any future G attack. A rearmed and powerful G would be a threat to F. In the late 1920s, France had been willing to compromise and develop friendly relations w G. W H’s rise to power, F reverted to hard-line approach it had from 1919-24.

I also had reason to fear H. esp his desire to form a union between G and Austria. One of M’s major concerns was the post-ww1 weakness of Austria. As a neighbouring nation, A’s lack of pol, eco or military strength meant that it would provide I with little protection should G regain its power and show signs of aggression. Indeed, a revival of G military strength and ambition seemed increasingly likely when H’s NP gained power. Consequently, M provided support to the anti-NP Austrian gov of Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss. When Dolfus’s was murdered by Austrian Nazis in July 1934, M sent Italian troops to the border to prevent a suspected G invasion of A. I’d actions were heavily praised in F and B, which increasingly viewed M as a vital ally against H’s G.

Stalin’s USSR also had reason to be concerned by H’s rise to power as the only commie country, R felt isolated and vulnerable. Its only formal alliance was that w G, which began w the ToR in 1922. In view of the G NP’s strongly anti-communist views, this relationship was now under threat. So too was R security. In ‘Mein Kampf’ H argued the G pop was too large for the boundaries in which it was constrained. His solution was Lebensraum (living space), whereby G would take and to the east to provide more space for the expanding G pop. The implication was clear- long term intention was to take land from both Pol and there USSR.

In attempt to ensure the security of the USSR against H’s G, S consistently tried to secure agreements with B and F. Amid the social and eco chaos of the GD, pol stability was under threat in both B and F. Extremist pol parties were growing in popularity, and revolution seemed a distinct possibility. Under these circumstances, the B and F govs viewed S’s commie R w distrust and fear. Indeed, most B pols saw S’s R as a bigger threat than H’s G.

MILITARY DICTATORSHIP IN JAPAN

Increased int tension resulting from the rise of dictatorships was not confined to Europe. In countries that lacked a strong demo tradition, existing forms of gov found it impossible to cope. In J, a demo gov had only existed since 1889. Accustomed to a system in which the emperor held supreme power, the J ppl had little respect for parliamentary democracy. They believed that pols were weak, corrupt and open to bribery. As unemployment and poverty grew alarmingly following the WSC, J blamed the elected gov for their misfortunes. w social unrest increasing, the armed forces took control and the country became a military dictatorship.

In Sept 1931, against the wishes of J’s elected gov, elements of the J army had mobilised and taken control over the whole of Manchuria, part of C. This event led to the collapse of the J democracy. With the demo elected goiv unable to control the armed forces, Emperor Hirohito replaced it w a gov of National Unity under Admiral Makoto Saitō. J had become a military dictatorship, with the clear intent. of further expansion in Asia. This caused great concern in a weak, unstable and vulnerable C, but also threatened the regional interests of EU and USA.

March 1933, J withdrew from LoN and cancelled arms limitations agreements made at Washington Naval Conference 1921-22. In November 1936, J formed an alliance w G, known as the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Comintern, which had been established by the USSR’s Bolshevik gov to encourage worldwide commie rec, was perceived as a threat by both J and G govs. In theory, the Anti-Comintern Pact was a defensive alliance, the govs of G and J agreeing to provide mutual support if USSR attacks. However, the union of two dictators, both following aggressive foreign policies, caused suspicion and concern internationally. The fact G formally recognised J’s control over Manchuria, thereby legitimising J aggression was also concerning. The situation became even more intimidating in 1937, when a third dictatorship, that of M’s I, joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. The alliance of three dictatorships, all ideologically opposed to communism and all following aggressive foreign policies, posed an obvious threat to the USSR. Also caused alarm in B, F and USA bc they perceived the Pact as threatening to int peace and their own democracy. Indeed, by the end of 1937, US President Roosevelt concluded the Pact’s true intention was world domination.

