Chapter 3: Constitutions - Vocabulary Flashcards
The Institutional Options
The founding act for political engineering is the creation of a constitution to govern a country; since 1789 this has become an almost universal process, especially in democratic polities. Constitutions frame the basics of how power is designed and divided among legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and how authority is divided between central and local levels.
Written constitutions were not historically guaranteed; in the early 21st century they are common, but the norm was not universal at the time of the framing of the US Constitution. The sources note that the pool of models available to the framers was limited and that the best references were the states themselves; The Federalist Papers frequently referred to existing state documents.
The US could have operated without a formal written constitution (as Great Britain does)
several reasons favored a written charter:
lack of deep American traditions to mirror British practice,
the presence of state-level pathways toward a written constitution
the federal/presidential system’s need for explicit written parameters to define powers veto gates in policy-making and implementation.
constitution is to manage popular sovereignty
in a federal/presidential system where powers are delegated to specific actors who control veto gates
without a written document, it would be hard to determine powers of the president and Congress and their interrelationship.
The concept of popular sovereignty does not by itself guarantee democracy or power derived from the people; constitutions exist in nondemocratic states as well. Some examined constitutions are in nondemocratic regimes; others are revised or replaced under democratic reform.
The founding of the US constitutional order is presented as a prominent example of political engineering, evidenced by the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and The Federalist Papers, which argued for a new constitutional framework beyond the Articles of Confederation.
Defining the Concept
Constitutions are documents that establish a basic framework for governance and are, by definition, the highest law in a polity; they are the source of all other laws and underpin the rule of law, helping to constrain arbitrary rule.
In democratic tradition, constitutions translate the abstract notion of popular sovereignty into a formal order that structures government; the concept is closely tied to the development of modern democracy since the late 17th century.
The German term Rechtsstaat (the state of law) captures the idea of a constitutionally governed state where laws bind the government and courts enforce restrictions on politically elected power when they violate legal norms.
Constitutions codify the basic parameters of the principal–agent relationship between citizens and their government, outline the design of government, and specify how the agents of the people interact to make and implement policy.
A fundamental constitutional choice is between:
a parliamentary system (fusion of legislative and executive power; the legislature selects the prime minister and cabinet; a hierarchical relationship with the cabinet answerable to the legislature; policy preferences of cabinet and legislature tend to align)
a presidential system (separation of powers; the executive is elected separately from the legislature; governance is more transactional because the president must secure legislative consent despite potentially divergent preferences).
Constitutions typically establish: the division of power between central and local authorities, the organization and functioning of legislative, executive, and judiciary, and the electoral system's basic parameters; the day-to-day policy making and administration are left to the legislative and executive branches.
Not all constitutions are single, unified documents. Some are unwritten or come from multiple sources (e.g., the United Kingdom’s unwritten constitution; New Zealand; Israel’s series of basic laws; organizations like Israel’s basic laws). In these cases, there is no single codified document.
Unwritten constitutions can be highly influential and still function as foundational constitutional orders; examples include Britain (Magna Carta as a historical anchor, but the constitution is an agglomeration of statutes, judicial interpretations, conventions, and common law).
The British constitution is characterized as unwritten in the sense of lacking a unified document; while it has written components, it is not a single codified text. NZ also lacks a unified written constitution, though it has foundational documents dating back to earlier times.
Israel’s constitution is often described as unwritten, consisting of a series of basic laws; the 1948 declaration of independence is seen as an early quasi-constitutional document.
Constitution writing and reform is a core example of political engineering (chapter 1’s theme): it embodies practical experimentation in how to design political institutions; the US experience is presented as a landmark example of constitutive political engineering (the 1787 convention and the ensuing constitutional framework).
The transition from colonial/continental models to a written constitution reflects a shift from novelty to norm across many states within the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Important note: constitution writing shapes the interaction of political parties, interest groups, and the policy process; constitutions influence not only governance but the broader political and social dynamics.
The United States Constitution in Comparative Perspective
All constitutions provide the basic rules for operating governments, but the US Constitution also serves as a source of national pride and is perceived as the oldest written constitution in the world and unusually brief, contributing to a sense of reverence and reluctance to amend.
The comparative project (Comparative Constitutions Project) places the US Constitution in a broader set of 29 democracies with written constitutions; the project starts from 1789 for constitution-making, and the US stands out as the oldest written constitution still in force among the group.
Age and durability: The United States has a long experience with constitutionalism and shares eighteenth-century origins with France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland; it remains the most durable among the pre-twentieth century-origin constitutions still in force.
