Epicurus & Nozick Readings

Questions to ask:

• What is utilitarianism

188 ULTIMATE GOOD

superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue. If reason

is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in

comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us,

being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things,

but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve

to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk,

much more does it in power and worth surpass everything. This would

seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and better

part of him. It would be strange, then, if he were to choose not the life of

his self but that of something else. And what we said before will apply now:

that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for

each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to reason is best and

pleasantest, since reason more than anything else is man. This life therefore

is also the happiest.

[The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford University Press: London, 1959),

261-6, Written in ¢.340 BC.]

Notes:

EPICURUS

The Pursuit of Pleasure

Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow

weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure

the health of his soul. And the man who says that the age of philosophy has

either not yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for

happiness is not yet come to him, or has passed away. Wherefore both

when young and old a man must study philosophy, that as he grows old he

may be young in blessings rhrough the grateful recollection of what has

been, and that in youth he may be old as well, since he will know no fear of

what is to come. We must then meditate on the things that make our

happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is

absent we do all to win it.

The things which I used unceasingly to commend to you, these do and

practice, considering them to be the first principles of the good life. [...]

Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good

and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And

therefore a right understanding thar death is nothing to us makes the

mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time,

but because it takes away the craving for immortality. For there is nothing

terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is

nothing terrible in not living. So that the man speaks but idly who says that

he fears death not because it will be painful when it comes, but because

EPICURUS 189

it is painful in anticipation. For that which gives no trouble when it

comes is but an empty pain in anticipation. So death, the most terrifying of

ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but

when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either

the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no

more.

But the many at one moment shun death as the greatest of evils, at

another yearn for it as a respite from the evils in life. But the wise man

neither seeks to escape life nor fears the cessation of life, for neither does

life offend him nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil. And just as

with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but

rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of

time, but the most pleasant.

And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man ta

make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life,

but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die

well. Yet much worse still is the man who says itis good not to be born, but

‘once born make haste to pass the gates of Death.’ For if he says this from

conviction why does he not pass away out of life? For it is open to him to

do so, if he had firmly made up his mind to this. But ifhe speaks in jest, his

words are idle among men who cannot receive them.

We must then bear in mind that the future is neither ours, nor yet wholly

not ours, so that we may not altogether expect it as sure to come, nor

abandon hope of it, as if it will certainly not come.

We must consider that of desires some are natural, others vain, and of

the natural some are necessary and others merely natural; and of the

necessary some are necessary for happiness, others for the repose of

the body, and others for very life. The right understanding of these facts

enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and

the soul’s freedom from disturbance, since this is the aim of the life of

blessedness. For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid

pain and fear. And when this is once secured for us, all the tempest of the

soul is dispersed, since the living creature has not to wander as though in

search of something that is missing, and to look for some other thing by

which he can fulfil the good of the soul and the good of the body. For it is

then that we have need of pleasure, when we feel pain owing to the absence

of pleasure; but when we do not feel pain, we no longer need pleasure. And

for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For

we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we

begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again,

using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good.

And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason

we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many

190 ULTIMATE GOOD

pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and

similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleas-

ure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every

pleasure then because ofits natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleas-

ure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always

of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the considera-

tion of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgement on all

these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and

conversely the bad as good.

And again independence of desire we think a great good—not that we

may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many,

we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the

sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it, and that all that is natural is

easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard. And so plain

savours bring us a pleasure equal to a luxurious diet, when all the pain due

to want is removed; and bread and water produce the highest pleasure,

when one who needs them puts them to his lips. To grow accustomed

therefore to simple and not luxurious diet gives us health to the full, and

makes a man alert for the needful employments of life, and when after long

intervals we approach luxuries disposes us better towards them, and fits us

to be fearless of fortune.

When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean

the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is sup-

posed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not

understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the

mind. For it is not continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the satisfaction

of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table,

which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the

motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to

which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit.

[{‘Epicurus to Menoeceus’ in Epicurus: Extant Remains, trans, C. Bailey (Clarendon

Press: Oxford, 1926), 84-91. Written inc. 300 BC.]

EPICTETUS

A Stoic View of Life

8. Do not seek to have everything that happens happen as you wish, but

wish for everything to happen as it actually does happen, and your life will

be serene.

9. Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the moral purpose,

unless that consents. Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but nor to the

EPICTETUS 191

moral purpose. And say this to yourself at each thing that befalls you; for

you will find the thing to be an impediment to something else, but not to

yourself.

10. In the case of everything that befalls you, remember to turn to

yourself and see what faculty you have to deal with it. If you see a hand-

some lad or woman, you will find continence the faculty to employ here; if

hard labour is laid upon you, you will find endurance; if reviling, you will

find patience to bear evil. And if you habituate yourself in this fashion, your

external impressions will not run away with you.

