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ethical naturalism

ethical naturalism:

  • absolutist

  • cognitive

  • ethical statements are factual statements

  • “murder is wrong” = “the car is blue” « no factual difference

  • independent of culture/historical context/religion

strengths

  • empiricism: provides a scientific, accessible basis for ethical n moral statements

  • moral standard: if there’s no objective right n wrong, there’s no moral standard

weaknesses

  • is-ought problem: hume argued one can’t go from a descriptive premise of what “is,” to a prescriptive conclusion, “ought” statement

    • no matter how closely you empirically examine a situation, the rightness/wrongness will not be objectively clear

  • naturalistic fallacy: g.e. moore argues moral properties may be correlated w natural properties, but moral properties aren’t identical to natural properties

    • eg: a moral act such as giving to charity might make me happy, but the morality of the act merely gives way to the happiness, and isn’t the happiness in itself » inflicting pain for a sadist is pleasurable, but is it good?

  • open question argument: if goodness n pleasure were the same thing, it would not make sense to ask “is pleasure good?” coz it would be like asking “is pleasure pleasure?”

    • as the former question does make sense, clearly good is distinct from pleasure/any other natural property

    • moral properties can’t be reduced to anything simple eg plain or pleasure, as moral properties are basic

  • relativist naturalism: many different forms n types of goodness, cannot be defined as one thing

proponents

FH Bradley

ethical naturalism:

  • absolutist

  • cognitives

  • ethical statements are factual statements

  • “murder is wrong” = “the car is blue” « no factual difference

  • independent of culture/historical context/religion

Aquinas

theological naturalism:

  • what is good can be known through rational thinking

  • what is good is objectively true through Divine Law

  • all humans have the natural capacity to know n understand what is good through contemplating the teachings of God

P Foot

  • moral evil is ‘a kind of natural defect’

    • if a person is evil they are lacking in goodness

  • when we call a person a ‘just man’ or ‘honest woman’, we are referring to ‘something

    • eg an honest women may keep her promises to others = observable behaviour

  • a moral person has qualities which are the reasons they carry out a certain action » also observable

  • these observations are the moral absolutes that empiricists argue we cannot measure

  • foot uses aristotle’s model of the qualities that humans need to survive eg behaving morally is in our best interests

    • helps us to survive n flourish ∴we can see naturally the goodness we need to thrive

  • ‘oaks need to have deep sturdy roots: there is something wrong with them if they do not’

    • humans need to behave morally: there is something wrong with them if they do not

critics

D Hume

C Pigden

JL Mackie

NM

ethical naturalism

ethical naturalism:

  • absolutist

  • cognitive

  • ethical statements are factual statements

  • “murder is wrong” = “the car is blue” « no factual difference

  • independent of culture/historical context/religion

strengths

  • empiricism: provides a scientific, accessible basis for ethical n moral statements

  • moral standard: if there’s no objective right n wrong, there’s no moral standard

weaknesses

  • is-ought problem: hume argued one can’t go from a descriptive premise of what “is,” to a prescriptive conclusion, “ought” statement

    • no matter how closely you empirically examine a situation, the rightness/wrongness will not be objectively clear

  • naturalistic fallacy: g.e. moore argues moral properties may be correlated w natural properties, but moral properties aren’t identical to natural properties

    • eg: a moral act such as giving to charity might make me happy, but the morality of the act merely gives way to the happiness, and isn’t the happiness in itself » inflicting pain for a sadist is pleasurable, but is it good?

  • open question argument: if goodness n pleasure were the same thing, it would not make sense to ask “is pleasure good?” coz it would be like asking “is pleasure pleasure?”

    • as the former question does make sense, clearly good is distinct from pleasure/any other natural property

    • moral properties can’t be reduced to anything simple eg plain or pleasure, as moral properties are basic

  • relativist naturalism: many different forms n types of goodness, cannot be defined as one thing

proponents

FH Bradley

ethical naturalism:

  • absolutist

  • cognitives

  • ethical statements are factual statements

  • “murder is wrong” = “the car is blue” « no factual difference

  • independent of culture/historical context/religion

Aquinas

theological naturalism:

  • what is good can be known through rational thinking

  • what is good is objectively true through Divine Law

  • all humans have the natural capacity to know n understand what is good through contemplating the teachings of God

P Foot

  • moral evil is ‘a kind of natural defect’

    • if a person is evil they are lacking in goodness

  • when we call a person a ‘just man’ or ‘honest woman’, we are referring to ‘something

    • eg an honest women may keep her promises to others = observable behaviour

  • a moral person has qualities which are the reasons they carry out a certain action » also observable

  • these observations are the moral absolutes that empiricists argue we cannot measure

  • foot uses aristotle’s model of the qualities that humans need to survive eg behaving morally is in our best interests

    • helps us to survive n flourish ∴we can see naturally the goodness we need to thrive

  • ‘oaks need to have deep sturdy roots: there is something wrong with them if they do not’

    • humans need to behave morally: there is something wrong with them if they do not

critics

D Hume

C Pigden

JL Mackie

robot