Tooley's Right to Life Philosophy
Tooley's Philosophy on the Right to Life
Tooley's central philosophical focus revolves around the concept of the 'Right to Life' (RTL). He posits that when considering the right to life, there is an absence of a moderate position. This means that a being either possesses a full right to life, akin to an infant, or it possesses no such right, like a zygote. There is no middle ground or spectrum regarding the fundamental right to life itself. There can be no argument with nuance for abortion. The only positions that are defensible are (1. Abortion is wrong, 2. Abortion is never wrong.)
Why? The line drawing problem. Where/how can we draw the line from conception to birth of when abortion becomes morally impermissible.
He concluded that it’s not possible to draw that line → so you must take a solid position of right or wrong.
The Problem with Visceral Abhorrence
Tooley argues that the common visceral abhorrence to infanticide, while emotionally powerful, is unprincipled if it is not supported by a robust and logically sound argument. Simply having a strong emotional reaction does not equate to a justified ethical position.
No evidence for this principle → based on a gut feeling.
Key Distinction: Human Being vs. Person
One of the most crucial elements of Tooley's argument is the clear distinction he draws between a "human being" and a "person." This distinction is fundamental to his entire ethical framework:
Human Being: A biological concept, simply meaning a member of the Homo Sapiens species. Have a certain set of functions. Most humans are persons, not all persons are humans. Right to life is not secure.
Person: A moral concept, defined by certain psychological and cognitive properties. For Tooley, if X is a person, it means that X has a serious right to life. All persons are entitled to a right to life.
This distinction is vital because it opens up two important possibilities:
X is human, but not a person: A being can be biologically human without possessing the moral status of a person who holds a right to life (e.g., a fetus in early stages of development).
X is a person, but not a human: A being could possess the qualities of a person and thus a right to life, even if it is not a member of the Homo Sapiens species (e.g., a highly intelligent alien or an advanced AI, hypothetically).
Rights vs. The Right to Life
Tooley further clarifies that having rights does not automatically equate to having a right to life. As an example, a kitten may have a right not to be tortured (meaning it is morally wrong to inflict suffering upon it without cause), but it does not possess a right to life in the same way a human adult might.
Tooley's Definitions
Person: X is a person if X is self-conscious and has a conception of itself as the continuing subject of experiences. This means the being can recognize itself as existing over time and having a persistent identity through different experiences.
Rights: X has a right to Y = X can desire Y, X does desire Y, and others have an initial obligation to not deprive X of Y. This definition emphasizes the capacity for desire and conscious desire as a prerequisite for having a right, along with corresponding obligations from others.
Right to Life: X has a right to life = X can and does self-consciously desire to be the continuing subject of experiences. This is the most crucial definition for his overall argument, as it directly ties the right to life to the capacity for self-conscious desire for continued existence.
Reprogramming Argument
Tooley introduces a reprogramming argument to support his claim that it's not biological life itself that is important, but rather the psychological properties. If a being's brain could be reprogrammed or its memories and self-consciousness transferred to another substrate, and the original biological brain was then destroyed, most people would consider the 'person' to have continued existing in the new substrate. This thought experiment aims to show that the physical continuity of the brain is not what truly matters for personhood and the right to life, but rather the continuity of the psychological properties (self-consciousness, memory, and desire for continued existence).
What matters morally, is personhood.
X has a right to life = X can and does self-consciously desire to be the continuing subject of experiences.
Applied to abortion (no RTL at any stage of pregnancy)
Applied to non-humans
Refutation of Alternative Views on RTL
Tooley scrutinizes common arguments for when a 'Right to Life' (RTL) is acquired, based on properties other than self-conscious desire for continued existence:
Viability: The point at which a fetus can survive outside the womb. Tooley would argue this is a contingent biological/technological status, not a moral property that bestows personhood. It does not relate to self-consciousness or the desire for continued experience. Something that is viable but is not a person, or is not viable but is in the MC. Not related to personhood.
Spontaneous movement: The detection of fetal movement. Mere physical action, without an underlying self-conscious mind or the capacity to desire continued existence, does not grant a being personhood or an RTL.
Human form: The developing biological appearance of a Homo Sapiens. While a fetus takes on a human form, Tooley's distinction between 'human being' and 'person' means that biological humanness alone does not confer personhood or an RTL.
Birth: The act of being born. Tooley contends that birth itself is a physical transition, not a moral event that instantly bestows personhood. An infant at birth may not yet possess the requisite self-consciousness and desire for continued experiences to be considered a 'person'.
Conception (potentiality): The argument that a zygote, embryo, or fetus, by virtue of its potential to become a person, should have an RTL. Tooley directly refutes this:
XX is developmentally continuous with YY ee XX = YY (e.g., an acorn is not a tree; a potential tree is not an actual tree): This analogy demonstrates that potentiality does not equate to actuality. A being with the potential for personhood is not yet an actual person and thus does not possess an RTL based on potential alone.
Kitten and drug argument: Tooley uses this to further challenge the 'potentiality' argument. If it is not morally wrong to administer a drug to a kitten that prevents it from ever developing capacities for self-consciousness (i.e., prevents it from becoming a 'person'), then it suggests that preventing the development of personhood (such as through abortion) in a being that currently lacks such properties is not morally equivalent to killing an actual person. This highlights that the moral weight is on actual personhood, not merely potentiality.
G.E Moore: Eventually the fetus will turn into a Tooley person then it will have a right to life. But she says that infanticide is not morally wrong in terms of violating it’s RTL. He says that if that argument that leads to that position, you’ve done something wrong.