FACISM IN ITALY

By 1934, M was widely respected abroad, w good relations w B and F, played an important role at Locarno, and help prevent H uniting G and A in 1934. Hw, in I, little progress had been made towards achieving the ambitious aims he had boasted about when he came ti power. I was not ‘great’ or ‘feared’. Bc the GD, I was facing severe eco and social probs, and M’s popularity in I was declining. M needed a propaganda boost, aka spectacular overseas success that would reunite the ppl behind him. He had seen, and been increasingly impressed by, the way H had challenged the ToV, and how this increased pop in G. Also saw weak response to H’s agg foreign policy by LoN, esp B and F. M became increasingly convinced there was more to be gained by a close relationship w G than B and F.

As a result, M completely reversed his foreign policy. Rather than fearing the resurgence of G power, he supported and imitated it. Dip approach used bt 1923-34 was replaced by agg and even greater desire for glory. In 1935, M ordered I troops to invade Abyssinia, one of the few parts of Africa not under EU control. H’s G only major power not critical of this. In 1936, I and G formed an alliance known as the Rome-Berlin Axis. In 1939, terms of this alliance were extended in the Pact of Steel, a formal military alliance bt I and G pledging mutual support if war.

Elsewhere in EU, PoS was interpreted as evidence G and I were preparing for war. feeling threatened, the USSR sought closer relations w B and F. Hw, the B and F govs, still fearing spread of comm and believing the USSR to be a untrustworthy ally, were not prepared to commit to any formal alliance w the USSR. While concerned about the PiS, neither B or F felt in a position to take any action against it.

Combined effects of GD and the dev of aggressive dictatorships completely destabilised int relations during the 1930s. Events in Spain were too soon to highlight the potentially serious implications of this.

FOREIGN RESPONSES TO THE CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN

As in J and G, demo was a victim of thew GD in S. Since 1885, S had been governed under the constitutional monarchy of King Alfonso XIII. Never been particularly effective, came under threat by major pol divisions, each wanting diff things.

• Monarchists wanted to preserve power of the king and Roman Catholic Church. Weakened bc two diff parties for diff royal branches, Bourbonists and Carlists.

• Liberals wanted reform to modern democracy like B. Powers of King and RCC reduced.

• Socialists wanted more extensive and rapid social change than libs. State should take control of industrial and agricultural businesses so everyone, not just the wealthy, could benefit.

• Communists wanted Russian style rev: seizure of property, abolition of other pol parties and dev of a classless society

• Anarchists rejected all authority, no gov at all. Opposed unequal power relationships and exploitation inc. gov, employers and landowners.

• Separatists wanted independence for throw regions. Many basques, Catalans, Andalusians, Aragonese and Castilians felt preserving regional identity more important than showing allegiance to S as a country.

W so many pol groups, each w contrasting aims, it became impossible for any elected for to provide S w effective leadership. Convinced of the need for strong and stable gov, army officers, under the leadership of Don Miguel Primo de Riviera, carried out a bloodless coup in 1923. W the support of the king, parliamentary gov wads removed, and Riviera established himself as dictator w absolute power over the country, governing in the absence of elections and a formal constitution.

• As the catastrophic social and eco effects of the GD hit S, Riviera lost the support of the army and was forced to resign. W him went the stability his dictatorship had provided, S tumultuous again.

• Fearing bloodshed, King alfonso abdicated in April 1931, and the new Republic of S was proclaimed.

• Period of pol chaos no party had control

• Right Wing groups formed Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right (CEDA)

• Left wing groups formed Popular Front'

• Neither could form a effective gov addressing social and eco probs

• Social order collapsed and S experienced strikes, riots and violence

• July 1935 RW pol Calvo Sotelo killed by police, so RW groups though military dictatorship only way to solve issues.

• 1936 army generals begin revolt in Morocco. General Francisco Franco flown in from Canary Islands to assume leadership.

• Within a day, revolt had spread to mainland Spain. SCW had begun.

