Week 1 reading (Notes on Anthropocentrism in Environmental Ethics)
“ If one had to summarize all of env ethics into one a single question it’s; ‘Is anthropocentrism the ideological source of our environmental problems?’”
anthropocentrism is commonly understood as a theory of value which maintains that only human beings or their experiential states have intrinsic moral value
Anthropocentrism is wrong as we have a desire not to follow the last man act
ontological anthropocentrism locates humans at the center of creation, as the end or reason for which everything else in the material world exists.
For environmental ethics, the most Signiant form of conceptual anthropocentrism is not theoretical but practical: limits imposed by the structure of human normative and axiological capacities and that All human values are human values
Human beings have signicant interests in their own conscious experience of pleasure and pain, and thus give moral consideration to the pain and pleasure of others, others who also value pleasure and the avoidance of pain.
Furthermore, we are subjects-of-a-life whose own well-being, beyond the content of our experiences, matters to us.
Because we believe that we deserve moral consideration and respect because our lives matter to us, consistency demands that we respect any other subjects-of-a-life.
Thus it seems reasonable to extend these concerns to many sentient non-human animals
Kai
Anthropocentrism in Environmental Ethics: Comprehensive Study Notes
Overview
Topic: Examining anthropocentrism and its alternatives within environmental ethics, drawing on Allen Thompson’s chapter from The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics.
Central claim: Exclusive moral concern for humans is often cited as the source of environmental problems; the chapter articulates three forms of anthropocentrism and three versions of ethical nonanthropocentrism, then argues that a virtue-theoretic approach to human natural goodness can play a vital role in an environmental ethic fit for the Anthropocene.
Structure of the chapter (as presented):
Distinguish three forms of anthropocentrism (ontological, ethical, conceptual).
Present three nonanthropocentric ethical frameworks (sentiocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism).
Review debates between anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists.
Propose that virtue ethics about human environmental character may offer a productive path forward.
Key terms to know: anthropocentrism, sentiocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism, speciesism, human chauvinism, environmental virtue ethics.
The Ideological Diagnosis
Central research question: Is anthropocentrism the root cause of our environmental problems?
Lynn White Jr. (1967) links Christian theology to anthropocentrism and thereby to ecological crises; Christianity is described as “the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen.”
Core idea: Anthropocentrism claims only human beings (or human experiential states) have intrinsic moral value; everything nonhuman has value only as a means to human welfare (instrumental value).
Routley’s Last Man thought experiment (Routley, 1973): If only one human remains who could push a button to wipe out most life on Earth, is there anything morally wrong with that act if no humans would be harmed? Intuition suggests yes; intrinsic value in nonhuman life provides a grounding for moral distaste or wrongness.
Consequence of the diagnosis: Many early environmental ethicists argued that rejecting anthropocentrism is necessary to justify intrinsic value in parts of nature.
The diagnosis is widely formative in the field and remains contested; the chapter aims to unpack anthropocentrism rather than settle the debate once and for all.
What Does It Mean to Be “Human-Centered”?
Three forms of anthropocentrism:
Ontological anthropocentrism: A metaphysical view that places humans at the center of reality, the end or reason for which everything else exists. Associated with a Great Chain of Being and creation narratives that place humans in a special status (images of God, soul vs body dualism).
Ethical anthropocentrism: Humans have a special and unique moral importance; moral standing is superior for human beings. This can be a strong or weak form:
Strong ethical anthropocentrism: Humans alone possess intrinsic moral worth.
Weak ethical anthropocentrism: Some nonhumans have intrinsic moral worth, but human worth always trumps theirs.
Conceptual anthropocentrism: Humans inevitably reason and value from a human-centered perspective; even if ontological or ethical claims are weakened, the valuing framework remains human-oriented.
Interrelations:
Ontological anthropocentrism does not entail ethical anthropocentrism, nor vice versa (Hayward).
Developments in science (cosmology, evolution) can diminish ontological anthropocentrism without automatically dissolving ethical anthropocentrism.
Foundations for conceptual anthropocentrism:
Rooted in Protagorean relativity: “man is the measure of all things.”
Kantian idea: experience is relative to the observer’s standpoint and the mind’s structures; what appears to be a property of an object may be a condition of the subject of perception.
Practical bearing for environmental ethics:
All human values are human values, including any intrinsic value attributed to nature by non-anthropocentrists; evaluative claims about nature must be intelligible to human agents and pursued within a human framework of value and life.
