IR Chapter 3 Part 2 Notes

Exam logistics and content overview

• Exam registration and scheduling

  • Morning class received emails about exam registration opening; reflection on how the semester already feels almost done.
  • Sign-up window: anytime on the day of the exam or up to the Thursday after the next Thursday; last available slot around 03:15 in the day. Sign up before 03:15 to secure a slot.
  • Exam duration: 1 hour 15 minutes, same as in-class period.
  • Attendance on exam day: not required to attend the class; you can take the exam off-campus or in another room; the instructor will not be present in the room if you’re in the exam session.

• Where to find content and preparation resources

  • Content about the exam is available in the course content/review: exam description, links to schedule, content, and practice questions.
  • The practice questions section includes material that resembles the multiple-choice portion of the exam and helps students gauge structure of questions.
  • InQuizitive readiness: guidance to understand exactly what the exam questions will look like.

• Student questions and instructor clarifications

  • Danielle asks whether chapter overviews posted in the module would be helpful in addition to the book; answer: they’re okay to use; they come with the book but are not authored by the instructor.
  • Advice: chapter overviews give sense of big concepts; students should dig deeper into other material to master specifics (e.g., flashcards need updating).

• Abstract: what causes war to start (bargaining model overview)

  • War as a bargaining problem: two sides expect a war outcome that splits a pie of value; war costs reduce the pie, so the war outcome is less than the potential pie.
  • Visual framing: the pie represents total value; the dotted line represents costs of war that erode the value gained if war occurs.
  • Key comparison for each side: the value obtained from the status quo vs the value obtained if war happens.
  • The status quo share for a side is from the current position to its right boundary on the diagram; the war outcome share is the portion of the pie the side would obtain after war costs are accounted for.

• Core quantities and notation (conceptual)

  • Let the total pie value be V.
  • Status quo payoff for side A: SA; status quo payoff for side B: SB = V - S_A.
  • If war occurs, the war outcome allocations are WA and WB with WA + WB = V - D, where D represents the total war costs (the value lost due to fighting).
  • Net payoffs after costs (rough representation): side A gets WA - DA, side B gets WB - DB, with DA + DB = D (costs borne by each side).

• Why war still occurs: incomplete information, commitment problems, and indivisibility

  • Incomplete information: uncertainty about probability of victory and resolve (how determined each side is to fight or back down).
  • Commitment problems: even if a bargain is reached today, future power shifts or incentive to renegotiate can undermine future credibility of promises.
  • Indivisibility: some goods cannot be split without losing value, leading to winner-take-all outcomes rather than shareable bargains.

• Gulf War as a focal example of incomplete information and costs

  • Saddam Hussein considered invading Kuwait; uncertainty about US resolve to defend Kuwait affected calculations.
  • Resolve: the degree of determination or willingness to back down; synonyms include ambition, intention, stubbornness.
  • Costs to Iraq from the Gulf War:
  • Military losses: between 60,200 soldiers lost (Iraq).
  • Territorial concessions: Iraq renounced territorial claims as part of postwar terms.
  • Demilitarization: Iraqi military force never fully recovered to pre-Gulf War strength.
  • Economic sanctions and reparations: financial damages financed by oil revenues.
  • Costs to the coalition and U.S.: approximately 61{,}000{,}000{,}000 (61 billion) in direct war costs; coalition deaths around 290.
  • Kuwait's costs: significant damage to oil infrastructure, civilian displacements, and large-scale resettlement needs.

• Conceptual framing of incomplete information in bargaining

  • Probability of victory: if both sides misestimate each other’s chances, bargaining ranges can be misaligned; if one side believes it will win a large share, it may reject plausible bargains.
  • Perceived resolve: if one side believes the other is highly resolved, it may be less willing to accept offers that seem temporary or precarious.
  • Visualization: bargaining range shifts left/right with changing probability of victory or with changes in perceived resolve.
  • Signaling difficulties: bluffing about resolve or probability of victory is common, and misrepresentation can sustain or deter conflict.

• Signaling and credibility: how to communicate willingness to go to war

  • Three main signaling tools discussed:
    1) Brinksmanship: elevating the risk of conflict to frighten the other side into concessions (e.g., Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis).
    2) Tying hands: making public commitments or irreversible actions to constrain future flexibility (public statements, legal obligations, audience costs).
    3) Pay for power (costly signaling): incurring upfront costs to demonstrate commitment and capability (military buildup, demonstrated resource allocation).

• Cuban Missile Crisis as a signaling case

  • The U.S. used brinksmanship by threatening nuclear escalation to force the Soviets to remove missiles from Cuba.
  • Conceptual question: why would the Soviet Union believe the U.S. would actually initiate nuclear war over missiles in Cuba?
  • The credible signaling challenge: both sides faced incentives to bluff; leaders may exaggerate resolve because misrepresentation can be strategically advantageous.
  • Mechanisms to credibly signal:
  • Public commitment (audience costs): making threats or commitments visible to domestic and international audiences.
  • Demonstrated capabilities or mobilization (military signaling) to alter perceived probability of victory.
  • Pay-for-power signals: prior investments or costs to show willingness to sustain pressure.

• Audience costs and legal obligations as commitment devices

  • Audience costs: public statements raise reputational costs if a leader backs down (e.g., red lines, tariff threats).
  • Legal obligations: formal alliances (e.g., NATO Article 5) create binding expectations, though they are not always perfect commitments.
  • Examples discussed:
  • Barack Obama’s 2012 red line on chemical weapons in Syria and the subsequent backlash for perceived credibility issues when not followed through.
  • Donald Trump’s tariff threats framed as public commitments; critics argued about follow-through credibility.
  • George H. W. Bush’s Kuwait defense and the perceived role of public signaling in his decision to follow through.