• For three years S torn apart as Franco’s RW nationals fought w LW for control

• By 1939, nationalist victory and FF establishes a military dictatorship that incorporated elements of fascism.

• Many Spaniards resisted military takeover: Anarchist trade unions in Barcelona fought against and defeated army insurgents, executing their leaders.

• Gov in Madrid, PF majority, issued workers w guns to fight nationalists

• FF has northern Spain and some southern areas e.g Cadiz, Seville. Reps had centre and NE of S, esp Madrid and Barcelona. Realising taking all control would be hard, FF asks h and M for help, claiming he was fighting to prevent commie rev in S.

• Neither H or M cared about S, but both could see the value in having a third fascist state in EU, esp bc it was on F border.

• So both M and H provided FF w military equipment and troops.

• Public Opinion in democratic states of B, F and USA was divided.

• Some saw FF as a brutal fascist dictator determined to seize power, some as a vital bulwark against the spread of communism.

• Hw, when the reps in S asked for B and F help against FF, pols in those countries adopted a more pragmatic approach.

• Didn’t want to provoke G, so B and F encouraged LoN to establish a Non-Intervention Committee, to ensure no foreign aid entered S

• G and I joined the committee, but both ignored it

• Denied B and F assistance, the republicans turned to the only country that seemed prepared to help, the USSR

• By the end of 1936, therefore, the Civil War was no longer an internal S affair. It had become an international battleground for the rival ideologies for fascism and communism

I, G and the USSR each had their own reasons for interfering in the SCW:

• ITALY- M was seeking glory, confirmation of his ability to lead I back to its former greatness as a major power. While I maintained the pretence of supporting the NIC, it was impossible to hide the presence of some 50k troops and over 75p Italian fighter planes in S. Within I, M boasted of his involvement. It provided propaganda material to maintain his popularity w I. He portrayed himself as leading the fight against commies, which was a major threat to I.

• GERMANY- the SCW provided an opportunity to test the efficiency and capability of G’s rearmament programme. Also, H encouraged I involvement in. S in an effort to distract M from G’s own plans to force a union w Austria. To prolong the SCW, G not only supplied FF’s Nationalists w men and equipment, but H also allowed G firms to sell arms to the Republicans.

• USSR- Soviet leader Stalin also had a vested interest in prolonging the SCW. Sensing G posed the biggest threat to the security of the USSR, S has worked hard not to maintain good relations with both B and F. While he certainly didn’t want Franco to take control of S, another fascist threat to the SU, he was also aware that neither B nor F would tolerate a communist gov in S. As a result, Stalin authorised just enough aid to ensure that the republicans could maintain their resistance, but not enough to enable them to gain outright victory.

Oblivious to these diplomatic intrigues, S continued to tear itself apart. Franco’s well-armed professional soldiers met determined, if unorganised, resistance. The ppl of madrid, encouraged by communist leaders, prepared to repel Nationalist assault. Both men and women enlisted and were given basic training. They were supported by International Brigades, comm organised armies of foreign volunteers. Civilians all joined, some to prevent the spread of fascism, some for adventure.

At a time of high unemployment, many ppl saw involvement in the SCW as a way of escape from boredom and poverty.

Increasingly concerned about its own security and diplomatic iso, the USSR stopped sending supplies to Spanish Republicans by late 1938, ofc helping the nationalist cause. Also, F gained further support from G in exchange for 40% share of Spanish iron mines. These factors gave F the upper hand. Jan 1939, Barcelona finally fell to the Nationalists. W the fall of Madrid two months later, F victory was secured.

Adopting the title of Caudillo (leader), F established a gov similar to M and H. Repression, military courts, and large scale execution became as common in S as in I and G. However, S wasnt completely fascist bc F supported the Church, and its control over education, and avoided the persecution of Jews. As the war started, H expected S support, but F kept S out of WW2. While H and M were ultimately defeated, F ruled S until his death in 1975.

