Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks

Introduction

• Conflicts, both within and between states, present a significant obstacle to effective conflict resolution, even amidst an overall decline in the number of conflicts observed since 1999.

• The year 2005 marked a post-Cold War low in conflict occurrence, as noted in the SIPRI Yearbook of 2006.

• Persistent conflicts plague nations such as Afghanistan, Angola (specifically the Cabinda Province), Sri Lanka, Somalia, and Uganda, as highlighted by Weeks in 1992.

• Ethnic identity and the distribution of resources, rather than ideological disparities, are key drivers of violence, a point emphasized by Lederach in 1995.

• Examples of conflicts rooted in ethnic identity include those in the Balkans, Sudan, and Rwanda, as cited by Ryan in 1995.

• Conflict is an inherent aspect of human existence, playing a role in survival and shaping political relationships. Weeks (1992) aptly states that “conflict is as much a part of our existence as is evolution” (p. 7).

• Various forms of diplomacy are employed to address and resolve conflicts, including “formal diplomacy,” “Track One Diplomacy,” “Track Two Diplomacy,” and “Multi-Track Diplomacy,” as identified by Diamond & McDonald (1996), Ziegler (1984), De Magalhaes (1988), and Montville (1991).

• President Thabo Mbeki’s “Quiet Diplomacy” serves as the chosen approach in Southern Africa, as noted by Christopher Landsberg in 2004.

• Peacemaking efforts undertaken by non-political third parties involving high-level political figures from conflicting groups or governments do not align with existing definitions.

• This paper aims to introduce and explore Track One and a Half Diplomacy, particularly as it is operationalized at The Carter Center.

• The principal advantage of Track One and a Half Diplomacy lies in its capacity to integrate both Track One and Track Two Diplomacy within a cohesive and strategic framework to foster peace.

Diplomacy Tracks

Track One Diplomacy

• Also referred to as Official Diplomacy.

• Its origins can be traced back to ancient times.

• De Magalhaes (1988) characterizes it as a foreign policy instrument used to establish connections between governments through officially recognized intermediaries (p.17).

• It is distinguished by its formal application at the state-to-state level and its adherence to established protocols.

• Serves as the primary peacemaking tool in a state’s foreign policy, executed by diplomats, high-ranking officials, and heads of state.

• Its objective is to exert influence on the structures of political power.

• Encompasses entities such as the United Nations, the Vatican, the European Union, the Arab League, the African Union (AU), and the Organization of American States (OAS).

• Negotiation is universally employed by these entities as a conflict resolution process.

• Jonsson and Hall (2005) underscore the dimension of universalism-particularism, wherein diplomats pursue the interests of their polities while concurrently recognizing peaceful conflict resolution and the avoidance of war as shared objectives.

Strengths of Track One Diplomacy

• Designed to foster improved relations among nations.

• Possesses the capability to leverage political power to shape negotiations and their outcomes (Sanders, 1991).

• This power includes the option to employ the threat of military force in instances where a party violates international treaties.

• Benefits from the capacity to access substantial material and financial resources, thereby providing leverage during negotiations (Bercovitch and Houston, 2000).

• Leverages in-depth knowledge of the interests of involved parties through intelligence gathering (Stein and Lewis, 1996).

• Mediators possess extensive knowledge of both their states’ and the conflicting parties’ foreign policies.

Weaknesses of Track One Diplomacy

• Conflict resolution strategies can be compromised by power dynamics; state power can undermine the viability of sustainable peace agreements (Diamond & MacDonald, 1996).

• Diplomatic missions frequently cease operations at the height of conflicts, thereby diminishing communication precisely when it is most critical (Ziegler, 1984, p. 27).

• Officials may exhibit excessive rigidity or protract negotiations due to mandatory consultations with their leaders (Volkan, 1991; Sanders, 1991).

• Susceptible to the impacts of electoral cycles.

Track Two Diplomacy

• Functions as a complement to Track One Diplomacy (Montville, 1991).

• Montville defined it as unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize resources to help resolve conflict (Volkan, 1991).

• Montville (1991) emphasizes that Track Two Diplomacy is not a substitute for Track One Diplomacy but compensates for constraints on leaders (p. 162).

• Intended to bridge or complement official Track One negotiations (Nan, 2004; Agha, Feldman, Khalidi, Schiff, 2003).

• Examples: Search for Common Ground, West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP).

Strengths of Track Two Diplomacy

• Parties are not constrained by political or constitutional authority (Montville, 1991; Ury, 1999; Sanders, 1991; Ryan, 1995; Lederach, 1997).