11. Never say about anything, ‘I have lost it,’ but only T have given it

back.’ Is your child dead? It has been given back. Is your wife dead? She has

been given back. ‘I have had my farm taken away.’ Very well, this too

has been given back, ‘Yet it was a rascal who took it away.” But what

concern is it of yours by whose instrumentality the Giver called for its

return? So long as He gives it to you, take care of it as of a thing that is not

your own, as travellers treat their inn.

12. If you wish to make progress, dismiss all reasoning of this sort: ‘If I

neglect my affairs, | shall have nothing to live on.’ ‘If do not punish my

slave-boy he will turn out bad.’ For it is better to die of hunger, but in a

state of freedom from grief and fear, than to live in plenty, but troubled in

mind. And it is better for your slave-boy to be bad than for you to be

unhappy. Begin, therefore, with the little things. Your paltry oil gets

spilled, your miserable wine stolen; say to yourself, “This is the price paid

for a calm spirit, this the price for peace of mind.’ Nothing is got without a

price, And when you call your slave-boy, bear in mind that it is possible he

may not heed you, and again, that even ifhe does heed, he may not do what

you want done. But he is not in so happy a condition that your peace of

mind depends upon him.

13, If you wish to make progress, then be content to appear senseless

and foolish in externals, do not make it your wish to give the appearance of

knowing anything; and if some people think you to be an important per-

sonage, distrust yourself. For be assured that it is no easy matter to keep

your moral purpose in a state of conformity with nature, and, at the same

time, to keep externals; but the man who devotes his attention to one of

these two things must inevitably neglect the other.

14. If you make it your will that your children and your wife and your

friends should live for ever, you are silly; for you are making it your will

that things not under your control should be under your control, and that

what is not your own should be your own. In the same way, too, if you

make it your will that your slave-boy be free from faults, you are a fool: for

you are making it your will that vice be not vice, but something else. If,

however, it is your will not to fail in what you desire, this is in your power.

Wherefore, exercise yourself in that which is in your power, Each man’s

42 Siate-of-Nature Theory

of the life of the person you kiiled? After all, there would be no

net diminution in total utility, or even any change in its profile of

distribution. Do we forbid murder only to prevent feelings of

worry on the part of potential victims? (And how does a utilitarian

explain what it is they're worried about, and would he really base

a policy on what he must hold to be an irrational fear?) Clearly, a

utilitarian needs to supplement his view to handle such issues;

perhaps he will find that the supplementary theory becomes the

main one, relegating utilitarian considerations to a corner.

But isn’t utilitarianism at least adequate for animals? I think

not. But if not only the animals’ felt experiences are relevant, what

else is? Here a tangle of questions arises. How much does an

animal’s life have to be respected once it’s alive, and how can we

decide this? Must one also introduce some notion of a nondegraded

existence? Would it be all right to use genetic-engineering tech-

niques to breed natural slaves who would be contented with their

lots? Natural animal slaves? Was that the domestication of ani-

mals? Even for animals, utilitarianism won't do as the whole story,

burt the thicket of questions daunts us.

THE EXPERIENCE MACHINE

There are also substantial puzzles when we ask what matters other

than how people’s experiences feel “from the inside.” Suppose there

were an experience machine that would give you any experience

you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your

brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great

novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the

time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to

your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, prepro-

gramming your life’s experiences? If you are worried about missing

out on desirable experiences, we can suppose that business en-

terprises have researched thoroughly the lives of many others. You

can pick and choose from their large library or smorgasbord of

such experiences, selecting your life's experiences for, say, the next

two years. After two years have passed, you will have ten minutes

or ten hours out of the tank, to select the experiences of your next

Moral Constraints and the State 43

two years. Of course, while in the tank you won't know that

you're there; you'll think it’s all actually happening. Others can

also plug in to have the experiences they want, so there’s no need

to stay unplugged to serve them. (Ignore problems such as who

will service the machines if everyone plugs in.) Would you plug

in? What else can matter to us, other than how our lives feel from the in-

Side? Nor should you refrain because of the few moments of

distress between the moment you've decided and the moment

you're plugged. What’s a few moments of distress compared to a

lifetime of bliss (if that’s what you choose), and why feel any

distress at all if your decision is the best one?

What does matter to us in addition to our experiences? First,

we want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of ~

doing them. In the case of certain experiences, it is only because

first we want to do the actions that we want the experiences of

doing them or thinking we've done them. (But why do we want to

do the activities racher than merely to experience them?) A second

treason for not plugging in is that we want to be a certain way, to. °

be a certain sort of person. Someone floating in a tank is an inde- —

terminate blob. There is no answer to the question of what a per-

son is like who has long been in the tank. Is he courageous, kind,

intelligent, witty, loving? It’s not merely that it’s difficult to tell;

there’s no way he is. Plugging into the machine is a kind of

suicide. Ic will seem to some, trapped by a picture, that nothing

about what we are like can matter except as it gets reflected in our

experiences. But should it be surprising that what we are is impor-

tant to us? Why should we be concerned only wich how our time

is filled, but not with what we are?