The US is often described as the oldest democracy, but this claim depends on the definition of democracy; Huntington’s waves framework provides a historical lens to analyze democratization across countries, with debates about what constitutes democratic status at different times.
Huntington’s waves of democratization and reverse waves (as summarized):
First wave: 1828–1926
First reverse wave: 1922–1942
Second wave: 1943–1962
Second reverse wave: 1962–1975
Third wave: 1974–present
The article notes limitations in Huntington’s criteria (e.g., universal suffrage as a strict threshold is overly lenient; the 50 percent male suffrage standard ignores women and minority exclusions that persisted in many places).
Universal suffrage and the establishment of democracy: A more robust condition is universal suffrage inclusive of women and minority rights; the text emphasizes that universal suffrage is necessary for democracy, but not sufficient (e.g., Iraq under Saddam Hussein voted but was not a democracy).
Table 3.4 (waves) shows that the United States is part of the first wave and that many current democracies experienced multiple waves and reverse waves; Four countries (Argentina, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary) experienced all waves and reverse waves; 25 of 31 democracies are “old” democracies linked to the first wave, but only eight have continuous democracy since the first wave.
Table 3.5 (establishment of universal suffrage) shows the year in which universal suffrage democracy was established or reestablished in each of the 31 democracies; many countries achieved universal suffrage after independence or after a period of nondemocratic rule; several notable cases include:
New Zealand: 1893
Finland: 1906; 1915 independence-era establishment
United Kingdom: 1928
France: 1944
Japan: 1947
Belgium: 1948
Israel: 1948
Germany: 1949
India: 1950
Canada: 1960
Australia: 1962
United States: 1965 (Voting Rights Act)
Switzerland: 1971
Greece: 1974
Portugal: 1976
Spain: 1977
Argentina: 1980
Brazil: 1985
Korea: 1988
Chile: 1990
Czech Republic: 1990
Hungary: 1990
Poland: 1990
South Africa: 1994
Mexico: 2000
The presence of universal suffrage does not guarantee a fully democratic regime; universal suffrage is a necessary condition but must be paired with other institutions and norms to ensure meaningful democracy.
Apart from universal suffrage, the text discusses “the oldest democracy” claim and notes that the United States has a long-standing tradition, but its democratic quality has varied and matured over time; in some respects, the US entered the fully democratic phase only in the 1960s (post–civil rights era).
The Dahl critique highlights the inequality in representation under the US system, particularly the overrepresentation of smaller states in the Senate; e.g., a Nevada vote can be about 17 times more influential than a California vote in practice, and Wyoming’s representation relative to California is nearly 70 to 1 in extreme cases; this is seen as a significant democratic deficit in terms of political equality.
Territorial and nondemocratic constraints: US residents in Puerto Rico and Guam lack presidential and congressional voting rights; District of Columbia residents gained presidential voting rights via the 23rd Amendment (1961) but have no voting member in Congress.
Slavery in constitutional history: Eight constitutions mention slavery; four contain a prohibition on slavery or emancipation for foreign slaves; others reference slavery without clear rights. The US Constitution originally contained three references to slavery:
The Three-Fifths Compromise (Article I, Section 2, Clause 3): slaves counted as three-fifths of a person for representation and taxation purposes; represented as the ratio 3/5.
The migration/importation clause (Article I, Section 9, Clause 1): prohibited the regulation of the importation of slaves until 1808.
The Fugitive Slave clause (Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2): required return of escaped slaves.
The Thirteenth Amendment eventually prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude, making these clauses moot.
The contrast with other countries: Several other constitutions (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Japan, Mexico, South Africa) address slavery differently, with some prohibiting it outright or referencing emancipation or other protections; in some cases slavery was retained in colonial or revolutionary contexts and abolished later (e.g., Brazil in 1888).
The ethics and practical implications: The inclusion of slavery in constitutional texts reflects historical sequencing and political compromises; the timing of constitution writing can significantly shape the content and trajectory of political development, especially race relations and civil rights, with lasting salience in US politics.
The general observation: The presence of a constitution does not guarantee democracy; nondemocratic regimes can and do adopt constitutions (and even long-standing, formal constitutional orders) to legitimize rule.
The Machinery of Amendments and Constitutional Rigidity
Democracies vary in how hard it is to amend their constitutions; all democratic constitutions provide amendment mechanisms, but these vary in rigidity: some are straightforward, others require multiple steps and supermajorities, and some require popular referenda.
Two core dimensions shape amendment difficulty:
Numeric threshold: how many must agree to amend (e.g., absolute majority, 50%+1, 2/3, 3/4).
