The Challenge from the Right:
Powerful right wing posed major threat to Weimar govt.
Right had been hostile to Republic from outset since it didn’t believe in democracy + it accused politicians who now led Germany of having betrayed the Fatherland.
H/e this was the limit of what they agreed upon many competing right-wing groups with different objectives: some wished to see restoration of monarchy, whilst others advocated dictatorship.
In areas such as Bavaria there were groups that fought for separation from the rest of Germany, whilst others wanted united Germany so that it could become a great power again diversions weakened ability of right-wing groups to overthrow the Republic.
Nevertheless, right-wing ideas were strong amongst members of the Freikorps and in the army, whilst the large landowners, industrialists, civil servants, police + judges on whom the Republic relied were also traditional conservative anti-republicans.
Extreme Right in Theory:
In contrast to Marxist socialism, extreme right didn’t really have alternative organized ideology (apart from shared intense nationalism). Simply drawn together by growing belief in:
i) Anti-democracy: United by its rejection of Weimar system + principles. Aimed to destroy the democratic constitution b/c it was seen as weak + believed to have contributed to Germany’s problems.
ii) Anti-Marxism: Even more despised than democracy was the fear of communism. It was seen as a real threat to traditional values + the ownership of property + wealth - + when Russian communism was established, it reinforced the idea that communism was anti-German.
iii) Authoritarianism: Extreme right favoured restoration of some authoritarian regime – although in the early 1920s there was no real consensus on what kind of strong govt. + leadership would be established.
iv) Nationalism: At core of extreme right; Germany’s national pride had been deeply hurt by events of 1918-9. Not surprisingly, from time of Treaty of Versailles, this conservative-nationalist response reinforced the ideas of the ‘stab in the back’ myth + ‘November criminals’. Argued war was lost not b/c of military defeat but result of betrayal by unpatriotic forces within Germany. Said to include pacifists, socialists, democrats + Jews. Right-wing politicians found whole range of scapegoats to take blame for German acceptance of Armistice.
German National People’s Party (DNVP):
DNVP a coalition of nationalist-minded old imperial conservative parties including such groups as the Fatherland Party + Pan-German League.
From v. start contained extremist + racist elements.
Although still party of landowners + industrialists, had broad appeal among some of the middle classes.
By far largest party in Reichstag on extreme right with 15.1% in 1920 election.
Racist Nationalism:
- Emergence of racist nationalism, or ‘volkisch’ nationalism, clearly apparent before 1914 but effects of war + aftermath increased its attraction for many on the right.
- By early 1920s probably about 70 relatively small splinter nationalist parties, which were also racist + anti-Semitic e.g. the Nazi Party.
- Bavaria became particular haven for such groups, since regional state govt. was sufficiently reactionary to tolerate them.
- One such group was German Workers’ Party, founded by Anton Drexler Adolf Hitler joined party in 1919 + within 2 years had become its leader.
- H/e during the years 1919-24, regional + policy differences divided such groups + attempts to unify the nationalist right ended in failure.
- Not until the mid-1920s Hitler began to bring different groups together under the leadership of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) – the Nazis.
Kapp Putsch, 1920:
- Govt. was obliged to put into effect the terms of the Treaty of Versailles in Jan 1920 and consequently needed to reduce the size of the army + to disband some Freikorps units.
- In Feb. 1920, the defence minister, Gustav Noske, ordered two Freikorps units, comprising 12000 men to disband. Units stationed 12 miles from Berlin.
- Gustav Noske (1868-1946) : journalist by profession + leading member of the SPD. Played key role in 1918 in persuading mutinying Kiel sailors to end their revolt + was appointed Minister of Defence in the new republican govt. As such, he was responsible for using the army + Freikorps to suppress the Spartacist revolt + later left-wing revolts. After the failure of the Kapp Putsch, he was forced to resign as Minister of Defence b/c of pressure from trade unions.
- General Walther von Luttwitz, commanding general, refused to disband one of them, the govt. ordered his arrest.
- General Walther von Luttwitz (1859-1942): an army general who had commanded forces on the Western Front in the war. In 1919, he was appointed Commander in Chief of the army in Berlin and was also in charge of Freikorps. As an outspoken opponent of the Treaty of Versailles, he became the driving force behind the Kapp Putsch. After the failure of the putsch, he escaped to Hungary but returned to Germany in 1924 after being granted an amnesty.