Thirdly, plugging into an experience machine limits us to a

man-made reality, to a world no deeper or more important than

that which people can construct.?° There is no actwal contact with {*

any deeper reality, though the experience of it can be simulated.

Many persons desire to leave themselves open to such contact and

to a plumbing of deeper significance.* This clarifies the intensity

* Traditional religious views differ on the point of contact with a transcen-

dent reality. Some say that contact yields eternal bliss or Nirvana, but they have

not distinguished this sufficiently from merely a very long run on the experience

machine. Others think it is intrinsically desirable to do the will of a higher

44 State-of-Nature Theory

of the conflict over psychoactive drugs, which some view as mere

local experience machines, and others view as avenues to a deeper

reality; what some view as equivalent to surrender to the experi-

ence machine, others view as following one of the reasons wor to

surrender!

We learn chat something matters to us in addition to experience

by imagining an experience machine and then realizing chat we

would not use it. We can continue to imagine a sequence of

machines each designed to fill lacks suggested for the earlier ma-

chines. For example, since the experience machine doesn't meet

our desire to be a certain way, imagine a transformation machine

which transforms us into whatever sort of person we'd like to be

(compatible with our staying us). Surely one would not use the

transformation machine to become as one would wish, and there-

upon plug into the experience machine! * So something matters in

addition to one’s experiences and what one is like. Nor is the

reason merely that one's experiences are unconnected with what

one is like. For the experience machine might be limited to pro-

vide only experiences possible to the sore of person plugged in. Is

it that we want to make a difference in che world? Consider then the

result machine, which produces in the world any result you would

produce and injects your vector input into any joint activity. We

shalf not pursue here the fascinating details of these or other

machines. What is most disturbing about them is their living of

our lives for us. Is it misguided to search for particular additional

being which created us all, though presumably no one would think this if we

discovered we had been created as an object of amusement by some superpower-

ful child from another galaxy or dimension. Still others imagine an eventual

merging with a higher reality, leaving unclear its desirabiliry, or where that

merging leaves xs.

* Some wouldn’t use the transformation machine at all; it seems like cheat-

ing. Buc che one-time use of the transformation machine would not remove all

challenges; there would still be obstacles for the new us to overcome, a new pla-

ceau from which to strive even higher. And is this plateau any the less earned or

deserved than that provided by genetic endowment and early childhood en-

vironment? Bue if che transformation machine could be used indefinitely often,

so that we could accomplish anything by pushing a button to transform our-

selves into someone who could do it easily, there would remain no limits we

need to strain against or try to transcend. Would there be anything left to do?

Doe some theological views place God outside of time because an omniscient

omnipotent being couldn't fill up his days?

Moral Constraints and the State 45

functions beyond the competence of machines to do for us? Per-

haps what we desire is to live (an active verb) ourselves, in contact

with reality. (And this, machines cannot do fer us.) Without

elaborating on the implications of this, which I believe connect

surprisingly with issues about free will and causal accounts of

knowledge, we need merely note the intricacy of the question of

what matters for people other then their experiences. Until one finds

a satisfactory answer, and determines that this answer does not /so

apply to animals, one cannot reasonably claim that only che felt

experiences of animals limit what we may do to them.

UNDERDETERMINATION OF MORAL THEORY

What about persons distinguishes them from animals, so that

stringent constraints apply to how persons may be treated, yet not

to how animals may be treated? 1! Could beings from another

galaxy stand to as it is usually thought we do to animals, and if

so, would they be justified in treating us as means a la utilitar-

ianism? Are organisms arranged on some ascending scale, so that

any may be sacrificed or caused to suffer to achieve a greater total

benefit for those not lower on the scale? * Such an elitist hierarchi-

cal view would distinguish three moral statuses (forming an inter-

val partition of the scale):

Status I: The being may not be sacrificed, harmed, and so on, for any

other organism’s sake.

Status 2: The being may be sacrificed, harmed, and so on, only for the

sake of beings higher on the scale, but not for the sake of beings at the

same level.

* We pass over the difficulties about deciding where on the scale to place an

organism, and about particular interspecies comparisons. How is it to be de-

cided where on the scale a species goes? Is an organism, if defective, to be

placed at its species level? Is it an anomaly thar it might be impermissible to

treat two currently identical organisms similarly (they might even be identical

in future and past capacities as well), because one is a normal member of one

species and the other is a subnormal member of a species higher on che scale?

And the problems of intraspecies interpersonal comparisons pale before chose of

interspecies comparisons.