AIMS AND IMPACTS OF HITLER’S EXPANSIONIST POLICIES

Hitler’s main foreign policy aims:

• abolishing ToV

• recovering all lost territory, inc. Polish Corridor

• developing army, navy and air force

• uniting all G-speaking people under G gov, beginning w Anschluss w Austria.

• supporting Lebensraum, by acquiring new territory

In 1934-38, H achieved unqualified success in these. Also did so wo starting another war. His methods were devious, dependent on a mixture of threats and conciliatory statements. His actions frequently openly defied the ToV and, by his own admission, gambles w potentially serious consequences- he had no way of accurately predicting what the reaction of other countries might be.

Little by little, H wore away at the restraints of the ToV upon G by convincing the major euro nations, esp B, that his motives were solely honourable, justifiable and peaceful. while at the same time isolating countries that were the targets of his desire for the expansion of G power. Whether H was following a meticulous plan or simply improvising as opportunities presented themselves is a debate among historians.

In Jan 1935, the Saar region, w its valuable coal fields, was returned to G. Although the pleb was legal through ToV, H took full advantage and exploited the propaganda opportunity this presented to enhance his rep in G. To assure F of his peaceful intentions, H claimed this put an end to all remaining grievances bt G and F.

REARMAMENT

Developing G’s armed forces was one of H’s objectives. In March 1935, in direct contradiction to the ToV, he reintroduced conscription, claiming this was in response to increases in B airforce and F announcement that conscription was going from 12 to 18 months. H also declared it was his intention to increase army to 600000 men, 6x higher than ToV allowed. ToV also banned G from having an airforce, in feb 1935, H publicly announced the Luftwaffe a new G airforce which had been formed secretly in May 1933.

It was clear form H’s comments at, and subsequent withdrawal from, the World Disarmament conference that he intended to rearm G in defiance of the ToV.

Initially, there appeared to be a strong reaction to G rearmament. B, F and I reps met in Stresa in I to discuss their common concerns. In April 1935, prime ministers of these, Ramsay MacDonald, Pierre Laval and Benito Mussolini signed an agreement that established the Stresa Front. Its aim was to reaffirm the Locarno Treaties, maintain Austria independence and resist any future attempts to change the ToV.

From the outset, there was fundamental weakness in the Stresa front that meant it provided no real deterrent to H’s plans. Terms were vague, didn’t specify what action B, F, I would take on support. Although implications were clear, agreement was so vague it didn’t actually mention G. Realistically, preventing H from remilitarisation would mean full scale invasion. None of these three were prepared for such drastic action.

The Stresa Front’s weaknesses were quickly exposed. In June 1935, B, wo consulting the SF, entered negotiations w G which lead to the singing of the Anglo-G Naval Agreement. G agreed to limit its navy to 35% of B’s. While this guaranteed B’s naval supremacy, B was condoning breaking the tov. Clearly demonstrated fragility against G. W B’s opposition to G rearmament effectively removed, H continued to increase size of army, ordered building of new battleships, and began developing a large air force. H was tearing up the Tov, and no one was stopping him.

In Oct 1935, M launched the I invasion of Abyssinia, assuming that his SF partners would offer no opposition. He was angry and surprised when B and F supported the LoN sanctions, and in response withdrew I from the LoN and SF.

G’s rearmament, and B’s apparent acceptance of it, caused considerable alarm in F, which following the collapse of SF, felt isolated and vulnerable. USSR had similar concerns. Despite reservations abt making an agreement w a comm country it considered untrustworthy, F gov signed a Treaty of Mutual Assistance in 1935. The two countries agreed to support each other in the event either were attacked by another Euro country.

REMILITARISATION OF THE RHINELAND

Hitler’s foreign policy thus far was based on the assumption no major euro country would take serious action against him. Evident in March 1936, when H ordered G soldiers to enter the Rhineland, on its border w F. ToV had ordered demilitarisation of the Rhineland, providing F w security against G. H argued it was unreasonable, since it prevented G from defending that part of its border. H’s decision to defy this was a gamble, he was completely aware his armed forces were not yet ready for a full-scale war, so he issued strict orders his troops should retreat if they met French resistance.

