This study investigates how emotional content affects memory accuracy and susceptibility to misinformation over time.
Participants viewed positive and negative images, with some exposed to misinformation.
Memory recall was tested after one week and one month.
Misinformation Effect: Exposure to inaccurate information reduces recall accuracy.
Constructive Memory: Memory is not a perfect replay but is influenced by post-event information.
Paradoxical Negative Emotion (PNE) Hypothesis: Negative events are well-remembered but more susceptible to misinformation.
Memory is not a virtual reproduction but is constructive and influenced by post-event information (Loftus, 2005).
Eyewitness errors have caused injustices (Porter, Campbell, Woodworth, & Birt, 2003; Wilson, 2003).
False autobiographical events can be implanted (e.g., Hyman & Kleinknecht, 1999; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Porter, Birt, Yuille, & Lehman, 2000).
Loftus' misinformation paradigm (1970s) showed that exposure to misinformation decreases recall accuracy (Weingardt, Loftus & Lindsay, 1995; Loftus, 2005).
Time affects misremembering (Loftus et al., 1978; Higham, 1998).
Most eyewitness studies lack emotional content.
Clinical Perspective: Stress impairs memory retrieval (van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995).
Decay Theory: Stressful memories decay over time due to forgetting and post-event influences (Laney & Loftus, 2005; McNally & Geraerts, 2009).
Enhanced Memory View: Negative events are better remembered (Porter & Peace, 2007).
Charles, Mather, and Carstensen (2003): Negative images were better recognized than positive images by younger adults.
Porter and Peace (2007): Traumatic experiences were recalled more consistently over 5 years than positive experiences.
Talarico, Labar, & Rubin (2004): Memory quality is associated with intensity rather than valence.
Negative emotion may increase susceptibility to misinformation.
Porter, Spencer, and Birt (2003): Negative emotional images were associated with increased susceptibility to major misinformation.
False memories can be generated for both positive and negative events (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995).
Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, (1999): The highest rate (56%) of false memories was found for highly negative events.
Porter, Taylor, and ten Brinke (2008): Participants recalled more true-negative events than true-positive events and recalled false-negative events more than false-positive events.
Negative emotion may facilitate memory but heighten susceptibility to misinformation.
Evolutionary perspective: Negative events should be recalled better to avoid future threats (Porter & Peace, 2007).
Incorporating information from trusted sources concerning negative events could be adaptive.
Major details may be more likely incorporated into memory.
PNE hypothesis predicts negative information will be well remembered but more susceptible to misinformation.
The PNE hypothesis was tested by examining memory for positive and negative images over 1 week or 1 month.
Some participants were exposed to misinformation.
The study examined roles of emotionality, post-event misinformation, and time on memory accuracy.
Predictions: Negative images would be recalled as accurately or more accurately than positive images; negative images would be recalled better after delay; memory for negative images would be more susceptible to misinformation.
Participants: 80 undergraduate students (66 female, 14 male), mean age = 21.12 (SD = 4.7).
Random assignment to misinformation (n = 40) or no misinformation (n = 40).
Follow-up sessions: 1 week (n = 45) or 1 month (n = 35).
Design: 2 (emotion: positive vs. negative) × 2 (type of information: misleading vs. no misleading) × 2 (latency: 1 week vs. 1 month) X 2 (session: initial vs. follow-up) mixed design.
Emotion and session were within-subjects variables.
Type of information and latency were between-subjects variables.
Materials: International Affective Picture System (IAPS) was used.
Ten photographs were selected based on emotional valence and arousal.
Positive images: mean emotional level = 7.24, mean arousal level = 4.93.
Negative images: mean emotional level = 2.42, mean arousal level = 5.99.
Images had visible backgrounds and people present.
Each image had three sets of questions.
Misled participants received 10 questions (5 misleading, 5 nonmisleading).
Major misleading detail: false suggestion of a person, animal, or significant object not present.
Nonmisled participants received 10 nonmisleading questions.
All participants answered 15 open-ended questions (Question Set 2).
The same questions were asked in the follow-up session (Question Set 3).
Participants viewed two images (one positive, one negative) for 30 seconds each.
A 15-minute questionnaire distracter task was given.
Participants answered verbally presented questions about each image (Question Set 1).
After filler questionnaires, participants answered 15 open-ended questions (Question Set 2).
Follow-up session: participants answered the same 15 questions (Question Set 3).
Responses coded for accuracy (accurate or inaccurate).
Accuracy for major misleading details was coded dichotomously.
A 2 (emotion) × 2 (misinformation exposure) × 2 (latency) × 2 (session) X2 (question type) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted.
Main effects: Exposure to misinformation, F(1, 74) = 5.68, p < .05, η^2 = .07, and session, F(1, 74) = 24.87, p < .001, η^2 = .25.
Misled participants were less accurate (M = 45.41%, SD = 17.49) than nonmisled participants (M = 53.84%, SD = 13.09).
Participants were more accurate initially (M = 52.01%, SD = 16.19) than at follow-up (M = 47.24%, SD = 15.45).
Interaction: Misinformation exposure × latency, F(1, 74) = 7.48, p < .01, η^2 = .09.
Misled participants' memory decreased more from 1 week to 1 month.
Interaction: Exposure to misinformation × question type, F(1, 74) = 10.61, p < .01, η^2 = .13.
Misled participants were less accurate on questions regarding misleading details.
A 2 (misinformation exposure) X2 (emotion) × 2 (session) × 2 (latency) mixed ANOVA was used.
Main effects: Misinformation exposure, F(1, 75) = 15.01, p < .001, η^2 = .17, and emotion, F(1, 75) = 7.22, p < .001, η^2 = .09.
Misled individuals were more likely to incorporate major misleading details (M = 0.80, SD = 0.23) than nonmisled participants (M = 0.96, SD = 0.10).
Major misleading details were more likely incorporated into memory for negative images (M = 0.82, SD = 0.31) than for positive images (M = 0.92, SD = 0.20).
Emotion did not immunize memory from misinformation.
Misleading questions impaired recall accuracy across emotional conditions.
Impairment was specific to questions pertaining to misinformation.
Individuals were more likely to incorporate major misleading details into negative images.
Negative emotion heightens suggestibility in the presence of major misinformation, consistent with the PNE hypothesis.
The hypothesis that negative scenes would be more accurately recalled was not supported.
The passage of time impaired recollection.
Memories of misinformed participants were particularly fragile.
Misinformation may accelerate the natural decay of memory over time.
Predictions concerning the impact of emotion on memory accuracy were partially supported.
Negative emotion heightens suggestibility in the presence of major misinformation relative to positive emotion, consistent with the PNE hypothesis.
Improper questioning techniques should be avoided to reduce erroneous testimony.