## **Chapter 1: Dualism**

Chapter 1: Dualism

Key Concepts

• Substance Dualism: Mind and body are distinct substances (Descartes).

• Property Dualism: Mental states are properties of the physical brain but are not reducible to physical states.

• Epiphenomenalism: Mental states are caused by physical states but do not influence physical states.

Key Arguments

• Descartes’ Argument from Doubt: If I can doubt my body’s existence but not my mind’s, they must be different.

• Interaction Problem: How does a nonphysical mind interact with a physical body?

• Explanatory Weakness: Dualism does not explain how mental states arise or interact with each other.

Chapter 2: Behaviorism

Key Concepts

• Philosophical Behaviorism: Mental states are behavioral dispositions.

• Methodological Behaviorism: Psychological study should focus only on observable behavior.

• Behaviorist Revolution: Rejected introspection as unreliable; emphasized observable behavior (Pavlov, Watson, Skinner).

• Behaviorist Manifesto (Watson, 1913): Psychology should be objective and focus only on observable behavior.

• Classical & Operant Conditioning:

  • Classical (Pavlov): Learning through association.

  • Operant (Skinner): Behavior shaped by reinforcement and punishment.

• Token Economies: Using reinforcement principles in practical applications.

Key Arguments

• Logical Behaviorism (Ryle): Mental states should be defined in terms of behaviors.

• Radical Behaviorism: Only external behaviors matter; internal states are irrelevant.

• Criticism: Fails to account for internal mental experiences (qualia) and subjective consciousness.

• Problems with Radical Behaviorism:

  • Science often deals with unobservables (e.g., electrons, black holes).

  • Language acquisition (Chomsky’s critique of Skinner).

  • Neuropsychology (Luria’s studies on brain damage effects).

  • Thought experiments: Superstoic (no pain behavior despite feeling pain) & Perfect Pretender (pain behavior without feeling pain).

Chapter 3: The Identity Theory

Key Concepts

• Mind = Brain: The mind is what the brain does.

• Mental States = Physical Brain States.

• Three Versions of Identity Theory:

  1. Type Identity: Each mental state corresponds to a specific type of brain state.

  2. Restricted Type Identity: Different species may have different physical realizations of the same mental state.

  3. Token Identity: Each instance of a mental state corresponds to an individual brain state.

Key Arguments

• Reductionism:

  • Ontological Simplification: Explaining higher-level theories through more fundamental theories.

  • Identity Claims: Identifies mental states with certain physical brain states.

• Multiple Realization Problem: Mental states can be realized in different physical systems (e.g., humans vs. AI).

• Brain Injury & Mind Injury:

  • Phineas Gage: Prefrontal cortex damage led to personality changes.

  • H.M.: Medial temporal lobe removal impaired episodic memory but preserved procedural memory (mirror tracing task).

Arguments Against Identity Theory

• Pain and Brain States:

  • Is pain in our bodies or brains? Phantom limb pain suggests the brain retains a body map.

  • Pain may not be strictly reducible to neural activity alone.

• Ontological Simplification through Reduction:

  • Higher-level theories (e.g., optics) are replaced by more fundamental theories (e.g., electromagnetic radiation theory).

  • Mental theory (higher-level) aims to be reduced to brain theory (finer level of analysis).

Chapter 4: Functionalism

Key Concepts

• Mental States as Functional States: Defined by their causal role in processing information rather than physical composition.

• Turing Machines: Model of mind as a system of inputs, states, and outputs.

Key Arguments

• Pros: Avoids problems of identity theory (multiple realizability).

• Cons: Does not fully explain consciousness (e.g., qualia).

Chapter 5: The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM)

Key Concepts

• Thought as Computation: Mental processes are analogous to symbol manipulation in a computer.

• Syntactic vs. Semantic Processing: Symbols in computation have structure (syntax) but no intrinsic meaning (semantics).

Key Arguments

• Pros: Explains reasoning and problem-solving.

• Cons: Does not explain subjective experience (Chinese Room Argument by Searle).

Chapter 8: Physicalism and Supervenience

Key Concepts

• Physicalism: Everything, including mental states, is ultimately physical.

• Supervenience: Mental properties depend on physical properties but are not reducible to them.

Key Arguments

• Pros: Compatible with scientific findings.

• Cons: Struggles to explain consciousness (Explanatory Gap).

Ontological Simplification through Elimination

• Aims to refine explanations rather than just making them simpler.

• Example: Phlogiston vs. Oxidation Theory—scientific progress eliminated phlogiston.

• Some philosophers argue mental states should be eliminated like phlogiston.

• Eliminativists (e.g., Churchlands): Believe mental states don’t exist; instead, we need a new scientific vocabulary.

Folk Psychology

• Refers to common-sense explanations using beliefs, desires, emotions.

• Critics (Churchlands) claim it is stagnant and lacks scientific basis.

• Scientific Folk Psychology: Applies scientific methods to study mental states (e.g., cognitive behavioral therapy).

Fictionalism

• Mental states don’t exist, but it’s useful to act as if they do.

• Three Stances (Dennett):

  1. Physical Stance: Examining physical mechanisms.

  2. Design Stance: Understanding functions and purposes.

  3. Intentional Stance: Assuming rational behavior in others.