How cognitive neuroscience could be more biological—and what it might learn from clinical neuropsychology
Introduction
This note synthesizes Stefan Frisch’s argument about how cognitive neuroscience (CNS) could be more biological by learning from clinical neuropsychology, particularly Goldstein’s insights. The central claim is that three widespread assumptions in CNS—localizationism, internalism, and isolationism—are not sufficiently supported when one looks closely at clinical practice and real-life brain–environment interactions. From the perspective of clinical neuropsychology, brain damage reveals a person in a specific environment, not a collection of isolated brain modules. All human research presupposes a situated, reflecting, and interacting subject—an assumption that precedes any decomposition of mind and brain. These observations align with the embodiment approach to brain and mind and locate Goldstein and his clinical work at the core of its historical origins.
The Three Widespread Assumptions in CNS
Frisch identifies three assumptions that often guide CNS research. First, localizationism holds that mental functions are localized in circumscribed brain areas that can be precisely identified, enabling complex functions to be decomposed into brain parts and mapped onto a modular brain organization. This view is linked to a tradition of lesion studies and has been reinforced by neuroimaging findings showing focal activations. Second, internalism posits that cognitive functions are causally produced inside the brain, such that reconstructing computational principles (even in silico) reveals how mental functions are generated and how disorders arise as brain products. Third, isolationism claims that scientific knowledge about mind and brain must be derived from controlled laboratory experiments in which phenomena are isolated from their contexts, after which broader pictures are assembled. Clinical neuropsychology has often been cited as supportive evidence for these claims by emphasizing lesion–deficit correlations and comparing patients’ deficits to brain lesions, alongside imaging studies that provide correlational evidence.
Goldstein’s Turn: A More Appropriate View of Brain Lesions (and Brains)
Goldstein challenged localizationist tenets while integrating clinical insight. He observed that clinical signs are not clean, context-free phenomena but are dynamic and shaped by the organism’s interaction with its situation. In Goldstein’s view, a brain-damaged person cannot be understood by examining a single function in isolation; instead, the entire organism and its environment must be considered. This perspective emphasizes that brain damage alters not only specific abilities but the whole range of abilities, producing amorphous responses and changing the organism–Umwelt relationship. Goldstein drew on the concept of Umwelt to describe the world meaningful to a given organism; brain damage disrupts an organism’s alignment with its Umwelt, prompting compensatory strategies and environmental reorganization. A key illustrative example is Fuchs’ pseudofovea, where a patient with primary visual cortex damage develops a dynamically shifting site of sharp vision depending on external context, illustrating that perception adapts to ecological demands rather than obeying fixed anatomical maps.
Goldstein’s Neuropsychological System View
Goldstein argued for a systemic view of brain function where the organism and environment are inseparably linked. He proposed that a brain operates as a network that remains active and whose activation patterns shift with stimuli, seeking to return to stable states while accommodating environmental demands. This network-based, systemic approach anticipated later dynamical systems ideas such as attractors, multistability, and bifurcations. Goldstein’s work anticipated that brain damage yields global, qualitative changes in functioning, not merely deficits localized to specific modules. He argued that environment and organism co-determine what the brain can do, and that studying brain function requires attention to an organism’s overall state and its relation to Umwelt.
The Trial Against “Winner is Localization”
Today, neuroimaging often appears to confirm localization by showing consistent activations for certain tasks. Yet Goldstein’s critique remains relevant: localizing a clinical sign is not the same as localizing a function, and localizing experimental effects does not guarantee a function’s localization. Modularity—conceiving the brain as a set of discrete, specialized modules—remains widespread, but Goldstein’s perspective urges caution: even seemingly focal changes are embedded in dynamic, global reorganizations that can alter behavior and personality over time. Moreover, the presence of networks in imaging does not automatically imply fixed functional modules; the brain’s dynamic, context-dependent patterns may underlie robust but nonmodular organization.
The Idea of Degeneracy and Equipotentialism
Frisch discusses degeneracy, the notion that multiple structural elements can support the same function. Degeneracy exists both between subjects (interindividual) and within subjects (intraindividual), and it helps explain why identical lesions or activations can yield different outcomes across individuals or tasks. This undermines a simplistic one-to-one mapping between brain area and function. The literature increasingly acknowledges that a given brain region’s activation does not necessarily imply that the region is necessary for a task, as other regions may compensate. Degeneracy also prompts a broader view of brain mechanisms, where multiple neural configurations can drive similar outputs. Equipotentialism—an idea often attributed to Lashley—seems insufficient to describe Goldstein’s stance, which is better read as a synthesis: lesion effects are best understood at a higher level that accounts for organism–Umwelt relationships rather than a purely brain-immanent account. Goldstein’s network conception posits constant activity and shifting activation patterns, with stabilizing constants arising from the organism’s ongoing interaction with its world. This perspective foregrounds distributed, dynamic brain activity and the context-dependent emergence of function.
Networks, Modularity, and Dynamical Systems
Frisch notes that while networks and modular ideas are not wrong per se, they risk being treated as static clockworks. In dynamic, real-world contexts, brain networks reorganize and exhibit degeneracy, making fixed modules an oversimplification. Behavioural and neural responses are shaped by transient states, strategies, arousal, and external demands. Goldstein’s intuition foreshadows modern dynamical systems concepts such as attractors and multistability, where the brain can sustain multiple states simultaneously and switch between them in response to perturbations. In this view, lesions can induce global system changes, creating new stable patterns that reflect the organism’s attempt to preserve identity and function within a changed Umwelt.
