naturalistic fallacy n the 'is-ought' problem
Moore argued that concepts such as happiness, fitness, health, desire, pleasure » they are all non-moral concepts
there’s nothing intrinsically good about them
therefore, defining good in terms of what makes you ‘happy’ or ‘healthy’ are open to question, as not everyone will agree that they’re good in every situation
eg: murder is wrong » you ought not to murder
eg: kindness is good » you ought to be kind
s.a. burns argued that offering a description/definition of ‘good’ leads implicitly or even explicitly to the moral prescription that we should do what is defined as ‘good
then comes the ‘is-ought’ problem
Moore argued that concepts such as happiness, fitness, health, desire, pleasure » they are all non-moral concepts
there’s nothing intrinsically good about them
therefore, defining good in terms of what makes you ‘happy’ or ‘healthy’ are open to question, as not everyone will agree that they’re good in every situation
eg: murder is wrong » you ought not to murder
eg: kindness is good » you ought to be kind
s.a. burns argued that offering a description/definition of ‘good’ leads implicitly or even explicitly to the moral prescription that we should do what is defined as ‘good
then comes the ‘is-ought’ problem