Abortion, Beginnings

Early Abortion

According to the Embodied Mind Account of Identity, we begin to exist when our organisms develop the capacity to generate consciousness. An early abortion, performed before this point, doesn't kill anyone but prevents someone from coming into existence, similar to contraception.

The fetal brain's capacity for consciousness is estimated to develop between the twentieth and twenty-eighth week of gestation. Approximately 99% of abortions in the United States are performed prior to twenty weeks.

McMahan addresses objections to early abortion:

• The belief that a fetal organism has intrinsic value simply by being alive and human is "speciesist."

• The claim that the fetal organism has the potential to become one of us is ambiguous and doesn't necessarily make killing it wrong.

• The argument that the fetal organism is a vehicle through which someone may be brought into existence applies equally to any pair of sperm and egg.

Late Abortion

According to the Embodied Mind Account, a late abortion (after twenty weeks) involves killing someone. McMahan outlines positions on the morality of killing a developed fetus.

Don Marquis argues that killing a fetus deprives it of a future with a great deal of good, making abortion seriously morally wrong. McMahan raises objections:

• Marquis's argument doesn't initially distinguish between early and late abortions.

• It requires an explanation of why killing is more objectionable than lesser deprivations.

• It implies that a late abortion is more seriously wrong than killing an older child or adult.

McMahan argues against a sharp dividing line in the moral status of abortion at twenty weeks. He suggests the moral objection to abortion increases gradually over time with fetal maturation. He also rejects the idea that the developed fetus has the same moral status as a normal adult.

Time-Relative Interest Account

McMahan introduces the Time-Relative Interest Account, where the wrongness of killing varies with the strength of the victim's time-relative interest in continuing to live. This interest depends on the amount of future good and the degree of prudential unity relations.

For a developed fetus, the amount of good in prospect is great, but the prudential unity relations are weak. Therefore, the fetus has a comparatively weak time-relative interest in continuing to live.

The Time-Relative Interest Account is a component of the Two-Tiered Account, distinguishing between beings above and below a threshold of respect. The morality of killing a developed fetus falls under the Time-Relative Interest Account.

A gradualist view suggests the developed fetus is not a fully real individual but a self in the process of becoming. This view accounts for the intuition that the developed fetus is not a victim of loss in the same way a person is when they die.