Is Equipotentialism the Answer?
Frisch cautions against claiming equipotentialism as a simple resolution to localization debates. A purely brain-centered equipotential view would ignore the clinical usefulness of lesion–deficit correlations. Instead, the synthesis suggests that functions emerge from dynamic interactions among neural networks, the organism, and the environment. Goldstein’s concept of a network with context-dependent activation offers a model in which brain regions do not house fixed functions but participate in flexible ensembles whose configurations depend on task goals, environmental context, and the organism’s internal state. This view aligns with a dynamical, embodied understanding of cognition that privileges interaction over isolation.
The Sickness Question: When Is a Deficit Pathological?
A central problem is distinguishing mere deviance from pathology. Statistical deviance from a control mean does not by itself denote disease, because many deviations are benign variants. Goldstein argues that disease arises when there is an imbalance between the organism and its Umwelt that cannot be corrected, leading to suffering and impairment. Thus, diagnosis and treatment must consider the relational (organism–Umwelt) perspective and individual norms. Deficits are not solely brain-internal phenomena; they are meaningful only in relation to an individual’s environment and life goals. This relational view informs clinical decisions and challenges purely brain-centered interpretations of pathology.
Personal, Situated Encounters: A Comprehensive View of Clinical Neuropsychology
From a modern clinical perspective, Goldstein’s ideas emphasize that quantified test scores must be interpreted with rich context. Neuropsychological assessment relies on interactions among patient, examiner, and the broader medical history, premorbid status, and subjective experience. Test scores are simultaneously under- and over-specified: tests isolate specific aspects yet cannot capture global changes such as personality or everyday functioning. Validation should involve multiple information sources, including medical history, patient’s self-report, family observations, and real-world behavior. The first-person perspective (patient’s experience) and the second-person perspective (empathy and the therapeutic relationship) are essential, especially in therapy, where success is defined in terms of restoring identity and meaningful engagement with the world. Therapeutic outcomes rely on integrating 1st, 2nd, and 3rd person information, blending clinical data with subjective experience and empathic understanding. This approach challenges the lesion-deficit view as the sole scientific framework and supports a broader, ecologically grounded clinical science.
The Experimental Paradigm in Human Neuroscience: The One and Only?
Frisch critiques the overreliance on controlled experiments as the gold standard for studying mind and brain. He notes that isolating biological phenomena may distort living systems, because life involves staying in and adapting to an Umwelt. Experimental manipulations often remove organisms from their authentic states, potentially altering the very phenomena under study. Humans are interpretive agents who reflect on strategies, motivations, and hypotheses; researchers must consider the 1st-person perspective (subjective experience) and the 2nd-person perspective (interpersonal interaction) to design meaningful experiments and interpret results. The artificial separation of observer and object, common in the natural sciences, is particularly problematic in cognitive and clinical neuroscience, where intersubjective factors shape results and meaning.
External Validity and Ecological Validity: Real-World Relevance
A central critique is the ecological validity gap: laboratory findings may not translate to everyday life. Frisch argues that ecological validity should be a priority, and that clinical neuropsychology offers a corrective by emphasizing real-world performance, adaptive behavior, and interactions with the Umwelt. Shallice and Burgess’ work on executive function exemplifies this shift, highlighting that standard laboratory tasks sometimes fail to predict everyday multitasking difficulties. The remedy is to incorporate ecological validity into research design, using behavioral observations, virtual reality, and tasks that approximate real-world demands. In this view, the brain is best understood through its capacity to adapt to a changing environment, not through isolated task-evoked activations alone.
The Workbench Engine View of the Brain
Frisch uses the metaphor of the brain as a workbench engine that processes stimuli while remaining constantly embedded in an Umwelt. Even highly precise perimetric studies of vision illustrate that anatomy often yields to function when confronted with real-world demands. The pseudofovea example shows how perception co-evolves with action and environment; the brain’s activity is not a fixed map but a dynamic system that reorganizes in response to environmental contingencies. This perspective emphasizes that first-person experience and the organism’s active engagement with its surroundings shape perceptual and cognitive outcomes in ways that laboratory measurements alone cannot fully capture.
Conclusion and Implications for CNS
Frisch argues for an embodied, situated science of brain and mind. The key takeaways are:
Brain, organism, and Umwelt are deeply intertwined; cognition emerges from their dynamic interaction rather than from brain activity alone.
Mind is constituted within this interwoven system, making it problematic to isolate mind from body and environment in scientific inquiry.
Living systems cannot be fully decomposed into independent, basic units of explanation; understanding requires acknowledging non-transparent interrelations between wholes and parts.
Living systems are autonomous agents that actively maintain identity while adapting to perturbations, generating norms and meaningful interactions with their Umwelt.
Experimental methods are limited in validity for mind/brain research and should be complemented by ecological third-person approaches, as well as first- and second-person perspectives to validate and enrich findings.
These ideas align with the embodiment approach in cognitive and brain science and offer a robust alternative to strict isolationist or purely modular viewpoints. Goldstein’s clinical-neuropsychological observations remain pertinent, and integrating his perspective with contemporary neuroscience could advance both theory and practice. The overarching message is to remain open to interdisciplinary perspectives—philosophy, humanities, and physics alike—to test core assumptions and to foster a more integrated, ecologically valid understanding of brain and mind.