David Hume is known as a radical empiricist and skeptic because of his focus on experience and skepticism toward metaphysical ideas like "substance," "God," "causality," and "self."
Hume's main empirical principle, from A Treatise on Human Nature, states that an idea cannot be formed without a prior impression. Essentially, no impression, no idea.
Hume's critique of causality involves analyzing the idea of causality to see if its elements match with an impression.
Hume's theory of impressions is similar to Locke's.
Impressions are vivid perceptions, sensations, or feelings caused by unknown factors triggering our senses spontaneously.
They encompass perceptions and feelings.
Impressions are more forceful and vivid than ideas, which are pale copies.
Impressions can be simple (single perceptions) or complex (clusters of perceptions).
Simple impressions come from the five senses, like the color perceived when looking at a cloudless sky.
Complex impressions are bundles of perceptions, like different sensations of our surroundings.
Ideas are formed when we think about something instead of directly experiencing it.
Ideas are less forceful and vivid than impressions, being pale copies of them.
Ideas can be simple (derived from a simple impression) or complex (composed of other ideas).
Simple ideas are copies of simple impressions, such as the idea of 'blue' derived from seeing the sky.
Complex ideas consist of other ideas ultimately based on impressions.
Hume uses the principle that an idea requires a prior impression to challenge metaphysics.
Ideas of substance, cause, or God, which are cornerstones of metaphysical theories (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz), lack direct, vivid impressions.
Hume considers these ideas as fraudulent and suggests they should be discarded as sophistry and illusions.
The copy principle, or empirical prejudice, is the belief that an idea is a copy of an impression.
Hume proposes that there are two types of meaningful propositions:
Analytic Propositions:
Express relations of ideas.
Examples: mathematical propositions such as 2 = 2 or the statement that the interior angles of a triangle amount to 180 degrees.
Known a priori (independently of experience).
Their truth depends on the definitions of the ideas involved.
Necessarily true or necessarily false; denial leads to contradiction.
Synthetic Propositions:
Express matters of fact.
Example: "The book is on the desk."
Known a posteriori (from experience).
Their truth depends on their correspondence with experience.
Contingently true or false; denial does not necessarily involve a contradiction.
Hume defines causality as "an object followed by another… where if the first object had not been, the second had never existed."
Causality cannot be a relation of ideas since we learn about causes and effects through experience.
Treating cause and effect as matters of fact is problematic because not all aspects of causality can be traced back to experience.
Hume finds the ideas in metaphysics, especially causality, obscure and uncertain.
Causal relations: Relations between objects or events consist of three components:
Contiguity (spatial contact): Causal relations must be spatially connected. A must contact B to cause B.
Temporal priority (temporal succession): The cause must precede the effect. A must come before B to cause B.
Necessary connection: The cause must make the effect happen. A must necessarily cause B to cause B.
We can observe contiguity and temporal priority but not the necessary connection.
We infer causation from correlation without experiencing a direct impression of necessary connection.
Example: Billiard balls – When a cue ball hits a red ball, we see spatial contact and the cue ball's movement before the red ball's movement, but not the necessary communication of movement.
Hume regards causal relations as "loose and separate" because no necessary connections are experienced.
The idea of causality lacks components that correspond to any impression, yet it is essential for understanding the world.
We think in terms of causality without a real corresponding impression because it is a cognitive habit.
When objects and events are repeatedly related in space and time, our minds interpret them as causation.
This habit of causation becomes fixed in our thinking, even without a vivid impression of necessary connection.
This cognitive habit leads us to expect events within the chain of associations in our minds.
This is related to the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy: assuming event B caused event A simply because B followed A.
This is fallacious because correlation does not equal causation.
Association and habit, not vivid impressions, underlie the idea of causality.
Descartes: Body and mind are distinct substances (res cogitans and res extensa) connected in the pineal gland.
Locke: Distinguished between body and mind but admitted their ultimate nature and relation are incomprehensible (an agnostic approach).
Hume's bundle theory of the self offers insights into the body-mind problem.
Hume: The self is not a thing or a res cogitans, it is merely a bundle of impressions.
We lack a fixed impression of the self.
We only experience a flux of impressions about ourselves:
Impressions of our face in a mirror, the sound of our voice, our body, memories, thoughts, habits, desires, hopes, fears, fantasies, and illusions.
The term "self" is used to tentatively define this bundle of fluctuating impressions.
The self as Archimboldo's portrait heads: A collection of items arranged to resemble a head and face.
Similarly, the self is a mixed assortment of fluctuating feelings and shifting perceptions.
Hume: Humans are a bundle of different perceptions succeeding each other rapidly in perpetual flux and movement, with no single power of the soul remaining the same even for a moment.
The idea of self is not derived from any specific or other impression.
Hume: When looking inward, one always finds a particular perception (heat, cold, light, shade, love, hatred, pain, pleasure) and never catches oneself without a perception, observing only the perception itself. "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception."