Killing in War and the Morality of War

Killing in War

George Orwell - On the Futility of Limiting War

• No one in their right mind likes war, but dodging responsibility for its barbarity is distasteful.

• Pacifism is acceptable if consequences are considered.

• Talk of "limiting" or "humanizing" war is hypocritical because people don't examine catchwords.

• The idea that it's worse to kill civilians than soldiers is questioned, arguing war is unavoidable and others besides young men will die.

• The immunity of civilians has been shattered, which isn't regrettable because war isn't "humanized" by being confined to the young.

• War is inherently barbaric, and recognizing this might lead to improvement.

George I. Mavrodes - Conventions and the Morality of War

• Mavrodes examines the basis for rules protecting civilians, arguing immunity of noncombatants is "convention-dependent."

• Obligation stems from conventions aimed at taming war, substituting limited combat for full warfare.

• Assumes warfare can be morally justified under certain conditions and for some ends.

• The distinction is between wars and other international combats and focuses on the intentional killing of noncombatants.

• He critiques arguments from Elizabeth Anscombe, John C. Ford, and Paul Ramsey, arguing they ignore the distinction.

Immunity Theorists

• Immunity theorists believe noncombatants have moral immunity from being intentionally killed.

• They use the "principle of double-effect," dividing consequences into intended and unintended.

• Intentional killing of noncombatants is always immoral, regardless of potential good.

• Unintended death of noncombatants is acceptable if the good outweighs the evil.

• The moral distinction between combatants and noncombatants cannot be based on the value of human life alone.

Critique of Innocence

• The argument for immunity turns on notions of guilt and innocence.

• Innocence, in this context, is synonymous with "noncombatant."

• A person can support an unjust war without being a combatant, while a drafted soldier may be a combatant without understanding the war.

• Innocence as used by immunity theorists lacks moral content.

• Warfare is unlike ordinary criminal activity as individuals engage in it as members of nations.

Convention-Dependent Morality

• The immunity of noncombatants is a convention-dependent obligation related to a convention substituting limited combat for warfare.

• The convention is justified by its results, aiming to reduce pain and death involved in combat.

• Moral obligations are convention-dependent if the obligation exists because a convention is in force, and an alternative convention would negate the obligation.

• Acting in conformity with a preferable convention not widely observed may be worse than following a less desirable but widely observed convention.

• The status of traffic rules vs. conventions of warfare is compared.

Convention vs. Morality

• The immunity of noncombatants is not an independent moral rule but part of a convention for a morally desirable alternative to war.

• The key distinction is between warfare per se and international combats limited by convention and custom.

• Unilateral restraint may signal willingness to abide by a convention, potentially leading to mutual respect and a new convention.

Jeff McMahan - The Ethics of Killing in War

• McMahan challenges just war theory, arguing that combatants in unjust wars act wrongly by attacking enemy soldiers.

• He also posits that combatants in just wars may target noncombatants responsible for wrongs.

Traditional Theory of the Just War

/

• Traditional theory has two parts: justice of war (jus ad bellum) and ethics of conduct in war (jus in bello), viewed as independent.

• A just war can be fought unjustly, and vice versa.

• Those who fight in a just war are just combatants; those in an unjust war lack a just cause and are unjust combatants.

• Jus in bello is independent of jus ad bellum, making no distinction on the permissibility of an unjust combatant inflicting harm.