Complexity: how many actors must approve (e.g., only the legislature versus multiple gates including the electorate or second legislative chambers).
Examples of amendment mechanics include:
Pure legislative supremacy with a simple majority (50%+1) in a unicameral system (low complexity, low rigidity).
Two-thirds in a bicameral system with additional steps (higher rigidity).
Two-level approval, possibly with an intervening election (higher complexity).
Referendum requirements (public vote) and a federal structure that requires majorities in multiple jurisdictions (e.g., a nationwide majority plus a majority in a majority of subunits like cantons).
The most flexible models tend to be legislative-centered; the most rigid models involve two-level approvals and strong supermajority requirements.
The 3-by-3 framework presented: Figure 3.1 plots amendment procedures by two dimensions (numerical threshold and number of veto gates). The line from top-left to bottom-right maps from flexible to rigid constitutions.
The United States has a unique example: it is the only democracy with a three-fourths (75%) supermajority requirement for all amendments (i.e., a 3/4 threshold). It is also one of two cases with any 3/4 requirement (South Africa’s constitution uses 3/4 for some foundational amendments).
The more common pattern: a two-thirds (2/3) supermajority requirement appears in many democracies; a majority of 2/3 often comes with bicameral legislatures and additional procedures (e.g., veto gates).
Other common features include: some constitutions require a referendum; others, a bicameral vote in which both chambers must approve; some require a specific national election as part of the process; the presence of subnational ratification in federal systems (e.g., cantons in Switzerland).
The overall takeaway: Federal systems tend to have more complex and thus more rigid amendment processes; this rigidity can help stabilize constitutional orders but may also slow reform.
Appendix: Concerning multiple amendment processes, the text lists specific cases with their procedures (e.g., Austria uses two-thirds in both chambers; two-thirds plus referendum for total revision; Chile requires 3/5 in both chambers or 2/3 for particular chapters; Colombia requires 50%+1 in two consecutive sessions, sometimes with referendum; France uses 50%+1 in both chambers followed by referendum or 3/5 in Congress, etc.).
Historical and Comparative Perspectives on Constitutionalism
The United States Constitution is presented as an old, durable document; it is short and relatively easy to amend only in theory, given its actual amendment thresholds; in practice, amendments have been relatively rare due to the rigidity of its processes.
The debate about which country is the oldest democracy centers on definitions of democracy, suffrage, and continuous democratic governance; Huntington’s framework provides a historical lens but is not without critique, particularly regarding the suffrage threshold used to define universal democracy.
The chapter emphasizes that constitutional orders can be nondemocratic yet still operate under constitutional rules, and that constitutions are not inherently democratic; rather, they are tools of political engineering with both normative and practical implications for governance and policy.
The discussion connects to prior chapters by highlighting the principal-agent dynamic, the distribution of power, and the influence of constitutional design on political parties, interest groups, and policy outcomes.
The Comparative Constitutions Project is highlighted as a resource for understanding constitutional origins, characteristics, and consequences across states; it aggregates constitutional data from 1789 onward and provides a basis for cross-country comparison.
The discussion ties constitutional design to the broader concept of political engineering (as introduced in chapter 1) and to the real-world process of reform and reformulation in response to political change (e.g., post-authoritarian transitions, post-occupation revisions, and democratic consolidations).
Constitutional Features Across Democracies: A Snapshot
Written vs unwritten constitutions:
Written: The US, France, Germany, India, etc.
Unwritten or partly unwritten: United Kingdom, New Zealand, Israel (basic laws), and Israel’s case is described as quasi-unwritten due to its Basic Laws.
The scope and content of constitutions:
Constitutions serve as the highest law and set the basic structure of government and rights.
They provide a blueprint for governance without detailing day-to-day policy; some do include explicit policy statements, but most leave policy specifics to legislatures and executives.
The relationship between constitutions and democracy:
A constitution does not guarantee democracy; some nondemocratic regimes have constitutions, and some democracies experience non-democratic practices or limitations within otherwise constitutional orders.
The relationship between federalism and amendment procedures:
Federal systems often require additional ratification by subnational units, increasing rigidity and protecting regional interests; this can empower minorities within the federation but also complicate reform.
Slavery as a constitutional issue:
Eight constitutions mention slavery in some form; several countries prohibited or emancipated slavery through their constitutions; in the United States, slavery is entangled in several clauses and amendments, culminating in the Thirteenth Amendment.
Practical numerical references and formulas (as used in the text):
Three-Fifths compromise: representation and taxation counted slaves as 3/5 of a person; mathematically, a slave’s contribution to representation is scaled by the ratio rac{3}{5}.