H’s gamble proved successful. No resistance was met. although they protested vigorously, neither B or F took any action to remove G soldiers. H had successfully regained control, wo bloodshed. H was now convinced that B and F were not willing to go to war in defense of the Tov, and wouldn’t stand in the way of rebuilding his armed forces.

H justified the remilitarisation of the Rhineland and the redevelopment of G’s armed forces by arguing that he was merely righting the wrongs inflicted on G by the ToV. G was simply exerting its right to defend itself. H’s arguments were largely accepted in B, who had long argued ToV was too harsh. Many B pols also saw a strong G as a good defence against the spread of communism. Concerns regarding long term impacts of H’s actions were greater in F and USSR. G remilitarisation posed a clear threat to the security of F, esp now troops were positioned on the border. In the USSR, there were concerns that the re-development would lead to an attack against P, which would adversely affect the USSR’s own claims to parts of P, but would also threaten the security of the USSR itself. However, neither F nor USSR felt strong enough to confront H, and neither were prepared to go to war against G wo the guarantee of B support.

ANSCHLUSS (1938)

Although expressly forbidden in the terms of both ToV and the ToSG, Anschluss was one. of H’s main foreign policy aims. It would unite G speaking ppl, provide G w A resources and undermine the treaties H detested.

That H fully intended to force a union bt G and A became clear in 1934. W H’s encouragement, A nazis staged a revolt and murdered the Austrian Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss. H’s troops were ready to enter A in the pretence of restoring order, but they were forced to back down when M sent I regiments to the A border. This highlighted that G did not yet possess the military strength to risk war against I. H had no alternative but deny any involvement. This gamble failed.

Later in 1936, H both removed M as a potential hindrance to his plans by forming the Rome-Berlin Axis w I and gained a further ally by signing the Anti-Comintern Pact with J. Like M, H provided military assistance to F during the SCW. This enabled G army and airforce to gain vital experience.

In March 1938, H finally achieved Anschluss w A in defiance of the Tov. Following riots and demos organised by Austrian Nazis, which the gov of Chancellor Schuschnigg was powerless to control, G troops moved in and declared A part of G. As before, B and F protested but didn’t act. Unlike in 1934, M, now a G ally, did nothing.

In doing so, H gained access to valuable resources like iron ore, added 7m ppl to G pop, and increased army by 100,000. G’s strategic position in EU had been enhanced, posing an obv threat to other countries, esp Czechoslovakia, which was now surrounded on three sides by Nazi territory. Also achieved wo bloodshed.

SUDENTENLAND

Having effectively isolated potential opposition from Eu’s other major powers, and convinced they would take no action against him, H now tried to bring more G speakers into the Third Reich. There were around 3.5m such ppl living in the Sudenten area of CS, many of whom joined the Sudenten German Party. Under their leader, Konrad Henlein, they claimed, w some justification, that they were being discriminated against by the Czech gov. Riots and demonstrations broke out, many orchestrated by the Nazis.

Beneš, the Czech pres, believed that H was deliberately stirring up this disturbances to justify an invasion in the guise of restoring order. H’s instinct B and F would do nothing was correct. The B pm, Neville Chamberlain, and his F counterpart, Daladier, put pressure on the Czech gov to concede to H. Chamberlain believed G’s claim to the Sudetenland was reasonable- an error of the ToV in need of correction. The Czechs were reluctant to allow g to do this, a part of the country vital to the industrial infrastructure. Also, w the mountains and strategically located defences, was key to the security of CS. Loss would leave them vulnerable to any future G attack. If Ch genuinely believed H’s aggression would end there he was wrong. H had already informed his generals that ‘it is my unalterable decision to smash CS by military action in the near future.’ that’s nl