- Luttwitz decided to march his troops to Berlin in protest + other sympathetic officers offered their support.
- Luttwitz also supported by right-wing civil servant + politician Wolfgang Kapp, who was intent on organizing a putsch.
- Wolfgang Kapp (1868-1922): trained in law + worked as a civil servant. Attracted to right-wing politics + co-founded the Fatherland Party in 1917. He was a monarchist and in 1919 was elected to the Reichstag for the nationalist DNVP. Attempted a putsch in 1920 + tried to set himself up as Chancellor but, after its failures, he fled to Sweden. He returned to Germany in 1922 but died in Leipzig whilst awaiting trial.
- Putsch: a coup/violent attempt to overthrow a govt.
- H/e crucially Generals Hans von Seeckt + Ludendorff remained non-committal they sympathized but were aware of the dangers of voicing open support.
Kapp’s Proclamation:
12 March 1920: 12,000 Freikorps troops marched into Berlin unopposed + 13 March 1920 Reich Chancellor Wolfgang Kapp issued a proclamation.
“The Reich and nation are in grave danger. With terrible speed we are approaching the complete collapse of the state and of law and order. Prices are rising unchecked. Hardship is growing. The government, lacking in authority and in league with corruption, is incapable of overcoming the danger. From the East we are threatened by war-like Bolshevism. Is this government capable of resisting it? How are we to escape internal and external collapse? Only by re-erecting a strong state. There is no other way but a government of action. In the best German tradition, the state must stand above the conflict of classes and parties. We recognize only German citizens. Everyone must do his duty!”
Impact of Kapp Putsch:
Ebert’s govt. was forced to withdraw to Dresden, and when Ebert and his chancellor, Gustav Bauer, called on the regular army to crush the rising.
Seeckt famously told Ebert: “Troops do not fire on troops; when Reichswehr (German army) fires on Reichswehr, all comradeship within the officer corps has vanished”.
Situation appeared dangerous, but actually considerable tension between the military + civilian elements of the putsch and it failed to gain widespread support, even from the right wing.
Civil servants + bankers remained at best lukewarm + often hostile, whilst trade unions, encouraged by socialist members of Ebert’s govt., called general strike.
Berlin brought to standstill + within 4 days putsch collapsed Kapp + Luttwitz forced to flee.
Ebert’s govt. returned, but not quite with the air of triumph that might have been expected.
At first sight, collapse of Kapp Putsch could be viewed as major success for Weimar Republic = in 6 days of crisis, it had retained the backing of the people of Berlin + had effectively withstood a major threat from the extreme right.
H/e was is significant is that the Kapp Putsch had taken place at all,
Putsch taught no. of lessons army not to be trusted, civil servants could be disloyal, workers as a group could show their power (a realization that gave renewed vigour to the communist movement) + without the army’s support Weimar govt. was weak.
The army leadership had revealed its unreliability, yet amazingly at end of that very month Seeckt was made chief of the army command (1920-6); was appointed b.c he enjoyed the confidence of his fellow officers, even though his support for the republic was lukewarm.
Under Seeckt’s influence, the organization of the army was remodeled + its status redefined:
I)Seeckt imposed v. strict military discipline + recruited new troops, increasingly at expense of Freikorps.
II)Seeckt was determined to uphold independence of army; believed it held privileged position placing it beyond direct govt. control e.g. turned blind eye to Versailles disarmament clauses in order to increase size of army with more modern weapons.
Many within army ranks believed it served some higher purpose to nation as a whole, with right to intervene as it saw fit without regard to obligations to the republic.
All this suggests that aftermath of Kapp putsch, the Ebert-Groener agreement + constitution’s failure to reform its structures had left the army as a ‘state within a state’.
Judiciary also continued with old political values that hadn’t changed since imperial times enjoyed advantage of maintaining independence from Weimar constitution, but questioned legal rights of new republic + reached dubious and biased decisions.
Those involved in putsch 1920 never felt full rigour of law Kapp died awaiting trial + Luttwitz granted early retirement. Only 1 of 705 prosecuted actually found guilty + sentenced to 5 years imprisonment.
