EC202_Lecture_notes_11

Page 1

Introduction to EC202 Intermediate Microeconomics

  • Instructor: George Symeonidis

  • Office: 5B.215

  • Academic Support Hours: Thursdays 11-12 or by appointment

  • Email: symeonid@essex.ac.uk

Page 2

Course Structure

Teaching Format

  • 10 two-hour lectures

  • Weekly one-hour classes

Textbooks

  1. Perloff

  2. Varian

  3. Morgan, Katz and Rosen

Resources

  • Lecture notes, Module Outline, and Problem sets available on Moodle

Prerequisites

  • Introductory economics preferred

  • Basic algebra (solving systems of linear equations, understanding graphs) required

  • Calculus useful, but not essential

Assessment

  • Coursework and a final examination (both contribute to the aggregate module mark)

  • Coursework this term includes a test (details forthcoming)

Page 3

Course Schedule for Spring Term

  • Weeks 16-17: Monopoly I and II

  • Week 18: Introduction to Game Theory

  • Weeks 19-20: Oligopoly I and II

  • Week 21: Intertemporal Decisions: Consumption and Investment

  • Weeks 22-23: Behaviour under Uncertainty I and II

  • Weeks 24-25: Asymmetric Information I and II

Page 4

Lecture Notes

  • Lecture Topic: Monopoly

  • Instructor: George Symeonidis

Page 5

Understanding Monopoly

  • Prior studies focused on firms as price takers, suitable under certain conditions:

    • Large number of firms in an industry

    • Firms produce similar goods

  • Example of monopoly: Amazon, Google - firms influencing market prices via market power.

  • Analysis focus: how to study firms with significant market power.

Page 6

Monopoly vs Perfect Competition

Characteristics of Monopoly

  • One seller

  • Price-making seller

  • No close substitutes; no other firms in the market

  • No market entry barriers

Characteristics of Perfect Competition

  • Many small sellers

  • Price-taking sellers

  • Many small buyers

  • Perfectly informed buyers

  • Homogeneous products

  • Equal access to resources

  • Free entry

Page 7

Sources of Monopoly

Real-World Monopolies

  • Indefinite legal monopolies: Electricity generation, railway systems

  • Temporary legal monopolies: Patents, trade secrets

  • De facto monopolies: Unique access to specific inputs

  • Discussion on natural monopolies follows

Page 8

Sources of Market Power

Factors Leading to Significant Market Power

  • Large economies of scale (high fixed or sunk costs)

  • High switching costs for consumers (e.g., network goods)

  • Cost or product advantages through innovation

  • Examples: Firms like Facebook or Microsoft exhibit significant market power.

Page 9

The Profit-Maximising Monopolist

Profit Function

  • Profit (Π) = Revenue (R(Q)) - Cost (C(Q))

  • R(Q) = P(Q) * Q

  • Important: C(Q) refers to the firm’s cost function

  • For monopolists, the quantity sold depends on pricing adjustments due to demand dynamics.

Page 10

Conditions for Profit Maximisation

Key Concept

  • Required condition: Marginal Revenue (MR) = Marginal Cost (MC)

  • Under perfect competition, MR = P, but for monopolists, MR < P for all output levels greater than zero.

Reasons

  1. Uniform pricing (same price for all units sold)

  2. Lowering prices to sell more units involves reducing prices on previously sold units as well.

Page 11

Understanding Marginal Revenue (MR)

  • Visualization of MR change:

  1. Revenue gain = P1 for an extra unit sold

  2. Revenue loss = Q0 * ΔP (where ΔP = P1 - P0 < 0)

Key Formula

  • More generally, for non-unit changes,:

    • MR = P + Q * (ΔP/ΔQ) < P

Page 12

Deriving the MR Curve

  • Given demand: Q = 12 - ½P

  • Inverse demand: P = 24 - 2Q

MR Calculation

  • MR = 24 - 2Q + Q(-2) = 24 - 4Q

Page 13

MR Curve vs Demand Curve

  • Visualization shows MR < P, implying that MR curve lies below demand curve for all Q > 0.

Page 14

Price Elasticity and MR Relationship

  • Key Formula: MR = P * (1 - 1/ε)

  • As demand becomes more elastic, MR approaches P.

Page 15

Profit Maximisation Framework

  • Visual representation:P, MC, and Demand curves showing equilibrium output Q*

Page 16

Steps for Profit Maximisation

  1. Derive MR curve

  2. Set MR = MC to find optimal output Q*

  3. Find market price P* corresponding to Q* using demand curve.

Page 17

Example of Profit Maximisation

  • Given inverse demand: P = 24 - 2Q; MR = 24 - 4Q

  • MC assumed constant at 4.

