Hylomorphism Notes

Hylomorphism

Hylomorphism: Basic Claims

• Overview: Hylomorphism offers a unique perspective on human persons, minds, brains, and material substances.
• Key aspects:
  • Presents a non-Cartesian approach to the philosophy of mind.
  • Argues for the superiority of the Hylomorphic view compared to alternative theories.

First Set of Claims: Material Substance

• Aristotelian Account: A substance is an individual being that is a unity of matter or stuff .
• Parts: A part of a substance is not the primary focus but plays a supporting role.
• Aristotelian Axiom: Substances are not composed of substances .
• Paradigm Cases: Individual human beings , rose bushes , and penguins are examples of material substances.

Second Set of Claims: Metaphysical Parts

• Composition: Material objects are composed of form and matter .
  • Form: Explains why an object is actually something of a certain kind . It is a principle of intelligibility .
  • Matter: Explains the object's extension in three dimensions and its capacity for change. It is a principle of potentiality .
• Examples: A rose bush, a penguin, or a human person, comprises quantitative parts (stems, brains, bones) and metaphysical parts (substantial form and prime matter).
• Discernment: Metaphysical parts are understood through philosophical reflection, not direct sense experience.
• Living Substances: The reality of metaphysical parts is evident in living organisms.
• Non-Substantial Parts: Quantitative and metaphysical parts are not substances themselves when part of a substantial whole.

Third Set of Claims: Substantial Form

• Explanation: The substantial form of a material substance S , such as a rose bush, explains:
  • Why S exists as ONE object of a certain KIND despite its many parts.
  • Why S remains the same NUMERICALLY through time, even with changes in its quantitative parts.

Fourth Set of Claims: Prime Matter

• Explanation: If substantial form explains why S is F , prime matter explains S ’s tendency toward corruption or death.

Fifth Set of Claims: Life, Sensation, and Rationality

• Qualitative Differences: Differences between non-living substances, plants, non-rational animals, and rational animals (humans) are qualitative and ontologically significant.
• Explanation: These differences are due to different kinds of substantial forms .
• Aristotle's Distinction: Living substances are distinguished from non-living ones by calling their substantial forms souls .
• Plant Souls: Enable growth, nourishment, and reproduction.
• Non-Rational Animal Souls: Enable growth, nourishment, reproduction, sensing the world, and experiencing emotions.
• Rational Animal Souls: Enable growth, nourishment, reproduction, sensing, feeling, and engaging in rational and intellectual activity.

Sixth Set of Claims: Holism

• Intellectual Soul: Enables a human person to understand the natures of things and will.
• Embodiment: These actions are done naturally as embodied beings.
• Singular Substance: A human is a single substance, a rational animal, and actions are attributed to the person, not just parts like the soul or eyes.

Seventh Set of Claims: Life After Death

• Human Soul's Survival: Unlike non-rational substances, the human soul can survive the death of the composite substance because its activities (understanding, willing) transcend materiality.
• Imperfect State: The soul without matter is only part of a human person, existing in a diminished state.

Applying Hylomorphism

• Philosophy of Mind: Hylomorphism offers a non-Cartesian approach.

Hylomorphism vs. Cartesian Approaches

• Cartesian Assumptions about Matter: Material substances are:
  • Essentially atomic.
  • Essentially non-experiential.
  • Causally determined or random in behavior.
  • Qualities are reducible to quantities.
• Cartesian Assumptions about Mental Events: Mental events are private and knowable only by introspection; physical events are public.
• Cartesian Positions: Based on the assumptions:
  • Substance Dualism: The human mind is a non-physical substance capable of subjective experience and free activity.
  • Epiphenomenalism: Mental events are real, non-causal, and non-physical effects of brain events.
  • Physical Monism: Mental events are identical to brain events and, are sub-personal events, denying free will.
  • Eliminative Materialism: Mental events are unreal; talk of mental events is folk psychology to be replaced by neuroscience.

Hylomorphic Alternative

• Rejection of Cartesian Material Assumption: Hylomorphism rejects the Cartesian view of matter.
• Experiential Material Substances: Some material substances (animals, humans) subjectively experience the world because of their substantial forms (sensitive or intellectual souls).
• Non-Quantifiable Features: Substantial forms and prime matter are real but not quantifiable, implying that some features of human persons are beyond the scope of experimental sciences.

Hylomorphism and Privacy

• Rejection of Cartesian Assumption: Hylomorphism rejects the Cartesian assumption about privacy of mental events.
• Direct Knowledge: Mental acts can be known through introspection and external senses.
• Example: Eating is a rational activity observable through the five senses.
• Critique: Cartesian views falsely assume mental events are necessarily private and self-conscious.

Argument for Hylomorphism (H)

• Criterion for a Better Theory: Theory A is better than theory B if it explains more data and raises fewer problems.
• Hylomorphism's Strengths: Consistent with more data about persons/minds and raises fewer problems than dualist interactionist theories, epiphenomenalism, eliminative materialism, and physical monism.
• Conclusion: Hylomorphism is a better theory of persons and minds than its alternatives.