• Pay for power / sunk costs signaling

  • Pay upfront costs to signal resolve and reduce the perceived value of backing down (e.g., military mobilization, reserve activation).
  • Russian actions prior to the Ukraine crisis cited as possibly signaling willingness to endure costs to extract concessions; critics question credibility of such signaling when costs are extreme.

• Commitment problems and sources of power shifts

  • Why credible commitments fail in international contexts compared to domestic contracts (no police force to enforce terms).
  • Three sources of power shifts that can create credible commitment problems:
  • Bargaining over strategic assets (e.g., nuclear weapons): acquiring a strategic asset shifts the balance of power, making concessions less credible after acquisition.
  • Preventive war: one side anticipates future power shifts and chooses to fight now to prevent being dominated later.
    • Example discussion: Japan before WWII (Pearl Harbor) as a preventive action due to anticipated shifts in power and resource access; Germany and USSR in WWII discussions as a preventive case.
  • Preemptive war: equal-power scenarios where the first strike confers a clear advantage; the fear of being attacked first discourages waiting for bargains.
    • Israel’s 1967 war and the broader discussion of preemption in international crises.

• Distinction between preventive and preemptive war

  • Preventive war: driven by long-term shifts in relative power; a weaker-but-rising side may threaten to gain advantage in the future, prompting the stronger side to strike now.
  • Preemptive war: not driven by long-term shifts; instead, the rationale is to strike first to deter or deny the other side's expected advantage if both sides are equally capable in the near-term.
  • Illustration: in preventive cases, the power balance changes over time, making future bargains less favorable; in preemptive cases, the decision relies on the immediate first-mover advantage rather than an expected shift in power.

• Indivisibility and its implications for war

  • Indivisible goods cannot be split without losing value, leading to winner-take-all outcomes.
  • Common example: Jerusalem/holy sites in Israeli-Palestinian disputes; disputes over sanctified spaces where compartilhar is hard to agree upon.
  • Arguments about divisibility: some scholars argue that even sacred sites can be divided through shared visitation rights or arrangements, while others contend there are fundamental non-divisible values at stake.

• Ukraine conflict and the bargaining model

  • Attendance quiz question: which factor best explains the cause of war in Ukraine within the bargaining framework?
  • Options discussed included incomplete information about probability of victory or resolve vs indivisible territorial claims.
  • The class discussion suggests focusing on commitment problems, incomplete information, and indivisibility as key lenses; Ukraine case can be analyzed through the lens of credible commitments and whether any deal would satisfy both sides given future incentives.

• Practical and ethical implications for the theory

  • Misrepresentation and bluffing: both sides have incentives to misrepresent their true resolve or probability of victory; this can prolong conflict or deter peaceful bargains.
  • Improving credibility: signaling strategies aim to align beliefs with actual intent, potentially reducing unnecessary wars; mechanisms include audience costs, legal commitments, and costly signaling.
  • Policy relevance: understanding brinksmanship, tying hands, and sunk-cost signaling helps analysts interpret international crises and mitigation strategies.

• Quick recap of key terms and concepts

  • Bargaining model of war: war as a costly instrument to settle disputes over a pie-valued good.
  • Incomplete information: uncertainty about winning chances and resolve; creates misaligned bargaining ranges.
  • Commitment problems: difficulty in enforcing future bargains due to shifts in power or incentives to renegotiate.
  • Indivisibility: non-divisible goods that can lead to war rather than negotiated division.
  • Strategic asset: assets that, once acquired, shift the balance of power and alter bargaining outcomes.
  • Preventive war: conflict driven by anticipated future power shifts.
  • Preemptive war: conflict triggered by first-strike advantage in an environment of perceived immediate threat.
  • Signaling tools: brinksmanship, tying hands, pay for power (costly signaling).
  • Audience costs and legal obligations: mechanisms to credibly commit to future behavior.

• Next steps and logistical notes

  • The instructor will begin a deeper dive into the content of the exam next week and will formally introduce the exam topics.
  • Students should review the exam description page and practice questions to familiarize themselves with the structure of questions, especially the multiple-choice portion.
  • Attendance is optional on exam days; students may attend in class or take the exam in the designated room elsewhere, as the instructor may not be present in the exam room.
  • The attendance quiz will be administered; late attendance is allowed in some cases; consult the instructor for excused absences or special circumstances.

• Quick reminders for practical exam prep

  • Revisit the three signaling techniques (brinksmanship, tying hands, pay for power) and be able to identify examples in historical cases.
  • Be able to distinguish between preventive and preemptive war, with clear example frameworks.
  • Understand how incomplete information shifts bargaining ranges and how signaling interacts with credibility and audience costs.
  • Review the Gulf War case for concrete numbers and outcomes to illustrate the real-world costs of war.

• Final reflection prompts for study

  • How would you model the payoffs for each side given a specific pie value, cost of war, and estimated war outcomes? Write the equations for net payoffs for each side.
  • Choose a historical crisis and analyze it through the lens of incomplete information, commitment problems, and indivisibility. Which factor best explains the outbreak of war or the persistence of crisis?
  • Compare and contrast preventive vs preemptive war using a real or hypothetical scenario. What signals would be most credible in each case, and why might a state choose one strategy over the other?