Outcomes

  • MR = MC leads to Q* = 5; price P* = 14.

Page 18

Measuring Profit

  • Profit (Π) expressed as:

    • Π = (P - AC) * Q

  • Meaning: Profit = Producer Surplus - Fixed Cost

Page 19

Profit Area Visualization

  • Graph shows profitability regions and their definitions including areas related to P, AC, and MC.

Page 20

Shut-Down Decision for Monopolists

  • Similar to competitive firms, a monopolist may shut down if unable to cover average economic costs.

Page 21

About Market Power

  • Definition: Market power exists if a firm sets its price above marginal cost.

Lerner Index

  • Measures market power: L = (P - MC)/P

  • Greater demand elasticity indicates lesser market power.

Page 22

Monopoly and Welfare Considerations

  • Importance of caring about market power: Price above MC leads to resource misallocation.

  • Implications of P > MC result in lower overall welfare due to deadweight loss.

Page 23

Deadweight Loss in Monopoly

  • Graph illustrating deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing behavior.

Page 24

Tax Implications for Monopolies

  • Considering tax on monopolies:

  • Lump sum tax shifts profits but outputs remain unchanged unless causing shutdown.

  • Per unit tax exacerbates inefficiency by raising MC and reducing output.

Page 25

Subsidising Monopolies

  • Subsidies could counteract inefficiency, allowing for socially optimal production with respected MR = MC.

Page 26

Assessing Social Cost of Market Power

  • Evidence on deadweight loss varying; also considers productivity and innovation impacts.

Page 27

Static vs Dynamic Efficiency

  • Monopolies may encourage R&D if increased profits from innovation cover costs but effects vary.

Page 28

Innovation Perspective

  • Higher market power may not optimize innovation; perfect competition might be more conducive under certain circumstances.

Page 29

Rent-Seeking Behavior and Welfare

  • Monopolies may invest considerable resources to protect their positions, impacting overall welfare negatively.

Page 30

Antitrust Policy Overview

  • Antitrust authorities aim to mitigate market power abuse.

  • Concerns with digital giants prevalent.

Page 31

Antitrust Remedies

Types of Remedies

  1. Conduct remedies: Monitor behavior with fines to deter bad practices.

  2. Structural remedies: Prevent abusive behaviors through alterations in market structure.

Page 32

Structural Remedies Challenges

  • Technology and consumer behavior influence market structure challenges; economies of scale complicate assessment of firms.

Page 33

Ambiguities in Antitrust Effectiveness

  • Outcomes of mergers or specific business practices can have conflicting welfare implications.

Page 34

Challenges in Assessing Market Power

  • Evaluating market power impacted by defining relevant markets, knowledge gaps, and dynamic market conditions.

Page 35

Understanding Natural Monopoly

  • Cost-effective to produce a single product in one firm rather than multiple; moderation of production efficiency and allocative efficiency a challenge.

Page 36

Characteristics of Natural Monopoly

  • Average costs can decline consistently or within a relevant output range.

Page 37

Examples of Natural Monopolies

  • Relevant industries include: gas networks, electricity grid, railways, and fibre-optic broadband.

Page 38

Regulation of Natural Monopolies

Regulatory Frameworks

  1. Rate of return regulation

  2. Strict price caps to incentivize cost investment

Page 39

Welfare Maximization Challenges with Regulation

  • Aim to set P = MC; conflicts arise with declining AC resulting in firm losses.

Page 40

Regulating Monopolies with Known Costs

  • Situations where firms unable to charge sufficiently to cover costs lead to potential losses.

Page 41

Solutions for Declining AC Firms

  1. Price set at demand curve and AC curve intersection allows for some break-even production.

  2. Two-part tariffs to eliminate deadweight loss and maintain breakeven.

Page 42

Regulation Difficulties

  • Firms often have asymmetric information; balancing returns on investment while minimizing misallocative inefficiencies proves complex.

Page 43

Quiz Question 1

  • Question: "An increase in either fixed cost or marginal cost will cause a monopolist to reduce output in the short run."

  • Answer: True or False?

Page 44

Quiz Question 2

  • Question: "For a monopolist facing an upward-sloping MC curve, the imposition by the government of a fixed price below the monopoly price will..."

  • Options: (a) Increase output (b) Decrease output (c) Not affect output (d) Any of the above.

Page 45

Quiz Question 3

  • Question: "Monopoly can sometimes be more efficient than perfect competition because..."

  • Options: (a) Better cost incentives (b) Subject to antitrust policy (c) Lobbying activities (d) Creates shareholder income.

robot