Evaluation Table

• SDI: Substance Dualist Interactionism
• CDI:?Cartesian Dualist Interactionism
• E: Epiphenomenalism
• PM: Physical Monism
• H: Hylomorphism

Argument Against the Identity Thesis

• Premises:
  • If the identity thesis is true, then all mental events are identical to neural events.
  • All neural events are, in principle, observable by way of the five senses.
  • Therefore, if all mental events are identical to neural events, then all mental events are, in principle, observable by way of the five senses.
  • Not all mental events are, in principle, observable by way of the five senses; some mental events can only be observed by way of introspection, even if I can become aware by way of the five senses of what someone else is thinking about when they introspect, e.g., by a brain scan, I can’t observe someone’s act of introspecting by way of my five senses, even by way of a brain scan.
  • Therefore, it is not the case that all mental events are identical to neural events.
  • Therefore, the identity thesis is false.

Argument for Dualism

• Definition: Dualism = (df) It is not the case that mental events are identical to micro-physical events and mental events are real.
• Premises:
  • Micro-physical events are, in principle, directly observable by way of the five senses.
  • Mental events are not , in principle, directly observable by way of the five senses, but rather by introspection .
  • If x and y have different essential properties, then x and y are not numerically identical.
  • Therefore, mental events are not numerically identical to bodies or micro-physical events.
  • Mental events are real.
  • Therefore, dualism is true.

Argument Against Weak Physicalist Views

• Premises:
  • If human persons are numerically identical to human organisms, then a human person S is numerically—and so personally—identical to a person S1 only if S and S1 are composed of the same matter.
  • Human organisms constantly undergo changes with respect to their matter and total replacement of their parts every seven years or so.
  • Therefore, if human persons are numerically identical to human organisms, then no human person lasts long enough to be held morally accountable for their actions, accomplish projects, maintain friendships and marriages, etc.
  • But human persons sometimes do last long enough to be held morally accountable for their actions, accomplish projects, maintain friendships and marriages, etc.
  • Therefore, it is not the case that human persons are numerically identical to human organisms.
  • If E or PM are true, then human persons are identical to human organisms [self- evident].
  • Therefore, E and PM are false.

Problem of Personal Identity Beyond Death

• Argument:
  • You are identical to an organism of a certain sort.
  • An organism ceases to exist at death.
  • Therefore, you cease to exist at death [from (1) and (2)].
  • For any being b that begins to exist, b can only have one beginning to its existence, i.e., “gappy” existence is impossible.
  • Therefore, you do not exist after your death, and you won’t exist ever again [from (3) and (4)].
• Generalization: For any human person S , if S dies, then, for any human person S1 that exists after S ’s death, S1 is not numerically identical to S .

Argument from Common Speech

• Premises:
  • All other things being equal, the way we commonly about reality is an accurate guide to reality.
  • The way we commonly about ourselves is not consistent with , or perhaps, more specifically .
  • Therefore, all other things being equal, we should reject () for some other hypothesis about the nature of human persons that is compatible with the way in which we _ about human persons.

Argument Against E from Freewill

• Premises:
  • If E, then freewill is never a cause of human behavior [self-evident].
  • Sometimes human freewill is a cause of human behavior.
  • Therefore, ~ E.

Argument Against PM from Personal Agency and Freewill

• Premises:
  • If (a) physical monism is true, then (b) human mental acts, e.g., acts of belief, desire, and freewill, are to micro-physical actions, i.e., certain chemical reactions in the brain [self-evident].
  • Chemical reactions are sub-personal, i.e., they do not have persons as their causes, but other chemical reactions; any so-called personal act is just another chemical reaction in the brain.
  • Human acts of belief, desire, and libertarian freewill are acts of , and not sub-personal [assumption].
  • Therefore, if (b) human mental acts, e.g., acts of belief, desire, and freewill, are to micro-physical actions, i.e., certain chemical reactions in the brain, then (c) human persons, e.g., you and I, never engage in acts of belief, desire, or libertarian free will [from (2) and (3)].
  • Therefore, if (a) physical monism, then (c) human persons, e.g., you and I, never engage in acts of belief, desire, or libertarian free will [from (1) and (4), ].
  • Human persons, e.g., you and I, do sometimes engage in acts of belief, desire, and libertarian free will [assumption].
  • Therefore, physical monism is false [from (5) and (6), MT].

The Unity of the Cognizer Argument

• Premises:
  • If DI, then either SDI or CDI [assumption].
  • IF SDI, then (a) the non- substance which is identical to the self is what senses, i.e., sees, hears, smells, etc. or (b) the five senses are powers that belong to the body and we don’t really sense things, our bodies do [self-evident].
  • Not (a); since seeing, smelling, and hearing, etc., involve the use of physical organs, it does not make sense to say that a non-physical substance sees colors and shapes, hears sounds, smells odors, etc. [assumption].
  • Not (b), since we human persons really do sense things [assumption]
  • Therefore, not SDI.
  • IF CDI, then (c) we are not substance but , a soul which thinks but does not smell things and a body that smells things but does not think [self- evident].
  • Not (c), for we (normally and naturally) experience ourselves as a unified cognizer, i.e., as one substance that both thinks and senses [assumption from experience of ourselves as unified cognizers].
  • Therefore, not CDI [from (6) and (7), MT].
  • Therefore, not DI [from (1), (5) and (8), MT].
  • If E or PM, we are not one substance, but merely a collection of substances [assumption].
  • Therefore, not E, and not PM [from (7) and (10)].