Notes on Judith Jarvis Thomson's "A Defense of Abortion"

In the famous philosophical essay "A Defense of Abortion," Judith Jarvis Thomson discusses the moral implications of abortion, particularly focusing on the rights of the fetus and the pregnant woman. Thomson's primary argument is that even if we grant that a fetus is a person with a right to life from the moment of conception, this does not automatically render abortion morally impermissible. She challenges the common stance that a fetus's right to life outweighs a woman's right to control her own body, particularly through thought experiments like that of the unconscious violinist who is dependent on someone else’s body for survival.

Thomson introduces the notion of bodily autonomy by illustrating situations where individuals are not obligated to maintain another's life, even if that person has a right to life. Her argument includes an analysis of responsibility and consent; for instance, a mother may not have inherently provided a fetus the right to use her body, especially in cases of rape. Thomson argues that unless a woman has explicitly accepted responsibility for a fetus (by intentionally engaging in acts that may lead to pregnancy), she is under no moral obligation to maintain its life at the expense of her own autonomy and well-being.

The overarching theme in Thomson's essay reflects a nuanced position on the rights of individuals. Her argument is less about the consequences of each case of abortion, as in consequentialist or utilitarian ethics, and more focused on the rights-based approach, which emphasizes individual rights and the moral implications of actions regarding those rights. This aligns with elements seen in the works of Kant and Dworkin, who stress the importance of personal rights and dignity over purely utilitarian calculations. Thus, while outcomes may be considered, the crux of Thomson's argument rests upon rights and moral accountability, rather than on the consequences alone.