Amendment thresholds: common patterns include 50%+1 (simple majority), 2/3, 3/4; some require a referendum; others require two-level approval (e.g., a legislative vote plus a popular referendum) or supermajorities in both chambers plus subnational approval.
The US Constitution’s amendment threshold is 3/4 of the states (i.e., rac{3}{4} of state ratifications).
Key empirical takeaways:
The US is distinguished by its age, brevity, and durability, but its democratic depth (universal suffrage and equal voting value) has broadened over time and remains debated (Dahl’s critiques of unequal vote weight across states).
The length of constitutions varies widely; India’s constitution is notably long (exceeding one hundred thousand words), while many others are comparatively short; the length of the constitution often correlates with the level of detail and the likelihood of amendments, but not necessarily with the durability or quality of democracy.
Summary observations on durability, reform, and stability:
Some countries evolve toward longer, more detailed texts (e.g., Switzerland’s modernization in 1999) to streamline amendments and codify existing practices; other countries maintain shorter texts with broad principles but rely on broad, flexible procedures for change.
The presence of multiple constitutional systems within a country (due to coups, occupations, wars, or reforms) is a durable indicator of political instability or reform pressure, and counting constitutional systems can serve as a proxy for long-term political stability or external vulnerability.
Appendix: Constitutions with Multiple Amendment Processes (Selected Highlights)
Austria: two-thirds of both chambers; Austria: two-thirds plus referendum for total revision
Chile: three-fifths of both chambers; Chile: two-thirds if amendments affect specific chapters (Referendum threat by president in both cases)
Colombia: Passed by 50%+1 in two consecutive regular sessions (no intervening election); Colombia: Passed by 50%+1 of the legislature and then submitted to referendum (25% of electorate must participate for passage)
France: 50%+1 of both chambers followed by a referendum; France: three-fifths of parliament convened in congress
India: two-thirds of legislature; India: two-level requirement if changes affect specified articles and/or lists or representation; several listed complex conditions
Poland: two-thirds in the Sejm, 50%+1 in the Senate; Poland: amendments to certain chapters can be submitted to a referendum
South Africa: other amendments require a two-thirds vote in the National Assembly and six of nine (two-thirds) in the National Council of Provinces; South Africa: Section 1 and Subsection 74 require a three-fourths vote in the National Assembly and six of nine in the Council of Provinces
These examples illustrate the diversity of amendment procedures that exist across democracies, reflecting constitutional entrenchment, federal structure, and the balance between stability and reform.
Connections to Foundational Principles and Real-World Relevance
Constitutional design embodies deep philosophical commitments (popular sovereignty, rule of law, balance of power) and practical considerations (stability, adaptability, minority protections).
The structure of government (parliamentary vs presidential) has direct consequences for policy formation, accountability, and the balance of incentives among political actors.
The amendment process acts as a brake on rapid change and ensures that constitutional reforms reflect broad political consensus; it also shapes the ease with which societies can reform in response to shocks or shifts in political norms.
The comparative data underscores how constitutional design interacts with historical trajectories, social rights, and democratic consolidation across diverse political contexts.
Key Terms and Concepts to Remember
Constitutionalism, Rechtsstaat, rule of law, popular sovereignty, principal-agent relationship, separation of powers, fusion of powers, federalism, unwritten vs written constitutions, amendment thresholds, referendum, bicameral vs unicameral legislatures, constitutional rigidity vs flexibility, universal suffrage, abolition of slavery, Three-Fifths compromise, Slavery in constitutional texts, Voting Rights Act, district voting rights (DC), Comparative Constitutions Project
Important dates and figures to recall:
US Constitution adopted: 1787, effective: 1789
First wave of democratization (Huntington): 1828-1926
First reverse wave: 1922-1942; Second wave: 1943-1962; Second reverse: 1962-1975; Third wave: 1974-
Three-Fifths compromise representation: rac{3}{5}
Majority of amendments in many democracies require a two-thirds or three-fourths supermajority (and sometimes referenda)
Universal suffrage milestones: New Zealand 1893; France 1944; United States 1965 (Voting Rights Act); Switzerland 1971$$; etc.
Notable outliers and contrasts:
India’s constitution as an outlier in length (over 100,000 words)
The US as the oldest written constitution among the 29 democracies examined, and its unique rigidity (3/4 state ratification requirement)
The existence of unwritten or partially unwritten constitutions in the UK, NZ, and Israel
The material from the Appendix provides concrete amendment-path examples that illustrate how different constitutional architectures embed different layers of checks and balances. These specifics can help you analyze the political feasibility of constitutional reform in different countries.