• Officials do not risk losing their constituencies, as they themselves constitute the constituency.

• Empowers disenfranchised groups by affording them a platform to articulate their perspectives on achieving peace.

• Proves effective in both pre-violent and post-violent conflict phases, contributing to prevention and peacebuilding efforts.

• Engages grassroots and middle-level leadership in direct engagement with the conflict.

• Remains unaffected by electoral cycles.

Weaknesses of Track Two Diplomacy

• Exhibits a limited capacity to exert influence on foreign policy and political power structures.

• Interventions may require extended periods to yield tangible results.

• Demonstrates a limited ability to effect change during the active war stage of a conflict.

• Participants often lack the necessary resources to sustain leverage throughout negotiations and agreement implementation.

• Proves less effective in authoritarian regimes characterized by leaders who disregard lower-level input.

• Actors lack public accountability for suboptimal decisions due to their lack of political authority.

• Actors/organizations are frequently criticized for their lack of coordination.

Track One and a Half Diplomacy

• The conventional definitions of Track One and Track Two Diplomacy do not fully encompass the spectrum of peacemaking activities.

• These gaps are addressed by individuals (such as retired politicians and religious leaders) and organizations (including The Carter Center and the Community of Sant’Egidio).

• Nan references LUFJAAN, signifying long-term unofficial facilitated joint analysis among negotiators facilitated by the Conflict Management Group (Nan, 1999, p. 202).

• Mapendere (2000) defines Track One and a Half Diplomacy as the public or private interactions between official representatives from conflicting governments or political entities, facilitated by a third party not affiliated with a political organization, with the aim of influencing attitudinal shifts and transforming political power structures (p. 16).

• Nan (2003) characterizes it as unofficial engagements between official representatives of states (p. 9).

• Nan (2005) further refines the definition to encompass diplomatic initiatives facilitated by unofficial bodies, directly involving officials from the conflict (p. 165).

• It is distinguished from Track One Diplomacy because the third party does not represent a political institution.

• It is differentiated from Track Two Diplomacy because the participants are official representatives of the conflicting groups.

• This approach can be termed “hybrid diplomacy” due to its integration of Track One and Track Two methodologies.

• The Carter Center serves as a prime example of an organization that actively employs Track One and a Half Diplomacy.

• Former President Carter and his staff played a mediating role between President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir of Sudan in December 1999.

• The Carter Center successfully negotiated the “Guinea Worm Ceasefire” between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement in 1995.

• In 1994, Former President Carter was instrumental in de-escalating nuclear tensions between North Korea and the United States.

• In 1996, President Carter averted a potential military confrontation between the Haitian military government and the U.S. government.

Conduct of the Process

• This process can be conducted either privately, akin to Track Two Diplomacy, or publicly, resembling Track One Diplomacy.

• President Carter’s intervention in Haiti in 1996 occurred publicly, whereas his involvement in the North Korean-U.S. conflict in 1994 was conducted privately.

• The Carter Center’s mediations between Sudan and Uganda (1999-2003) were primarily private.

• The decision to adopt a private or public approach is contingent upon the specific circumstances and individuals involved.

Characteristics of Track One and a Half Third Parties

• These third parties often possess international political prominence, exemplified by figures such as Former Presidents Nelson Mandela and Jimmy Carter.

• They may also exhibit academic visibility, as seen with scholars like Bill Ury.

• National and international recognition facilitates their access to world leaders.

• The trust placed in the third party is of paramount importance, as illustrated by The Carter Center’s ongoing engagement in the Sudan conflict.

• Interveners typically possess substantial resources, owing to their established reputations.

Entry into Process

• Entry into the process can occur through various means:

  • Invitation by one or both parties in conflict.

  • Requests for intervention from concerned external entities.

  • Self-initiated intervention by the third parties themselves.

• Former President Carter’s intervention in the North Korean-U.S. standoff was rooted in a long-standing invitation from Kim Il Sung to visit North Korea, as well as their pre-existing personal relationship.

• President Carter’s involvement in Haiti was prompted by an invitation from General Raoul Cédras, the Commander in Chief of the Haitian military.

• Actors demonstrate adaptability in their approach to entering conflict situations.

Strengths of Track One and a Half Diplomacy

• It complements both Track One and Track Two Diplomacy, effectively bridging the gap between them (Diamond & McDonald, 1996, p. 43).

• It directly influences power structures without being solely dictated by governmental political agendas.