Leniency shown by right-wing judges towards those brought to trial in the aftermath of the putsch contrasted strongly with harsh treatment suffered by left wing, + their behavior sent a message that the govt. was not really in control.
Political Assassinations:
Violence continued as right-wing nationalists organized themselves into leagues, committed to elimination of prominent politicians + those associated with ‘betrayal’ of Germany.
These Vaterlandische Verbande (Patriotic Leagues), often formed out of the old Freikorps units, acted as fiercely anti-republican paramilitaries.
They were potentially v. powerful + some were actively supported by members of the regular German army.
One early victim of the assassins’ bullets was Hugo Haase, a USPD member who had been a member of the Council of People’s Commissars.
Hugo Haase (1863-1919): Jewish lawyer who had become a leading figure in the SPD before 1914. His anti-war stance alienated him from the majority of the party + in 1917 he took leading role in forming the breakaway USPD. During revolution of Nov. 1918, he joined with the Majority SPD in setting up a new govt. but resigned in December in protest at the armed suppression of a sailors’ revolt in Berlin.
The Assassination of Erzberger:
Matthias Erzberger (1875-1921): entered Reichstag as deputy for Centre Party in 1903. He had supported the Peace Resolution of 1917 + became member of Prince Max’s govt. in 1918. Led German delegation to sign the armistice + had signed Versailles Treaty on behalf of the German govt. in 1919. Was Reich Finance Minister from June 1919 to March 1920 + carried out major reform of German taxation system. Had been subject to frequent attacks in the Conservative press + was prime target for assassination.
In August 1921, former Finance Minister, Matthias Erzberger, was assassinated in the Black Forest by two members of the terrorist league Organisation Consul.
Organisation Consul: ultra-nationalist paramilitary group formed from ex-Freikorps members after their units were disbanded following the failed Kapp Putsch.
Had already been shot in Jan. + left wounded, but assassins were determined to complete the job.
Erzberger had led German delegation for signing of the armistice + signed Treaty of Versailles.
Was also Germany’s representative on the reparations committee.
Even after he was buried, his widow continued to receive abusive letters, including threats to defile his grave.
Assassination of Rathenau:
Walther Rathenau (1867-1922): physicist + chemist by training + head of AEG Electricals. Entered politics as a Liberal. In 1919, he joined the DDP + became Minister of Reconstruction in 1921, then foreign minister in 1922. He recommended the fulfillment of the Treaty of Versailles.
24 June 1922 : assassination of foreign minister Walther Rathenau was driving to work in an open-top car when 4 assassins from Organisation Consul shot at him + hurled a hand grenade for good measure.
Rathenau’s ‘crimes’ were to be a Jew and leading minister in republican govt., had participated in signing of the armistice + negotiated with Allies to try to improve the Treaty of Versailles.
Nevertheless, Rathenau had been popular figure + following day over 700,000 protestors lined streets of Berlin.
Assassination also had impact abroad value of mark fell as other countries feared repercussions.
Karl Gareis, leader of Independent German Social Democratic Party (USPD) was also murdered on 9 June 1921 b/c he was committed socialist.
Impact of Assassinations:
Altogether, between 1919 +1923, there were 376 political assassinations, 22 carried out by the left, 354 by the right.
In attempt to halt rising tide of lawlessness, in July 1922 Reichstag passed law ‘for the protection of the Republic’, which imposed severe penalties on those involved in conspiracy to murder + banned extremist organisations.
Organisation Consul forced to disband, but law was ineffective b/c judges who had to enforce it were often right-wing sympathisers.
In Bavaria, staunchly conservative govt. even refused to implement it (+ so unwittingly allowed Nazi movement to establish itself).
Rathenau’s killers + their accomplices received an average of only 4 years each in prison.
Whilst 326 right-wing murderers went unpunished + only one was convicted + sentenced to severe punishment until 1923, 10 left-wing murderers were sentenced to death.
Conclusion:
Although right-wing activity failed to destroy the Republic, developments of the 1919-23 period bolstered arrogance of anti-republican nationalists, who showed they could get away with murder.
Since Weimar politicians seemed constantly to exaggerate the threat from the left + to underestimate that from the right, the anti-republican right-wing was able to establish itself v. firmly in the new German state.