Key takeaway: Even when rejecting ontological anthropocentrism, practical, real-world normative questions in environmental ethics are still constrained by human perspectives and capacities.
Developing Alternatives to Ethical Anthropocentrism
Three commonly distinguished non-anthropocentric ethical frameworks:
Sentiocentrism: Extends human ethical theories (utilitarian or deontological) to nonhuman animals. Key figures: Bentham, Singer.
Bentham: the capacity to experience pleasure and to suffer pain makes beings morally relevant; expand consideration to nonhuman animals accordingly.
Singer: equal weight to similar interests; pain experience is a minimally sufficient condition for moral consideration.
Result: nonhuman animals’ experiences give them moral standing; direct moral consideration is required.
Deontological version: Regan’s subjects-of-a-life (experiencing beings with beliefs, desires, memory, future orientation) possess intrinsic value and rights; not to be used merely as means.
Biocentrism: Value in all living beings; not necessarily requiring consciousness to have moral standing.
Schweitzer’s Reverence for Life: “good consists in maintaining, assisting and enhancing life; destroying or hindering life is evil.”
Taylor’s teleological center of a life: each organism pursues its own good in its own way.
Variants: egalitarian biocentrism (equal intrinsic value across organisms) vs pluralistic or other variant
Ecocentrism (holistic): Intrinsic value resides in ecosystems, not just individual organisms; ecosystems as units of moral consideration.
Leopold’s Land Ethic: “a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community; it is wrong when it tends otherwise.”
Callicott (communitarian ecocentrism): value is rooted in the moral community expanding to soils, waters, plants, and animals; value is grounded in human sentiments but ethically broadens the community.
Rolston (ecocentric holism): systemic value in ecosystems; intrinsic value of systems exists independently of human evaluative acts; value is discovered, not conferred, by humans.
Key contrasts and debates:
Holistic (ecocentric) views vs. individualistic (biocentric or sentiocentric) views.
Philosophical strategies include: value grounded in human evaluative acts (Callicott-style weak anthropocentrism) vs. objective, mind-independent value in nature (Rolston).
The practical upshot of these theories includes how to treat ecosystems, species, and individuals in moral decision-making.
Foundational figures and ideas invoked:
Bentham’s utilitarian framework (pleasure vs pain).
Singer’s equal consideration of interests.
Regan’s rights-based approach (subject-of-a-life).
Schweitzer’s reverence for life.
Taylor’s teleology of life.
Leopold’s land ethics; Callicott’s communitarian ecocentrism; Rolston’s systemic intrinsic value.
Meta-notes:
Critics challenge whether nonanthropocentric theories can escape anthropocentric biases in practice.
Some argue that even nonanthropocentric views are ultimately anthropocentric in the sense that humans must interpret, implement, and act on the value they ascribe to nature.
Recoil into Various Forms of Anthropocentrism
Progress and division:
There is broad rejection of ethical anthropocentrism, but no consensus on a single replacement.
Different nonanthropocentric theories oppose one another (sentiocentrism vs biocentrism vs ecocentrism) and also critique each other.
Even advocates of nonanthropocentrism often rely on some form of anthropocentric reasoning about what to value and how to act.
Norton’s broad or “convergence” approach:
Norton, Weston, and Light advocate environmental pragmatism—moving toward policies that work in practice, regardless of whether intrinsic value is ascribed to nature.
Norton suggests a convergence hypothesis: people who embrace broad human values and those who accept intrinsic value in nature may converge on similar policies in practice.
Hargrove’s fourfold typology of value in nature (to illuminate the debate):
Nonanthropocentric instrumental value: value relations between living beings that are objective facts (e.g., a predator benefits from catching prey).
Anthropocentric instrumental value: value relations dependent on human evaluation (e.g., shells as currency).
Nonanthropocentric intrinsic value: intrinsic value not dependent on human valuation (biocentric or ecological value of life/nonlife entities).
Anthropocentric intrinsic value: intrinsic value assigned by humans but grounded in human evaluative capacity.
Unpacking Hargrove’s four theses:
(a) Callicott’s ecocentrism treats intrinsic value as anthropogenic, making it a form of weak anthropocentrism: humans value ecosystems noninstrumentally.