• A Track One and a Half intervener can employ lower-level, indirect peacemaking strategies, such as humanitarian interventions, to cultivate trust among the involved parties.

• Interventions can be strategically deployed at various stages of a conflict (Mitchell, 1997; Lund, 1997; Fisher, 1997).

• It assists world leaders in finding dignified resolutions to challenging situations.

• It facilitates communication between leaders whose dialogue has been disrupted by conflict.

• Carter’s visit to North Korea in 1994, in his capacity as a private citizen, played a pivotal role in resolving tensions between the U.S. and North Korea.

Weaknesses of Track One and a Half Diplomacy

• Mediators may, at times, be perceived as representing the foreign policy interests of their home country.

• Mediators possess limited capacity to employ inducements and directive mediation techniques.

• Actors typically lack the technical, financial, and military resources required to either encourage agreement or support and enforce its implementation.

• Successes driven by the moral authority of the mediator are challenging to replicate by others within the same organization, as they often hinge on the unique personality of the individual.

• Interveners’ activities may, on occasion, contravene their country’s foreign policy objectives.

Complementary Application of Tracks of Diplomacy

• The emergence of multiple tracks of diplomacy underscores the intricate nature of conflict, necessitating a multifaceted approach for effective management and resolution.

• It is crucial to identify methods for mitigating the weaknesses inherent in each track to enhance the likelihood of resolving conflicts peacefully and minimizing loss of life and resources (Ziegler, 1984; Volkan, 1991; Montville, in Volkan, et al, 1991).

• Limitations often stem from the specialized nature and resources available to individual institutions and organizations.

• This reality underscores the need for “complementarity of conflict resolution efforts” (Nan, 1999, p. 4).

• In the context of preventive diplomacy, Bercovitch (1993) suggests that the early deployment of economic, diplomatic, and military tools can effectively prevent or resolve conflicts before they escalate.

• The Oslo Accord, signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, was the product of collaborative efforts between Track Two institutions that facilitated and augmented Track One initiatives (Rupesinghe, 1995; Agha, et al, 2003).

• In Volkan et al (1991), Sanders asserts that private citizens possess insights into optimal approaches, while officials refine and broaden these concepts.

• Nan (1999) demonstrates through field research that Track Two initiatives lay the groundwork for Track One by enabling the testing of ideas prior to official negotiations.

• A comprehensive model that addresses the gap left by the separate application of Track One and Track Two Diplomacy by distinct actors has been lacking.

• Identifying this gap and recognizing how Track One and a Half Diplomacy can address it is vital for fostering positive complementarity among the various tracks of diplomacy and the diverse actors involved in the field of conflict resolution (Nan, 1999).

• Figure 1 illustrates how actors with varying degrees of specialization can enhance the efficiency of the three tracks in resolving conflicts through concerted efforts at distinct levels of leadership (Lederach, 1997), with the overarching goal of minimizing the impact of their respective weaknesses.

• Figure 1 synthesizes Lederach’s (1997) three levels of leadership, encompasses various types of diplomacy (including Track One and a Half), and elucidates the types of actors operative at different diplomatic levels and the levels of leadership they can influence.

• Figure 1 underscores that different levels of diplomacy are targeted at distinct social structures within a conflict.

Explanation of Figure 1

• Track One: Actors such as the UN, regional organizations, heads of state, and government representatives facilitate negotiations at the top level of leadership.

• Track Two: Actors address conflict resolution and humanitarian concerns, operating at the middle and grassroots levels.

• Track One and a Half: Actors, including The Carter Center, the Crisis Management Initiative, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, and Sant’ Egidio, can engage with both top and middle levels of leadership.

Conclusion

• The primary rationale for introducing Track One and a Half Diplomacy extends beyond merely expanding conflict resolution terminology; it aims to emphasize its theoretical and practical value in resolving both interstate and ethno-political conflicts by bridging the divide between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy.

• Diplomatic agility and impartiality stand out as key strengths of Track One and a Half Diplomacy.

• Political, academic, and situational visibility are defining characteristics of individuals engaged in Track One and a Half Diplomacy.

• Track One and a Half Diplomacy, as implemented by The Carter Center, mitigates the limitations of the other two tracks through its demonstrated understanding of both official diplomacy and the capabilities of Track Two actors.

• Figure 1 visually represents the interconnectedness of diplomatic tracks, leadership levels, and the activities of actors at various levels of diplomatic engagement.

• The introduction of Track One and a Half Diplomacy, along with the promotion of complementarity among tracks and organizations, equips the peacebuilding community with the essential tools to intervene effectively at any stage of a conflict.