(b) Rolston’s ecocentrism posits objective intrinsic value in nature; yet normative implications require recognizing objective value and acting toward it (a bridge to weak anthropocentrism).
(c) Hargrove argues weak anthropocentric intrinsic value can be politically superior to Norton’s broad instrumentalism for guiding policy when it rests on aesthetics and cultural judgments.
(d) Most nonanthropocentric theories, in various ways, still rely on anthropocentric assumptions; thus, fully nonanthropocentric theories may be impractical for guiding action.
Key issues raised:
The need to justify moving from “what is good” to “what we ought to do” in the presence of objective or nonanthropogenic intrinsic value.
Whether a strictly nonanthropocentric value system can avoid anthropomorphic projection or whether some level of human-centered framing is inevitable for normative guidance.
Conclusion of this section:
There is no simple wholesale replacement of anthropocentrism; instead, there is a spectrum of theories with different degrees and kinds of anthropocentrism embedded in them.
Reassessing Alternatives to Ethical Anthropocentrism
Core challenge: How to determine which properties are morally relevant when extending moral considerability beyond humans.
Hayward’s analysis (anthropocentrism vs. “human chauvinism”):
The struggle is not simply to identify nonhuman members as morally relevant but to determine which properties count as morally relevant and how those criteria are justified.
The debate includes whether conscious experience, welfare, health, and somatic identity are the appropriate bases for moral consideration in nonhuman beings.
A key tension: whether biocentric holists (species or ecosystems as moral patients) can maintain meaningful moral claims without collapsing into anthropomorphism or arbitrary judgments.
Conceptual vs. practical anthropocentrism:
Biocentric individualism: value centers on living individuals and their interests, potentially independent of consciousness.
Biocentric holism: value centers on species or ecosystems, potentially decoupled from individual organisms.
Ecosystem health and integrity: value may be attributed to ecosystems as functional units, regardless of whether individual organisms bear interests in the same way humans do.
The problem of nonanthropocentric value schemes:
If a value scheme is radically nonanthropocentric, it may become arbitrary or anthropomorphic in projecting human concepts onto nonhuman beings without warrant.
The author suggests that some degree of anthropocentric framing is inescapable due to human perspective and the very act of valuing.
The ultimate point:
Even strong nonanthropocentric theories may be profitably understood as ultimately involving some form of human-centered interpretation, especially when it comes to policy and moral guidance.
Why this matters for environmental ethics:
It highlights the difficulty of constructing a fully nonanthropocentric framework that can consistently guide human action in the real world.
Conclusion: A Prognosis for the Anthropocene
Diagnostic takeaway: The core moral issues relate not simply to whether nature has intrinsic value, but to concerns about speciesism and human chauvinism—biases in favor of our own species and human-centric perspectives.
Two dimensions of conceptual anthropocentrism:
Dimension 1: How we identify and rank morally relevant properties through evaluative judgments (subjective or communal judgment).
Dimension 2: The conceptual architecture of moral inquiry (the framework or vocabulary we use to talk about value, duty, and virtue).
Williams’ claim revisited: Environmental questions must invoke human-understandable values; but these values can guide the development of a morally robust environmental ethic without collapsing into dogmatic anthropocentrism.
Path forward proposed by Thompson:
Emphasize human excellence and environmental virtues as a naturalistic basis for environmental ethics (a naturalistic environmental virtue ethics).
This approach frames environmental ethics around the cultivation of virtues (not just obligations or intrinsic-nature value claims) and grounds action in human flourishing within an environmental context.
Practical implications:
A virtue-centered approach helps to resist dualisms (human/nature, spirit/matter) and supports a more integrated view of human well-being and ecological health in the Anthropocene.
The aim is to foster a set of human environmental virtues (e.g., responsibility, justice, love, awe) that ground action in real human capacities and social practices.
Critical reflections and cautions:
Some scholars (Attfield, McShane) warn that even virtue-focused or anthropocentric approaches can be dogmatic or overly human-centered; the challenge is to cultivate a broad, inclusive sense of environmental responsibility.
Rolston critiques environmental virtue ethics as potentially anthropocentric if it prioritizes human flourishing as the sole normative anchor; but a nuanced, multi-virtue approach can mitigate this concern by incorporating duties of justice, care, and respect for nonhuman life.
Final position:
If we accept we are entering the Anthropocene, philosophy should focus on the species-specific environmental character traits—environmental virtues and vices—of humans as moral beings capable of shaping the future of life on Earth.
This perspective preserves the relevance of human moral agency while remaining attentive to nonhuman values and ecological realities.
Connections to Foundational Principles and Real-World Relevance
Foundational links:
Protagoras and Kant anchor the notion that value and knowledge are at least partly conditioned by human perspectives.
Great Chain of Being and Biblical creation narratives historically shaped ontological anthropocentrism.
Leopold’s Land Ethic reframes the moral community to include ecological whole rather than only individual organisms.
Real-world relevance:
The Anthropocene demands policies and practices that recognize human impact while cultivating virtues that promote ecological stewardship.
The debate helps inform public policy, conservation ethics, and environmental justice discussions by clarifying what we owe to nonhuman life and to future generations.
Examples and Hypothetical Scenarios mentioned in the chapter
Routley’s Last Man: A thought experiment illustrating why many people judge actions affecting nonhumans as morally wrong even when no humans are directly harmed.
Leopold’s Land Ethic: The prescription that moral obligation expands to the biotic community; “a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.”
Schweitzer’s Reverence for Life: The ethical principle directing us to preserve, assist, and enhance life.
Regan’s Subjects-of-a-Life: Some beings possess inherent value and rights by virtue of being conscious subjects with beliefs, desires, memories, and future-oriented concerns.
Kantian Copernican hypothesis: Perception and judgment are constrained by cognitive structures; what we take to be properties of objects may be shaped by our own faculties.
Convergence in Environmental Values: Norton’s idea that broad anthropocentrism and intrinsic-value theories may converge on policy in practice (the convergence hypothesis).
Notes on Key References and Thinkers (selected)
Bentham, J. (1823): Foundations of utilitarian approach to pleasure/pain.
Singer, P. (1975): Equal consideration of interests for all beings capable of experiencing pain.
Regan, T. (1983): The Case for Animal Rights; subjects-of-a-life.
Schweitzer, A. (1923/1946): Reverence for Life.
Taylor, P. (1986): Respect for Nature; teleological centers of life.
Leopold, A. (1949): Land Ethic.
Callicott, J. B. (1979, 1989): Environmental ethics; ecocentrism debates.
Rolston, H. III (1975, 1994, 2005): Environmental ethics; systemic value; noninstrumental value in nature.
Norton, B. (1984, 2013): Weak anthropocentrism; convergence in environmental values.
O’Neill, J. (1992): The Varieties of Intrinsic Value.
Williams, B. (1995, 2008): Must a concern for the environment be centered on human beings?; Kantian reason critique.
Attfield, R. (2011): Beyond Anthropocentrism; responsiveness to criticisms of anthropocentrism.
McShane, K. (2007): Anthropocentrism critiques; love, respect, awe toward nature.
Hargrove, G. (1992): Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value Theory; four-type-value framework.
Hayward, T. (1997): Anthropocentrism as a misunderstood problem; critiques of nonanthropocentric theories.
Norton, B., and Thompson, A. (2014): Ethics and sustainable development; virtues of adaptive environmental choice.
Summary Takeaways for Exam Preparation
There are three forms of anthropocentrism (ontological, ethical, conceptual) and three nonanthropocentric ethical frameworks (sentiocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism).
Rejections of ethical anthropocentrism do not yield a single universal alternative; there is ongoing debate and variation among sentiocentric, biocentric, and ecocentric theories.
A pragmatic path proposed is environmental virtue ethics: focusing on human virtues in relation to the natural world as a route to robust environmental responsibility in the Anthropocene.
Two dimensions of conceptual anthropocentrism shape how we understand value and action: (1) evaluative judgments and (2) the architecture of moral inquiry.
The discussion emphasizes balancing human moral agents’ responsibilities with respect for nonhuman life and ecological integrity, avoiding rigid dogmatism on either side of the debate.
Key Takeaway Phrases
“The most anthropocentric religion the world has seen.”
“A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.”
“Man is the measure of all things.”
“Subjects-of-a-life” have a claim against all others and are not to be used merely as means to others’ ends.
The Anthropocene may require a shift toward environmental virtues and human excellence rather than a purely intrinsic-value framework for nature.
Final Note
The chapter endorses a nuanced, plural approach: it acknowledges valuable insights from many positions, while arguing for ongoing attention to human moral character and practical virtue as central to an ethical response to environmental challenges.